respective lots shall descend as real estate to heirs, may be devised by will, or may be disposed of by the owners by sale with the approval of the president and managers of the corporation." The final resting place of the dead has in all ages been properly regarded as sacred ground, and it was in recognition of this fact that the Legislature of Maryland enacted this statute. Under its provisions, one holding a cemetery lot for burial purposes in the state of Maryland cannot be deprived of the same by attachment or execution, nor is same affected by the insolvent laws of that state. It was manifestly the purpose of the Legislature to protect a proprietor owning a lot of this character from the annoyance and humiliation incident to having the same subjected to court process. That this statute was intended to apply only to such lots as might be held for the personal use of the proprietor, clearly appears from the provision in the statute to the effect that: "Every burial lot sold or conveyed shall be held by the proprietors thereof for the sole purpose of sepulture, and none other. * * It plainly appears from the record that only one of these lots was bought for sepulture purposes. The petitioner, among other things, says: "That the lot which your petitioner has used as a place of sepulcher for his family is No. 331." He then gives the numbers of each of the other lots, amounting in all to nine, and these numbers show that they are scattered about in various parts of the cemetery; there being only two that are contiguous. The location of these lots, and the numbers, clearly indicate that it was not the purpose of the petitioner, in purchasing the same, to use them for burial purposes within the meaning of the Maryland law, under which the petitioner now seeks to have them exempted from being sold as a part of his assets. By virtue of the provisions of this statute a sufficient amount of land may be held by an individual for burial purposes-whether it be one or two lots-provided it is held for such purposes only. But in this instance only one lot is claimed by the petitioner to be held for such purposes, and there is no intimation that any of the other lots are needed for the personal use of the petitioner in that respect. The amount of land held for such purposes would depend upon the size of one's family, and it might, in some instances, be necessary for an individual to hold more than one lot for such purposes; and in that event we think that any reasonable amount of land dedicated and held for the personal use of the owner thereof for burial purposes only, would come within the purview of the statute. It cannot be reasonably contended that, under the provisions of this statute, one may hold a number of lots, and hold them purely for speculative purposes, and thus be enabled to evade the insolvent laws of that state. Under the laws of Maryland, the petitioner is undoubtedly entitled to hold the lot which he has selected for burial purposes, and this right guarantees to himself and family decent interment, and is in the nature of an assurance that he and those who may come after him may hold and retain this spot as a last resting place, notwithstanding the petitioner may be unable to meet his financial obligations. In the case of Gill v. Cacy, 49 Md. 243, the Court of Appeals of that state, in referring to the proper interpretation to be placed upon a statute, said: "The intention of the Legislature is to be carried out, and that intention is to be collected from the words of the statute, by considering every part of it, as well as the cause or necessity of making the act or from foreign circumstances." Applying this rule, we find that the purpose of the statute is to exempt from attachment, execution, or the insolvent laws of the state, a lot to be held by the individual "for the sole purpose of sepulture, and none other." This is the entire scope of the statute, and in determining the questions involved in this controversy, keeping in mind the legislative intent, we are necessarily forced to the conclusion that only the portion of land, or, as in this instance, the lot, set aside by the petitioner for burial purposes, is exempted from the operation of the provisions of the law designed for the enforcement of the collection of debts. Under the provisions of section 217, art. 23, of the Maryland Code, all money or other benefit and relief to be paid by any fraternal organization is exempt from seizure under any process; also under section 8 of article 83, $100 worth of property, as well as all money payable in the nature of insurance benefit or relief, is exempted. Section 11, art. 83, exempts all wearing apparel, mechanical text-books, books of professional men, tools and other mechanical instruments and appliances moved or worked by hand, necesssary to the practice of any trade or profession and used in the practice thereof. Thus it will be seen that ample provision is made for the protection of those who may be in financial distress, and these provisions are independent of the one which relates to property held for burial purposes, and it is under them, and them alone, that the citizen of Maryland can claim exemption for property which he owns, other than land for burial purposes. