406 NORTHEASTERN REPORTER. leaves baggage in charge of the innkeeper with his consent, he is liable for its safe-keeping for a reasonable time, according to the circumstances of the case. In Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. Y. 34, the plaintiff's stallion stood at defendant's inn certain days in the week, under an arrangement, made for the season, for serving mares. Plaintiff had the key to the stall, and fed and cared for the horse. Defendant furnished the oats for the horse, and meals for the plaintiff, at a price less than the ordinary rates to travelers. It was held that the defendant's custody was not that of innkeeper, and that, therefore, he was not liable for the destruction of the barn and horse by fire, without negligence on his part. (140 Mass. 213) SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. SHURTLEFF, Judge of Probate, v. RILE and others. 1. GUARDIAN AND WARD-LIABILITY OF GUARDIANS FOR Rents. A guardian is liable to a ward who is under age for rents which he received, or might have received, by due diligence on his part. 2. SAME LIABILITY FOR ESTATE SOLD FOR TAXES. A guardian is liable to a ward under age for the value of an estate sold for taxes, when he had the means of paying them. He is also liable to a ward for any loss to her estate during her minority, but not for a loss occurring after she became of age. 8. SAME-WARD DEVOTING MONEY TO SUPPORT OF FAMILY. Where a ward, while a minor, devotes his wages to the support of the family of which he is a member, there is no implied promise of the guardian to repay him the amount expended by him over and above the fair value of his support. A. Webster, for plaintiff. C. L. Lang, for one of the defendants. MORTON, C. J. James Rile died in 1871, leaving a widow and four children, Edmund, Hannah, Margaret, and Dennis. He left a lot of land and house in Springfield, incumbered by a mortgage. One-half of the house was continuously occupied by the family until it was sold as hereinafter stated. The widow died in 1874. In February, 1875, Edmund, the oldest son, was appointed guardian of Margaret. Hannah was of age, an invalid, and unable-to support herself. Margaret became of age in September, 1877, and Dennis in September, 1880. In December, 1877, the said real estate was sold by the collector of taxes of Springfield for the non-payment of the tax assessed thereon for the year 1876, amounting to $29.16. Judgment had been rendered for the penal sum of the the bond; and at the hearing, upon the question as to the amount for which execution should issue, the presiding justice reserved, for the consideration of the full court, several questions, which we will proceed to consider, so far as is necessary to settle the rights of the parties. 1. It is too clear to admit of any doubt that the guardian is liable both to Margaret and Dennis for the rents of half of the house let to tenants, which he received, or which he might have received by the use of reasonable diligence. The finding of the auditor and of the presiding justice upon these points is therefore affirmed. 2. We are of opinion that the guardian is liable to Dennis for the loss to him of the value of the real estate sold for taxes. It is the duty of a guardian to use reasonable care and prudence in managing and protecting the estate of his ward. When the estate was sold, and for more than two years thereafter, Dennis was a minor, having no control over his property. It was the duty of his guardian to pay the taxes, and it appears in the case that he had the means of paying them, derived from the rents of the part which was occupied by tenants. He is therefore liable upon his bond for the loss to Dennis caused by this neglect of duty. 3. The question whether he is liable to Margaret for the loss of her share is a different one. She became of age in September, 1877. The guardian's power over her estate, and his duty in regard to it, then ceased. She might have paid the taxes before the sale, or have redeemed the estate within two years after the sale, and it was her duty to do so. It is not just that the sureties on her guardian's bond should be held liable for a loss caused by her neglect. 4. It is contended that the defendants are liable to Dennis for his wages, which were devoted to the support of the family, over and above the value of his own support. The facts bearing upon this question are as follows: After the death of the parents the four children continued to occupy the house, forming one family. Edmund contributed to the support of the family, but a large part of the household expenses were paid by Dennis out of wages earned by him. No accounts were kept of the amounts expended by either of them. Margaret did the housework, and Hannah was an invalid, unable to work. Dennis was an industrious man, of good character, and his guardian permitted him to receive and retain to his own use the wages earned by him. He voluntarily applied a large portion of his wages to the support of the united family, as before stated. It is not contended that there was any