WYATT, SAMUEL, power loom weaver, Glossop. Pet. Feb. 11. Reg. & O. A. Hibbert. Sols. Brooks, Marshall, and Brooks, Ashton-under-Lyne. Sur. Feb. 25 YEOMAN, CHRISTOPHER, out of business, Liverpool. Pet. Feb. 13. O. A. Turner. Sol. Blackhurst, Liverpool. Sur. March 2 BANKRUPTCIES ANNULLED. Gazette, Feb. 9. GILLBEE, HENRY ARMITAGE, late out of business, Marylebonerd. Aug. 26, 1963 TAYLOR, JOSEPH MANLOVE, shipbroker, Birke ahead. Dec. 20, 1865 Gazette, Feb. 12. RUSSELL, SAMUEL, lighterman, Mincing-la. March 1, 1967 TURNER, EDWARD JOHN, accountant, Victoria-ter, New-cross, and Coleman-st. Aug. 8, 1863 Dibidends. BANKRUPTS' ESTATES. The Official Assignees are given, to whom apply for the Dividends. Clements, J. G. zinc worker, first, 14. 04. Parkyns, London.Colebguru, H. tailor, first, 58, 7d. Kinnear, Birmingham.-Edwards, J. P. merchant, on new proofs, 2. (portion of dividend of 544) Kinnear, Birmingham.-Fitcher, J. T. saddler, second, 1014. Parkyns, London. -King, W. butcher, first, 2. Turner, Liverpool.Richards and Hill, Ironniasters, first, 48. Kinnear, Birmingham.Seaward, W. commander in the navy, second, 6. Parkyns, London-Smith, F. H. linendraper, first, 5. 34. Kinnear, Birmingham.- Wakemna, B. looking glass manufacturer, first, 18, 4}d. Kinnear, Birmingham.- Whittingham, J. grocer, first, 38. 04. Kinnear, Birmingham. Assignment, Composition, Juspectorship, and Trust Deeds. Gazette, Feb. 12. Jan. 22. Trust. R. Wallis, ALLEN, WILLIAM, grocer, Liverpool. provision merchant, Liverpool BARNES, CHARLES, victualler, Norwich. equal instalments, in 14 days and 3 mos. builder, Norwich BARON, JAMES HIRST grocer, Barnsley. Jan. 19. 6s. 8d. by two Trust. R. P. Wiseman, Jan. 16. Trusts. R. Lelgar, tallow chandler, Barnsley, and W. H. Johnson, tobacco manufacturer, Bolton-le-Moors BAUME, JOHN WESLEY, ironmonger, Halifax. Jan. 12. Trust BAXTER, ABRAHAM, tobacconist, Oldham. Feb. 4. 8s. by three Trusts. B. L. Boucher, New Corn Exchange, Mark-la, and J. Eagles, corn merchants, Bethnal green CARR, THOMAS, and HILL, ALFRED SEPTIMUS, alkali manu- CATLOW, WILLIAM HARRISON, cotton cloth manufacturer, Colne. COLE, WILLIAM HENRY, grocer, Exeter. Jan. 14. Trusts. R. C. COMBES, HENRY JAMES, chemist, Exeter. Jan. 13. 58. by two equal instalments, at 6 and 12 mos CORNISH, EDWARD, leather seller, Exmouth-st, Clerkenwell. Jan. 20. 5, by two equal instalments, in 7 days and 2 mos DAVISON, THOMAS, miller, Blyth. Jan. 5. Trusts. T. Wren, sen., corn merchant, Stockton, and E. Liddell, corn merchant, Newcastle FLINT, WILLIAM, cab proprietor, Albert-yd, Stanhope-st, Camden Feb. 9. 18. on May 1 town. HARVEY, THOMAS, tailor, Bootle-cum-Linacre. Jan. 20. Trust. H. C. Langton, jun., accountant, Liverpool. Sola. J. and H. Quinn, Liverpool HATHERINGTON, WILLIAM JAMES, and HEARD, JOSEPH, fruit merchants, Liverpool. Feb. 5. Inspectors, G. MacAndrew, merchant, and W. Oulton, contractor, both Liverpool HOLLINGSHEAD, CHARLES GEORGE, confectioner, Derby. Jan. 22. 5s, by two equal instalments, on execution, and on Feb. 16 JAMES, CHARLES THOMAS, gasfitter, Bristol. Feb. 2. Trust. S. Harris, gasfitter, Bristol LAKE, THOMAS, hop merchant, Wakefield. Jan. 19. 8s. by two equal instalments at 1 and 4 mos LAWRENCE, HENRY, grocer, Reading. Jan. 14. Trusts. J. Bishop, College-hill, and G. Chancellor, Reading, wholesale grocers LEEDER, WILLIAM. farmer, Salhouse. Jan. 14. Trusts. W. Harris, Hargrave, farmer, Salhouse, and F. C. Foster, gentleman, Norwich Jan. 15. Trust. R. LOGAN, ROBERT, oil merchant, Newcastle. Jan. 13. 58. by three equal instalments in 3, 6, and 10 mos-secured. Trust. J. Murray, agent to the West Calder Coal Co., Newcastle MEMBREY, WILLIAM FREDERICK, bricklayer, Alpha- pl, East Greenwich. Jan. 16. 4.-2. 67. in 1 mo, and 14. 6. in 2 mo MITCHELL, SAMUEL, grocer, Cardiff. Jan. 18. 78. 6, by three equal instalments, in 1, 3, and 5 mos PAYNE, JACOB HUGH, chemist, Oakham. Sturton, chemist, Peterborough PIPER, WILSON THOMAS, builder, Bishopsgate-st-without, and Belgrave dock, Pimlico. Feb. 5. Trusts. M. Hall, plumber, Bulstrode-mews, Marylebone, J. H. Parsons, plasterer, Gray'sinn-rd, T. B. Phillips, glass merchant, Paddington-green, A. N. Pawle, gentleman, Lambeth Lead-works, Belvedere-rd, Lambeth, and T. Stirling, slate merchant, Belvedere-wharf, Belvedere-rd REES, JEREMIAH, bootmaker, Pontardawe, near Swansea. Jan. 28. 6s. 8. by three equal instalments, in 3, 6, and 9 mossecured SERJEANTSON, ISAAC, joiner, Foggathorpe. Jan. 13. Trusts. T. Liversedge, timber merchant, and J. Oldridge, wine merchant, both Selby SHEPHERD, WILLIAM, carrier, Willenhall. Jan. 14. 10s. by two TALBOT, ROBERT JOSEPH, grocer, Preston. Jan. 20. Trust. H. TWINCH, FREDERICK, and TWINCH, JOHN, brewers, Windsor. Feb. 10. 5. in 14 days WESTGATE, JAMES, coal merchant, Brighton. Jan. 28. 64. 8d. on Feb. 11. Trust. T. Llangford, coal merchant, Brighton WHEELWRIGHT, FREDERICK, and WHEELWRIGHT, JOSEPH, jewellers, Birmingham. Jan. 27. 9. by three equal instalments of 3. down, 3e, in G mos, and 38. in 9 mos WHITE, JOSEPH BENJAMIN, corn dealer, Leman-st, Goodman'sfields. Feb. 8. 2. 6d. in 6 mos WHITTICK, MATILDA, innkeeper, Bath. Jan. 20. 2s. 6d. in 3 mos. Trust. F. J. Strange, accountant, Bath WILLSDON, GEORGE, coal merchant, Shillingford. 2s. 6d, in 1 mo Jan. 27. WILLIAMS, JOHN, candle manufacturer, Menai-bridge, co. Anglesea. Jan. 29. 2s. 6d. in 31 days WINTER, GEORGE WILLIAM HENRY, hosier, Leeds. Jan. 23. 54. by two equal instalments, in 3 and 6 mos from Jan. 25guaranteed WOOLLATT, GEORGE, upholsterer, Derby. Jan. 12. Trusts. H. R. Ellington, Watling-st, and H. R. Kynaston, Gresham-st, warehouseman Gazette, Feb. 16. ACTON, EDWARD, draper, Liverpool and Rhyl. Jan. 16. Trusts. J. Howell, St. Paul's Churchyard, and J. Scott, jun., Cannon-st, both warehousemen ARCHER, HENRY, tailor, Blackpool. Jan. 18. Trust. G. Teale, draper, Preston ARCULUS, ISAAC, bootmaker, Birmingham. Feb. 8. 58. on demand, at any time after Feb. 13 BADEN, THOMAS JENNER, farmer, Shalbourne. Jan. 14. Trusts. J. Brunsden, Shalton Saint Margaret, H. Selfe, Marten. Z. Carker, Wilton, J. Woolford, Snodahill, all farmers, and H. J. Briant, miller, Shalbourne BAILEY, JOHN, NC hp, 11 BAILEY, ROBERT, millers, Boston. Jan. 18. Trusts. T. Wise, banker, and T. Wedd, merchant, both Boston BAXTER, SAMUEL, grocer, Kidsgrove, Jan. 6. Trusts. B. Collett, wholesale grocer, Stafford, and W. Hollinshead, commission agent, Burslem BENEDICT, ELIAS, jeweller, Liverpool. Jan. 27. 78. Gd, by three equal instalments, in 2, 3, and 5 mos from rezistration BROOKING, NICHOLAS, gentleman, Dartmouth. Jan. 30. 58. in 28 days BUNNETT, WILLIAM JACOB, blind maker, Westminster-bridge. rd, Lambeth. Feb. 1. 48. by two equal instalments, in 1 and 3 mos from registration CROSS, MARGARET, licensed victualler, Manchester. Jan. 29. 10s. in 1 mo from registration DOCWRA, CHARLES WHITSEY, cheesemonger. Lambeth - walk, and Tavistock-st, Covent-garden. Jan. 18. Trust. M. C. Haughton, accountant, Lower Thames st ENTWISTLE, JOHN, farmer, Brindle. Jan. 25. 6. 8. by three instalments, 3s. on Feb. 1, 182, 2s. on Feb. 1, 1870, and 1s. 84. on Feb. 1, 1871-secured. Trusts. J. Hatch, carter, Bolton-leMoors, and W. Ireland, farm labourer. Brindle ETHERIDGE, WILLIAM, stonemason, Williams-ter, Rotherhithe. Feb. 9. 2s. 6d. in 7 days from registration. Trust. J. Morse builder, Lucy-rd, Bermondsey FORD, JOHN STEPHEN, out of business. Woodland-cottage, Cator-st, Peckham. Feb. 9. Trust. R. Boreham, fly master, Cator-st, Peckham BREAKFAST-EPPS'S COCOA-GRATEFUL AND COMFORTING. The agreeable character of this preparation has rendered it a general favourite. The Civil Service Gazette says: "The singular success Mr. Epps attained by his homeopathic preparation of cocoa has never been surpassed by any experimentalist." Simply made with boiling water or milk. Prepared solely by JAMES EFFS and Co., Homeopathic Chemists, London; and sold by the trade in all parts, in lb., lb., and 1lb. packets, tinlined and labelled.