lows: "The inhabitants of the ceded Territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advan tages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion, which they profess.

Although the language of this article is not very precise or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import and intent cannot be mistaken. The first clause provides for the admission of the ceded Territory into the Union, and the succeeding clause shows this must be according to the principles of the federal Constitution; and this very qualification necessarily excludes the idea that Congress were not to be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such admission, which were consistent with the principles of that Constitution, and which had been or might justly be applied to other New States. The language is not by any means so pointed as that of the Resolve of 1780, and yet it has been seen that that Resolve was never supposed to inhibit the authority of Congress, as to the introduction of slavery, and it is clear, upon the plainest rules of construction, that in the absence of all restrictive language, a clause, merely providing for the admission of a Territory into the Union, must be construed to authorize an admission in the manner, and upon the terms, which the Constitution itself would justify. This construction derives additional support from the next clause. The inhabitants "shall be admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal Constitution, to the enjoy ment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States." The rights, advantages and immunities here spoken of must, from the very force of the terms of the clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by the Constitution of the United States; such as are common to all citizens, and are uniform throughout the United States. The clause cannot be referred to rights, advantages and immunities, derived exclusively from the State governments, for these do not depend upon the federal Constitution. Besides, it would be impossible that all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the different States could be at the same time enjoyed by the same persons. These rights are different in different States; a right exists in one State, which is denied in others, or is repugnant to other rights enjoyed in others. In some of the States, a freeholder alone is entitled to vote in elections; in some, a qualification of personal property is sufficient; and in others age, and freedom are the sole qualifications of electors. In some States no citizen is permitted to hold Slaves; in others, he possesses that power absolutely; in others it is limited. The obvious meaning therefore of the clause is, that the rights derived under the federal Constitution, shall be enjoyed by the inhabitants of Louisiana, in the same manner as by the citizen of other States. The United States, by the Constitution, are bound to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; and the inhabitants of Louisiana are entitled, when a State, to this guarantee. Each State has a right to two senators, and to representatives according to a certain enumeration of population pointed out in the Constitution. The inhabitants of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, are also entitled to these privileges. The Constitution further declares, "that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." It would seem as if the meaning of this clause could not be misinterpreted. It obviously applies to the case of the removal of a citizen of one State to another State; and in such a case it secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the State to which he removes. It cannot surely be contended, upon any rational interpretation, that it gives to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of every other State,

at the same time and under all circumstances. Such a construction would lead to the most extraordinary consequences. It would at once destroy all the fundamental limitations of the State constitutions upon the rights of their own citizens; and leave all those rights at the mercy of the citizens of any other State, which should adopt different limitations. According to this construction, if all the State constitutions, save one, prohibited Slavery, it would be in the power of that single State, by the admission of the right of its citizens to hold Slaves, to communicate the same right to the citizens of all the other States within their own exclusive limits, in defiance of their own constitutional prohibitions; and to render the absurdity still more apparent, the same construction would communicate the most opposite and irreconcilable rights to the citizens of different States at the same time.

It seems therefore to be undeniable, upon any rational interpretation, that this clause of the Constitution communicated no rights in any State, which its own citizens do not enjoy, and that the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not enjoy higher, or more extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio. It would communicate to the former no right of holding Slaves, except in States, where the citizens already possessed the same right under their own State constitutions and laws.

The Treaty, then, by providing for the inhabitants of Louisiana the enjoy ment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States, seems distinctly to have pointed to those derived from the federal Constitution, and not to those, which, being derived from other sources, were enjoyed by some and denied to others of the citizens of the United States.

The remaining clause of the Treaty, "that in the meantime" the inhabitants "shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion, which they profess," requires no examination. It manifestly applies to the period of its Territorial government, and has no reference to the terms of its admission into the Union, or to the condition of the Territory after it becomes a State. But it may be confidently asked whether, if the whole Ordinance of 1787, which contains the prohibition of Slavery, had been extended to Louisiana, there would have been anything inconsistent with the enjoyment of liberty, property or religion? So far as Slaves are deemed property, it might be just that the then real owners within the Territory should be secured in the enjoyment of that property; but the permission to acquire such property in future, like every other right of property, ought to depend upon sound legislation, and be granted or denied by Congress, as its own judgment should direct. And the memorialists cannot perceive, in the clause of the Treaty, any restriction upon the right of Congress to exercise the utmost freedom of legislation as to the future introduction of Slaves into the ceded territory.