agreement that the guardian should repay Dennis any money paid by him, though it might be more than the fair value of his own support. There seems to have been a mutual arrangement, made without fraud or imposition, that the family should be kept together, each contributing to its own support according to his ability, with the praiseworthy purpose of furnishing to the children a home, with the ties and associations of domestic life. It was not contemplated by either that the guardian was to repay any part of the money advanced by Dennis, and the law will not imply a promise to do so. He can be held, if at all, only upon the ground that it was a breach of his duty, as guardian, to permit Dennis to receive his wages and to apply them to the purpose to which they were applied. It may be that under some circumstances a guardian would be guilty of a breach of duty if he allowed his ward to receive all his wages or income and to apply them to vicious or improper uses; but here was the case of a ward approaching maturity, competent to understand his rights and to take care of his expenditures, of steady and industrious habits, and earning moderate wages. think his guardian was not guilty of any breach of his duty towards the ward when he allowed him to receive his wages, and to apply them towards the support of an invalid sister, and maintaining a home for the family. This claim of the plaintiff cannot be allowed. 5. The same considerations dispose of the claim of Margaret that she is entitled to wages for her services over and above what her support was fairly worth. There was no contract that she should be paid any wages, express or implied; there was no fraud or imposition practiced upon her; and her claim cannot be allowed. 6. As the amounts which both wards are entitled to recover do not reach the penal sum of the bond, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether, if necessary, interest could be added, so as to enlarge the liability of the sureties beyond the penal sum. The result is that Dennis is entitled to execution for the amount found to be due him as his loss of the real estate, and the amount found due him for the rents; and Margaret is entitled to execution for the amount found to be due her for the rents. Ordered accordingly. (105 Ind. 55) SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA. WELTY v. INDIANAPOLIS & V. R. Co. Filed January 21, 1886. 1. RAILROADS-DUTY TO FENCE-HIGHWAYS-CATTLE-GUARDS NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO ANIMALS. It is the duty of railroad companies to place cattle-guards at highway crossings wherever practicable, and they are liable for animals killed because of a failure to discharge this duty, although they may have been free from negligence in killing the animals, and although the owner may have been guilty of contributory negligence.1 2. SAME-ABANDONMENT OF ANIMALS BY THE OWNER. An owner who knowingly abandons his animals to destruction by passing trains, or willfully exposes them upon the track of a railroad company, cannot recover, although the company may not have performed the statutory duty of fencing its track. 3. SAME-AGENT. An owner lent his horse to another person to ride to a neighboring town, and the borrower, on his return, while riding the horse, suffered it to leave the highway, and travel upon the railroad track a distance of 800 feet, when, becoming frightened at an approaching train, it ran into a trestle-work, and was killed by the train. Held, that the owner cannot recover; for the borrower, as against the railroad company, is to be regarded as the owner's agent. 4. SAME-VOLUNTARY DRUNKENNESS. The fact that the borrower of the horse in the case above stated had voluntarily made himself drunk does not change the legal aspect of the case; for voluntary drunkenness is not available to avert the natural and usual consequences flowing from a wrongful act. Appeal from Morgan circuit court. S. O. Pickens, for appellee. ELLIOTT, J. The appellant was the owner of a mare, of the value of $150, on the thirtieth day of September, 1882, and on that day lent her to Thomas King to ride to Martinsville. King became intoxicated while at that place, and was in that condition upon his way from that town to the appellant's house. The mare, with King as her rider, traveled along the public highway leading to the house of the appellant, but, when she came to the place where the highway crossed the track of the appellee's railroad, left the highway, and traveled along the railroad for about 800 feet. An approaching train frightened her, causing her to run into a trestle-work, where the train ran upon her and killed her. There were no fences or cattle-guards at the highway crossing, and nothing to prevent the mare from entering upon the railroad track. Upon a special verdict, setting forth these facts, the trial court gave judgment in favor of the appellee. The appellant founds his cause of action entirely upon the statute requiring railroad companies to securely fence their tracks, and, unless the 1 See note at end of case. |