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insurance for the time he was delinquent and for any sickness contracted during that time.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1895, 1895, 1903; Dec. Dig. § 750.)

Appeal from City Court of Buffalo.

Action by Helen B. Gage against Paul Dettling. From a judgment of the City Court of Buffalo in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Calvin S. Crosser, of Buffalo, for Appellant.
James A. Magoffin, of Buffalo, for Respondent.

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ROANE vs. UNION PAC. LIFE INS. CO.*
(Supreme Court of Oregon.)

1. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT-VALIDITY.

A compromise and settlement of a claim asserted on reasonable grounds and in good faith, which the parties, having equal knowledge of the facts, consider doubtful, constitutes a new and valid agreement, which is enforceable, though the matter compromised be not in fact doubtful in legal contemplation, and the settlement be not what a court would have adjudged on the facts involved.

(For other cases, see Compromise and Settlement, Cent. Dig. §§ 17-31, 33; Dec. Dig. § 8.)

2. INSURANCE-CLAIM-COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT—

VALIDITY.

Plaintiff's husband, since deceased, held a policy for $5,000 in a New York insurance company, on which he had paid the first premium when the company failed. The A. company was incorporated to take over the risks, and solicited plaintiff's husband to apply for a policy for the same amount in it. This he did. His application was accepted, and he gave his note to the company for the first annual premium. Thereafter defendant was organized, and took over all the assets and business of the A. company and assumed its liabilities. The premium note was turned over to defendant and by it collected before decedent's death. He died before receiving the policy from defendant, and, plaintiff having made a claim which was disputed, an agreement was entered into that she should receive $2,750, for which defendant's agent executed defendant's demand note. Held, that such agreement was a valid compromise and settlement, so as to form a sufficient consideration for the note.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1417, 1419; Dec. Dig. § 579.) 3. INSURANCE-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-QUESTION FOR

JURY.

In an action on a note executed by the agent of an insurance company in compromise of a claim, he having authority to effect a settlement, and *Decision rendered, Oct. 21, 1913. 135 Pac. Rep. 892.

having informed plaintiff that he was authorized to execute the note, and having done so and received a release which defendant, on repudiating the agent's authority, did not offer to return, whether the agent had such authority was for the jury.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1417, 1419; Dec. Dig. § 579.)

4. INSURANCE-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-RATIFICATION. Where an agent of an insurance company authorized to effect a settlement of a claim, executed a note on defendant's behalf for the amount of the settlement and received from plaintiff a release of such claim, which defendant, though repudiating the settlement, refused to return until five or six months after knowledge of the compromise, it thereby ratified the compromise.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1412; Dec. Dig. § 565.)

5. INSURANCE-OPERATION OF COMPANY-STATE LICENSE

STATUTES-APPLICATION-CONTRACTS.

L. O. L. § 4609, providing that no insurance company shall transact a life insurance business in Oregon without a certificate from the State Insurance Commissioner authorizing the same, had no application to the note of a domestic insurance company executed in Washington in settlement of a claim.)

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. § 5.)

6. INSURANCE-COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN STATELICENSE-FAILURE TO OBTAIN-CONTRACTS.

L. O. L § 4609, prohibits insurance companies from doing business in Oregon without a license, and section 4646 provides a fine of from $100 to $500 for a violation of the insurance law by an officer, agent, or employee of any insurance company. Held, that such provisions applied only to officers, agents, and employees of insurance companies, and did not invalidate policies issued or contracts made by insurance companies within the state before receiving a license.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. § 5.)

7. CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS-POWER-ESTOPPEL. Where a corporation has executed a contract in excess of its granted powers, and has received the benefits thereof, it is estopped to deny its power to make it in an action brought to enforce the same. (For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1556-1567; Dec. Dig. § 388.)

Department 1. Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; Geo. N. Davis, Judge.

Action by Eva L. Roane against the Union Pacific Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and new trial ordered.

This is an action upon a promissory note, which the plaintiff alleges was executed by the defendant for $2,750. A judgment of nonsuit was entered against the plaintiff in the court below. The plaintiff appeals. The facts appear in the opinion of the

court.

Thos. G. Greene, of Portland (Bauer & Greene and A. H. McCurtain, all of Portland, on the brief), for Appellant.

Guy C. H. Corliss, of Portland (Corliss & Skulason, of Portland, on the brief), for Respondent.

HARPER ET AL. US. FLATT.*

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky.)

TRUSTS-EXISTENCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-EVI

DENCE.

In an action by creditors of a policyholder to have it adjudged that the beneficiary held the proceeds of the policy as trustee for the creditors, evidence held to show that insured took out the policy for the benefit of the beneficiary and not for the benefit of the creditors. (For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. §§ 66-68; Dec. Dig. § 44.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hickman County.

