Sect. IV. Prop. 3. Though infallible assurance, as aforesaid, may be here attained, yet perfect certainty in degree cannot, nor may lawfully be by any man expected.c

This also I have proved before. For if we may be perfect in the degree of assurance, why not of all grace as well; and so have no sin? nay, there are so many graces exercised in producing our assurance, besides reason itself, that if they be not first perfect, it is impossible that assurance should be perfect. For example: He that believeth not in perfection the truth of Scripture, and of that promise, that "Whosoever believeth shall be saved;" 2. And he that knoweth not in perfection the sincerity of his own faith, neither of which any man breathing doth do; cannot possibly be perfectly certain that he is justified, and shall be saved: for who can be perfectly certain of the conclusion, who is but imperfectly certain of the premises? And yet I have met with some men that think themselves very learned and spiritual, that confidently dispute for a perfection in assurance. If any man say, that Bellarmine meant as much as this imperfect certainty, when he grants a conjectural certainty; and be sure that he speaks truly; I will like Bellarmine the better, and his opposers in this the worse, but I will like a plain, necessary truth of God never the worse. Sure I am that our great divines affirming, that we are sure of salvation by a certainty of faith, hath given the papists fearful ground to baffle them and play upon us, and triumph over them. And when their own students and followers find it so, it hardens them against us fearfully. And as sure I am that no man is perfect gradually in this life in any grace, much less in so high a point as his assurance. Among all those consciences that I have had opened to me, I never met with a humble, heavenly, upright Christian, that would say, he was perfectly certain; nay, and but few, that durst call their persuasion a certainty, but rather a strong hope: but some licentious, fantastical disputers, I have heard plead for such a perfect certainty; whose pride and loose living, and unmortified passions and corruptions, told the standers-by, that they were the farthest from true certainty of any.

Sect. V. Prop. 4. Though in some cases it may be useful to

Read of this our British divines in the Synod of Dort. in suffrag. ad art. v. thes. 2, 3; excellently and moderately, as they did in all. The conclusion follows the weaker part of the premises, say logicians. Vide Smigletii Logicam Disp. xiii. quæst. 8. 12, 13. Ubi strenue probatur, præmissæ alterius debilitatem, semper et in omni materia, redundare in conclusionem.

name several marks; yet the true, infallible marks of sincerity, which a man may gather assurance from, are very few, and lie in a narrower room than most have thought.

As I would not pick quarrels with the most godly divines, who lay down many marks of sincerity in their sermons and books; so would I not, in foolish tenderness of any man's reputation, be so cruel to the souls of poor Christians, as to hide the truth from them in so weighty a point: and I speak against no man more than myself heretofore. I know ordinary Christians cannot discern how these multitudes of marks do lie open to exceptions; but the judicious may easily perceive it. I shall therefore here tell you the truth, how far these many marks are commendable and convenient, and how far they are condemnable and dangerous. And, 1. When we are only discovering the nature of some sin, rather than the certainty of the unholiness of the sinner, it is both easy and useful to give many signs, as from the effects, &c., by which it may be known what that sin is and so men may know how far they are guilty of it. But to know certainly whether that sin will prove the damnable state of the sinner, is neither easy, in most cases, nor to be done by many marks.

2. When we are discovering the nature of some duty or grace, and not the very point wherein the soul's sincerity in that grace or duty lieth, it is both easy and useful to give many marks of them. But by these no man can gather assurance of his sincerity.

3. When we are describing a high degree of wickedness, which is far from the best state of an unregenerate man, it is both easy and useful to give plain marks of such a state. But to discover just how much sin will stand with true grace, is another matter.

4. When we are describing the state of the strongest Christians, it is easy and useful to mark them out, and to give many marks of their strength; but to give many of their truth, and to discover the least degree of true grace, is not easy. So I have shown you wherein marks may commendably be multiplied; but to lay down many marks of sincerity, and say, 'By these you may certainly know whether you shall be saved or not;' this I dare not do.

Sect. VI. Prop. 5. There is a threefold truth to be inquired after in examination: 1. The truth of the act or habit; 2. The moral truth of it as a grace or duty; 3. The moral truth of it

as a saving or justifying grace or duty, or as the condition of justification and salvation. It is the last of these three only that the great business in self-examination lieth on, and which we are now searching after; the two first being presupposed as more easily discernible, and less controvertible.d

I will not here trouble plain readers, for whose sakes I write, with any scholastic inquiries into the nature of truth, but only look into so much as is of flat necessity to a right managing of the work of self-examination: for it is inconceivable how a man should rationally judge of his own condition, when he knows not what to inquire after; or that he should clearly know his sincerity, who knows not what sincerity is. Yet I doubt not but, by an internal feeling, a strong, sound Christian, who hath his faith and love and other graces in action, may comfortably perceive the sincerity of his graces, though he be so ignorant as not clearly and distinctly to know the nature of sincerity, or to give any just description of it; even as an unlearned man, that is of a sound and healthful body, may feel what health is when he cannot describe it, nor tell distinctly wherein it doth consist. But yet, as he hath a general knowledge of it, so hath this ignorant, sincere Christian, of the nature of sincerity. And, withal, this is a more dangerous ground to stand on, because our sense is so uncertain in this case, more than in the welfare of the body; and the assurance of such a soul will be more defective and imperfect, and very inconstant, who goes by mere feeling, without knowing the nature of what he feeleth, even as the forementioned unlearned man, in case of bodily health, if he have no knowledge, but mere feeling of the nature of health, he will be cast down with a tooth-ache, or some harmless disease, if it be painful, as if he should presently die, when a knowing man could tell that there is no danger; and he would make light of a hectic, or other mortal disease, till it be incurable, because he feels no great pain in it. It is, therefore, a matter of necessity to open, most clearly and distinctly, the nature of sincerity or truth, so far as concerns the case in hand. I told you before, that there is a metaphysical truth of being, and a moral; I now add further, that here are three things to be inquired after: 1. The truth of the act; 2. The truth of the virtuousness of the act; 3. The truth of the justifying or saving nature of the act. The first is of natural, the two last of moral consideration: as,

