THE INCONVENIENCIES OF

A LONG CONTINUANCE

OF THE SAME PARLIAMENT.

PRINTED IN 1680. FOLIO, CONTAINING FOUR PAGES.

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HAT there is a necessity of a government among mankind, is ad

fools

this, is too great a task. Johannes Woolebius, in his Compendium, Theolo. Christ. says, "That it is unworthy in a Christian so much to seem to mistrust the divine authority of the scripture, as to make any question of it: it being a principle, so necessary to be believed, that it ought not to be brought into doubt, by disputes.' To the like purpose, it may be said, that it is unworthy, in an English commonwealth'sman, to bring it into debate, whether, or no, the sovereignty of this realm be in the king alone, disjoined from any other persons? And true it is, there are as yet but few, if any, that dare be so hardy, as positively to say otherwise, whatever their thoughts be, and though their actions seem to look that way. And forasmuch as the word, common. wealth, hath been of late years, for the most part, applied to the go. vernment, when it is in the hands of many; it might not be impertinent to insert here, what a commonwealth is. A commonwealth, there, fore, is a lawful government of many families, and that which unto them, in common, belongeth; and the end and design thereof is, That the wicked be punished, and the good and just protected.' So that it is as much, nay, rather more a commonwealth, and tends more to common good, when the government is in the hand of one man, than in the hands of many; and, for this, we have the general consent of all great politicians, in past ages, who, after the trial of all sorts of governments, and comparing the conveniencies and inconveniencies of each, have concluded that government best for the generality of the people, when the sovereign power to command was in one man, and not in many. For oftentimes, even where a tyrant hath reigned, and he removed, and the commonwealth changed into a popular state, the people have been soon sensible, that the change hath been much for the worse, and that, instead of one tyrant, they had a multitude of tyrants, to oppress them. Yet the dissolution, or prorogation of a parliament, hath been of late looked upon to be so high a violation of right, and so great a point of misgovernment, as if thereby our liberties were lost, and our lives and estates subjugated to the arbitrary power and pleasure of our king; or else we falsly conclude it impossible, that the king can be so wise, as to govern without their counsels. To remove which mistakes, and to quiet the minds of men misled, these following considerations and collections

out of English history are offered to publick view, whereby it will be most apparent, That not only the proroguing, but the frequent dissolving of parliaments, is absolutely necessary for the preservation of monarchy, our now established government, and the best sort of government for the people of England, and most suitable to their temper, in preservation whereof, our own preservation consists. But the long continuance of one and the same parliament, or the same members in parliament, which are both alike, is the most pernicious thing imaginable both to king and people.

It is necessary for the preservation of monarchy that parliaments be often dissolved, because nothing makes it more manifest, in whom the sovereign power resides; for it puts them in mind, by what authority, they have their being; whereas, by a long continuance, they are apt to plead prescription to their seats, and think themselves disseized, if removed thence, though by the same power that placed them there.

In former times, parliaments, in this kingdom, consisted only of some of the nobility, and wise men of the nation, such as the king pleased to call; and the first time, that ever the commons of England were admitted to parliament, was, in the sixteenth year of Henry the First; which parliament was assembled at Salisbury, and it was so assembled of the king's own pleasure, not of any obligation, that, by law, lay upon him so to do. And certain it is, the kings of England were no ways obliged to assemble parliaments, or being assembled, to permit them to sit, during their own pleasure, till of late years, that such vapours corrupted our region, with a destructive contagion. By the ancient statutes of Edward the Third, whereby parliaments were to be holden once a year, and oftener, if need were, cannot, by any reasonable construction, be intended, so much to oblige the king to call a parliament, as to oblige the subject to attend, being called; and this seems the rather to be so, for that, those statutes being but briefly penned, by a subsequent statute of Richard the Second, as an act explanatory of the former acts, a penalty is imposed upon every person, having summons to parliament, that should not come accordingly. But now, by an act of the sixteenth, of his now majesty's reign, he was prevailed upon to pass it into a law, That parliaments should not be intermitted or discontinued above three years. However, God be thanked, it is yet in the king's power, that, if, when they are called, they behave themselves not well, his majesty may, without violation of any law, send them whence they came; and, I hope, it will never more be otherwise, lest that, if they had a grant of not being dissolved, without their own consent, they would do, as those did, that had the like power. And, sure it is no solacism, that the like cause may have the like effect.

