wine of colchicum on the 13th of November, 1885. It appeared that Hall had some horses and dogs which suffered at different times from sore eyes. There was also a circumstantial story told by a bookseller of Timaru, who said that in May 1885 Hall asked him for a book 'treating on the subject of antimony;' that he lent him Headland's Action of Medicines, which he bought, but subsequently returned with a few pages, including those about antimony, cut; that he afterwards bought a copy of Taylor on Poisons, and wrote on the fly-leaves at both ends. The book was produced at the trial, and bore at the beginning the inscription, 'T. Hall 1882,' and at the end 'T. Hall, Dunedin, 1882.' It is clear, however, from the report of the cross-examination, that this was not at all a satisfactory witness, and some of the witnesses for the defence. thought they had seen the book in question in Hall's possession in 1883 and 1884. Inasmuch as several other persons besides Hall had access to Cain during the last months of his life, it is abundantly clear that this evidence by itself could not have justified a conviction.

The prosecution, therefore, gave, subject to objection and to the probability of a case being reserved, evidence of Mrs. Hall's symptoms in June, July, and August, 1886, of the discovery of large quantities of antimony in her excretions, of Hall's constant access to her, of her cure ensuing immediately upon his arrest, and of his purchases of tartar emetic in 1886 on June 18th and 26th and August 4th, of colchicum wine on July 5th, 17th, 31st, and August 11th, of atropia on June 3rd, of antimonial wine on June 12th, and of colchicum and tincture of colchicum on July 16th.

This evidence was of course objected to. Mr. Justice Williams ruled as follows:- I think evidence would be admissible to show that some other person to whom the prisoner had access exhibited the same symptoms as Cain exhibited, and also to show that there was found in the excreta of such person the same substance as was found in Cain's body. I think the cases show that so far evidence is admissible. If, however, evidence is tendered to show that there was some motive for administering this drug to that other person, I confess to greater doubt.' No evidence to show motive for poisoning Mrs. Hall was given, but the evidence mentioned above concerning the attempt on her life was given. The jury found Hall guilty, and he was sentenced to death. The judge reserved the point as to whether the evidence of the symptoms of Mrs. Hall ought to have been given, and the Supreme Court quashed the conviction on the ground that it ought not.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is reported in full in the Otago Daily Times, 14 March, 1887. It deals seriatim with the three grounds on which counsel for the Crown had argued that the

2. As

evidence of matters connected with the attempt to murder Mrs. Hall was admissible. These were:-1. As evidence that the administration of antimony to Cain was not accidental. evidence of another part of the same transaction. 3. As evidence of what the symptoms of antimonial poisoning are.

1. As evidence that the administration of antimony to Cain was not accidental. The Court held that the admission of the evidence on this ground could not be justified, because there was no prior evidence of any weight that Hall was the person who administered antimony to Cain. The evidence of what happened the summer after Cain's death went to show less that the administration was intentional than that Hall was the person who administered. 'No general abstract question of danger or accident arose, as in the arson cases, which could be separable from and precede the particular and personal question, “Was the prisoner's act wilful?” It is, indeed, difficult to imagine how a succession of small doses of antimony could have been given accidentally to an old gentleman who was very ill, whose diet was regulated by his doctor, and in whose medicines antimony was not prescribed. In this part of the case the Court had to consider the case of Reg. v. Geering (18 L.J., M. C., 215, 1849), and they seem to have been of opinion that though Chief Baron Pollock admitted such evidence as was given in Hall's case, he did not lay down a rule in sufficiently general terms to bind them. That case is generalized in Stephen's Digest of Evidence as follows (Art. 12, Illustration (c)):–

"The question is whether the administration of poison to A by Z, his wife, in September, 1848, was accidental or intentional.

The facts that B, C, and D (A's three sons) had the same poison administered to them in December 1848, March 1849, and April 1849, and that the meals of all four were prepared by Z, are deemed to be relevant, though Z was indicted separately for murdering A, B, and C, and attempting to murder D.'

The report of Reg. v. Geering does not state whether the unchallenged evidence pointed decisively to the guilt of the prisoner, or whether, as in Hall's case, it implied only that the poison was administered by one of several persons including the prisoner. The counsel for the Crown (one of whom reported the case)' contended that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving, not that the prisoner had feloniously poisoned the deceased, but that the deceased had in fact died of poison, administered by some party; and secondly, that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving that the death of the deceased husband was not accidental.' The Chief Baron's ruling, as reported, is short enough to be given in full.

'I am of opinion that evidence is receivable that the death of three sons proceeded from the same cause, namely arsenic. The tendency of such evidence is to prove and to confirm the proof already given, that the death of the husband, whether felonious or not, was occasioned by arsenic. In this view of the case, I think it wholly immaterial whether the death of the sons took place before or after the death of the husband. The domestic history of the family during the period that the four deaths occurred is also receivable in evidence, to show that during that time arsenic had been taken by four members of it, with a view to enable the jury to determine as to whether such taking was accidental or not. The evidence is not inadmissible by reason of its having a tendency to prove or create a suspicion of a subsequent felony. My brother Alderson concurs with me in thinking that the evidence ought to be received.'

