from German, the other from French-speaking Switzerland-both speaking German and French and one also Italian-chosen by the Court by ballot for six years), from 6000 to 8000 francs. The assistant judges receive 25 francs a-day and a fixed travelling allowance; the ordinary judges and the secretaries further, when away from the seat of the Court on official business, 15 francs a-day and a fixed travelling allowance (Federal law of Dec. 22, 1874).

The Federal law of June 27, 1874, Articles 10-24 (in many points simply a reproduction of that of June 5, 1849), contains many other regulations as to the Federal Court. In cases of elections, and in civil and constitutional causes, seven judges form a quorum, and the number present must always be uneven (apparently because the President has no casting-vote). The judges (but not the assistant judges) are required to reside in the town where the Court is fixed; this town is Lausanne, as determined by a decree of the Federal Executive, dated June 26, 1874. The vacations must not exceed four weeks in the year 1, and even then the President or Vice-President must be at Lausanne. Temporary leave of absence may be granted to the members of the Court and to the secretaries.

A judge, ordinary or assistant, cannot sit when his relatives by blood or by marriage in an ascending or descending line, or collaterals up to and including first cousins, or brother-in-law are in any way interested in the case. He is similarly disqualified from sitting when the affairs of his ward are under consideration, or in a case in which he has taken any part previously as Federal or cantonal official, or judge, or arbitrator, or counsel, or in affairs relating to an incorporated company of which he is a member, when his parish (Gemeinde) or canton of birth is a party, or when a suit is brought against the executive or legislature of his canton of birth. A judge of either kind may be refused by a party to a suit if the said judge is an enemy of or dependent on one of the parties, or since the institution of the suit, as a member of the Court has expressed his opinion on it; but the Federal Court as a whole must be accepted by the parties. If by reason of such refusals there are not enough members to form a quorum, the chairman selects by lot from among the presidents of the Supreme Cantonal Courts a sufficient number of 'extraordinary assistant judges' pro hac vice. All members and officials of the Court are bound by oath to fulfil the duties of their respective offices: in the case of members of the Court it is administered in the presence of the Federal Legislature.

1 By (1833) Art. 95, it was provided that the Court should sit every year at fixed times, but that the President at the request of the Federal Executive (and also, in the second recension, at the instruction of the Federal Legislature) was to call a special meeting. There seem to be no provisions on this point in 1848 and (1872).

Such oath may be replaced by a 'Handgelübde' or raising of the hand in the case of persons objecting on conscientious grounds to take an oath. The Court sits and gives judgment in public, but not the juries or during the preliminary enquiry. The President settles the order of business and maintains order in Court, being empowered to imprison disobedient persons for twenty-four hours, and in criminal cases to fine up to fcs. 100, and to imprison up to twenty days. He superintends the work of the minor officials of the Court. Every year the Court is bound to lay an account of the business transacted by it during the past year before the Federal Legislature, which has a right to criticise any act of the Court, but can alter by a law alone any of its decisions of which the Legislature may disapprove. All officials of the Court have the right of transacting in any canton (without needing to ask leave of the cantonal authorities) any business which falls within their jurisdiction1. A Federal law of June 25, 1880, regulates the costs of the Court, which are defrayed out of the Federal Treasury, and the fees which are to be paid to it by parties to a suit heard before it.

W. A. B. CoOLIDGE.

1 It must be borne in mind that there is nothing in Switzerland which corresponds to the district and circuit Federal or United States courts in America. Hence in Switzerland Federal officials commonly transact business in the cantons, but cannot decide cases; whereas in America the district and circuit United States courts may in certain cases have concurrent jurisdiction with the States courts, while an appeal lies from the former to the Supreme Court of the United States.

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THE DEEDS OF ARRANGEMENT ACT, 1887.

T is doubtless very convenient that in a country largely populated, in which a vast number of people are engaged in mercantile dealings, the buyers and sellers respectively should be able to know something of the honesty and the solvency of those with whom they traffic; but it by no means follows that one party to a contract perpetrates a fraud on the other if he does not publish. an account of his previous trade transactions and of his present position. A moral fraud is effected if a purchaser buys that which he knows he cannot pay for, and poses before the seller as a person who may be supposed to be solvent; but the scope and powers of fraud are infinite, and it is impossible for legislation to strike at every indication of it. A great deal must necessarily be left to the traders themselves, and in the long run their own intelligence and self-interest will protect them more effectually than all the laws that ever were made.

