A leading case supporting the rule that conditional delivery to the agent is not delivery to the applicant is McCully, Adm'r, vs. Life Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 782, in which deceased applied to the local agent of his home city, Wheeling, W. Va., for a policy of $1,000 life insurance. The application which he signed contained a provision that "this application shall be completed by delivery of the policy." A policy was sent to the local agent about September 1st. It contained a provision that it should take effect when countersigned by the local agent. It was not countersigned by the agent, nor ever delivered to the applicant, who was taken ill after the policy was received by the agent, and died on September 28th. Various questions were raised in the case; but it was disposed of on the ground that there was no completed contract of insurance because the policy was not countersigned by the agent nor delivered to the applicant. The court said in part: "All of these conditions, whether wise or not, reasonable or unreasonable, are within the power of the insurer to impose. The insurer is not bound to accept the proposal made, and may impose such additional requirements to create the contract as it sees fit. *** The applicant in this case agreed that no contract should be consummated except upon delivery of the policy. This was a most important stipulation. Many troubles might arise between the application and the delivery which would induce the company not to contract. The party's health might fail; his habits might become such as to make him an undesirable person to insure; it might be ascertained that the answers made in the application to important questions were untrue. * * * It seems to me, therefore, that, if the policy in this case had not in fact been delivered to McCully, no contract had arisen between him and the company. * * In no view of this case can I see that a contract was at any time consummated between the parties. The mere sending of the policy to the agent did not make the contract. Beyond the policy itself there was no evidence of a willingness to contract. It is unlike those cases where there was an antecedent completed contract, and the policy was but the mere formal expression of the previous contract. ** McCully had no notice, actual or constructive, of the acceptance of his proposal, and, according to the authorities, at any time before such notice, if there had been an acceptance, it could have been withdrawn. The conditions upon which by the terms of the policy it was to take effect were never complied with, and the negotiations between the parties were never terminated by a mutual agreement between them. That case was more favorable to plaintiff than this in the particular that the policy was in the hands of the local agent through whom the business had been transacted at a time when the applicant was alive and well; while here the special agent who took the application was not located in the same town, or state, and did not receive the policy during the applicant's lifetime. There is nothing in this case to indicate that Bowen was in any way deceived or misled, or that he understood he would be insured until his policy was delivered to him while in good health as agreed in his contract. We are constrained to hold, under the documentary history and undisputed facts of this case, that the tentative contract of insurance was never consummated by delivery of the policy to the applicant during his lifetime. The judgment is therefore reversed, and no new trial granted. APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA. DIVISION No. 1. MARION TRUST CO.. US. BANKERS' LIFE ASS'N OF DES MOINES, IOWA. (No. 8,054.)* Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; Clarence E. Weir, Judge. Action by the Marion Trust Company, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Oliver H. Carson, against the Bankers' Life Association of Des Moines, Iowa. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Frank G. West and Guilford A. Deitch, both of Indianapolis, for Appellant. Wiley & Jones, of Indianapolis, and I. M. Earle, of Des Moines, Iowa, for Appellee. SHEA, P. J. The questions presented in this appeal are the same in all essential particulars as those involved and decided in the case of Stubbs et al. vs. Bankers' Life Association, on April 16, 1913, by this court, reported in 101 N. E. 638, and on the authority of that case the judgment in this case is affirmed. * Decision rendered, Dec. 10, 1913. 103 N. E. Rep. 508. APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA. DIVISION No. 2. BROWN VS. BANKERS' LIFE ASS'N OF DES MOINES, Iowa. (No. 8,032.)* Appeal from Superior Court, Marion County; Clarence E. Weir, Judge. Action by Annie Brown against the Bankers' Life Association of Des Moines, Iowa. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Frank G. West and Guilford A. Deitch, both of Indianapolis, for Appellant. Wiley & Jones, of Indianapolis, and I. M. Earle, of Des Moines, Iowa, for Appellee. LAIRY, C. J. This was an action brought by appellant against appellee to recover on a certificate of insurance. The case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts, and there was a finding and judgment in favor of appellee. The case of Stubbs et al. vs. Bankers' Life Association, 101 N. E. 638, in all essential respects, is identical with the case at bar, and decides all questions here involved adversely to appellant. On the authority of this case, and the case of Marion Trust Co., Adm'r, vs. Bankers' Life Association, supra, the judgment is affirmed. * Decision rendered, Dec. 19, 1913. 103 N. E. Rep. 508. BANGE vs. SUPREME COUNCIL LEGION OF HONOR OF MISSOURI.