Congress, after this cession, divided the Territory into two Territorial governments; and by an act passed on the 2nd of March, 1805, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, directed that the Orleans Territory (which has since become the State of Louisiana), should be governed by the Ordinance of 1787, excepting as to the descent and distribution of estates, and the article respecting Slavery. By a subsequent act of the 11th of April, 1811, authorizing the inhabitants of this Territory to become a State, Congress annexed several highly important conditions, to the exercise of this high act of sovereignty. Among other conditions it required that the River Mississippi, and the waters thereof, should be highways, and remain forever free to all the inhabitants of the United States and its Territories, without any tax, toll or impost laid by the State therefor; that the constitution should contain the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, and should allow the trial by jury in

criminal cases, and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; that all the laws, records and judicial proceedings of the State, judicial and legislative, should be in the language, in which the laws of the United States are written; that the people should disclaim all rights to the unappropriated Territory, within the limits of the State, and that the same should be at the disposal of the United States; that the lands sold by the United States should be exempt from taxation for five years from the sale; and that lands of non-residents should not be taxed higher than those of residents. These conditions are certainly very striking limitations of sovereignty, and embrace most of the fundamental regulations of the Ordinance of 1787, excepting the article touching Slavery. It is not known to the memorialists that any doubt of their constitutionality, or of their perfect harmony with the treaty of 1803, was ever entertained, either in Congress or in Louisiana; and yet they contained some principles as repugnant to the original jurisprudence of the Territory at the time of its cession, as could well be devised; and if Congress could then impose such conditions, what reason is there to say, that it may not impose such conditions on the Missouri Territory? and if such conditions, why not any others, which its wisdom, its justice or its policy may dictate?

Upon the whole, the memorialists would most respectfully submit, that the terms of the Constitution, as well as the practice of the governments under it, must, as they humbly conceive, entirely justify the conclusion, that Congress may prohibit the further introduction of Slavery into its own Territories, and also make such prohibitions a condition of the admission of any New State into the Union.

If the Constitutional power of Congress to make the proposed prohibition be satisfactorily shown, the justice and policy of such prohibition seem to the undersigned to be supported by plain and strong reasons. The permission of Slavery in a New State necessarily draws after it an extension of that inequality of representation, which already exists in regard to the original States. It cannot be expected, that those of the original States, which do not hold Slaves, can look on such an extension as being politically just. As between the original States, the representation rests on compact and plighted faith, and your memorialists have no wish, that that compact should be disturbed, or that plighted faith in the slightest degree violated. But the subject assumes an entirely different character, when a New State proposes to be admitted. With her there is no compact, and no faith plighted; and where is the reason, that she should come into the Union with more than an equal share of political importance and political power? Already the ratio of representation, established by the Constitution, has given to the States holding Slaves twenty members in the House of Representatives more than they would have been entitled to, except under the particular provision of the Constitution. In all probability this number will be doubled in thirty years. Under these circumstances, we deem it not an unreasonable expectation, that the inhabitants of Missouri should propose to come into the Union, renouncing the right in question, and establishing a constitution, prohibiting it for ever. Without dwelling upon this topic, we have still thought it our duty to present it to the consideration of Congress. We present it with a deep and earnest feeling of its importance, and we respectfully solicit for it the full consideration of the National Legislature.

Your memorialists were not without the hope, that the time had at length arrived, when the inconvenience and the danger of this description of population had become apparent, in all parts of this country, and in all parts of the civilized world. It might have been hoped that the New States themselves would have had such a view of their own permanent interests and prosperity,

as would have led them to prohibit its extension and increase. The wonderful increase and prosperity of the States north of the Ohio is unquestionably to be ascribed in a great measure to the consequences of the Ordinance of 1787; and few, indeed, are the occasions, in the history of nations, in which so much can be done, by a single act, for the benefit of future generations, as was done by this Ordinance of 1787; and as may now be done by the Congress of the United States. We appeal to the justice and the wisdom of the National Councils to prevent the further progress of a great and serious evil: We appeal to those who look forward to the remote consequences of their measures, and who cannot balance temporary or trifling convenience, if there were such, against a permanent, growing, and desolating evil.