-[ADVT.] THE MANUFACTURE OF WATCHES AND CLOCKS.-A most interesting and instructive little work, describing briefly, but with great clearness, the rise and progress of watch and clock making, has just been published by Mr. J. W. Benson, of 25, Old Bond-street, 99, West. bourne-grove, and the City Steam Factory, 58 and 60, Ludgate-hill. The book, which is profusely illustrated, gives a full description of the various kinds of watches and clocks, with their prices, and no one should make a purchase without visiting the above establishments, or consulting this truly valuable work. By its aid, persons residing in any part of the United Kingdom, India or the Colonies are enabled to select for themselves the watch best adapted to their use and have it sent to them with perfect safety. Mr. Benson, who holds the appointment to the Prince of Wales, sends this pamphlet to any address on receipt of two postage stamps, and we cannot too strongly recommend it to the notice of the intending purchaser.-[ADVT.] A SUCCESS UNPRECEDENTED-MARAVILLA COCOA IS PERFECTION.-The Globe says "Taylor Brothers' Mara villa Cocoa has achieved a thorough success, and supersedes every other cocoa in the market. For homœopaths aud invalids we could not recommend a more argeeable or valuable beverage." Sold in packets only, by all Grocers.-[ADVT.] three equal instalments, on Feb. 1, 1870, and each succeeding PARTRIDGE AND year W. Clayton, commercial agent, Gateshead, and R. P. Hardcastle, chemist, Newcastle-upon-Tyne HULME, SAMUEL, provision dealer, Hulme. Jan. 20. Trust. J. B. Sheridan, auctioneer, Manchester HUMPHREYS, JOHN, builder, Kenilworth Castle, Kilburn. Feb. 10. 3s, in 21 days from registration IVEY, CLEMENT DUNSFORD, cordwainer, Devonport. Jan. 21. 28. 61. on March 15 JOHNSON, JOHN, builder, Lambourn-rd, Clapham. Feb. 3. 10s. on May 6 JOHNSON, JOSEPH, cheesemonger, Mare-st, Hackney. Feb. 11. 5. in 3 mos from registration. Trust. J. R. Heron, gentleman, Ely-pl, Holborn KEOGH. HENRY, confectioner, Wycombe-ter, Holloway. Feb. 9. 1s. on Dec. 31 MEADOWCROFT, JOHN, provision dealer, Stafford. Jan. 30. Trusts. W. Hewitt, grocer, Hanley, and G. Jepson, miller, Madeley MOOS, DAVID, merchant, Basinghall-st. Jan. 7. Trusts. J. R. Clarke, accountant, King-st, and H. Eschwege, merchant, Coleman-st NAPPER, GIDEON, licensed victualler, Keynsham. Jan. 11. Trusts. C. Fisher and W. L. Fear, wine merchants, both Bristol PARKER, WILLIAM, tailor, Hastings. Jan. 18. Trusts. T. B. Ritchie, woollen draper, Gresham-st, and C. J. Wornersley, auctioneer. Hastings ROGERS, GEORGE, cabinet maker, Hotwells. Jan. 13. Trusts. H. M. Leslie, banker, and A. A. Taylor, linendraper, both Bristol STOWER, JACOB SINGLETON, and BLANSHARD, WILLIAM, grocers, Boston. Jan. 19. Trusts. W. Armstrong, gentleman, Boston, J. Roberts, jun., wholesale grocer, Leicester, and J. E. Mawson, tobacco manufacturer, Boston WALKER, WILLIAM, trimming manufacturer, Falcon-st. Feb. 15. 10. by three equal instalments, on April 1, June 1, and Aug. 2 next WALL, HENRY, tailor, St. Swithin's-la. Jan. 16. Trusts. W. Yates, warehouseman, Aldermanbury, and J. Wood, woollen warehouseman, Cheapside WATSON, JAMES COPE, miller, Langtoft. Jan. 18. Trust. T. G. Marshall, bank agent, Great Driffield WEEDON, WILLIAM, plumber, Bristol. Jan. 28. 6s. by two equal instalments, in 3 and 6 mos,-secured BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. CROSSE. On the 14th inst., the wife of Thomas Neufville Crosse, solicitor, of a son. GUNDRY.-On the 13th inst., at The Cottage, Bridport, Dorset, the wife of J. P. F. Gundry, Esq., of a son. KAYE. On the 9th inst., at Potter's-bar, the wife of James Kaye, barrister-at-law, of a son. SIMMONS. On the 16th inst., at No. 82, Oakley-street, Chelsen, the wife of John Simmons, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a daughter. STRATTON. On the 11th inst., at 16, Norfolk-street. Park-lane, the wife of George Stratton, Esq., barrister-at-law, of a daughter. TRUEFITT. On the 16th inst., at 18, Weighton-road, South Pengepark, the wife of F. Truefitt, Esq., solicitor, of a son. MARRIAGE. THOMPSON-WADE.-Or the 9th inst., at Leeds, Vincent T. Thompson, Esq., of Lincoln's-inn, barrister-at-law, eldest son of the late Mr. Serit. Thompson, to Eleanor, second daughter of J. Wade, Esq., of Leeds. DEATHS. BERKELEY. On the 8th inst., at his residence, 18, Russell-square, aged 74, Charles Berkeley, Esq., of 32, Lincoln's-inn-fields. GASKELL-On the 29th Dec., at Hongkong, aged 57, William Gaskell, Esq., formerly Queen's Proctor and Crown Solicitor. GURNEY. On the 16th inst., at No. 21, Loraine-place, Hollowayroad, aged 55, Mr. Thomas Nelson Golding Gurney, of No. 7, Furnival's-inn, Holborn, solicitor. HANMER.-On the 8th inst, aged 57, Thomas Hanmer, Esq., of the Middle Temple. LANE. On the 31st ult., at the Castle Green, Hereford, Julia Ellen, daughter of the late Theophilus Lane, Esq., solicitor, of that city. LANGHAM. On the 13th inst., aged 3, Marion Elizabeth, the only daughter of Frederick Adolphus Langham, of 2, Priory-houses, Hastings, solicitor LEBURN.-On the 11th inst., at No. 56, George-square, Edinburgh, Thomas Leburn, Esq., solicitor, Supreme Courts. MASON. On the 12th inst., at Barton-upon-Humber, aged 26, Sarah Jane, the beloved wife of Henry Edward Mason, solicitor. MARKBY.-On the 10th inst., at the residence of her son-in-law, the Rev. Francis Duke, Chaplain's House, County Gaol, Lewes, aged 64, Jane, widow of Edward Gillam Markby, solicitor, of Chatteris, county Cambridge. OLIVER. On the 16th inst., at 14, St. Mary Abbots-terrace, Kensington, aged 12, Leonard Chabrol, the second son of the late James Oliver, Esq., barrister-at-law, of Ladbroke-square. SHIELL. On the 14th inst., at King-street House, Dundee. Alexandrina Ursula Wilhelmina Korn, wife of John Shiell, of Smithfield, solicitor, Dundee. COOPER (Late PARTRIDGE and COZENS), WHOLESALE & RETAIL STATIONERS, 92, FLEET-STREET, AND 1 & 2, CHANCERY-LANE, LONDON, E.C. ANNUITIES AND REVERSIONS. CS, CHANCERY-LANE, LONDON. CHAIRMAN.-The Right Hon. Russell Gurney, Q.C., M.P., Recorder of London. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN.-Sir W. J. Alexander, Bart., Q.C. Reversions and Life Interests purchased. Immediate and Deferred Annuities granted in exchange for Reversionary and Contingent Interests. Annuities, Immediate, Deferred, and Contingent, and also Endowments, granted on favourable terms. Loans may also be obtained on the security of Reversions. Prospectuses and Forms of Proposal, and all further infor mation, may be had at the office. C. B. CLABON, S MPERIAL LIFE INSURANCE CHIEF OFFICE.-No. 1, Old Broad-street, London. The outstanding sums assured by this Company, with the Bonuses accrued thereon, amounting to about 2,800,000, and the Assets, consisting entirely of Investments in first-class securities, amount to upwards of 950,000Z. The Assurance Reserve Fund alone is equal to more than nine times the premium income. It will hence be seen that ample Security is guaranteed to the policy holders. Attention is invited to the prospectus of the company, from which it will appear that all kinds of a surances may be effected on the most moderate terms and the most liberal conditions. The company also grants annuities and endowments. Prospectuses may be obtained at the offices as above, and of the agents throughout the kingdom. ANDREW BADEN, Actuary and Manager. LEADING ARTICLES, SUMMARIES, 824 830 834 321 321 321 322 Beerhouses...... 