d Lege Aquin. Sum, de Veritate, c. 1, 2, &c. accuratissime de veri et veritatis definitione.

for example, if you be trying the sincerity of your love to God, you must first know that you do love him indeed, without dissembling; 2. That this love is such as is a duty or good, which God requireth; 3. That this love is such as will certainly prove you in a state of salvation. The first of these (whether you believe and love Christ or not) must needs be first known; and this must be known by internal feeling, joined with a consideration of the effects of real love. And to this end many marks may be useful, though, indeed, inward feeling must do almost all; no man else can tell me whether I believe and love, if I cannot tell myself. It is no hard matter to a solid, knowing Christian, to discern this ordinarily; but when they do know this, they are far enough from true assurance, except they go to the rest. A man may be a true man, and not an image, or a shadow, or a corpse, and yet be a false thief, or a liar, and no true man in a moral sense: this I lay down to these uses.e

First, That you take heed when you hear or read marks of grace, how you receive and apply them; and inquire whether it be not only the truth of the being of the act or habit that those marks discover, rather than the virtuous, or the saving being or force.

Secondly, That you take heed, in examination, of taking up at this first step, as if, when you have found that you believe, and love, and repent, you had found all, when yet you have not found that you do it savingly.

Thirdly, To take heed of the doctrine of many in this, who tell you, that every man that hath faith, knows he hath it; and it is impossible to believe, and not to know we believe. This may, ordinarily, but not always, be true about this first truth, of the mere being of the act; but is it no wonder that they should not consider that this is but a presupposed matter, and

e Lege Rivet. Disput. de Certitud. salutis, sect. xxxiii. pp. 248, 249. Even learned Testardus is thus mistaken (De Natura et Grat. p. 142, thes. 180), whose words I will give you, that you may see what way others go, in him. "If any man feel that he believeth, for felt it is, and that most certainly of him that believeth, and be persuaded of the veracity of God and Christ, that man cannot choose but certainly conclude with himself, that his sins are pardoned, and life eternal shall be given him. He, therefore, that professeth himself uncertain of the pardon of his sins, and of his salvation, doth in vain boast that he is a believer. Certainly, he that is not certain of the pardon of his sins and of his salvation, which is the conclusion of the syllogism of faith, is either ignorant of what is contained in the major; or else doth not take it for certain, which yet is the word of God and Christ; or else it must needs be, that he doth not feel that he believes: and how then can he be called a believer ?" Thus Testardus erreth, with too many more.

not the great thing that we have to inquire after in point of sincerity and that they may know they believe long enough, and yet not know their faith to be saving? It is our beyondsea divines that so mistake in this point: our English divines are sounder in it than any in the world, generally: I think because they are more practical, and have had more wounded, tender consciences under cure, and less empty speculation and dispute. The second truth to be inquired after is, that this act is truly good, or a virtue, or grace; for every act is not a virtue, nor every act that may seem so. I will not stand here curiously to open to you, wherein the goodness of an action doth consist. Somewhat will be said in the following propositions: only thus much at present. To denominate an action properly and fully good, it must be fully agreeable to God's will of precept, both in the matter, end, measure, and all circumstances; but, improperly and imperfectly, it may be called good or virtuous, though there be evil mixed, if the good be most eminent, as if the substance of the action be good, though the circumstances be evil; and thus we ordinarily call actions good: but if the evil be so predominant as that the good lie only in ends or circumstances, and the substance, as it were, of the action be forbidden, then we may not call it a good action, or a grace, or duty. So that it is not perfect, proper goodness that I here speak of, but the second, that is imperfect; when the action is commanded and good in itself, and the good more eminent than the evil; yet it may not be saving for all that.

For there is a common grace which is not saving, yet real, and so true and good, and so true grace; as well as a special grace, which is saving; and there are common duties commanded by God, as alms-deeds, fasting, prayer, &c., which, though they are necessary, yet salvation doth not certainly accompany them, or follow them. A man that finds any moral virtue to be in himself truly, and to be truly a virtue, cannot thence conclude that he shall be saved, nor a man that doth a duty truly good in itself. Many did that which was good in the sight of the Lord, but not with an upright heart; and even an Ahab's humiliation may have some moral goodness, and so some acceptance with God, and bring some benefit to himself, and yet not be saving nor justifying.

And some actions again may be so depraved by the end and manners, that they deserve not the name of good or duty. As to repent of a sinful attempt is, in itself, considered a duty and