of Common Pleas ruled, that the damages were its value at the time of conversion, which might be ascertained by taking its value at the place where it was built, when completed according to contract, and deducting the amount which it would have been necessary to lay out for that purpose after the conversion. Maule, J., said, in the course of the argument, "Although it be true that in trover the owner may recover for the conversion of the improved chattel, it does not follow that he is entitled to recover the improved value as damages. The proper amount of damages is the amount of pecuniary loss which the plaintiffs have been put to by the defendant's conduct" (a). defendant under void contract. Where the plaintiff has deposited or transferred goods to Where goods the defendant on a contract, which is void ab initio, e. g. for deposited with usury, he may recover them in trover (b). And in such a case the full value of the goods must be given as damages, without deducting the amount actually paid to the plaintiff in pursuance of such contract (c). tain cases. When the defendant in trover will not produce the article, Presumption as it will be presumed against him to be of the greatest value to value in certhat an article of that species can be (d). And on the same principle, where part of a diamond necklace, which had been lost by the plaintiff, was traced into the possession of the defendant, who could not account satisfactorily for having it, and did not swear positively that the whole set had not come into his hands, the jury were directed to presume that the whole necklace had been in his custody, and to give damages accordingly (e). In all other cases, however, the plaintiff must strictly prove the amount taken, and its value, even though the conversion be admitted by the pleadings. Otherwise there would be no evidence of damage more than nominal (f). Where goods are sold under a distress, the appraised value Value when sold. is never conclusive as to their worth, unless the jury are satisfied that the best means were taken to ascertain the (a) Reid v. Fairbanks, 13 C. B. 692; 22 L. J. C. P. 206, S. C. (b) Tregoning v. Attenborough, 7 Bingh. 97; [Hely v. Hicks, 3 Ir. L. R. 92.] (c) Hargreaves v. Hutchinson, 2 Ad. & Ell. 12. (d) Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Stra. 504; 1 Sm. L. Ca. 315, 6th ed. (e) Mortimer v. Cradock, 12 L. J. C. P. 166. (f) Cook v. Hartle, 8 C. & P. 568, Trover for title deeds. Bills and notes. value; and the fact that they sold for no more makes no difference (g). In trover for title deeds, the jury give the full value of the estate to which they belong by way of damages, which, however, are generally reduced to 408. on the deeds being given up (h). In actions for the recovery of bills, the amount of the bill is also the measure of damages (i). It is no ground for reducing the damages that after the conversion the defendant has by his own act lessened the value of the bill, by procuring part of it to be paid (k). But in such a case, if he brought into Court the bill, and the money he had received in part payment of it, the verdict might be entered for a nominal sum (7). In another case the bills in question had been issued by the government of Peru, at the interposition of the British government, to the plaintiff, as compensation for detention of his ship, and were retained by the defendant, and a verdict found against him for the full value of the bills. The bills at the place where they were payable were at a discount of 60 to 70 per cent. and were of no value at all in England, where the action was brought. The plaintiff by affidavits showed, that the bills would in his hands be worth the full amount they represented, being backed by the weight of the British government. The Court directed that they should be taken as worth the full amount of dollars they represented, and that as to the value of the dollars, the plaintiff should be in the same situation as if the bills were drawn on a house of unquestionable solidity in Lima, the place of payment. The net amount recoverable was to be the value of such a bill in London, taking into account the rate of exchange resulting (g) Clarke v. Holford, 2 C. & K. 504, and see ante, p. 288. (h) Loosemore v. Radford, 9 M. & W. 659; Coombe v. Sansom, 1 Dowl. & Ry. 201. [(i) Numerous decisions in America have settled what seems to be the true rule, that the measure of damages is prima facie the amount of the bill or note, but the insolvency of the parties liable thereon, payment in whole or in part, or any other facts tending directly to reduce its value, may be shown in mitigation of damages. See 2 Parsons on Contracts, 471; Potter v. Merchants' Bank, 28 N. Y., 641; Walrod v. Ball, 9 Barb. (N. Y.), 271; Sedg. Dam. 569, 4th ed.] (k) Alsager v. Close, 10 M. & W. 576. and post, p. 296.] (1) Ibid., 584. [As to interest, see ante, p. 287, from the expense and risk of transfer between Lima and London (m). If the security is void at the time of the conversion, and not by any act of the defendants, only nominal damages can be recovered. This was held in two curious cases where in fact the security, though void, turned out to be of value. A bankrupt delivered a cheque on his bankers after bankruptcy to a creditor, who obtained the money on it. The assignees brought trover for the cheque. The jury gave the full amount of the cheque, and their verdict was set aside. Mansfield, C. J., said, "The plaintiffs proceed on the ground that the cheque is worth nothing, being drawn without their authority; how then can they recover on it the sum of 3007 ?” (n). In the second case, the plaintiff had assigned a policy of insurance to the defendant, as security for the debt. After the assignment it turned out that the policy was utterly void. This was admitted by both plaintiff and defendant. The company, however, paid the defendant a certain sum upon it, merely as a gratuity, upon his giving it up to be cancelled. In an action of trover it was held that the full amount of the policy could not be recovered, because it was confessedly bad; nor the sum paid to the defendant, for this was merely a gratuity. But that as he had retained the actual document after his right to do so had ceased, the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict with nominal damages for the parchment (0). But where the worthlessness of the document arises from the defendant's own wrongful act in mutilating it, as where the action was for an unstamped guarantie for "half the amount of certain fixtures, say about 1007.," from which the defendant had erased his signature, the jury were held to have been justified in giving the full 1007. as damages. And it was no misdirection that they were not told to find in the alternative, that the damages should be nominal on the memorandum being given up, because the defendant's own act had prevented such a course being just (p). The same doctrine of estoppel was carried to a remarkable (m) Delegal v. Naylor, 7 Bingh. 