322 County Court Costs (Common Law) 323 Principal and Agent 324 To Readers and Correspondents. A LAW STUDENT (Bristol).-This question as stated is All communications must be authenticated by the name THE Law and the Lawyers. MR. MONK has introduced a Bill to remove the Mr. THRING, who has been for many years the We understand that the Liverpool Law Society has just become a body corporate under the title of "The Incorporated Law Society of 321 Liverpool." This has been effected under sect. 23 of the Companies Act 1867, by which an association formed for the purpose of promoting commerce, art, science, religion, charity, or any other useful object, and not for gain, may, on obtaining a licence from the Board of Trade, be registered with limited liability without the addition of the word "limited" to its name. The society has thus acquired a legal status, perpetual succession, and a common seal, and its property will be vested in itself instead of in trustees. This inexpensive mode of incorporation will, it is believed, be found a great boon to societies and institutions of various kinds which have hitherto been prevented from becoming incorporated by the great cost of a Royal Charter. 326 326 326 327 Benchers of the Inner Temple after an inquiry protracted over six months considered it proved, and made an order disbarring Mr. GILL, which they caused to be served upon all the law and equity Judges as well as on other persons. Against this decision Mr. GILL appealed to the Judges of the Superior Courts of common law, before whom the whole of the evidence taken before the Benchers was carefully reviewed, and counsel heard for both parties. A lengthened inquiry has just terminated most favourably to Mr. GILL. The Judges exonerate him from the charge of unprofessional conduct, and acquit him of any conduct inconsistent with the character of a man of honour and a gentleman, and they have unanimously determined that the order of the Benchers disbarring Mr. GILL must be reversed. It is not in our power to examine comparatively the grounds upon which they have come to this conclusion. That they have done so is sufficiently remarkable; but that the judges, of whom there were six present, should unanimously decide upon a question of fact contrary to the Benchers of the Inner Temple, when the question was one dictating leniency rather than still. Whilst, however, we sincerely commiserate harshness to the accused, is more remarkable Mr. GILL, and even venture to hope that the Inner Temple may do all in their power to compensate him for the ruin they have brought upon him by an erroneous judgment, we have to thank him for calling forth a judicial exposition on the subject of the jurisdiction of the benchers. "In the first place," says Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN, in delivering judgment, "with respect to the suggestion that our jurisdiction is limited, seeing that the benchers have, acted bona fide, and the proceedings having been conducted according to the customary course, we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that we possess, and are called upon to exercise, an appellate jurisdiction, in the fullest sense of the term, and that it is our province and duty to satisfy ourselves, not only that the charge against the appellant was one on which, if established, he could be properly disbarred, but also that there was evidence sufficient to establish the charge. If, upon either of these grounds, the results of the inquiry has been to produce in our minds a conviction that the decision of the benchers, however well intended, was erroneous, with every possible respect to the members of that body, the decision they have come to ought not to prevent our doing justice to the appellant." This is very important, because in the case of ordinary tribunals if a judgment is bona fide come to on a question of facs, there is no appeal. Questions of fact, however, are all that the benchers have to try, and to say that bona fides should exempt them from appeal would have been to say that there should have been no appeal at all. "We are satis The second Bill is "further to facilitate pro- We have said we cannot examine the grounds 338 338 338 338 338 338 340 CHARGES FOR ADVERTISEMENTS. Four lines or thirty words..................... 3s. 6d. Every additional ten words 08. 6d. Advertisements specially ordered for the first page are charged one-fourth more than the above scale. Advertisements must reach the office not later than five o'clock on Thursday afternoon. NOTICE. Subscribers and Advertisers are requested to make their VOL. XLVI.-No. 1352. being the victimiser, the Judges appear to think that he was the victim. For they say, "We do not infer from the facts of this case that Mr. GILL, in entering into this transaction, had any Then so far from the unfortunate barrister MR. GILL AND THE BENCHERS OF THE intention of deceiving Miss. DODD, and appro INNER TEMPLE. THIS case which has excited considerable interest priating her money to his own use; but, on the contrary, the evidence satisfies us that the loan originated in the urgent pressure put upon the appellant by Miss DODD to allow her a far larger amount than his means would admit of, and arose as much from the desire of Mr. GILL to make provision for her, and to put an end to the connection." And the upshot of the whole matter is, that Miss DODD, with her eyes open, invested her money in bad security, which Mr. GILL honestly believed to be good. "For the reasons given," conclude the Judges, "we think the transaction was a bona fide one on the part of Mr. GILL; that he acted as well with a desire to make a provision for Miss DODD and her child as with a view to his own interests; that he intended to work the quarry and pay Miss DODD according to the terms of the deed, and that the non-fulfilment of the instrument was due to the unfortunate circumstance of the fault which was discovered in 1865, and consequently that it was impossible to work the quarry without a large increase of capital. And the fact that Mr. GILL also gave personal security tends to show his bona fides in giving the security on the quarry, because by this deed he would be personally liable in the event of the security failing." And finally they say, "We acquit him of any endeavour dishonestly or dishonourably to obtain Miss DODD's money for his own purposes on delusive and worthless security. We think he took her money honestly, for the purpose of expending it on the quarry, and with the intention to pay her the annuity, and that he expected in the end to be able to pay it out of the future working of the quarries, and that he intended to apply that sum, and in fact did apply a sum considerably exceeding the amount of the loan for that purpose. We therefore determine that the order of the benchers of the Inner Temple, disbarring Mr. GILL, must be set aside." We have omitted one small paragraph in the judgment which we shall here notice. In that paragraph the Judges regret that a gentleman at the Bar should have entered into a transaction whereby reference being had to the circumstances in which the parties were placed relatively to one another, was so much open to question, and that he should not have left the preparation of the deed to some person appointed by Miss DODD. This case is a caution to counsel always to have an independent solicitor in the matter especially where the client is a friend, or perhaps a relative. In fact, we are sure