A parliament of the modern constitution is, without controversy, very necessary and useful, if they intend that, which properly belongs to them; the business of both houses being to consult with, and advise the king, in such things, as he shall require their advice in, and to represent to him publick grievances, such as are real grievances, and not such as every whimble pated fellow esteems so. But they are not to think to compel the king, under the plausible term of address, to exercise any point of government, or to make any new laws, that he likes

not of. And it is proper and peculiar to himself only to judge, what advice is fit to be followed, and what to be rejected; for there may be some private reason of state, for his so doing, which might be incon venient to be publickly known. This hath been the ancient settled practice, and under which this kingdom hath long flourished; and it is not safe to alter it, for, it being now the declining age of the world, most changes, violent ones especially, are from good to bad, and from bad to worst, and from worst to stark naught.

Is not the advantage of monarchy, above the government of many, apparent, at this time, to any seeing man? For, if his majesty, like the main-mast of a ship, had not been the stay of all, and had not, as it were, parted the fray, by the late dissolution of the parliament, all the aristocratical rigging and tackle of both houses, if it deserves to be so called, had been torn in pieces by faction, amongst themselves, and this poor kingdom thereby, before this, might have been a second time, in our memory, blown up by her own inbred divisions; and it is not without precedent, that parliaments are alike infallible as the pope, or his college of cardinals, and have given as ill advice, and done as ill things, and of late have been more troublesome than ever.

If it should be so, that the advice of either, or both houses of parliament, must of necessity be followed by the king, then would it not be properly an advice but a command in effect; and where, in a commonwealth, the sovereign power or command is in more than in one, that commonwealth is no longer a monarchy, but is degenerated, at best, into an aristocracy, the sovereignty being thereby divided amongst many; and, if we judge impartially, it must be acknowledged, that they that endeavour after that, viz. That the votes and ordinances of the house of commons might have the force of laws, are no less enemies to the state, than they that would introduce popery, for in both cases, it is but endeavouring to alter the government: to prevent which fond and dangerous attempt, the frequent dissolving of parliaments is very

necessary.

Divers other inconveniencies will be prevented by frequent proroguing and dissolving of parliaments; for, by that means, the privilege of parliaments will not over long protect the members thereof, to delay and defraud their fellow subjects of their just and due debts; which sort of practice, for many years past, hath been a killing oppression, when not only the members themselves made ill use of that privilege, but many of them gave their clerks liberty to sell blank protections by the dozens, as the pope doth his indulgences. And moreover, if any such, or other like vicious men, should, by flattery and bribery, get into the parliament, a dissolution gives opportunity of discharging such, from having hand in so high a trust; and great reason, such should be discharged; for, how can it be expected, that men, unjust in their pri vate concerns, should be otherwise in publick administration, which they will always strive to make subservient to their by-interests?

By the long continuance of one and the same parliament, it hath happened, that the members thereof, having long beheld the tempting, though forbidden fruit of supremacy, they have not scrupled to grapple with the king, for a share of the sovereignty; and most commonly,