* (St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.) I. INSURANCE LIFE INSURANCE ACTIONS BURDEN OF PROOF. In an action on a benefit certificate, proof by the beneficiary of the death of the insured, coupled with the introduction in evidence of the certificate, makes out a prima facie case, casting on the defendant the burden of establishing its defense. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 2006, 2007; Dec. Dig. § 819.) *Decision rendered, Dec. 2, 1913. 161 S. W. Rep. 352. 2. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-NOTICE OF CONTRIBUTIONS. Where the by-laws of a mutual benefit association required notice of contributions called to be mailed to the member at his regular address, the mailing of such notices was a condition precedent to the right of the association to declare a forfeiture of the member's right to participate in death benefits. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1897-1902; Dec. Dig. § 751.) 3. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-SUSPEN SION. Where the by-laws of a mutual benefit association vested a discretion in the council whether to assume the burden of paying contributions for a member, and it was the custom to defer action thereon to the next meeting, the provisions for forfeiture of the member's rights for nonpayment of contributions are not self-executing, and the suspension, if made, is necessarily deferred, even though notice is given, until the action of the council is had and the member is declared suspended. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1917, 1918; Dec. Dig. § 756.) 4. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-NOTICES. Parties to an insurance contract may agree that the mailing of notices for contributions shall be notice to the member. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1897-1902; Dec. Dig. § 751.) 5. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-ACTIONS— JURY QUESTION. In an action on a benefit certificate, the question of the insured's regular address held for the jury. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 2009; Dec. Dig. § 825.) 6. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-NOTICES. Where the by-laws of a mutual benefit insurance association required the mailing to the members of notices of calls for assessment and of suspensions for nonpayment, and a member had thirty days after suspension in which to reinstate himself by payment, proof of actual receipt of the notice in time for the member to have exercised his rights is necessary to sustain a suspension, where they were not mailed to his regular address. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1919; Dec. Dig. § 757.) 7. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-NOTICES. For the notice of suspension to conclude a forfeiture against a member of an insurance order, the notice must be an official one. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1917, 1918; Dec. Dig. § 756.) 8. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-“REGULAR ADDRESS." The question of the regular address of a member of an insurance order is not identical with that of domicile, which depends on intention; the expression, "regular address," merely referring to the place where the member would be likely to get his mail. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1917, 1918; Dec. Dig. § 756.) 9. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONS-SUSPENSION-ACQUIESCENCE. Where a member of an insurance order acquiesced in a suspension, his beneficiary is bound by such acquiescence, even though the suspension was not legal. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1917, 1918; Dec. Dig. § 756.) 10. INSURANCE-MUTUAL SION-NOTICE. BENEFIT INSURANCE-SUSPEN For the acquiescence of a member of an insurance order in an illegal suspension to bind his beneficiary, it need not appear that the member had official notice of his suspension. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1917, 1918; Dec. Dig. § 756.) Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court, Eugene McQuilin, Judge. Action by Minnie E. Bange against the Supreme Council Legion of Honor of Missouri. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded. See, also, 153 Mo. App. 154, 132 S. W. 276. James J. Donohoe, of St. Louis, for Appellant. KEYS ET AL. vs. NATIONAL COUNCIL, KNIGHTS & LADIES OF SECURITY.* (Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.) 1. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-WAIVER OF FORFEITURES. The question whether a fraternal benefit association has followed a course of conduct as might waive a forfeiture of a certificate for nonpayment of dues is usually one for the jury. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 2009; Dec. Dig. § 825.) 2. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-WAIVER OF FORFEITURES. Waiver of forfeiture of a benefit certificate for nonpayment of dues by the acceptance of a premium is not based on contract or actual intention, but on estoppel to insist on conditions inconsistent with the acceptance or rejection of the premium. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1907-1916; Dec. Dig. § 755.) 3. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-WAIVER OF FORFEITURES-REVIVAL. A forfeiture of a benefit certificate once waived cannot afterwards be revived. (For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1907-1916; Dec. Dig. § 755.) 4. INSURANCE-MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-WAIVER OF FORFEITURES. As between the association and a beneficiary, the rule that actual knowledge of the cause of forfeiture must be shown to work a waiver will *Decision rendered, Dec. 1, 1913. 161 S. W. Rep. 345: |