certain counsel would do well if in the first place they always sent friends and relatives to strangers to do their legal business for them. But such matters must be left to the discretion of individuals. such a conclusion instead of a definition that does not define. But he goes further still. Not only in his judgment may there be an unlawful restraint of trade without unlawful coercion, but it may even be without such obstruction or molestation as that referred to above; and he proceeds to argue that a combination to stop or impede the supply of labour by making conditions is also unlawful. This argument is curious, and its importance cannot be exaggerated; for, if he is right, it strikes the trades unions at the root by making the avowed object of such unions unlawful. A trades union, established for its proper purpose and limiting itself strictly to its own proper objects, is simply an association of workmen to determine by mutual arrangement at what price they will sell their labour. All beyond this are excrescences, good or bad, as the case may be, and diversions from the original design. But according to Sir W. ERLE, such a combination is in restraint of trade, and, therefore, illegal-a conclusion from which we venture, with all deference to so great an authority, entirely to dissent. Sir W. ERLE's argument is this: "I assume that the employer and employed have each a right to a free course for trade in labour. The supply of labour to the employer is stopped if the working man chooses to stop; and assuming for the present that his act is lawful, whenever he freely chooses so to do, still a party who induces him so to do may, in so doing, infringe the right of the employer to a free course for the supply of labour." And he illustrates his position thus: "I take the case of money paid to the working man to induce him to stop (work, we presume, was intended), in which the motive for so paying was malice towards the employer-that is, some corrupt or spiteful motive. I put aside money so paid from a motive of supposed interest, as in the case of some strikes, and assume it to be paid for the sole purpose of ruining the employer or destroying his manufacture. A question is thus raised, Does the law allow it? I think not. A stop in the supply of labour is obviously SIR W. ERLE ON THE LAW OF TRADES a damage in every trade; the causing of a stop is a restraint of trade, and all restraint of trade is presumed to be unlawful until the contrary is shown. Such a stop may be lawful; as, for instance, where the money is paid by a competitor offering higher wages to obtain workmen ; but, in the case supposed, the money is paid, sole purpose of causing damage to that party 'not for work' for a particular party, for the whose supply is stopped." UNIONS. WHAT is "unlawful coercion ?" Definition is difficult, but, says Sir W. ERLE, "it seems clear that the causing of damage to the person, or the property, or the estimation, of the party to be coerced, either by unlawful action, or by falsehood (including all deception), or by causing the fear of such damage from unlawful action or falsehood, or by obstructing the party who is to be coerced in the exercise of any right connected with trade by unlawful action or by falsehood, for the purpose of swaying or defeating his will in disposing of his labour or his capital, would be instances of unlawful coercion, and so of unlawful restraint of trade." These are clearly coercions, which the law forbids; but Sir W. ERLE "submits," by which we presume he intends to say that it is his own opinion but not yet confirmed by actual decision, "that there may also be unlawful obstruction of the free course of trade without any such unlawful coercion as is above described. Restraint of the free course for trade or labour by acts of molestation or obstruction, which are not otherwise unlawful, but which operate as an hindrance to the fexercise of a trade, and which are done for the purpose of such hindrance with out justification, seems to me, as above stated, to be an actionable wrong. The Act of 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, is, in my opinion, declaratory of the common law as to the offence, and operative only to make a summary remedy. The statute declares acts of molestation and obstruction, as well as acts of violence, intimidation, and threats, to be an offence." It must be admitted that this definition is not very clear, and would afford little help in determining whether any particular acts amount to "unlawful coercion." What we want to know, and what we had hoped that the great legal acumen of the author's mind and his large judicial experience would have enabled him to supply, was something like an indication of limit at which lawful influence becomes "unlawful coercion," for that has been the real question at issue in the more recent cases. It may be that it is incapable of definition; that it is a question of evidence only, to be determined on a review of all the circumstances of the particular case: but we should have been better pleased to have had Sir W. ERLE's authority for It seems to us that the fallacy of this argument lurks in the use of the term "from motives of malice" to the employer. That is of the very essence of the offence. If any persons combine maliciously to injure another in almost any manner they would be guilty of a misdemeanor; but the answer of the trades union is, that malice, either towards the particular employer or towards employers generally, is not their motive; they combine for the honest and lawful purpose of obtaining the best price for their labour, and that it is not a conspiracy, but a species of partnership. If this lawful object should be, as too often it is, departed from, and malice is substituted for barter, the object of the combination laws becomes unlawful. The union would become itself unlawful. In all this class of questions motive is of the essence of offence. "If two or more," says Sir W. ERLE, "combined for the purpose of so causing damage, the combination would, I believe, be a crime." So we say; but then we deny that the object of the unions is to cause damage. "If," he adds, a person would be material as a witness at an approaching trial, would it not be a wrongful obstruction to the course of justice for the adverse party to pay him to conceal himself, so that he could not be summoned to attend, although no duty to attend would be created before service of a summons? And so, before the statute against corrupt practices at elections, would not an action have lain for paying a voter to be out of the way at polling time?" Here, again, arises the question of motive. There is no real analogy between the cases of a trades union agreeing not to work save at a certain price, and a suitor maliciously sending away a material witness for his opponent. The one is a combination to do what they please with their own, and the other is an act done purposely to deprive another of something that belongs to him, for the evidence of a witness is the property of the public, and any person who wants it for the purposes of justice has a right to possess it. If we had a doubt before, it would be confirmed by the conclusion to which the argument has logically led the writer. "What has been said of gifts of money for the purpose of stopping supply of labour is true, mutatis mutandis, of persuasion for the same purpose;" that is to say, it is unlawful for two or more men to agree together to persuade other men not to work for less than a certain amount of wages, and this would extend, we presume, to persuasion by writing as well as