If the Supreme Court had been prepared to go beyond the illustration in Stephen's Digest, and adopt as a binding authority the first sentence of this ruling, I think they would have been obliged to hold that the evidence of subsequent administration of antimony to Mrs. Hall when Hall had access to her, was relevant to the question whether he murdered Cain. As they held that evidence of this class could only be admitted on account of its relevancy to the question of accident or intention when there was evidence aliunde fixing the prisoner with the administration, I think they might have decided the point on the ground that the evidence of Hall's purchases of tartar emetic in June, July, and August, 1866, was clearly inadmissible, and the conviction therefore bad, unless the evidence could be admitted on some other principle. But if the doctrine of Reg. v. Geering and Reg. v. Garner is to be confined in this way, I do not see that such evidence can ever be admissible in cases like Hall's. If the poisoning was all done in one dose there might be a question of accident, as in cases of arson, but where it is in many doses it seems as if it must always be by design.

2. As evidence of another part of the same transaction. On this point the Court decided shortly that to make two poisonings part of the same transaction for the purpose of making one evidence of the other, they must be, in the words of Stephen's Digest (note vi) 'linked together by the chain of cause and effect in some assignable way.' Here there was clearly no such concatenation. There was some evidence that Hall expected Cain to leave money to his stepdaughter, Mrs. Hall, but it was so slight that the prosecuting counsel was reduced in his reply to arguing that it did not matter what Hall's motive was, and even that he might not have had any, and might merely have conceived an idea that to poison some one would be an interesting experience.

3. As evidence of what the symptoms of antimonial poisoning are. On this ground too, the Court simply stated that the evidence was not receivable. It is perhaps enough to say, though the judgment does not, that by no possible reasoning could the fact that Hall bought antimony in May and June 1886 be construed as evidence of the symptoms of poisoning by antimony. There was plenty of medical evidence as to what the symptoms are, and it does not seem to matter much, if a man is proved to have taken antimony by the fact that it was found in his body, what the external symptoms of it

are or are not.

It is an interesting question whether in this case the law is reasonable. The Supreme Court evidently thought not. They say, 'Viewed in the light of science, philosophy, or common sense, there is no doubt a nexus between the two events; the all but mortal illness of Mrs. Hall having been traced to antimony, administered by the prisoner in small doses, and the death of Captain Cain having also been traced to the same physical cause, it is, having regard to other circumstances, reasonable to infer that the human agency in both cases was the same.' Elsewhere they call the inadmissible evidence 'cogent evidence to the general mind,' and speak of the 'strong moral probability' of Hall's guilt. The law ought to be the means of ascertaining and expressing the just conclusions of science, philosophy, and common sense. If it does not, it is defective. The logical justification for excluding irrelevant evidence is that its admission would be a waste of time. If the evidence of the attempt to murder in July was not a reason why sensible men should think Hall guilty of murder in January, the jury ought not to have convicted him upon it, as they undoubtedly did. If it was, it ought to have been admissible. Practically I have no doubt that nineteen people out of twenty, upon a perusal of the whole story, would feel confident that Hall poisoned Cain. If they would be right, the law on the subject appears to be defective.

The judgment of the Supreme Court ends with a brief statement that they think the judge at the trial did right to reserve the point. This seems plain enough, but they give the astonishing reason that 'the English authorities state that no single judge could take upon himself the responsibility of declining evidence tendered by the Crown.' I am not acquainted with any such statement, but if it exists it is certain that single judges in this country constantly ignore it. HERBERT STEPHEN.

78

PUBLIC MEETINGS AND PUBLIC ORDER.

T has been thought desirable to obtain authentic information of the manner in which certain questions lately debated in this country are treated in other free constitutional states. Senator Tommaso Corsi has been so good as to furnish, as regards Italy, the information here given; and M. H. Lentz, who is at the head of the permanent staff of the Ministry of Justice at Brussels, will contribute to our next number a similar account as regards Belgium. also hope to give accounts, on equally good authority, of the law and practice prevailing in the United States and in Switzerland.

I. ITALY.

We

The old Sardinian Penal Code, based on the French, is in force in the kingdom of Italy except as regards Tuscany, which had a later and more scientific Code, and has been allowed to retain it provisionally.

The draft of a Penal Code for the whole kingdom has been in preparation a long time, and is now published.

With regard to offences of resistance to public authority, we may generally distinguish mere resistance to any public authority in the exercise of its duties from violence offered to public officers, either to hinder them in the exercise of their duty or from personal malice. The Sardinian Code deals with both under art. 247.

'The offence of revolt (ribellione) is—

1. Every assault and any and every resistance with acts of violence against public force [here follows an enumeration of several classes of public servants] when acting in the execution of the law of orders from public authority, or orders or sentences of a court of justice.

2. Any violence or assault employed to dissolve the meeting of a deliberating assembly, to hinder the execution of a law, decision or sentence, or any regulation made by competent authority, or to obtain a decision or ordinance from the proper authority, or to avoid the performance of a duty ordered by such authority.'

If the revolt has been committed by more than ten persons, but without arms, the punishment is imprisonment with hard labour (reclusione). If with arms, penal servitude (lavori forzati) for the time fixed by the sentence.

The penalties are less when the persons engaged in the offence are fewer than ten; but six months' imprisonment is the minimum penalty unless the offenders are fewer than three and unarmed, in which case it is the maximum.