tickets stolen shall exceed twenty-five dollars, such price shall be deemed the value of them, and the offence is grand larceny; but if such price shall only amount to twenty-five dollars or under, the offence is petit larceny.1

The stealing of records, papers, or proceedings of a court of justice, or deposited in any public office, or with a judicial officer, is grand larceny, without reference to the value of the stolen.2

7. Of Principals and Accessories.

paper

At common law all present aiding and abetting in the commission of this offence, were principals in the second degree.3

In grand larceny there are accessories before and after the fact. Thus, a man may make himself an accessory after the fact to a larceny of his own goods, by harboring or concealing the thief or by assisting him in his escape. And so, also he may be an accessory before the fact in stealing his own goods, if he procures another to do so with a felonious design.5

An accessory to larceny, before or after the fact, cannot be convicted as principal. But in petit larceny there are no accessories, and all concerned in the commission of the offence are principals. Those who procure aid and advice are principals, and those who merely assist the prisoner's escape are not at common law regarded as criminals.

One who sends another to commit petit larceny may be convicted as a principal, although the offence was committed in his absence. There are no accessories in petit larceny, on account of the smallness of the felony; all are principals." If the prisoner procure an innocent agent, as a child or a lunatic, to take the property, he will himself be a principal offender. 10 But where larceny is accomplished by means of an agent, the contriver is guilty as a principal, if he had a felonious intent, and the agent

was wholly innocent; but if the agent was cognizant of the felonious intent, the contriver can be convicted only as an accessory before the fact.1

Under the common law doctrine that larceny was committed in every county into which the thief carried the goods, it was said if two persons be guilty of a felonious taking in one county, and if one of them alone carry the property into another county, yet if the other afterwards concur with him in securing the possession, they may both be jointly indicted in the second county.2

So, if two jointly commit a larceny in one county, and one of them carry the stolen goods into another county, the other still accompanying him, without their ever being separated, they are both indictable in either county, the possession of one being the possession of both in each of the counties, so long as they continue in company.3

Where there is one continuing transaction, though there be several distinct asportations in law by several persons, yet all may be indicted as principals who concur in the felony before the final carrying away of the goods from the virtual custody of the owner."

And if several persons act in concert to steal a man's goods, and he is induced by fear to trust one of them in the presence of the others with the possession of the goods, and another of them entice him away, so that the man who has the goods may carry them off, all are guilty of felony. The receipt by one is a felonious taking by all."

Where several were acting together to steal privately in a shop, and some were in the shop and some out, and the property was stolen by one of those who were in the shop, those outside were held equally guilty as principals.

And where property which the prosecutor had bought was weighed out in the presence of their clerk and delivered to their carter's servant to cart, who let other persons take away the cart and dispose of the property for his benefit, jointly with that of

' Peo. v. McMurray, 4 Park. Cr. R., 234.

Rex v. County, East. T., 1816. See Com. v. Dewitt, 10 Mass. R., 154.

Rex v. M'Donogh, Cow. Supp., 2d ed., 23.

2 East. P. C., 557; State v. Trexler, 2 Car. Law Rep., 90.

R. v. Standley et al., R. & R. Cr., ch. 305.

Russ. & Ry. C. C., 343-421; Ry. & Moo. C. C., 9C.

other persons, it was held that the carter's servant, as well as the other persons, was guilty of larceny at common law.1

But, in an indictment for larceny, one cannot be convicted as a principal unless he was actually or constructively present at the taking and carrying away of the goods, his previous assent to or procurement of the caption and asportation will not make him a principal, nor will his subsequent reception of the thing stolen or his aiding in concealing or disposing of it have that effect.2

The knowingly receiving stolen goods does not make a man an accessory at common law unless he harbored and assisted the original offender; but, by our statute, knowingly receiving stolen goods is made a criminal offence, which will be hereafter considered.

