Ind Coope & Co. v. Emmerson, 12 App. Cas. 300, which was decided too recently to permit any adequate treatment of it in the pages now under review (see p. 941 and Appendix, p. 1357). That case has decided, as our readers are aware, and it must now be taken for settled law, that the plea of purchase for value without notice is no longer available as a bar to discovery. That decision was, we believe, contrary to the general opinion of the profession; and it is a curious circumstance that, to the best of our recollection, the view which has at length been established by the House of Lords was hastily advanced in a new edition of a legal work of some repute published very soon after the passing of the first Judicature Act, where it met with a good deal of ridicule, and was withdrawn on the publication of a subsequent edition. Though the decision of the House of Lords must silence dissent, it may perhaps not always convince the judgment; and a careful reader of the case may feel some suspicion that the reasons alleged in its favour are neither very well conceived nor very well expressed, and fall somewhat short of the most convincing argument that might by possibility have been framed.

At p. 950 et seq., we find an excellent discussion of a cognate subject — the liability of a purchaser to lose the advantage afforded by his possession of the legal estate, if he has been negligent in enquiring after, and obtaining delivery of, the title deeds. Particular attention may also be directed to the improved treatment of constructive notice to the purchaser by means of notice to his solicitor (p. 988); and to the discussion of the doctrine laid down in Price v. Jenkins, 5 Ch. D. 619, that the liability which, in theory at least, must always attach to a leaseholder, will, in every case, prevent a voluntary settlement of leaseholds from being avoided, under the statute of 27 Eliz., upon a subsequent sale for value by the settlor. The editors are dissatisfied with that decision, and not unreasonably. But it must not be forgotten that the construction of the statute against which the somewhat absurd decision in Price v. Jenkins is a protest, was itself an absurdity, and that the two absurdities neutralize one another and effect a return to common sense.

To the foregoing remarks we might add many others, by way of indicating passages which show signs of the careful attention of the present editors; but it is useless to indefinitely multiply references of this kind. We will only add, that chap. xiv. sect. 3, on the vendor's right of preemption under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, chap. xix. sect. 1, on sales by the Court under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, and sect. 3 of the same chapter, on the Partition Acts, 1868 and 1876, appear to have been entirely rewritten. The last-mentioned section contains what is perhaps the best summary in existence of the provisions of the Partition Acts and the mode of procedure under them, and appears to omit none of the decided cases. At p. 1295 a valuable list is given of the various circumstances under which the procedure of the Settled Estates Act is still practically useful.

A critical eye might of course detect points at which further improvement might still be possible. The consideration, at p. 229, of Walsh v. Lonsdale, 21 Ch. D. 9, is somewhat perfunctory, and the space devoted to it less than its importance (perhaps for evil rather than for good) seems to demand. The quaere in note (f.), p. 231, as to whether the actual deposit of title deeds is a part-performance sufficient to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds, seems to be superfluous, because there is, we believe, no doubt that the Statute does not apply to such an actual deposit, and the assistance of the part-performance doctrine is not required. At pp. 289, 290, some curious language is cited from the Intestates Estates Act 1884, 47 & 48

Vict. c. 71, apparently without any consciousness that it contains anything odd or calling for explanation. At pp. 292, 293, where we find the subject treated of disclaimer by a trustee in bankruptcy, we do not also find any discussion as to what is meant by not affecting the rights or liabilities of third parties; but in the absence of decided cases on the point (see now Ex parte Shilson, In re Cock, 20 Q. B. D. 343), this was a very pardonable omission. In discussing (pp. 294, 295) the relation between sect. 4 of the Conveyancing Act, which empowers the personal representatives to convey freeholds which at the death of a vendor are subject to a contract for sale, and sect. 30 of the same Act, by which estates of inheritance or pur autre vie vested in a sole trustee or mortgagee are made to devolve upon his death to his personal representatives, the editors rightly, as we think, hold that the trust for the purchaser which is created by a contract for sale is not a trust within the meaning of the last-cited section; but they seem somewhat to have misapprehended the import of sect. 4, apparently supposing that it would or should be generally used under such circumstances. There can, we think, be little doubt that it was meant to be used only in cases where the legal estate either is limited in strict settlement by the vendor's will, without any sufficient power enabling trustees to convey, or descends to an heir at law subject to some disability, such as infancy. The suggestion that the purchaser ought to preserve the contract, or evidence of it, as a necessary part of the title, seems to be sound; and in such cases a recital of the circumstances should be inserted in the conveyance. The remarks at p. 467, on the application of the Statute of Limitations between lord and copyholder, usually symbolised by the case of Walters v. Webb, L. R. 5 Ch. 531, wear, perhaps, a somewhat meagre appearance; but it may be doubted whether more could have been said, except by way of conjecture. At p. 622, treating of limited covenants by fiduciary vendors, we think that on the question, whether trustees should be required to give an 'undertaking for safe custody,' something might with advantage have been said in addition to, if not in substitution for, the reference to an article in 29 Sol. J. 215.' Sed hae sunt nugae, and we break off our list of cavillings with the expression of a hope that the reader will have thought our praise more solid and more hearty than our blame.

