not ratified by the states. The states never acceded to it, and possess no power to secede from it. It was ordained and established over the states by a power superior to the states, by the people of the whole land, in their aggregate capacity, acting through conventions of delegates, expressly chosen for the purpose, within each state, etc." [I. Reb. Rec. 211.] Every sentence of the above is directly and positively contradicted by the history and records of the country, as heretofore shown, and as we shall constantly see.

Many instances of this ingenuity on the part of some of the later "best minds of Massachusetts" could be given, but it is presumed the following will suffice. An American politician considers himself quite fortunate, if he can quote an apposite and forcible passage of the Federalist, to prove his contention. In quoting to prove his, Judge Story says: "It is truly remarked by the Federalist (Article 39), that the constitution was the result, neither from a decision of the majority of the people of the union, nor from that of a majority of the states. It resulted from the unanimous assent of the several states that are parties, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves." He professes to give the substance, but abstracts what is merely prefatory to the gist of the passage, and leaves off, so as to convey the impression of a national constituency, or the " wethe-people" idea, to prove which is the great end of his argument. Here is what next follows: "Were the people regarded, in this transaction, as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the united states, would bind the minority. . . . Each state, in ratifying the constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, the new constitution will, if established, be a federal, and not a national, constitution." This is decisive on the very point Judge Story was discussing, and it destroys him completely; and he recognized this by suppressing the passage confuting him, while quoting its antecedent, which seemed to support him. And the careful reader will find that all of Judge Story's arguments and multitudinous citations, on the great subject of "the nature of the constitution," are so delusive, that full examination is necessary.

An Effort of Daniel Webster in this Line. Mr. Webster also culled expressions and facts to suit his purpose, and failed in accuracy as to contexts and historical explanations. An instance like the above is the following, from his speech of 1833. He asserts that the

writers of the Federalist declare that "the fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE [the small capitals are his]; and he uses this expression of the said writers, and the immediate context, to refute the idea of pact, and to show that a nation was formed. He did not seem to know that this expression, found in Number 22, refers to the first federation being made by delegative, instead of original, power; and simply meant that the people of the states, and not their legislatures, were to ordain and establish the new pact. He did not seem to reflect that, not only were the people of the commonwealths the only people, but that, as has been shown, they could politically act only as states; and that their several absolutely independent acts made them "united states," as they agreed to call themselves.

He then goes on to declare, that "the powers conferred on the new government, were perfectly well understood to be conferred, not by any state, or the people of any state, but by the people of the united states." And, finally, he improperly quotes the ratifications of Virginia, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to prove his view; and then proceeds to say: "Indeed, sir, if we look to all contemporary history, to the numbers of the Federalist, to the debates in conventions, to the publications of friends and foes, they all agree that a change had been made from a confederacy of states to a different system." Now, all these statements are unfounded, and the authorities he refers to, flatly contradict him. For instance, "the writers of the Federalist," instead of calling the system a nation or state, in any technical sense, repeatedly characterize it as a "confederacy." [See again Part I., Chap. VII.] Instead of saying the general government rests on the "basis of the consent of the people" as a nation, they say that "each state ratified" " as a sovereign body," and is only "bound by its own voluntary act." [Number 39.] Instead of saying the powers are conferred on the new government by the people of the united states as a nation, they say "the states " alone "delegate them. Instead of saying the people compact to form a nation, they say "thirteen independent states are the parties to the compact,' forming "the confederacy." [Number 85.] Finally, in direct opposition to all that this expounder asserts, they say "the states are regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns . . . by the constitution proposed." [Number 40.]

With but slight investigation, the expounders could have found

1 This very article, written by Hamilton, contains the expression, "A nation without a national government is an awful spectacle." This, like the "we-the-people" sentence and others, long did much "detached service" in forming the aforesaid bellicose "public convictions."

numerous proofs like these, covering and deciding the very points of controversy. But their search was - like that of most persons who adopt the theory before they ascertain the facts-only for short and convenient passages to sustain foregone conclusions. And even the so-called "state rights" men of the original states neglect these truths, which sparkle like gems wherever, in the archives and constitutions of the said commonwealths, they look!

CHAPTER VI.

