App.] Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Education. And again at page 345 the court says: "Moreover, it was not within the power of the council or the village engineer to increase the liability of the corporation beyond the amount for which the certificate had been filed and thereby nullify Section 2702. That would be striking down rather than obeying the statute. No mere final estimate of the engineer, no matter if it is correct in its terms, can increase the corporate liability, neither did the acceptance of the work by the public authorities accomplish that result. If the contractor found he was deceived by the estimate as to quantities and work, and that the improvement could not be made on such terms, he should have acted promptly and had legal and proper action taken to relieve the dilemma rather than proceed blindly or willingly, expecting that the law and action of council would be relaxed so he could get full compensation by putting another and unexpected burden upon the taxpayers. "No longer can it be said that the contractor need not look to the legal phases of his negotiations with a municipal corporation. He must be active in protecting himself. This doctrine was announced in McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, 54 Ohio St., 439; and clearly stated in Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St., 558. It is there held, not only that the terms of a statute regulating the execution of a contract whereby public money will be expended, must be followed, but where the statutory requirements have been omitted, the corporation will not by the acts of its officers be estopped to set up such omissions as a defense to an action brought against it on such contract. The strictness of the rule is Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Education. [13 Ohio justified in the opinion of the court on page 575. Among other things, it is there said: 'Contracts made in violation of these statutes should be held to impose no corporate liability. Persons who deal with municipal bodies for their own profit should be required at their peril to take notice of limitations upon the powers of those bodies which these statutes impose.' In the above case it will be observed that contracts were let for an amount largely in excess of the proceeds of the bonds, that there was one bond issue and a number of separate contracts let for the contemplated improvements. In the case at bar there was one bond issue and the plaintiff bid only for a part of this work. True its bid is within the bond limit, but the record does not disclose whether all of the bids were within the bond limit or not, nor does it disclose what the estimate or what the contract was for the heating and ventilating of this building. And where there is a single bond issue and different contracts are let for different parts of the improvement we hold that it is a condition precedent and the duty of the clerk to file and record his certificate covering each of these separate contracts, and the contractors are bound to take notice at their peril that a sufficient amount of money is in the treasury, and duly certified, to provide sufficient funds for the payment of the money due them. Our attention has been called to the case of City of Akron v. Dobson, 81 Ohio St., 66, the third proposition of the syllabus of which reads as follows: App.] Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Education. "Section 1536-205, Revised Statutes, providing that no contract, agreement or other obligation involving the expenditure of money shall be entered into, nor shall any ordinance, resolution or other order for the expenditure of money, be passed by the council or by any board or officer of the municipal corporation, unless the auditor of the corporation shall first certify to council that the money required for the contract, agreement or other obligation, or to pay the appropriation or expenditure, is in the treasury to the credit of the fund from which it is to be drawn and not appropriated for any other purpose, does not apply to an ordinance appropriating the money obtained by council, from a sale of bonds made by it, to the purpose for which the bonds were sold." Our attention has also been called to Emmert v. City of Elyria, 74 Ohio St., 185, the second proposition of the syllabus of which is: "Sections 45 and 45a of the municipal code (1536-205 and 1536-205a, Revised Statutes, Bates 5th ed.), providing in substance that no contract involving the expenditure of money shall be entered into unless the auditor of the corporation shall first certify to council that the money required for the contract is in the treasury to the credit of the fund from which it is to be drawn and not appropriated for any other purpose and that a contract entered into contrary to such provision shall be void and that the money to be derived from lawfully authorized bonds or notes sold and in process of delivery shall be deemed in the treasury and in the appropriate fund, do not apply to contracts for street improvements, when bonds have been au Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Education. [13 Ohio thorized by the municipality to be issued to pay the entire estimated cost and expense of the improvements." It is somewhat difficult to harmonize or distinguish the three cases cited above. In City of Akron v. Dobson, at page 77, the court says: "It is also contended that the contract is void because the auditor did not certify to the council that the money required for the contract was in the city treasury as prescribed by Section 1536-205, Revised Statutes. The supplemental petition avers that the auditor did so certify. This is denied by the answer in the circuit court, and that court does not make any finding upon that issue." So that in the City of Akron case the question does not seem to have been decided by the circuit court, the petition averring that the auditor did so certify, which averment was denied in the answer, and the circuit court making no finding upon this issue. Emmert v. City of Elyria was an injunction suit, seeking to enjoin the city of Elyria from paying the balance due on a paving contract. The certificate of the auditor of the city that the money necessary for said improvement was in the treasury to the credit of the proper fund and unappropriated for any other purpose was filed with the clerk of the council, and also in the office of the board of public service of said city, on the same day, and immediately before said contract was let. At page 194 the court says:. "But, because a municipality is not legally liable to pay for a public improvement, it does not follow App.] Knowlton & Breinig v. Board of Education. that it is not under a moral obligation to do so or that a court because it will not enforce payment will enjoin it. The contract for paving this street is not ultra vires. If invalid it is so merely because the contract was made before the bonds to provide the money to pay for it were sold. Now that the work has been done in accordance with the contract and the bonds have been sold and the money to pay for it is in the treasury, it is right that it should be paid for and a court of equity ought not, unless its failure to do so would defeat the purpose of the law, prevent the municipality from doing what equity and fair dealing would exact from an individual." The third finding by the circuit court in the City of Elyria case, page 189, is as follows: "III. At the time said certificate was filed there was no cash in the proper fund and unappropriated in said treasury for said improvement, but bonds of said city wherewith to provide such cash had been duly authorized. Said bonds had not been sold nor were there any notes of said city then sold and in process of delivery, and said facts were all well known to all the defendants; who, however, in good faith, and pursuant to the advice of the solicitor of said city, proceeded with said improvement, believing that their proceedings were lawful." So that the real question there seems to have been not that a certificate was not filed, but that the contract was invalid because the contract was let before the bonds were sold for the improvement. In Carthage v. Diekmeier a certificate and an amended certificate were duly filed and the contract then executed, and the amended certificate is a |