The personal appearance of these volumes is such as to make it a pleasure to consult them, and the list of addenda shows by its commendable brevity (when compared with the size of the work) how well the text must have been kept in hand down to the moment of publication. We regret, indeed, that the abbreviations used in references have been subjected to a somewhat excessive clipping. In the Preface this is said to have been done for the sake of brevity, and in order to confine as far as possible the dimensions of the book;' but we think that this shows some misunderstanding of consequences. To cut down Beav.' into 'B.' has rarely any tendency to shorten the book, and commonly shortens only the last line of the paragraph in which it occurs. A complete list of abbreviations, with their extended meaning, is indeed given; but to refer to lists is a nuisance, and the look of the things themselves is something of an eyesore in so handsomely printed a work. In the list, too, we think that the arrangement would have been more convenient if it had been strictly alphabetical, instead of having the reports placed in a bunch together before the other authorities and textbooks. But for the copious and excellent index we have nothing but praise. We have been informed that an authority of the highest eminence has pronounced it to be the best in any existing law-book, and we humbly concur in that opinion. H. W. C.

A Bill intituled an Act for codifying the Law relating to the Sale of Goods. (Lord Herschell.) 1888. H. L. 267.

THIS Bill is intended to do for the law of sale of goods what the Bills of Exchange Act has done for the law of negotiable instruments, and, as the introductory Memorandum explains, is drafted on the same lines. It seems neither hazardous nor indiscreet to infer that it comes from the same hand: but any reader who thinks otherwise may, if he pleases, read the draftsman' for 'Judge Chalmers' in the following remarks.

The object is expressed to be 'to reproduce as exactly as possible the statutory and common law rules relating to the sale of goods, leaving any amendments that may seem desirable to be introduced at a later stage.' Accordingly we get not only the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, exposing, as the biographer of Chunder Mookerjee would say, its cui bono in all its naked hideousness, but those remarkable enactments of their late Majesties King Philip and Queen Mary against the buying of stolen horses,' with the supplementary Act of Elizabeth 'to avoid horse stealing,' about the only example of any legislation of 'your Highness' sister, the Lady Mary' having been confirmed under Elizabeth. These would probably be the first sacrifice demanded by the modification of the Bill (at present only hinted at as possible) to make it applicable, like the Bills of Exchange Act, to Scotland as well as England. In this case the adaptation would be less easy, for the whole policy of the rule as to market overt would have to be considered. Either the law of Scotland would prevail, and the rule would be abolished, or the English rule would have to be not only confirmed but extended. The latter course would be in agreement with modern Continental legislation. On the passing of property there would be little trouble in assimilating the Scottish rule to the English: the practical difference is already slight, and under the modern French law, founded on Roman law though it is, property passes by the contract without delivery. It has been suggested that the framers of the Code Napoléon did not understand the Roman law. This however is a matter of mere curiosity at the present day.

But our first concern is with the workmanship of the Bill as a codified statement of English law. Many of our readers will be aware that this part of the law has already been codified in British India, where the Contract Act contains a pretty full chapter on Sale of Goods. Judge Chalmers appears to have consulted the Indian Contract Act, but his work is quite independent in arrangement and general design, and the language of the Indian Act is called to mind only by two or three clauses. His arrangement is decidedly more clear and logical, and his treatment of details is both more complete and more exact. Whether this Bill does or does not become law, the attention of the Government of India should be directed to it with a view to the revision of the Indian Contract Act which will sooner or later be called for, and which, when undertaken, ought to be so thoroughly performed as to last for another generation. The Bill is arranged in six parts: 1. Formation of the Contract (including the rules as to conditions and warranties); 2. Effects of the Contract (as to transfer of property and title); 3. Performance of the Contract (delivery and acceptance); 4. Rights of unpaid seller against the Goods; 5. Action for breach of the Contract; 6. Supplementary.

Although the sale of goods is a fairly self-contained chapter of the law of Contract, it offers not a few troubles to the codifier in the shape of complex legal ideas of more general scope which have to be assumed as known.

Here we read in the interpretation clause that 'delivery' means transfer of possession actual or constructive from one person to another. This is perfectly correct, though it would be not less correct, nor, I think, less clear, if the words 'actual or constructive' were omitted. Moreover Judge Chalmers is right in holding it not to be the business of a Sale of Goods Bill to explain what either actual or constructive possession is. For a lay reader, nevertheless, the definition goes near to be obscurum per obscurius, and even for most lawyers at most times it is rather a finger-post to interpretation than interpretation itself. In dealing with the specific rules of the subject-matter Judge Chalmers gives more express weight to the intention of parties than the Indian Contract Act, and makes it clearer that the minor rules are only in the nature of presumptions, and will yield to a different intention when such intention appears. This is certainly according to the letter and the spirit of English authority.