speech, so that it would be illegal, for instance, for the editors of two newspapers to agree to recommend other editors not to accept less than a certain salary. It must be borne in mind, however, that the author is treating of the common law and not of the statute law. How far, then, is combination lawful? "Each person," he remarks, "has a right to choose whether he will labour or not, and also to choose the terms on which he will consent to labour, if labour be his choice. The power of choice in respect of labour and terms, which one person may exercise and declare singly, many, after consultation, may exercise jointly, and they may make a simultaneous declaration of their choice and may lawfully act thereon for the immediate purpose of obtaining the required terms." Then comes this very subtle distinction: "Any arrangement for that purpose, whatever be its purport or form, does not bind as an agreement, but is illegal though not unlawful on account of restraint of trade, and therefore void." Being void, nobody is, of course, bound by his agreement, and may take what wages he pleases, and if any attempt is made to enforce it by coercion of any kind it is an attempt to obstruct in the lawful exercise of the right to the free course of trade. And he concludes this portion of his review of the common-law liabilities for interference with freedom of trade with this dogma derived from Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47: "A person can noithor alienato for a time his freedom to dispose of his own labour or his own capital, according to his own will, nor alienate such freedom generally and make himself a slave; and it follows that he cannot transfer it to the governing body of the union." An examination of this position must be reserved for another week. BEERHOUSES. AN influential deputation has waited upon the Home Secretary to recommend the transfer of the licensing of beerhouses from the Excise to the magistrates. Mr. BRUCE received them with his usual courtesy, and listened with attention to their remarks, but he threw out some very pertinent observations which the deputation appear to have found a difficulty in answering. The United Kingdom Alliance are clamouring to take entirely from the magistrates the granting of licences, a demand quite inconsistent with the suggestion of the deputation, that beer licences should be transferred to them. No answer was given to this objection. One gentleman proposed that a magistrate should be prohibited from sitting upon the bench when an application was considered for the licence of any public house or beerhouse situate upon his own property. But Mr. BRUCE at once suggested that in many country parishes they would get no licences, for they would find no magistrates not landowners, and the secretary of the Society hinted to his officious colleagues that the law already provided sufficiently for this by prohibiting a justice from voting for a licence in which he has an interest. Mr. BRUCE said that it would be impossible with the mass of business before them to touch the great licensing question this Session; but the present proposal was limited to one point of it only, and therefore he would submit it to his colleagues. There can be no doubt of the desirable nature of the proposed change. In practice, beerhouses are exempt from the supervision exercised over the regular public-houses. The licences are granted by the Excise, without inquiry or the slightest reference to the requirements of the locality. They are the nests of crime, and have not a solitary advantage to set off against their undisputed mischiefs. The transfer of the licences to the magistrates and subjecting them to the same control as public-houses is so obvious a remedy for the evil of which all complain, that the only surprise one feels is that it has not been adopted long ago. COUNTY COURT COSTS (COMMON LAW). defendant was entitled to his costs as between The next provisions on the subject of costs are found in the County Courts Act 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 61). By sections 11-13 of that Act, THE loose phraseology of the County Courts Act plaintiffs in the Superior Courts, who recover in of 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 142) has drawn forth actions of contract, other than those for breach observations from several of the Judges who of promise of marriage, a sum not exceeding have been called on to interpret the provisions 201., or, in actions of tort, a sum not exceeding of that statute, and the Superior Courts will 51, were to "have judgment to recover such sum beyond doubt have to decide a good many ques-only, and no costs," except in certain cases; tions relating to it which still perplex the viz., (1), in case of a judgment by default; (2) practitioner, and on which, in the absence of where a sum less than those above mentioned express decisions, it is impossible to advise conwas recovered by verdict, and the Judge, or fidently one way or the other. The law relating other presiding officer, certified on the back of to the subject of costs, however, is gradually the record (a)" that it appeared to him at the assuming a more complete shape than that trial that the cause of action was one for which relating to others which might be suggested, and a plaint could not have been entered in any it is proposed in this article to present the reader such County Court as aforesaid, or (b) that it with a brief sketch of the history of the law appeared to him at the trial that there was a relating to it, and a summary of the law as it sufficient reason for bringing the said action in exists at present. the court in which the said action was brought:" in either of those cases, the plaintiff was to have the same judgment to recover his costs as he would have had if the Act had not been passed; (3) where, whether there was a verdict or not, the plaintiff should make it appear to the satisfaction of the court in which the action was brought, or to the satisfaction of a Judge at chambers (a) that the case was one of concurrent jurisdiction, or (b) one for which no plaint could have been entered in the County Court, or (c) that the cause was removed from a County Court by certiorari. In any of these eases the court or judge might by rule or order direct that the plaintiff should recover his costs, and thereupon the plaintiff was to have the same judgment to recover his costs that he would have had if the Act had not passed. Independently of the enactments relating to the County Courts (which are purely statutory tribunals), the old rule of law as laid down by the Statute of Gloucester (6 Edw. 1, c. 1) was, that the plaintiff in all actions in which he recovered damages against the defendant should also recover against him his costs of suit. This was held to apply to all actions of trespass, trover, case, assumpsit, debt upon contract, covenant, replevin, and ejectment. Various statutes were subsequently passed limiting the plaintiff's right to costs where the damages recovered by him were below a certain amount, and in some cases rendering necessary a certificate from the Judge. The law relating to costs, independently of the County Courts Acts, has thus been summed up: "In actions on the case for slanderous words merely, that is to say, words actionable in themselves, if the plaintiff recovers less than 40s., he, unless the Judge certifies under the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, s. 2, gets no costs; and, if the Judge does so cortify, then a the plaintiff only recovers as much costs as damages. In other actions on the case, and in actions