Action by J. L. Harper and others against Frank P. Flatt. From a judgment dismissing the petition, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Bennett, Robbins & Thomas, of Clinton, for Appellants.

R. B. Flatt and R. L. Smith, both of Clinton, for Appellee. *Decision rendered, Nov. 12, 1913. 160 S. W. Rep. 241.

GRAND CAMP OF COLORED WOODMEN OF ARKANSAS ET AL. VS. JOHNSON.*

I.

(Supreme Court of Arkansas.)

INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-ACTIONS

COMPLAINT.

Under Kirby's Dig. § 4354, requiring fraternal insurance orders to give a bond conditioned for the prompt payment of all moneys coming into the hands of its officers to which beneficiaries are entitled, in an action on a bond conditioned in the language of the statute, a complaint alleging that the company had failed and refused to pay a beneficiary's claim except a partial payment, and that there was due and unpaid a specified sum, failed to show any breach of the bond, and was * Decision rendered, Oct. 20, 1913. 160 S. W. Rep. 400.

insufficient as against the sureties, since their liability was fixed by the terms of the bond, and depended upon a breach of the condition. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1996-1998; Dec. Dig. § 815.) 2. PLEADING-DEMURRER-SCOPE.

Where a complaint is assailed by general demurrer, the question is whether it entitles plaintiff to any relief.

(For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 409, 412, 416-418; Dec. Dig. § 216.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Woodruff County; J. S. Thomas, Special Judge.

Action by Fed Johnson against the Grand Camp of Colored Woodmen of Arkansas and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Carmichael, Brooks, Powers & Rector, and Scipio A. Jones, all of Little Rock, for Appellants.

Harry M. Woods, of Augusta, for Appellee.

MARCUS vs. HERALDS OF LIBERTY.*

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.)

1. INSURANCE-CERTIFICATE OF MEMBERSHIP_“INSURANCE POLICY" EVIDENCE.

A certificate of membership in a beneficial association is not an "insurable policy" within Act of May 11, 1881 (P. L. 20), making by-laws, which are referred to in an insurance policy as a part thereof inadmissible in evidence unless attached to the policy.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1854; Dec. Dig. § 718.)
(For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 5440-5442.)

2. INSURANCE-ACTION ON POLICY-DEFENSES-SUICIDE. An insurance policy which contains no stipulation as to suicide is not avoided as to the beneficiary, the insured's wife, where the insured commits suicide.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1956; Dec. Dig. § 788.)

3. INSURANCE-MUTUAL ASSOCIATIONS-CHARACTER OF BUSINESS-DETERMINATION-WHAT LAW GOVERNS. Whether the character of the business transacted in Pennsylvania by an Alabama beneficial association is an insurance business will be determined by the law of Pennsylvania when the subject of judicial inquiry therein.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1824; Dec. Dig. § 687.)

* Decision rendered, June 27, 1913. 88 Atl. Rep. 678.

4. INSURANCE-MUTUAL ASSOCIATIONS-PRESUMPTION OF NATURE OF BUSINESS-EVIDENCE.

The presumption that the business transacted in Pennsylvania by an Alabama beneficial association is what the association declares it to be and not an insurance business may be overcome by the evidence.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1999-2002; Dec. Dig. § 817.) OF BUSINESS-SUFFICIENCY OF

5. INSURANCE-NATURE

EVIDENCE.

Evidence, in a beneficiary's action for insurance, held to show that the business transacted by the defendant order, an Alabama corporation, in Pennsylvania was that of life insurance; and hence, under the express provisions of Act May 11, 1881 ( P. L. 20), failure to attach its by-laws to the certificate sued on defeated its right to set up the defense of suicide, which was not provided for in the certificate except by reference to the by-laws.

(For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 2006, 2007; Dec. Dig. § 819.)

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. Action by Yetta Marcus against the Heralds of Liberty, a corporation, etc. From judgment for defendant n. o. v., plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

From the record it appeared that Herman D. Marcus held five membership certificates in the Heralds of Liberty, an Alabama corporation, under each of which there was payable $500 at his death to his wife, Yetta Marcus, the plaintiff. Each certificate contained this printed clause: "This certificate is issued to and accepted by the holder hereof, subject to the laws, rules and regulations of this society, which are hereby referred to and made a part of this contract." The laws, rules, and regulations of the society provided: "Section SS. No benefits shall be paid on account of death * * from suicide whether sane, or insane. *" This clause was not printed on the certificates. On June 16, 1910, Herman D. Marcus committed suicide by taking poison. Other facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court. Verdict for plaintiff for $2,750. The court subsequently entered judgment for defendant n. o. v.

*

Argued before Fell, C. J., and Potter, Elkin, Stewart, and Moschzisker, JJ.

Paxson Deeter, Samuel W. Salus, and John C. Bell, all of Philadelphia, for Appellant.

George J. Edwards, Jr., of Philadelphia, for Appellee.

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