ADROIT SUBSTITUTIONS.

INTERPRETATION No. 10. CHANGING TERMS AND MEANINGS.

WHEN,

THEN, in 1861, Mr. Edward Everett was preparing his address to strengthen the "public convictions" against the South, and against his own previous utterances,' he saw that the thirteen ratifications were the only means of communicating the power of the people to the federal compact; that each of these ratifications was passed by the highest legislative body known-the one usually employed by the people in such sovereign action; and that the acts of such bodies were generally considered to be of the character of ordinances or enactments. He saw that, for his argument, "ordinance" was a bad name, for the reason that the power of enactment and that of repeal are commensurate; and hence in order to refute the secessionists, he conceived the idea of substituting "deed" for "ordinance," and thereby getting a more favorable definition, to assist in producing the desired "public convictions."

So, in his address of the 4th of July, 1861, we find him speaking of South Carolina's ordinance of secession as follows: "It was intended, by calling the act of ratification an ordinance, to infer a right of repealing it, by another ordinance. It is important, therefore, to observe that the act of ratification is not, and was not, at the time, called an ordinance, and contains nothing which by possibility can be repealed." [I. Reb. Rec. 8.]

But, as if lacking confidence in this link of his feeble chain, he wrote to "the learned and accurate historian of the constitution," Mr. George Ticknor Curtis, who strengthened it as follows: "I have

1 In 1826, Mr. Everett was in Congress, and a warm defender of the states. He then agreed, with Mr. Jefferson, that "the constitution of the united states is a compact of independent nations." [VII. Jefferson's Works.] On May 29, 1860, he wrote to Washington Hunt against coercion, and said our "union of co-equal sovereign states requires, as its basis, the harmony of its members, and their voluntary co-operation in its organic functions." On February 22, 1861, he wrote: "To expect to hold fifteen states in the union by force, is preposterous. If our sister states must leave us, in

...

the name of Heaven, let them depart in peace."

looked carefully at the ratification," and found it to be "much more in the nature of a deed, or grant, than an ordinance. An ordinance would seem to be an instrument, adopted by a public body, for the regulation of a subject, which, in its nature, remains under the regulation of that body;- to operate till otherwise provided for;" while "a deed, or grant, operates to pass something; and, unless there be a reservation of some control over the subject-matter by the grantor, his cession is necessarily irrevocable. . . . These distinctions are applicable to the cession of political powers by a people. . . . The question submitted to the people of South Carolina by the congress, was, whether they would cede the powers of government, embraced in an instrument sent to them. . . . In other words, they were asked to make a grant of those powers. When, therefore, the duly authorized delegates of the people of South Carolina, executed an instrument under seal, declaring that they, 'in the name and behalf' of that people, 'assent to and ratify the said constitution,' I can perceive no propriety in calling this deed an ordinance."

...

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At the very outset, Mr. C. unwittingly shows the impropriety of calling the "ordinance" a "deed." The act he treats of, was an instrument adopted by a public body, for the regulation of a subject, which, in its nature, remains under the regulation of that body." What that "public body" was, Mr. C. well knew, for the following words, which he did not quote, were at the head of the very "ordinance" which he pretends is a "deed." "In convention of the people of the state of South Carolina." That "body" was a republic, and the subject of the action was self-government, which was never intended to be alienated, but was to remain forever and ever under the regulation of that body." So much for his artifice of exchanging words to get an advantage in definition. He succeeded in showing the absolute propriety of calling the "deed " an "ordinance."

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And it is untrue that Congress "submitted" any question to the people, or the convention of South Carolina, at least in any such sense as Mr. Curtis implies; and even the "convention of states" did not do so; but South Carolina submitted a question to herself — her legislature speaking her voice in the submission. The following is an extract from the very ratification Mr. C. "looked carefully" at: "The convention having maturely considered the constitution or form of government, reported to Congress by the convention,

and sub

mitted to them by a resolution of the legislature of this state," etc.

Again, Mr. Curtis incorrectly represents the matter of ratifying. The convention of South Carolina sat and deliberated for her alone, acting exclusively with her power. The very beginning of the act is as follows: "In convention of the people of the state of South Carolina,