The Act to provide for the registration of deeds of arrangement, passed on the 16th September, 1887, was undoubtedly intended to put down, to some extent at least, an evil which (it was said) the mercantile public complained of. It was said that under the law as it then stood a debtor, being insolvent, might, in order to avoid bankruptcy process, or for any other reason, enter into a private arrangement with his creditors, or some of them, whereby the real control of his future business was taken out of his hands, and then incur fresh debts with other people who, ignorant of his position, might trust him as a solvent man, or he might possibly agree with his creditors for the payment of a composition on their debts, and, having thus reduced his liabilities, proceed to improve his position in the future. The first case might, and probably would, involve a fraud on those who afterwards dealt with him in ignorance of what had been done. The latter would in most instances not be injurious to his future creditors. It has nevertheless been in effect determined by the legislature that a fraud is put upon all those who may deal with a man after he has made any compromise with creditors if he has not published it to the world, so that the past may act as a warning for the future. The Deeds of Arrangement Act was passed in the interest of this great principle, and of course, if it is fitted for the purposes designed, the commercial and moral public ought to be greatly benefited by its operation. Whether honesty or even public morality can be manufactured by legislative

So.

enactments is sometimes doubted by those who cannot see in the present state of the trading mind the elements of a mechanically forced millennium. The idea no doubt is that publicity in relation to pecuniary matters enforces honesty. In some cases it may do In others it seems to have rather the opposite result. Take for instance the effect of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. Under that Act every proceeding, whether in bankruptcy or for liquidation or composition, was advertised, records were kept of the resolutions that were passed, and as much publicity as could possibly be attained was given to whatever was done. Lenient in other respects, the Bankruptcy law under that Act was severe in respect of advertisements and registrations. So lenient in administration was it that very few indeed were the arrangements made out of Court, and yet it may be questioned if the publicity given to failures made debtors more honest or creditors more careful. Men would in many instances fail again and again, always coming up bright and shining, and always able to find people who would trust them. In fact, publicity rather seemed (it may be only 'seemed') to engender a brazen and corrupt tone of mind than otherwise. So apparently thought the Legislature, for the Bankruptcy Act of 1883 was intended to act as a thunderbolt hurled at the moral laxity of commerce which its predecessor had patronised. But the very sternness of this latter measure had a painful result. Its very threats destroyed the candour which had characterised society prior to its existence. In the last year of existence of the Act of 1869, in the year 1883, the exact number of failures recorded was, I believe, 10,183. In the year 1884, the number was 3,231; so that if public records could prove anything, the commercial virtue of the kingdom was on the 1st January, 1884, 681 per cent. greater than it was on the 31st December, 1883. The improvement, unfortunately, was only superficial. Two-thirds of the debtors and creditors in the kingdom preferred private arrangements to the operation of the new Bankruptcy Law. They did not so much object to publicity as they did to other matters which the Act of 1883 would have brought perhaps painfully to their notice.

The result of the working of the old Act showed that publicity by itself was neither a deterrent to debtors, nor did it, as a rule, make creditors cautious; and if this was so, may one be permitted to doubt whether an Act the main object of which is to give publicity to transactions relating to insolvents and their estates outside bankruptcy is likely to be really beneficial. However this may be, the intention of the Act is good. Let us consider its probable operation, for up to the present we have had no cases of any importance to show what interpretation will be put upon its clauses.

The effect of it may be shortly stated thus. Every document coming within the statutory definition of a deed of arrangement is to be duly registered, and in default of registration is to be void. It will be readily understood therefore that whatever arrangement is made otherwise than by a document is not affected by the Act; that only such documents as come within the definition are so affected, and that the efficient operation of the Act will depend upon the comprehensiveness of the definition.

The defining clauses are ss. 4 and 19. They run as follows:S. 4 (1). This Act shall apply to every deed of arrangement as defined in this section, made after the commencement of this Act.' (2). A deed of arrangement to which this Act applies shall include any of the following instruments, whether under seal or not, made by, for, or in respect of the affairs of a debtor for the benefit of his creditors generally (otherwise than in pursuance of the law for the time being in force relating to Bankruptcy), that is to say :

(a) An assignment of property;

() A deed of, or agreement for, a composition.

'And in cases where creditors of a debtor obtain any control over his property or business;

(c) A deed of inspectorship entered into for the purpose of carrying on or winding up a business;

() A letter of license authorising the debtor or any other person to manage, carry on, realise, or dispose of a business with a view to the payment of debts: and

'(e) Any agreement or instrument, entered into for the purpose of carrying on or winding up the debtor's business, or authorising the debtor or any other person to manage, carry on, realise, or dispose of the debtor's business with a view to the payment of his debts.'

S. 19. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:"Court or a Judge" means the High Court of Justice and any Judge thereof;

6.66

Creditors generally" includes all creditors who may assent or take the benefit of a deed of arrangement;

Act;

"Person" includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate; "Prescribed" means prescribed by rules to be made under this

"Property" has the same meaning as the same expression has in the Bankruptcy Act, 1883;

"Rules" includes forms.'

The effect of section 4 is to confine the interpretation of the term 'Deed of Arrangement' to the instruments referred to in subs. 2 :—