App.] Bellaire, ex rel., v. Ferry Co. of a river is valid. This case appears to us to rest upon a very different foundation. But the right to regulate navigation operates only where the concurrent jurisdiction confessedly exists, and cannot operate upon the opposite shores of a river. Just what is meant by concurrent jurisdiction has not been made entirely clear by the authorities, but it is held to relate to things on the water and not to attach to the soil or extend beyond the boundary lines of the state. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U. S., 529; Mississippi & Missouri Rd. Co. v. Ward, 67 U. S. (2 Black), 485; Commonwealth v. Garner, 44 Va. (3 Grattan), 655; Roberts v. Fullerton, 117 Wis., 222; State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va., 122, 102 Am. St. Rep., 927. In the latter case the very question involved in this case was before the supreme court of West Virginia. The court held that a law of West Virginia regulating ferry charges across the Ohio river did not apply to an Ohio ferry company carrying passengers from the Ohio side. This is the exact case here except that in this case an Ohio municipality by ordinance attempts to legislate the fare from the West Virginia side. In the case of City of Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U. S., 333, the supreme court of the United States held that a state cannot make commercial intercourse with another state or foreign country a matter of local privilege, and held invalid an ordinance of the city of Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, requiring a license from boats of British registry operating ferries across the river to the Canadian shore. Bellaire, ex rel., v. Ferry Co. [13 Ohio The right to establish and regulate ferries on boundary streams is unquestionably within the power of the states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.), 1. Granted the right of a state to establish and regulate ferries operating on waters over which it has concurrent jurisdiction with other states on the opposite shore, can such legislation extend over objects upon which other states have an equal right to legislate, so as to prevent such other states in the exercise of their undoubted right from legislating on the same subject; can it extend to and control the fare from the opposite shore, over which it has no jurisdiction? If Ohio can control the fare charged by a West Virginia company from Wheeling to Bellaire, then it would follow also that West Virginia could regulate the fare charged from Bellaire to Wheeling. Both states cannot control the same thing by legislation differing in method and imposing different obligations relating to the same act. We, therefore, conclude that the concurrent jurisdiction over the waters of the Ohio river does not permit one state to legislate regarding fares from the shore of the state on the opposite side of the river. It is the right of each state to impose reasonable regulations within its own boundaries, but it cannot impose those regulations upon another state where such other state has an equal right to legislate upon the same subject. It is urged also that the provision of Section 4 requiring the sale of "workhand" and "shopping" tickets at the rate of 12 for thirty cents is void for App.] Bellaire, ex rel., v. Ferry Co. the same reason, and for the further reason that it discriminates in favor of certain classes to the exclusion of all other classes. These tickets evidently could be used both ways. They could also be used exclusively for the fare from Ohio to West Virginia, but can the ferry company be compelled to accept them from the West Virginia side to the Ohio side? Evidently, so far as this clause of the ordinance provides for fares from the other side of the river to the Ohio side, it is open to the same objection as the other provisions of the ordinance. We do not think, however, that this provision is necessarily void as a discrimination in favor of a class. The construction which the company has put upon it has made these tickets available to all persons alike, who desire to use them, without any discrimination, and where a class of tickets providing for a lower rate of fare is available to the public in general and is not confined to a particular class it is held not to be an unlawful discrimination. Larrison v. Chicago & Grand Trunk Rd. Co., 1 I. C. C., 369; Smith v. Northern Pacific Rd. Co., 1 I. C. C., 611; In re Passenger Tariffs, 2 I. C. C., 445; Interstate Commerce Com. v. B. & O. Rd. Co., 145 U. S., 263. While the construction put upon the clause in the ordinance by the company is not binding on the court, yet, as that construction relieves the clause from the objection of being a discrimination, we think it should be followed. State, ex rel. Gallinger, v. Smith, Auditor, 71 Ohio St., 13; Dutoit v. Doyle, 16 Ohio St., 400, and State, ex rel. Belford, v. Hueston, 44 Ohio St., 1. Borschewski v. State. [13 Ohio Our conclusion is that Section 4 of the ordinance, in so far as it fixes the rate of fare from the West Virginia shore, is void, but that the clause relating to workhand and shopping tickets is not void as being a discrimination in favor of a class. Judgment for defendant. FARR and POLLOCK, JJ., concur. BORSCHEWSKI V. THE STATE OF OHIO. BORSCHEWSKI V. THE CITY OF CLEVELAND. Evidence- Number of witnesses may be limited, when - Exercise of judicial discretion — Cumulative evidence. The trial court may fix a reasonable limitation on the number of witnesses to be examined on a given issue and its action in that respect will not be reversed unless the record shows the abuse of a sound judicial discretion. (Decided March 6, 1920.) ERROR: Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga county. Mr. Henry DuLaurence, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Samuel Doerfler, prosecuting attorney, for defendants in error. RICHARDS, J. Walter Borschewski was tried in the municipal court of Cleveland for two offenses, each alleged to have been committed on May 1, 1919, one charge being for assault and battery, in which he was prosecuted by the state, and the other App.] Borschewski v. State. for committing a disturbance and breach of the peace, in which he was prosecuted by the city for the violation of an ordinance. A jury was waived and he was convicted and sentenced upon each charge. These proceedings in error are brought to secure a reversal of the judgments so entered in the municipal court, and, as the evidence submitted and the points raised in each case are the same, the cases may be disposed of conveniently in one opinion. The evidence introduced on behalf of the prosecution tends to show that on May Day, 1919, Borschewski was marching in a procession down Superior street, approaching the Square in the city of Cleveland; that this procession was headed by musicians and that Borschewski was carrying a red flag, and that when the procession reached a point between the Hollenden Hotel and the Colonial Theatre a controversy arose between certain citizens and Borschewski over his carrying a red flag in the parade. In this melee, according to the testimony of witnesses called by the prosecution, Borschewski was guilty not only of creating a disturbance but of assault and battery. The facts, however, as so testified to by witnesses called by the prosecution, are denied by witnesses called on behalf of the defendant. The testimony offered in his behalf tends to show that he was not carrying a red flag, but a United States flag, and that he did not commit any disturbance or breach of the peace. Much of the testimony offered by the defendant was negative in character, and would not, under the well-known rules for weighing evidence, be entitled to as much credence, other things being equal, |