We cannot forbear to remind the two Houses of Congress, that the early and decisive measures adopted by the American Government for the abolition of the Slave Trade are among the proudest memorials of our nation's glory. That Slavery was ever tolerated in the Republic is, as yet, to be attributed to the policy of another government. No imputation thus far, rests on any portion of the American Confederacy. The Missouri Territory is a new country. If its extensive and fertile fields shall be opened as a market for Slaves, the Government will seem to become a party to a traffic which, in so many acts, through so many years, it has denounced as unpolitic, unchristian, inhuman. To enact Laws to punish the traffic, and at the same time to tempt cupidity and avarice by the allurements of an insatiable market, is inconsistent and irreconcilable. Government by such a course, would only defeat its purposes, and render nugatory its own measures. Nor can the laws derive support from the manners of the people if the power of moral sentiment be weakened, by enjoying, under the permission of Government, great facilities to commit offences. The laws of the United States have denounced heavy penalties against the traffic of Slaves, because such traffic is deemed unjust and inhuman. We appeal to the spirit of these laws: We appeal to justice and humanity: We ask whether they ought not to operate, on the present occasion, with all their force? We have a strong feeling of the injustice of any toleration of Slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on a portion of our community, which cannot be immediately relieved from it, without consequences more injurious than the suffering of the evil. But to permit it in a new country, where yet no habits are formed which render it indispensable, what is it, but to encourage that rapacity, and fraud and violence, against which we have so long pointed the denunciations of our penal code? What is it, but to tarnish the proud fame of the country? What is it, but to throw suspicion on its good faith, and to render questionable all its professions of regard for the rights of humanity and the liberties of mankind? As inhabitants of a free country; as citizens of a great and rising Republic; as members of a Christian community; as living in a liberal and enlightened age, and as feeling ourselves called upon by the dictates of religion and humanity; we have presumed to offer our sentiments to Congress on this question, with a solicitude for the event, far beyond what a common occasion could inspire.

APPENDIX G.

EXTRACTS FROM "THE LOST PRINCIPLE,” BY "BARBAROSSA," PUBLISHED AT RICHMOND IN 1860.

THE SECTIONAL EQUILIBRIUM.

HOW IT WAS CREATED.

In the constitutional convention of 1829, Watkins Leigh said: "The federal convention of 1787 had, for the first time, to arrange a representation of the people in congress. What was the origin of the federal number I do not certainly know. I have had recourse, in vain, to every source of information accessible to ascertain how that precise portion of slaves THREE-FIFTHS -came to be adopted, what mode or principle of estimate led to it. Some reason there must have been."

It is my purpose, in the following pages, to solve this question of constitutional history to ascertain the reason that operated on the convention which constructed the government under which we live, to adopt in the popu lar basis the fractional representation which was awarded to the servile population of the South. The report of "The Debates of the Convention of 1787," by Mr. Madison, enables me to do this. It is the only source from which that information can be derived, for the fragment of those proceedings preserved by Judge Yates, affords no clue whatever to the solution of this interesting problem. "The Debates," in 1829, were not published, but slept in manuscript, at Montpelier, until the death of Mr. Madison broke the seal.

This part of the organic law has excited but little curiosity, and yet it is the ground-work of the political edifice, with reference to which every other part was made. A just understanding of this part of the constitution will furnish. if I mistake not, an explanation of many of those questions that have convulsed the North and South, and will supply us with the means of ascertaining how far we have departed from the true meaning of that instrument— how far the ship of State has drifted from the intended course.

Mr. Madison was himself a member of the convention of 1829, and heard the enquiry of Mr. Leigh, but said nothing.

The constitution of the united states is generally understood to be a compact to which the several states are parties; and hence, that all the rights which it provides are state rights, and the remedies for the violation of those rights, state remedies. In consequence of this view of the constitution, state secession and state interposition have been suggested as the modes of redress in the several cases to which they apply. But I shall attempt to prove, by authentic evidence, that this is not true in the exclusive sense in which it has been stated.

The constitution is, indeed, a compact between states, but it is also a compact between slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections; and those sec