Evans vs. Eaton.

is not the case of an imperfect, or obscure description, but of one which relates exclusively to the whole machine; whereas the invention, for which the patent is granted, is for an improvement only.

2. The opinion of the Supreme Court, which states, "that it will be incumbent on the plaintiff, where he claims for an improvement, to show the extent of his improvement."* But how is it to be shown? The Court has not pointed out the manner; and we therefore think, the only fair implication is, that it must be shown as the statute of the United States, and the general principles of law require,-by the patent and specification. If it may be shown by parol evidence to the jury, as the plaintiff's counsel contend it may, then it may be fairly asked, cui bono? What sort of a showing would this be, so far as it could be productive of any useful purpose? As to this defendant, the evidence comes too late, to save him from the consequences of an error, however innocently committed. As to the public at large, with a view to caution during the continuance of the patent, and to information of the nature of the improvement, after its termination, the evidence given in this cause, must be evanescent, and totally useless.

We feel perfectly convinced, that the meaning of the Supreme Court, as to this subject, is again misunderstood by the plaintiff's counsel; not only for the reasons above mentioned, but because the extent and construction of the plaintiff's patent, and not the validity of it, in relation to any one of the machines, were the questions before that Court; and none others, (in reference to the charge,) were argued at the bar, or reasoned upon, by the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion, that the plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict, for the alleged infringement of his patent, for an improvement on the hopperboy.

Verdict for defendant. .

3 Wheaton, page 518.

Ex parte Graham.

EX PARTE PETER GRAHAM.

Habeas corpus. The petitioner was arrested by the marshal of the District of Pennsylvania, under an attachment from the Circuit Court of Rhode Island, for a contempt; in not appearing in that Court, after a monition" served upon him in the state of Pennsylvania, to answer in a prize cause, as to a certain bale of goods condemned to the captors, and which had come into the possession of Peter Graham, the relator.

The Circuit and District Courts of the United States, cannot, either in suits at Common Law or Equity, send their process into another district; except where specially authorized so to do, by some Act of Congress. The same restrictions as to proceedings in prize causes exist, not only by the express provisions of law, but also by the principles which apply to prize causes in this country, in England, and elsewhere.

WASHINGTON, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court. To the writ of habeas corpus, issued by this Court, upon the petition of Peter Graham, the marshal has returned, that he arrested the petitioner under the authority of a warrant of attachment, issued from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Rhode Island, to him directed, and which is annexed to the return, and is in the following words, to wit:United States of America.

(L. S.) Rhode Island District,

88.

The President of the United States of America, to the respective marshals of the respective Districts of Rhode Island, New-York, and the Eastern and Western Districts of Pennsylvania, greeting:

Whereas, a certain bale or box of merchandise, marked, and numbered 97-imported into the United States in the ship Francis, and condemned to the captors, in the case of the libel of Oliver Wilson and others against the ship Francis and cargo, in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Rhode Island

Ex parte Graham.

District, at the June Term of 1813 of said Court. And whereas, the said bale or box of merchandise was delivered to one James Stewart, by the Inspectors of the District of Bristol, by mistake, who took and carried away the same; and whereas, a representation to the said Circuit Court, at their November Term 1813, by the said Oliver Wilson, in behalf of the said captors, and on their petition therefor, the said Court granted a monition to said James Stewart, to show cause, why he should not bring said bale or box of merchandise, or the proceeds thereof, into the said Court, which monition was duly served upon the said James Stewart; and whereas, the said James Stewart neglected to appear to said monition, and was, and ever since has been, in contempt therein; said Court, upon petition therefor, in behalf of the said captors, granted a writ of attachment against the said James Stewart, which he hath avoided by absconding and departing from the United States; and whereas, afterwards, at the November Term 1816, of said Circuit Court, it was represented to said Court, by the proctors of the said James Stewart, that said bale or box of merchandise, or the proceeds thereof, were in the hands of one Peter Graham, of Philadelphia, merchant, and praying process against him; and whereas, said Court, at said Term, granted a monition to the said Peter Graham, to bring said bale or box of merchandise, or the proceeds thereof, into said Court, or, in default thereof, to appear, to show cause, why an attachment should not issue against him; and whereas, the said monition was duly served upon the said Peter Graham, and he hath neglected to appear thereto, and was and is in contempt therein; and whereas, application hath been made to the said Court, at their June Term 1818, in behalf of said captors and said James Stewart, for further proceedings against the said Peter Graham, in the premises; and the said Court, at the said Term last mentioned, at the instance of the said applicants, did order a writ or warrant of attachment to issue against the said Peter Graham, for said contempt; and, in case the said Peter Graham could not VOL. III. 3 M

Ex parte Graham.

be found, did further order, that the same writ or warrant of attachment should contain a clause, in that event, to seize, arrest, and sequester the goods and effects of the said Peter Graham, to the amount and value of two thousand dollars, wherever the same might or could be found within the United States, and the same safely to keep, to abide the further orders of the said Court,

You are, therefore, hereby commanded, in the name of the President of the United States, that you do attach and arrest the said Peter Graham, if he may be found in your District, ⚫ and to hold him in close custody, to answer the said Court for his contempt aforesaid. And if the said Peter cannot be found within your District, then that you do seize, and arrest, and sequester the goods and effects of the said Peter, if the same may be found in your District, to the amount and value of two thousand dollars, the same safely to keep, to abide the further orders of said Court, in the premises. Hereof fail not, but true return make of this warrant, with your doing thereon, to the next Term® of the said Circuit Court, to be holden at Providence, within and for the said Rhode Island District, on the fifteenth day of November next.

Witness, the Honourable John Marshall, Esq. our (L. S.) Chief Justice, this ninth day of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and eighteen.

Signed,

BENJAMIN COWELL, Clerk.

The question turns upon the authority of the District or Circuit Court of one District, to issue its process into any other District, to compel the appearance of a person, residing or found within the latter jurisdiction, before the Court from which the process issued; or to stand committed, for any alleged contempt of that Court.

It is admitted, that these Courts, in the exercise of their common law and equity jurisdiction, have no authority, gene

Ex parte Graham.

rally, to issue process into another District, except in cases where such authority has been specially bestowed, by some law of the United States. The absence of such a power, would seem necessarily to result from the organization of the Courts of the United States; by which two Courts are allotted to each of the Districts, into which the United States are divided; the one denominated a District-the other a Circuit Court,

This division and appointment of particular Courts, for each District, necessarily confines the jurisdiction of the local tribunals, within the bounds of the respective Districts, within which they are directed to be holden. Were it otherwise, and the Court of one District, could send compulsory process into any other, so as to draw to itself a jurisdiction over persons, or things, without the limits of the District, there would result a clashing of jurisdiction between those Courts, which could not easily be adjusted; and an oppression upon suitors, too intolerable to be endured.

But the legislature of the United States, from abundant caution, as it would seem, has not left this subject to implication. After conferring upon those Courts, respectively, the portion of jurisdiction which Congress intended they should exercise, the 11th section of the Act of 24th September 1789, chap. xx. declares, "that no person shall be arrested in one District, for trial in another, in any civil action, before a Circuit or District Court; nor can a civil suit be brought before either of those Courts, against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process, in any other District, than that whereof he is an inhabitant; or in which he shall be found, at the time of serving the writ."

These provisions appear manifestly to circumscribe the jarisdiction of those Courts, as to the person of the defendant, by the limits of the District where the suit is brought; and that the process of those Courts, was considered by the legislature, to be bounded by the same limits, is obvious from the subsequent Acts passed; the one on the 2d of March 1793,