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. JOHNSON v. COLUMBIA COTTON OIL MILL MFG. CO., Limited. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. May 16, 1910.) No. 2,045. PATENTS (§ 328*)—INVENTION-PROCESS FOR EXTRACTION OF COTTON SEED OIL. The Johnson patent, No. 691,342, for a process for the extraction of oil from cotton seed by using a mixture in stated proportions of cotton seed bran with the cotton seed meats, is void for lack of invention; it being shown that in the process previously used a mixture of hulls and meats occurred through the inability of the machinery used to wholly separate them. *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Suit in equity by Edwin Lehman Johnson against the Columbia Cotton Oil Mill Manufacturing Company, Limited. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Affirmed. Lamar C. Quintero, Philip S. Gidiere, and Melville Church, for appellant. J. R. Beckwith and Max Dindelspeil, for appellee. Before PARDEE, MCCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. This is a suit on a patent for a process. The process claimed is the use in the extraction of oil from cotton seed of the mixture of cotton seed bran with the cotton seed meats in proportion of 22 per cent. to 30 per cent. The proof shows that prior to the alleged invention a mixture of cotton seed hulls with the meats occurred in the process of preparing seed before compressing the oil, because the machinery used for preparing the seed for the press was inefficient to separate entirely the hulls from the meats, and the hulls in part went into the same mass with the meats. It seems to make no difference whether the hulls go into the mass necessarily from the inability to prevent them or purposely by being placed there. We do not think there is such difference between cotton seed hulls and cotton seed bran as to make patentee's process new or patentable. Both cotton seed hulls and cotton seed bran are from the outside covering or husk of the cotton seed. The claim that the "cotton seed bran" is the hull of the cotton seed with all the fiber removed is a distinction too fine to give validity to the patent. . The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed. WEED CHAIN TIRE GRIP CO. et al. v. EXCELSIOR SUPPLY CO. et al. (Circuit Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D. May 20, 1910.) 1. PATENTS (§ 40*)-VALIDITY-FUNCTIONAL CLAIMS. Claims of a patent for means for, or mechanism adapted to, a certain result, and, like functional claims, are not objectionable if limited to the invention shown by the specification and drawings. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. § 47; Dec. Dig. § 40.*] 2. PATENTS (§ 328*) -VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT CHAIN TIRE GRIP. The Parsons patent, No. 723,299, for a chain tire grip, was not anticipated, and is not for a function, but discloses an operative and useful device. basic to a large extent which required invention; also held infringed. In Equity. Suit by the Weed Chain Tire Grip Company, Harry D. Weed, and the Parsons Non-Skid Company, Limited, against the For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes Excelsior Supply Company and the Motor Appliances Company. Duncan & Duncan and Victor Elting, for complainants. SANBORN, District Judge. Infringement suit based on the Parsons patent, No. 723,299, issued March 24, 1903, for a chain tire grip. Complainants are, respectively, assignees or interested in the patent. One of defendants sells a similar device, and the other manufactures it. The patentee's description of his invention, and two of his claims, are as follows: "It has been proposed to guard against slipping and puncturing by incorporating an antislipping or antipuncturing device in the tire itself, which has the effect of slowing it considerably or causing disintegration and having other objectionable features. According to my invention I overcome these objections by providing a separate construction, giving, in effect, a nonslipping medium between the surfaces in contact, and merely suspending on or engaging with the wheel, but not fixed thereto, and it is therefore free to travel around the wheel by the action of rolling contact. "The device constituting my invention consists of a network of rings or strips of metal or other suitable material or a series of small chains or bands fitting loosely over the periphery of the wheel or passing from side to side across the tire-that is, not incorporated with it-and prevented from coming off by two rings, hoops, or their equivalent, preferably of wire or other suitable material, such rings or the like, or one of them, being provided, if desired, with means of attachment and detachment, such as a right and left hand screw-thread and nut, and the said rings or the like being smaller in diameter than the periphery of the wheel they cannot come off accidentally. "Antislipping or protecting means for the peripheries of wheels, pulleys or the like, comprising attaching