460. (n) Mathew v. Sherwell, 2 Taunt. 439. (0) Wills v. Wells, 2 Moore, 247; 8 Taunt. 264, S. C. (p) M'Leod v. M'Ghie, 2 Sco. N. R. 605; 2 M. & G. 326. Damages when security is void. By the act of the defendant. Interest. Special damage. extent in one instance, when the plaintiff was allowed to recover in respect of a chattel which had never existed. An agent had been employed to effect an insurance, and had asserted that he had done so, which was not the fact. The principal brought trover for the policy. Lord Mansfield refused to allow the defendant to contradict his own representation, and held that the same damages should be given as if the policy had been really effected (q). "I shall consider the defendant," he said, "as the actual insurer, and therefore the plaintiff must prove his interest and loss." The jury may, if they think fit, give damages in the nature of interest over and above the value of the goods at the time of the conversion (r). Even independently of this statute they were allowed to give interest on a bill of exchange (s), probably on the principle that as a bill by its nature bears interest, its value must be compounded of the amount for which it is given, and the interest of which the plaintiff is deprived by its conversion. Special damage may be recovered in this form of action if laid, but not otherwise. In trover for carpenter's tools, where the declaration stated that the plaintiff had been prevented working at his trade, 107. above the value of the articles was given (t). And similarly, in trover for a pony, where the damage was that the plaintiff had been forced to hire other horses instead (u). And in a recent case, Cresswell, J., said that consequential damage might arise where a party whose property had been converted was under a contract to sell it (x). The special damage must, however, be the necessary (9) Harding v. Carter, Park. Ins. 4. (s) Paine v. Pritchard, 2 C. & P. 558. interest is allowed, ante, p. 286. (t) Bodley v. Reynolds, 8 Q. B. 779. See as to the time up to which (x) Reid v. Fairbanks, 13 C. B. 692; 22 L. J. C. P. 206, 208. [See also Wood v. Bell, 5 E. & B. 772; 25 L. J. Q. B. 148, in Q. B. Quite recently a plaintiff who had bought champagne, which could not be got elsewhere, at fourteen shillings per dozen, and had contracted to sell it at twenty-four shillings to a person about to leave England immediately, recovered as damages in trover against one who wrongfully converted the wine, the price at which he had contracted to sell it, although the defendant had no notice of the sale. The Court of Queen's Bench drew a distinction between special damage and special value, and said that they were inclined to think that to enable a plaintiff to recover special damage which did not form part of the consequence of the defendant's act, and must be the immediate, not the remote, result of it. The first of these requisites may be illustrated by a case which arose between the sheriff and assignees in bankruptcy. The sheriff seized the bankrupt's goods under a fi. fa. and placed his man in possession upon the premises. Subsequently the messenger under the commission took charge of the goods, but the sheriff's officer still remained. Later still a formal demand was made upon the sheriff, and finally the goods were given up to the assignees, and accepted unconditionally. They sued in trover for the conversion, without laying special damage; and sought to recover the rent of the premises for the quarter, during which the goods had been lying there in charge of the sheriff, and for the expenses of the messenger. Part of the rent had accrued before their messenger had entered, and before any demand of the goods. No proof was offered that the rent could be apportioned, or that they could have given up the premises, even if the sheriff had not been there. It was held that these sums could not be recovered at all, as they had not been specially laid; and Tindal, C. J., doubted whether they could, in any way, fall within the remedy of an action of trover, not being a damage necessarily consequent on the wrongful conversion of the goods (y). As to remoteness of damage, I may refer to a case already cited (2), where in trover for a ship, the Court decided that the plaintiff could not claim as damages the freight he would have earned on the next voyage; and Maule, J., said that must be included in the value of the ship itself. People would not pay for a ship that could not earn freight. Where an action shall have been brought on account of the seizure of any goods, seized as forfeited under any Act relating to the Customs, and a verdict given against the defendant; if the judge shall certify that there was a probable cause for the actual present value of the goods, as in the case of withholding the tools of a man's trade, (Bodley v. Reynolds, supra,) the defendant must have some notice of the inconvenience likely to be occasioned, but no notice could be necessary where a special value was attached by special circumstances to the article converted. Notice could not affect that value, though it might affect the conduct of the wrong-doer. France v. Gaudet, L. R. 6 Q. B. 199; 40 L. J. Q. B. 121.] (y) Moon v. Raphael, 2 Bingh. N. C. 310, 315. (z) Reid v. Fairbanks, ubi sup. Action for sei Customs Act. zure under the |