of trespass, if the plaintiff recovers less than 40s., he can have no costs whatever, unless the Judge certifies that the action was brought to try a right, besides the mere right to recover damages, or that the trespass was wilful and malicious, or unless it be suggested on the roll that the action was for trespass to lands, &c., after notice. In other personal actions, if the plaintiff recovers less than 40s., he is, so far as regards the above statutes, and without reference to the County Courts Acts, entitled to his full costs, unless the judge who tries the cause certifies to deprive him of them; but this the judge may do if he think fit. By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1860, sect. 34, the plaintiff in an action for a wrong, where he recovers by the verdict of a jury less than 5, is not entitled to recover costs from the defendant in respect of such verdict, whether given upon an issue tried or judgment by default, if the judge or presiding officer before whom such verdict is obtained, immediately afterwards certifies that the action was not brought to try a right besides the mere right to recover damages, and that the trespass or grievance in respect of which the action was brought was not wilful and malicious, and that the action was not fit to be brought." The alterations made by the County Courts Acts in these general rules of law relating to costs were as follows: The first County Courts Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 59), by sect, 128, in cases where the plaintiff and defendant dwelt more than twenty miles apart, or where the cause of action did not arise wholly or in some material point within the jurisdiction of the County Court within which the defendant dwelt or carried on his business, or where an officer of the County Court was a party, allowed the action still to be brought in a Superior Court. This was the class of cases in which there was concurrent jurisdiction; and on proof of the concurrent jurisdiction the successful plaintiff was entitled to his costs. Where there was not concurrent jurisdiction, if the plaintiff recovered a verdict for less than 20%. if the action were founded on contract, or less than 51. if founded on tort, by sect, 179 of the same Act he was to "have judgment to recover such sum only, and no costs;" and a successful Sect. 4 of the County Courts Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 54) repealed the last portion of the preceding enactments, and provided that in any action in which the plaintiff should not be entitled to recover his costs by reason of the provisions of the 11th section of the Act of 1850, whether there were a verdict in such action or not, if the plaintiff made it appear to the satisfaction of the court in which the action was brought or Judge at chambers, that (1) the case was one of concurrent jurisdiction, or (2) one for which no plaint could be entered in the County Court, or (3) that the action had been removed from a County Court by certiorari, or (4) that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in a Superior Court-in all these cases the court or judge should by rule or order direct that the plaintiff should recover his costs. Lastly, sect. 30 of the Act of 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 108) deprived the plaintiff of costs in case of a judgment by default in actions of contract brought in a Superior Court "for a sum not exceeding 201.," unless "upon an application to such court or to a Judge of one of the Superior Courts, such court or Judge should otherwise direct." In this state the law relating to costs stood down to the passing of the County Courts Act of 1867, and the effect of it is thus summed up by Willes, J. in Mount v. Taylor, L. Rep. 3 C. P. 651; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 479, "I find this state of things-certain cases in which no plaint could be entered. These may be divided into two species, 1st, those in which it appeared on the record that there could be no plaint, and in which a prohibition would have been granted on reading the record; 2nd, those which in their nature were equally out of the jurisdiction of the County Courts, but in which that did not appear on the face of the record. . . These two species of cases fall under the same category, and are treated in 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 58. Then there was the class of cases in which there was concurrent jurisdiction; cases in which County Courts had jurisdiction, and in which there were no latent circumstances which would take away the right, but in which an action might also be brought in the Superior Courts at the option of the plaintiff, with a perfect right to costs upon proving the concurrent jurisdiction. A 3rd category included cases in which, though there was concurrent jurisdiction, there was sufficient ground for bringing the action in a Superior Court, as, for instance, cases in which, though the damage were small, the decision would effect important interests. In this class costs were to be allowed upon proof of the sufficient ground. The 4th category would All the former enactments in the County Courts Acts with respect to costs were repealed by the Act of 1867 (see 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 33, sched. C), which substitutes for them the following provisions (sect. 5), "If in any action commenced after the passing of this Act [20th Aug. 1867] in any of Her Majesty's Superior Courts of Record, the plaintiff shall recover a sum not exceeding 201, if the action is founded on contract, or 107. if founded on tort, whether by verdict, judgment by default, or on demurrer, or otherwise, he shall not be entitled to any costs of suit unless the Judge certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing such action in such Superior Court, or unless the court or a Judge at chambers shall by rule or order allow such costs," and by sect. 36, the Act was to come into operation on the 1st Jan. 1868. This provision left the limit in actions of contract the same as before, viz., 20l., but altered that in actions of tort from 57. to 107.; and the words of the section being perfectly general would at first sight seem to apply to actions which cannot (as actions for malicious prosecution, libel, slander, or seduction), as well as those which can be commenced in a County Court, but the case of Gray v. West (not yet reported), to which reference will again be made, is a decision the other way. The language of sect. 36, postponing the operation of the Act, was held to control that of sect. 5, and so a plaintiff who recovered less than 201 in an action of contract commenced in a Superior Court after the 20th Aug. 1867, but before the 1st Jan., 1868, was held entitled to his costs Wood v. Riley, 17 L. T. Rep. N. S. 216; 37 L. J. C. P.24), as the Act was to have no operation until the 1st. Jan. 1868. But when once it did come into operation, it was held to operate with refer ence to this section from the 20th Aug. 1867, the day of its passing; so that a plaintiff who after the 20th Aug. 1867, brought an action to recover a sum of 4. 