when they are a little settled, they strive to spoil the king of his prerogative, to usurp it to themselves; and, rather than fail of their designs, time hath been, that they have involved the people of this kingdom, in a miserable war and destruction of each other, when the thing, they seemed to insist on, was either of no moment at all to the people, or something that had a very remote possibility of ever happening; where. by, instead of preventing the mischief, they drew it hastily upon us. There are too many examples hereof in history, whereof to name a few: let it be impartially considered, and then judge, if there was a justifiable cause for the insolency of that parliament, in Edward the Second's time, who, being set on by some lords, that envied Gaveston's favour with that king, framed articles of some trifling grievances to be presented to the king, but added thereunto, the king must banish Gaveston, else they declared, they would rise in arms against the king. An action much to the credit of parliaments, indeed, that they, to gratify an envious lord or two, would not stick to stir up the plague of a civil war, in the bowels of their own country, by engaging in a rebellion, against the king! And they proceeded so far, that they murdered Gaveston, instead of bringing him to a fair and legal trial, for no reason in particular, that appears by Baker's Chronicle, other than that the king loved him, and that he was in more favour than they and, not long after, they even deposed the king, and yet no intrenchment upon the people's liberty or property was committed by that king, in all his reign, and it is expresly said of him, he took no base courses for raising money. And although, being forced to resign his crown, he was content to live a private life, and did so, very quietly, yet his seditious lords thought his liberty too much favour for him, and caused him to be imprisoned; and in carrying him to prison, he was most barbarously abused; for, being taken from his horse, and set upon a hillock, there, taking puddle water to shave him with, his barber told him, cold water must serve for that time: whereat the miserable king, looking earnestly upon him, told him, that, whether they would or no, he would have warm water to wash withal; and, to make good his words, he let fall a shower of tears: and, being carried to prison, they lodged him in a chamber over carrion and dead carcasses, thinking, thereby, to have poisoned him: but, when they saw that would not do, a letter was devised from a lord, to the king's keepers, blaming them, for giving him too much liberty, and for not doing the service that was expected from them; and, in the end of the letter, was wrote this line; Edvardum occidere nolite, timere bonum est: which may be Englished either, It is good to kill Edward, do not fear it : or, do not kill Edward, it is good to be afraid to do it: but they took it in the sense intended, and most inhumanly murdered the king. And (to see the fickleness of them) it is recorded, that they that despised him when living, so honoured him, being dead, that they could have found in their hearts to have made him a saint.

It cannot yet be forgot, nor will the ill effects a while be overcome, of that parliament, infamous for long, and of sad and direful memory, how, in the time of the best of kings, when they all ruled, there was no rule at all; but that, upon pretence of removing evil counsellors,

they removed from us all happiness, and overwhelmed us with all the evils imaginable; and because some people would make the world believe there is no preservation against popery, but by means of a par. liament, be it remembered, how poorly and sneakingly the parliament, in Queen Mary's days, became apostates to the protestant religion, drew up a supplication to the king and queen, wherein they shewed themselves very penitent for their former errors, and humbly desired their majesties to intercede for them to Cardinal Pool, the pope's legate, and the see apostolick, that they might be pardoned of all they had done amiss, and be received into the bosom of the church, being themselves most ready to abrogate all laws prejudicial to the see of Rome. That this is no fable, they that list may read it in Baker's Chronicle, fol. 320.

Is it not apparent, that what execution hath been done upon the late popish plotters, was by the king's immediate command? And the discoverers of plotters, and prosecutors of papists, are to this day encouraged by his majesty. Were not the lords in the tower several times brought to Westminster-hall, by the king's command, in order to their trial; but the house of commons were not, or would not be ready for it, unless they might pluck a plume from the prerogative, or peerage, to feather their own caps withal? And whether they were not more ready to kindle coals of contention, when even in the house, not long since, some laid hands on their swords to draw at each other, I leave the world to judge. Can any man then, that loves the peace of his country, be troubled at the prorogation or dissolution of such a parliament ?

It is, indeed, to be found in our English chronicles, that one parlia ment had the name of good, and that was in the reign of Edward the Third; but it seems to be so called in derision only; for the same author says, they wrought ill effects. To be plain, there seldom or never was a long parliament that did deserve much commendation, or that was free from faction: but that it was not otherwise, much may be imputed to the fault of the electors, who take not right measures in their choice. And because good parliaments are very useful to his majesty and people, it is to be wished men would observe the right means to obtain such; whenever it should please his majesty to give another opportunity of a new choice. And forasmuch as many of the commons of our late parliaments were so vile as to take pensions for their votes, as some of their own fellow-members give out; which, if true, in all likelihood were given by some corrupt minister of state, to promote the interest and designs of some foreign prince; and some others of them were under very gross errors touching succession, whether out of a real misapprehension, or a voluntary misfeasance, it is not proper here to determine. Only this I say, it is somewhat strange, that men, that are all for religion, will not trust God Almighty himself with that prerogative, though he give us his word for it, that the hearts of kings are in his rule and governance, and he turneth them which way it pleaseth him; and in another place it is said, By me kings reign, and princes do decree:' But of this more, perhaps, hereafter. Some others are mightily inraged at their dissolution, because it hath put them to