App.] Taylor v. Industrial Commission. considered so far incidental to the employe's work that injuries received while procuring such food and refreshments may be found to arise out of and in the course of the employment, provided the employe acts in a reasonable and prudent manner, and the injuries occur while he is upon the employer's premises, or is subject as an employe to the employer's control. See Borin's Case, 227 Mass., 452, and cases there cited. In the case of Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co. v. Shraluka, 64 Ind. App., 545 (116 N. E. Rep., 330), the court says at page 549: "Such acts as are necessary to the life, comfort and convenience of the workman while at work, though personal to himself, and not technically acts of service, are incidental to the service; and an accident occurring in the performance of such acts is deemed to have arisen out of the employment." In the case of Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co. et al., 259 Pa. St., 578, the syllabus is as follows: "Where an employee, during an intermission in his work, while waiting for material, struck a match for the purpose of lighting a cigarette and as a result his clothing, saturated with oil, by reason of the work in which he was engaged, caught on fire and he was fatally burned, an award of compensation to his dependents was properly made." And in the opinion the court says: "Nor do we regard the fact that the accident resulted from his striking a match for the purpose of enabling him to smoke at that time and place, as being sufficient to debar him and his dependents from the benefits of the statute. It is not un Taylor v. Industrial Commission. [13 Ohio reasonable for workmen to smoke out of doors, during intervals of work, where it does not interfere with their duties." See also case of Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 178 Cal., 505, 173 Pac. Rep., 1105. The conclusion is that where a workman does such things as are usually and reasonably incidental to the work of the employer, including the taking of refreshments, rest and smoke, which are not forbidden by the employer, and, in so doing, is injured, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the injury was received outside the course of his employment. Whether or not the injury occurred in the course of the employment is a question of fact, and if there is any evidence tending to show this fact it becomes a question for the jury to determine. It has been uniformly held that the Workmen's Compensation Law should be liberally construed to give effect to its beneficent purposes. We are, therefore, of opinion, upon reason and authority, supported by the cases above cited, that it was error for the trial court to say as a matter of law that there is no evidence of the injury complained of, or that the injury complained of was not received by the decedent in the course of his employment. The case should have been submitted to the jury. For this reason the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. SHOHL, P. J., and CUSHING, J., concur. App.] Universal Mach. Co. v. Ohio Northern Pub. Serv. Co. THE UNIVERSAL MACHINE Co. V. THE OHIO NORTHERN PUBLIC SERVICE CO. Municipal corporations — Electric light rates - Authority to fix by ordinance - Sections 614-44 and 614-47, General Code - Jurisdiction of public utilities commission — Ordinance authorizing contract for streets and public places — Specifications of director of service include private consumers - Right to increase rate. 1. By virtue of the provisions of Sections 614-44 and 614-47, General Code, municipalities may fix by ordinance the rates which public utility companies may charge private consumers for electric current furnished for heat, light and power. 2. In the absence of an ordinance effective for that purpose, such contracts are subject to the regulation of the Public Utilities Commission. 3. An ordinance which merely orders the director of public service to advertise for bids for lighting the streets and public places, and to enter into a contract there for in accordance with the plans and specifications and profiles on file, does not limit the power of the Public Utilities Commission to fix a higher rate for electric current furnished private consumers than is specified in the same plans and specifications. (Decided November 24, 1919.) APPEAL: Court of Appeals for Wood county. Messrs. Riegle & Avery, for plaintiff. RICHARDS, J. The plaintiff is a manufacturing company doing business in the City of Bowling Green, and the defendant is a public utility company, located in said city, engaged in furnishing electric current for purposes of heat, light and power. In the year 1917 the parties to this litigation entered into a contract by the terms of which the Universal Mach. Co. v. Ohio Northern Pub. Serv. Co. [13 Ohio defendant company was to furnish to the plaintiff company electric current for use in conducting its business for the period of two years, at certain rates specified in the contract. Current was furnished by the defendant pursuant to this contract, and at the prices named therein, for a portion of the period named, but in the year 1918 the defendant declined to furnish current any longer at the rates specified in the contract, claiming that those rates had been superseded by higher rates, as set forth in a revised schedule approved by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. The plaintiff insists that its contract must be carried out for the two-year period named therein, while the defendant insists that the contract was in law subject to the power of regulation by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, and, having been so regulated and higher rates established, that it, the defendant, is .authorized to charge such higher rates. There has been much litigation within the last few years arising out of situations quite similar to that disclosed by the evidence in this case, and as a result of such litigation various matters have been adjudicated and are no longer open to controversy. In the case of Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp., 248 U. S., 372, decided January 7, 1919, it was held that private contracts with a public service company, fixing rates, are subject to the police power of the state and may be regulated thereby, and that the exercise of such power and the fixing of a higher rate does not impair the obligation of a contract. The establishing of rates to be charged by public utilities in Ohio is within the control of the Public Utilities Commission of the App.] Universal Mach. Co. v. Ohio Northern Pub. Serv. Co. state, except in so far as the same is vested in municipalities by virtue of the exceptions in the statutes. Under Section 614-44, General Code, municipal corporations are authorized to fix public utility rates by ordinance. By virtue of the provisions of Section 614-47, General Code, valid contracts for supplying electric current by a public utility company are not subject to control or modification by the Public Utilities Commission of the state, if the rates have been lawfully fixed by a municipality under Sections 614-44, 3982 and 3983, General Code. This principle has been clearly enunciated by the supreme court of Ohio in Ohio River Power Co. v. City of Steubenville, 99 Ohio St., 421. This leaves for determination in the case at bar only the question whether the municipality by an effective ordinance, duly accepted, has fixed and established the rates which control the parties to this litigation. The power conferred upon the municipality to fix the rates to be charged for electric current supplied by the public utility must be exercised by an ordinance effective for that purpose, as required by Section 614-44, General Code, and held in City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 96 Ohio St., 270. We proceed then to determine, under the evidence, whether the city council of the city of Bowling Green did pass an ordinance effective for this purpose. The record discloses that an ordinace was introduced, entitled as follows: "An ordinance authorizing and directing the Director of Public Service of Bowling Green, Ohio, |