10s, judgment not being signed till the 2nd Jan. 1868, was refused his costs, (Wood v. Hunt, 16 W. R. 678.) As to the plaintiff's right to costs where the action was commenced before the passing of the Act, but the application for costs was not made until after the 1st Jan. 1868, the decisions have not been in harmony. In the case of Restall v. London and South-Western Railway Company (L. Rep. 3 Ex. 141; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 331), where the action had been commenced before the 20th Aug. 1867 and the verdict found before the 1st Jan. 1868, the Court of Exchequer held the plaintiff entitled to his costs as a matter of right, being of opinion that the Act of 1867 did not deprive the court or a judge of the power to make an order for the plaintiff's costs. The plaintiff was held entitled to his costs in this case, not on the ground that the Statute of Gloucester had been revived by the repeal of the enactments disentitling the plaintiff to costs without the order of the court or a judge, but on the ground that the power of granting the order had not been taken away by the Act of 1867. In Butcher v. Henderson (L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 335), however, the Court of Queen's Bench refused to follow this decision, and held that sect. 4 of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 54, which empowered the court or a judge to give a plaintiff an order for his costs having been repealed by the Act of 1867, they had no power to make any order for costs, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any costs without it. The Court of Queen's Bench was also of opinion that sect. 11 of the Act of 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 61) was a repeal of the Statute of Gloucester so far as applicable to actions commenced after the passing of that Act, and that the repeal of that section did not revive the Statute of Gloucester as to actions commenced before the Act of 1867 received the Royal assent. Here were two decisions directly conflicting. In Mount v. Taylor, L. Rep. 3 C. P. 645; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 476, where the action had been brought and a verdict recovered, subject to a reference, before the 20th Aug. 1867, but the award in favour of the plaintiff for 5l. was not made until after the 1st Jan. 1868, the right to costs in case of actions commenced before the passing of the Act of 1867 was fully discussed, and the Court of Common Pleas held that the Statute of Gloucester had not been repealed at all as to the classes of cases in which, under the former County Courts Acts, the plaintiff was entitled to his costs on obtaining a Judge's order or fulfilling the other conditions contained in those Acts, but had as to those in which the plaintiff could in no way obtain his costs; that the effect of the repealing enactments in the Act of 1867 was to remove all such conditions in the former classes of cases without imposing any fresh ones as to actions commenced before the passing of that Act, and that the plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to his costs under the Statute of Gloucester, independently of a Judge's order. As to the repeal of the Statute of Gloucester by the former County Courts Acts, Chief Justice Bovill says: "No doubt in some cases it was modified, and therefore to some extent and in one sense it was constructively repealed. But on a careful consideration of the County Courts Acts it seems to me that they do not amount to a repeal of the Statute of Gloucester within Lord Brougham's Act. The Statute of Gloucester is the foundation of the plaintiff's right to costs, and the County Courts Acts superadd conditions to the plaintiff's right to them in certain cases; and if the operation of these statutes be only to superadd certain conditions, and another statute takes away these conditions, or substitutes other conditions, the original statute, in my opinion, remains in force. . . . Then can it be said that the County Courts Acts repealed the Statute of Gloucester in cases where the County Court has no jurisdiction? The question seems to answer itself. Where the jurisdiction is expressly excluded, these statutes have no application; and I think it can only be where the plaint would lie that we could say there was any repeal." The reasoning of Willes, J., who gave a similar judgment, makes an ingenious distinction. "If the records of the court," he says, "be searched from the passing of the County Courts Acts to the present day, it will be found that the costs have always been taxed upon the Statute of Gloucester, and not upon the order of the Judge, that order being treated only as evidence of the right. They lead to the inevitable conclusion that the Statute of Gloucester was in force as to all cases in which a Judge's order could be obtained under the County Courts Acts, and that it was the Statute of Gloucester in such cases which gave the plaintiff his costs, while the County Courts Acts rendered the obtaining a judge's order a necessary condition, and it is the statutes imposing this condition only which have been repealed by the Act of 1867." The Court of Queen's Bench has, in the case of Levi v. Sanderson (see the LAW TIMES REPORTS of this week), 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 822, given its assent to the reasoning and decision of the Court of Common Pleas in Mount v. Taylor "looking to these authorities, and having regard to the desirableness of uniformity of decision in cases of this nature." In Levi v. Sanderson, the case was one of concurrent jurisdiction commenced on the 12th April 1867, and tried in a County Court by order of a Judge in July 1868, when a verdict was returned for 57. 10s. The courts are, therefore, now agreed in holding a plaintiff entitled to his costs under the Statute of Gloucester in cases of either exclusive jurisdiction (as in Mount v. Taylor), or concurrent jurisdiction (as in Levi v. Sanderson) where the action was commenced before the passing of the Act of 1867, and remained incomplete on the 1st Jan. 1868. As to actions commenced after the passing of the Act of 1867; by the 5th section of that Act the plaintiff must recover over 207. in contract, or 107. in tort in order to be entitled to costs; unless (1) the Judge certify on the record that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Superior Court, or (2) unless the court or a Judge at chambers shall by rule or order allow such costs. At first sight, as pointed out in an article of last week on this subject, it would seem that it was intended by this section that the refusal of the Judge at the time to certify should have the same effect as the refusal of the court or Judge at chambers to make the on " rule or order. But the Court of Queen's Bench in the (still unreported) case of Gray v. West, makes a distinction between the two, confining the power of the Judge at the trial to certifying a single point, namely, whether there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the Superior Court," and holding the power of the court or a Judge at chambers to be "generally to allow the plaintiff his costs;" and the court in that case (which was an action of slander commenced in Oct. 1867, and tried in Trinity Term 1868, when a verdict for 10l. was returned, the judge refusing to certify), held the plaintiff entitled to his costs, and doubted whether the 5th section of the Act of 1867 had any application to cases in which the County Courts had no original jurisdiction. This decision limits the application of sect. 5 to actions which can be commenced in a County Court, and holds the plaintiff in any other action of tort, entitled to his costs if he recovers such an amount of damages as would carry costs according to the general rule applicable to such an action of tort in the Superior Courts, even where the Judge at the trial refuses to certify. This is, beyond doubt, the most important decision on this section which has yet been given, and the analogy of former decisions makes one somewhat anxious to see whether the other courts will feel