EMINENT HOUSEHOLD OF COLUMBIAN WOODMEN (Supreme Court of Arkansas.) 1. INSURANCE — FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE FENSES TO POLICY-VIOLATION OF LAW. Where the fraternal benefit certificate sued on provided that it should be (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 2003-2005; Dec. Dig. § 818.) 2. EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF-CONTENTS-DOCUMENTS. Where the benefit certificate sued on was filed as part of the pleadings, and the stenographer's transcript, as incorporated in the bill of excep- tions, shows that it was read in evidence, and shows a call directing the clerk to copy it into the bill of exceptions, which was done, the benefit certificate was properly in the appellate record so that it would (For other cases, see Exceptions, Bill of, Cent. Dig. §§ 12-15, 19, 29; Dec. Appeal from Circuit Court, White County; Eugene Lankford, Action by Laura O. Howle against the Eminent Household of S. Brundidge, of Searcy, for Appellant. J. N. Rachels and John E. Miller, both of Searcy, for Appellee. FIDELITY MUT. LIFE INS. CO. OF PHILADELPHIA, PA.. (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.) A life insurance policy provided for the payment of annual premiums on his dues up to January 1, 1898. Thereafter and until his death he continued to pay annual premiums each year on or about January 1st. In 1903 the company changed to a legal reserve basis, and sent to insured a certificate to be, and which was, attached to the policy, stating the benefits thereunder on that basis, which certificate stated that the policy years were to be counted from October 1, 1895, and to end October 1, 1915, and that all provisions of the policy inconsistent or in conflict therewith were thereby canceled. Insured died December 20, 1910. The policy provided for the deduction of the balance of the dues for the current year of insured's death. Held, that each policy year commenced on October 1st, and not on January 1st, and hence the company was entitled to deduct the balance of the premium for the year ending October 1, 1911, since if any doubt as to the date of the beginning of the policy year was created by the change in the time of paying the premiums, it was removed by the certificate mentioned. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1307, 1308; Dec. Dig. § 523.) 2. INSURANCE-PAYMENT OF LOSS-WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS TO MEDIUM OF TENDER. Where an insurance company sent to a beneficiary under a policy a check for the amount due, which she retained without objection, except an unfounded objection that it was insufficient in amount, this constituted a sufficient tender, and prevented the recovery of interest. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1495, 1496; Dec. Dig. § 599.) Error to District Court, Fayette County; Frank S. Roberts, Judge. Action by Mrs. Isolde Zapp, executrix, against the Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia, Pa. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed in part, and reversed and rendered in part. Locke & Locke, of Dallas, for Plaintiff in Error. PIERCE vs. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.* (Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.) 1. INSURANCE CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY COMMENCEMENT OF RISK. While a binding contract of insurance may arise from the acceptance by the company of an application, without a policy being issued thereon, a provision that the contract shall not become effective until the policy is issued and delivered is valid. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 219-230; Dec. Dig. § 136.) * Decision rendered, Oct. 6, 1913. Rehearing denied, Nov. 3, 1913. 160 S. W. Rep. 40. 2. INSURANCE-PROVISIONS OF POLICY-WAIVER BY COM PANY. Such a provision is one for the benefit of the company which it may waive. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 75, 253-262; Dec. Dig. § 141.) 3. INSURANCE-COMMENCEMENT OF RISK-DELIVERY OF POLICY-UNAUTHORIZED AGREEMENT BY AGENT. Where an agent tendered insurance policies to the applicant, who objected to them because of the beneficiary named therein, but, on the advice of the agent, paid the premiums to him under an agreement that he was to retain the money until new policies with another beneficiary were issued and the money returned to her if she did not accept the policies, but insured knew that such an agreement was not binding on the company because of the restrictions upon the agent's authority, and that her right to recover the money would terminate if it were paid to the company by the agent, the agreement was not one by which the applicant reserved the right to reject the policy, but one where she trusted the agent to retain the money. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 219-230; Dec. Dig. § 136.) 4. INSURANCE-PROVISIONS OF POLICY-COMMENCEMENT OF RISK-WAIVER. Where the company thereafter changed the plan proposed by the agent, and instead of canceling the former policies decided to have the beneficiary changed therein, and the insured signed an application to that effect, the company elected to treat the contract as in force, and could not after the death of insured take the opposite position. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 75, 253-262; Dec. Dig. § 141.) 5. INSURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY-INDORSEMENT ON POLICY. The fact that insured died before the change of the beneficiaries was indorsed on the policy did not defeat the right of the new beneficiary under the clause of the policy that the change should not become effective until it was indorsed on the policy; since under the circumstances the former beneficiaries had acquired no vested interest therein. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent Dig. § 1470; Dec. Dig. § 586.) Appeal from Circuit Court, Atchison County; William C. Ellison, Judge. Action by Sallie D. Pierce, by her guardian, against the New York Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Culver, Phillip & Spencer, of St. Joseph, for Appellant. ROEDEL vs. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.* (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.) 1. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-BURDEN OF PROOF-EX ISTING ILLNESS. The burden was on a life insurance company to show that insured was ill from a progressive disease, when he took out the policy sued on and stated in his application that he was in good health. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1555, 1645-1668; Dec. Dig. § 646.) 2. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-MISREPRESENTATIONSEFFECT ON POLICY. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 6937, providing that no misrepresentations made in obtaining a life policy shall render the policy void unless the matter misrepresented actually contributed to the event on which the policy became payable, a misrepresentation in the application that insured was then in good health would not avoid the policy, unless he was then suffering from an infirmity which actually contributed to his death. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 681-690, 694-696; Dec. Dig. § 291.) ACTIONS - JURY QUES 3. INSURANCE - LIFE INSURANCE TION. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 6937, providing that no misrepresentation in securing a life policy shall render the policy void unless the matter misrepresented actually contributed to the event on which the policy was to become payable, "and whether it so contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury," the question whether the matter misrepresented contributed to the event is a question for the jury in every case irrespective of the condition of the evidence thereon. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1556, 1732-1770; Dec. Dig. § 668.) TION. Evidence in an action on a life policy, held to make it a jury question whether insured was in good health as represented in his application at the time the policy was issued. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1556, 1732-1770; Dec. Dig. § 668.) 5. APPEAL AND ERROR-REVIEW-CONFLICTING EVIDENCE. The appellate court will not review a finding of fact made on conflicting evidence. (For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3935-3937; Dec Dig. § 1002.) 6. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-INSTRUCTIONS-MISREPRESENTATIONS. An instruction that, to avoid a policy for a misrepresentation in the application that insured was in good health, any representation in procuring the insurance must not only have been with respect to a matter which contributed to the event on which the policy was to become * Decision rendered, July 16, 1913. Rehearing denied, Nov. 4, 1913. 160 S. W. Rep. 44. payable, but must have been made with knowledge of its falsity, was not erroneous to defendant's prejudice. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1556, 1771-1784; Dec. Dig. § 669.) 7. INSURANCE-LIFE INSURANCE-WARRANTIES. Answers by insured, in his application for a life policy, that he was then in good health, etc., were not warranties, but were representations. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 560; Dec. Dig. § 265.) 8. APPEAL AND ERROR REVIEW REFUSAL OF INSTRUCTIONS. Alleged error in refusing instructions cannot be reviewed, where the question was not raised in appellant's motion for new trial. (For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1744-1752; Dec. Dig. § 302.) Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; George H. Shields, Judge. Action by Catherine Roedel against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Leahy, Saunders & Barth and Block & Sullivan, all of St. Louis, for Appellant. H. A. Loevy and Bland & Cave, all of St. Louis, for Respondent. GAGE vs. DETTLING.* (Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, Erie County.) INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-FORFEITURE FOR NONPAYMENT-REINSTATEMENT. The by-laws of a lodge provided that no member who was in debt for more than 13 weeks' dues when taken sick should be entitled to sick benefits nor his family death benefits, and that a member who was three months in arrears for dues should not become a beneficiary until six weeks after such arrearages have been paid in full, and then only on furnishing satisfactory proof to the lodge that he was in good health at the time the payments were made. The dues were payable quarterly, and plaintiff's husband did not make the payment due September 30th until November 25th, on which date it was received by the lodge. The member's last sickness began on November 28th, and he died on January 4th following. Held, that under the by-laws the widow was entitled to death benefits; since a delay in paying the dues of less than three months did not forfeit the rights of the member to continue the insurance, but only required him to carry his own * Decision rendered, October 31, 1913. 143 N. Y. Supp. 767. |