Commercial lawyers are familiar with the sorely vexed question as to the effect of partial breaches of contract when there is a contract for delivery by instalments. Judge Chalmers, faithful to the principle of making the first draft a simple reproduction of the authorities as they stand, does not commit himself to any theory. It is a question in each case depending on the terms of the contract, and the circumstances of the ease, whether the breach of contract is a repudiation of the whole contract, or whether it is a severable breach giving rise to a claim for compensation, but not to a right to rescind the whole contract.' The law cannot rest there, nor would the enactment of the clause in this form appreciably check its development. Meanwhile this cautious acknowledgment of an unsolved difficulty may be taken as an example of the contrast between the practical codifier and the vague enthusiasts of codification. Some persons dream of a Code that would at once supersede all the reports and all the classical treatises. There are two ways of cherishing this imagination. One, and the better, is carefully to abstain from trying one's own hand at the codification of any particular topic. The other is to plunge into codification with a light heart, being chiefly careful to know so little law that one runs no risk of ever understanding what a bad piece of work one has done.

Minute verbal criticism is hardly in place at this stage: it seems undesirable, however, to introduce Latin phrases like 'prima facie' into an English Act of Parliament, and some few sentences, such as 'Reasonable time is a question of fact,' might be made more elegant even at the cost of a few more words. Unless we have overlooked something, the word ' representative' is used in one place (cl. 33) with an extended meaning which ought to be defined. In the main the Bill may be accepted as a good solid foundation. F. P.

Select Pleas of the Crown. Vol. I, A.D. 1200-1225.

Edited for the

Selden Society by F. W. MAITLAND. London: Bernard Quaritch. 1888. La. 8vo. xxx and 164 pp.

THIS volume consists in the main of most excellent work done by Mr. Maitland, but also contains a document of a different character for which he is not individually responsible.

Let us, however, look at the bright side first. Mr. Maitland, some years ago, set himself the task of collecting specimens of the earliest Pleas of the Crown, and published those of the County of Gloucester for the year 1221. He now continues his undertaking, selecting the cases which he considers

the most important from all the rolls he is able to find, without regard to county.

The execution is in every respect worthy of the design. The text is not that abbreviated Latin which can never be reproduced with perfect accuracy in print, and which when reproduced is often but a transparent cloak for want of scholarship. It is the Latin of the period with all the words (except English names of persons and places) written in full. Even this of course presents some difficulties to good classical scholars, but Mr. Maitland has given on the opposite page a translation into most appropriate and most vigorous English. Every one, therefore, who wishes to know what our early Pleas of the Crown are like, can learn with the greatest ease.

In these records there is to be found much that was known before. The insecurity of life and property, the astonishing number of murders in proportion to the population, and the fact that when any one was appealed of homicide, mayhem, or robbery, he usually escaped punishment, are not now revealed for the first time. Still, even these matters are illustrated with a richness of detail which only the rolls themselves can afford. There are, however, other lessons to be learned from the minute particulars which appear in a comparatively large number of documents relating to a short period, and they are lessons of great value for the history of the law.

The earliest of the cases now published by Mr. Maitland occurred about nineteen years before, the latest about six years after the abolition of Trial by Ordeal. These few years are necessarily of great importance in the history of Trial by Jury, because, in the end, the jury took, in criminal matters, the place which had been previously occupied by the ordeal as well as that which had been previously occupied by the judicial combat or duel.

It is interesting to notice that, in appeals, the trial by battle was giving way to the trial by jury before even the ordeal was abolished. Thus in one very remarkable case (No. 64) of the year 1203, an appellee, instead of accepting the wager of battle, successfully offered the King one mark of silver to have an inquest of lawful knights to make known whether he was guilty or not. The jurors found that they did not suspect him. Their finding was supplemented by certain facts which the county recorded, and thereupon he had judgment to be quit. There are also other cases in the volume of even earlier date which show that the idea of an 'inquest' as to fact in a criminal trial was becoming familiar, and that, too, beyond the limits of the towns which were by charter exempt from the trial by battle.

The inquest,' however, by itself, seems not to have been always conclusive. There is a case in the volume (No. 100), in which an appellee was acquitted by five inquests in respect of the same charge, and then offered fifteen marks to have a sixth. The first of the five was held by direction of the Justiciar with the object of deciding whether the appellee should remain in prison or be let out on sureties to abide the coming of the Justices in Eyre. The second, however, gave a verdict of Not Guilty in the Eyre. The third did the like at Westminster, the fourth again in the Eyre, and the fifth again at Westminster. Something more, however, was required, as in the abovementioned case (No. 64), before he could go quit. The end does not appear. Where there was a presentment of homicide by jurors there appears to have been only one mode of exculpation-the ordeal, until the ordeal was abolished. It seems, however, to have been usual, if not necessary, that oath should be made on behalf of the four neighbouring townships in confirmation of the presentment, and this was the only protection which the accused had against the ordeal. After its abolition some form of jury comes in, apparently the same (as Bracton has said), either wholly or in part, as