themselves bound to follow it. other party, who is liable to the principal, and to him alone. But to this rule, the operation of which is obviously in furtherance of the inten tion of the parties, there is an important class of exceptions. An agent, although he appears as such upon the contract, may sue upon it if he is personnally interested, as in respect of commission, in its being carried out, or has some property in the subject-matter of the contract. An auctioneer, for instance, sells goods avowedly as agent for the owner, but he is entitled to sue the vendee for breach of the contract of sale. This was established by Lord Loughborough's judgment in the case of Williams v. Millington (1 H. Bl. 81) where the sale was conducted on the premises of the owner of the goods, and the vendee was aware whose property they were. "An auctioneer," it was said, "has a possession coupled with an interest in goods which he is employed to sell, not a bare custody like a servant or shopman. There is no difference whether the sale be on the premises of the owner or at a public auction-room; for on the premises of the owner an actual possession is given to the auc tioneer and his servants by the owner, not a mere authority to sell. I have said a possession coupled with an interest, but an auctioneer has also a special property in him, with a lien for the charges of the sale, the commission and the In this summary of the law relating to costs auction duty which he is bound to pay. It is as affected by the County Courts Acts, the only not a true position that two persons cannot other case of importance which requires an bring separate actions for the same cause; the allusion is that of Thompson v. Dallas, L. Rep. carrier and the owner of goods may each bring 3 Q. B. 358; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 288, in which it actions on a tort; the factor and owner may each was held that the fact of the plaintiff and defen-have actions on a contract. I am, therefore, upon dant residing at a considerable distance from the whole, decidedly of opinion that this action each other is not to be considered any ground may well be maintained." And the fact that the for the exercise of the discretion to allow costs price of the goods has been paid to the owner by given to the court or Judge by this section. In the vendee will not afford a defence to an action that case it was said that the Judges had met for the price by the auctioneer. To bar such an and discussed the question as to costs under this action the plea alleging payment to the principal section, and had come to the conclusion that dis- must show that by the terms of the sale or tance should not be held a sufficient ground for otherwise a payment to the employer was pergranting costs under it. mitted and operated as a discharge of the plaintiff's claim. The auctioneer having a lien upon the price for his commission is in the position of a factor who sells goods on which he has advanced money, and to an action for goods sold and delivered by such factor it would be no answer that before action the defendant had paid the principal. The law, then, as it stands at present, may be thus summed up. In the case of actions brought since the passing of the Act, if the action is one which can be commenced in a County Court, the plaintiff, in order to be entitled to costs, must recover over 20/. in contract and 107. in tort. If the action is one which cannot be commenced in a County Court, the plaintiff may have his costs if he recover an amount which, according to the general rule, would entitle him to costs in the Superior Court, though the sum recovered be less than those above mentioned, and though the Judge at the trial refuse to certify. The court will not consider distance alone a sufficient justification for bringing the action in a Superior Court, and will not in such a case grant costs. In the case of actions commenced before the passing of the Act of 1867, but not completed on the 1st Jan. 1868, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should recover the amount mentioned in sect. 5 in order to get his costs. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. THERE are few points of law which have proved more fruitful in litigation than the question how far one who has entered into a contract as agent for another is entitled to sue or liable to be sued upon it. The cases decided upon this point are innumerable, and not always very consistent with one another or with general principles. The difficulty in each case is to ascertain what was the intention of the parties as it appears upon the contract, and from the extremely informal nature of many, perhaps of most, mercantile instruments it is by no means easy to apply the rules of law deducible from previous decisions to each new case as it arises. We propose, however, briefly to indicate some of the results that have been arrived at on this important branch of mercantile law. The first question that presents itself for consideration is, who is entitled to sue upon a contract that has been entered into by an agent? The answer must depend upon the form which the contract has assumed. If the agent contracted as agent for another and so describes himself upon the face of the contract, he has, as a general rule, no right whatever to sue the other contracting party upon it. He is merely the instrument by which his principal has brought himself into communication with the If, on the other hand, the agent does not describe himself as such upon the contract, but enters into it apparently as principal, he is of course entitled to sue upon it. Parol evidence that he who appears upon the written contract to have been a principal was in reality but agent for another, affords no defence to such an action. The written contract binds both parties, and the agent who appears therein to have contracted upon his own account has the rights of a principal. But, although parol evidence is not available to rebut the suit of the apparent principal, it is available to let in the real principal. If A. has in his own name entered into an agreement in writing with B., B., while he is liable to A., may also be liable to C., upon proof that A., in entering into the agreement in question, was acting by the authority of C. Parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of introducing a new party, but never for that of discharging an apparent party to the contract:" (2 Sm. L. Cas. 356, 6th edit.) This, however, must be understood as applying only to the always entertained what may almost be called case of a simple contract; the English law has seal, and parol evidence cannot be admitted a superstitious reverence for instruments under to show, in the case of a bond or a covenant, that the apparent is not the real principal, and so to let in the latter to sue. And even where the contract is not under seal, if to show that one of the contracting parties was in reality agent for another would be to contradict the express terms of the writing, the general rule, which prohibits the variation of a document by parol evidence, will exclude the right of the real principal to sue. If, for instance, the written agreement states in terms that the agent is himself the principal in the transaction, no parol evidence of agency will confer on another the right to sue upon such a contract. And in no case can the real principal by coming forward to sue in his own name, deprive the other contracting party of any grounds of defence that would have been available to him as against the agent. If the owner of goods has allowed another to sell them as if |