8. Larceny from the Person.

Whenever any larceny shall be committed by stealing, taking and carrying away from the person of another, the offender may be punished as for grand larceny, although the value of the property taken shall be less than twenty-five dollars; and attempts, under similar circumstances, may be punished as for attempts to commit grand larceny.3

Under a similar English statute, the indictment did not negative force or fear, and the facts amounted to a clear case of robbery. The trial judge doubted whether he ought not to direct an acquittal and detain the prisoner to be indicted for robbery, but the judges, upon a review of the case, were unanimous that the indictment need not and ought not to negative force or fear, and that the existence of such force or fear was no answer to the charge.4

To constitute a stealing from the person the thing taken must be completely removed from the person; and where a pocketbook was drawn from a waistcoat pocket an inch above the top of the pocket, but immediately returned again into the pocket by the quick motion of the prosecutor's arm upon the hand and arm of the thief, it was argued that the prisoner was not rightly convicted of stealing from the person, because from first to last the

book remained about the person of the prosecutor, but the judges all agreed that the larceny was complete.1

Under the act of 1860, applicable to the city and county of New York, which was similar in its terms to the act of 1862, above cited, and applicable to the whole State, it was held by the Court of Appeals that the word "may," in said act, was enabling and not mandatory, and that where an indictment under that act charged several sums, amounting to more than twentyfive dollars, the prisoner had an absolute right to have the jury instructed to find the amount of the sum stolen, and if the amount. as stated by the verdict, is under twenty-five dollars the court has discretion to pass sentence for petit larceny only.2

XXVIII. MAYHEM.

Mayhem was always an offence at common law. It was there defined to be a bodily hurt, whereby a man is rendered less able in fighting, to defend himself or annoy his adversary, therefore the cutting off, or disabling, or weakening a man's hand or finger, or striking out his eye or foretooth, or depriving him of those parts the loss of which in all animals abates their courage, are held to be mayhem. But the cutting off the ear, nose or the like would not, at common law, be mayhem, because the effect would be simply to disfigure, not to weaken.

Our statute declares that every person who from premeditated design, evinced by lying in wait for the purpose, or in any other manner, or with the intention to kill or commit any felony, shall, 1st. Cut out or disable the tongue; or, 2d. Put out an eye; or, 3d. Slit the lip, or slit or destroy the nose; or, 4th. Cut off or disable any limb or member of another on purpose, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned in a State prison.3

XXIX. MOCK AUCTIONS.

The Legislature of this State have enacted as follows: "Whereas, a failure of justice frequently arises from the subtle distinction between larceny and fraud, and whereas, certain evil disposed persons, especially in the city of New York, have for several years past, by means of certain fraudulent and deceitful

practices, known as mock auctions, most fraudulently obtained great sums of money from unwary persons, to their great impoverishment, each and every person who shall, through or by means of any other gross fraud or cheat at common law, designedly and with intent to defraud, obtain from any other person any money, or any goods, wares, merchandise or other property, or shall obtain, with such intent, the signature of any person to any written instrument, the false making whereof would be punishable as forgery, is guilty of a felony; provided always that if, upon the trial of any person indicted for such fraud, it shall be proved that he obtained the property in question in any such manner as to amount in law to larceny, he shall not, by reason thereof, be entitled to an acquittal, and no person tried for such fraud shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for larceny upon the same facts."1

The above mentioned statute to prevent gross frauds and suppress mock auctions extends to no other frauds than those indictable at common law, except mock actions.2

XXX. MALICIOUS INJURY TO RAILROADS.

The Revised Statutes provide that every person who shall willfully, with malicious intent, remove, break, displace, throw down or destroy, any iron, wooden or other rail, or any branches or branch ways, or any part of the tracks, or any bridge, viaduct, culvert, embankment or other fixture, or any part thereof attached to or connected with such tracks of any railroad in this State, in operation at the time of the passage of the act, or which should thereafter be put in operation; or who shall willfully, with like malicious intent, place any obstructions upon the rails or tracks of such railroad, is guilty of a felony.3

But the preceding section is not to be so construed as to extend to cases where death to a human being shall result from the commission of either of the offences mentioned in said section.4

XXXI. PASSENGER TICKETS UPON STEAMBOATS AND OTHER VESSELS.

By the Laws of 1860, chapter 103, page 177, various frauds in relation to the making and vending of passenger tickets upon