elements at opposite sides of the wheel, and an antislipping or protective medium secured to the attaching elements and extending across and around the periphery of the wheel, said parts being disconnected from though retained on the wheel whereby the antislipping or protective medium is free to move or shift its position around the periphery thereof. "Antislipping or protective means for the peripheries of wheels, pulleys or the like, comprising two rings or annuli at opposite sides of the wheel, and an antislipping or protective medium consisting of a chain or chains secured to the rings and extending across and around the periphery of the wheel, said parts being disconnected from but retained on the wheel whereby the antislipping or protective medium is free to move or shift its position around the periphery thereof." Advantages claimed for the device are thus stated by counsel: "The construction of the device by which it is loose on the wheel and free to travel circumferentially around it when in action gives several important results referred to in the patent. In the first place, the 'freedom to travel' adds very materially to the antislipping qualities of the device, in effect continuously laying down on the ground in front of the tire 'a nonslipping medium,' consisting of a series of loose cross chains, under conditions affording a maximum of traction result. In the next place, it prevents the disintegration of the rubber tire, which, as suggested in the patent, in all other proposed constructions had proved a fatal obstacle to the use of a metal traction device on a rubber tire. Again, it prevents the inevitable and objectionable 'slowing' of the tire in action, which occurs where metal traction plates or similar parts are incorporated in the tire." It is also essential in a practical device that it must be securely maintained on the tire against coming off, particularly at times of greatest strain when the machine is skidding. While the device is simple, a complicated problem is involved, which had to be comprehended by the inventor, and must be understood in order that the full scope of the invention can be comprehended. The elements of the problem are that by all prior inventors it was supposed to be necessary to fasten the device rigidly upon the tire, or incorporate it with it, instead of being left loose or flexible. Such devices proved failures for a number of reasons. They wore out the tire by abrasion at the point of contact, "slowed" it by destroying resiliency, wore themselves out by friction,, and were difficult to keep on. These objections were to a great degree overcome by the patent grip. It lessens wear by stopping the slipping, is easy to put on and take off, distributes and lessens wear of the tire by its circumferential travel, and has proved a great commercial success, superseding all other forms. This changing of the universal idea that an antiskid device must be securely fastened to the tire required invention, and the device described by the patentee, with such improved construction as experience and mechanical skill suggested, is fully capable of carrying out the inventive idea. There is an operative device, utility, a greatly improved result, commercial success, and the supplanting of all other like devices. It is true, and clearly disclosed by the evidence, that circumferential creeping, or what Parsons calls traveling around the wheel by the action of rolling contact, was not new with him as a practical result, but he was the first to claim and fully utilize it, and understand its significance in the art. It is the inevitable law of the rolling wheel. It is even difficult to keep the tire itself from creeping forward on the rim. This tendency has been well understood from the time of the bicycle. And, when an antislipping device is put on the tire, however firmly, it will travel around it. All other inventors, however, conceived the notion that this circumferential creeping was a detriment, and must be prevented in order to get traction and prevent slipping. Parsons was the first to understand that this motion was beneficial, that the best traction would be given by utilizing it, as well as the best form of antiskidding. He therefore reversed the prevailing idea that this motion must be prevented as much as possible, and specified a loose grip, "merely suspended on or engaging with the wheel, but not fixed thereto-free to travel around it." He also contrived a novel means of carrying his idea into practical application; that is, by a loose grip, held upon the tire by side members of sufficiently less diameter than the tire to securely retain the device in place. Neither of these things had been done before. This is not an attempt to patent a function, result, idea, or abstraction, but a new conception and new embodiment of that conception, producing an improved result, useful in itself, and commercially successful. It is entitled to liberal treatment, both as to anticipation and infringement. To the objection that the claims are functional, it may be said that claims for means for, or mechanism adapted to a certain result, and, |