LIEN.

1. The lien created by a levy made under execution prior to the
adoption of the Constitution of 1868, is lost by a failure to take
out a ven. ex. and the issuing of an alias fi. fa. after the Consti-
tution went into effect. James v. West, 290.

See JUDGMENT, 5, 6.

LIMITATIONS.

1. To take a case out of the operation of the statute of limitations,
the promise to pay or the acknowledgment of the debt must be
made to the creditor himself. Parker v. Shuford, 219.

2. A tender of depreciated currency will not prevent the operation
of the statute. Ibid.

3. An acknowledgment of a debt, barred by the statute of limita-
tions, in the following language, viz: "I owe A a considerable
sum, $1,000 or $1,200, and I reckon more, and I want it paid. A
is not uneasy about it," is not sufficient to take the case out of
the operation of the statute. Faison v. Bowden, 425.

4. An acknowledgment or promise in order to take the case out of
the operation of the statute of limitations, must be made to the
creditor himself. Ibid.

MANDAMUS.

See PRACTICE, 3.

MARRIAGE.

1. A marriage, solemnized in a State whose laws permit such mar-
riage, between a negro and a white person domiciled in such
State, is valid in this State. State v. Ross, 242.

2. The domicil of the husband becomes that also of the wife upon
marriage. Ibid.

3. A marriage, solemnized in a State whose laws permit such mar-
riage, between a negro and a white person domiciled in this State
and who leave it for the purpose of evading its laws and with in-
tent to return, is not valid in this State. State v. Kennedy, 251.
Eee PRACTICE, 12.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. A master may be liable to a servant for injuries received in his
service from the negligence of the master. Hardy v. C. C. Rail-
way Co. 5.

2. Also, for injuries received from the negligence of a fellow servant,
if the master was negligent in selecting a bad one. Ibid.

3. Also, for injuries received from bad machinery negligently selec-
ted by him. lbid.

4. He is not liable to a servant for injuries received from the negli-
gence of a fellow servant in the same employment. Ibid.

5. The provisions of Bat. Rev. ch. 70, § 1, are confined to the enti-
cing of servants by indenture or by contract in writing. State
v. Rice, 194.

6. It is no offence at common law to entice an infant from the ser-
vice of his parent. Ibid.

7.

A master is liable for an injury to a servant resulting from the
negligence of a fellow servant if the master contributes to the
negligence. Crutchfield v. R. & D. R. R. Co. 320.

8. It is the duty of a servant to notify his master when anything is
out of order in his peculiar department and if he neglects to do
so and continues in his employment and is injured, he cannot re-
cover damages of the master. Ibid.

MILLS.

See EVIDENCE, 12.

MORTGAGE.

1. A mortgagee with a power of sale is a trustee, first, to secure the
payment of the mortgage debt, and second, for the mortgagor as
to the excess. Kornegay v. Spicer, 95.

2. This power is to be watched with great jealousy, and when there
is any unfairness, such as complicated accounts, &c., or any sug-
gestion of oppression, such as usury, &c., the mortgagee will be
enjoined from selling until the balance due is ascertained and all
equities between the parties declared. lbid.

3. A mortgagee who purchases at a sale made by himself under a
power of sale in the mortgage deed, does not acquire an absolute
estate. Such a sale does not alter the relation existing between
the parties. Whitehead v. Hellen, 99.

4. A mortgage of a stock of merchandise, containing the provision
that the mortgagor is to remain in possession and continue to sell
the goods, approaches the verge of being on its face fraudulent in
law, but is not so. Cheatham v. Hawkins, 335.

5. In such case the mortgage affords the strongest possible ground of

presumptive fraud and the burden of disproving the fraud is upon the party claiming under the mortgage. lbid.

6. Powers of sale in mortgage deeds are looked upon by the Courts with extreme jealousy and whenever there is a controversy between the parties as to the amount due or other complication, the Court will require the foreclosure to be made under judicial direction and after all controverted matters have been adjusted and the balance due fixed. Mosby v. Hodge, 387.

See VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1. 2.

MUNICIPAL BONDS.

See BONDS, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

See STATUTE, 5.

TOWNS AND CITIES.

MURDER.

Words, however grievous, are not sufficient provocation to reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. State v. Carter, 20, See TRIAL, 2.

NEGLECT.

See JUDGMENT, 3.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. One who attempts to cross a swollen stream, the bridge over it being out of repair, when it is apparent that the stream is swollen and dangerous to cross, is guilty of contributory negligence and in case of injury cannot recover damages of the County for failure to repair the bridge. Jackson v. Com'rs. of Greene, 282.

2. The fact that such bridge was down and out of repair for some time after the injury to the plaintiff is not evidence of negligence on the part of the County. Ibid.

3. It is the duty of a Rail Road Company to provide a sufficient number of brakes upon a train to stop it within a reasonable time and distance, and a failure to do so is negligence. Forbes v. A. & N. C. R. R. Co. 454.

4. If one wantonly or carelessly drives stock upon the track of a rail road he is guilty of contributory negligence, and if the stock is

injured, cannot recover in an action against the Rail Road Com-
pany. lbid.

See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

1. A certificate of deposit, when expressed in negotiable words, is
negotiable and subject to the same rules that control other nego-
tiable paper. Johnson v. Henderson, 227.

2. To constitute a negotiable instrument, the promise must be to
pay in money; Therefore, where a certificate of deposit given to
A and payable "in current funds," came to B by several endorse-
ments; Held, in an action by B against an intermediate endor-
ser, that B was not entitled to recover. Ibid.

3. In such case B stands in the shoes of A, and his only remedy is
against the person who issued the certificate. Ibid.

See BOND, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

EVIDENCE, 9, 10, 11.

NEW TRIAL.

See PRACTICE, 11.

OFFICE AND OFFICER.

1. The provisions of Chapter 111, § 25, Battle's Revisal, prescribing
a penalty of $25 against any person who is duly elected or ap-
pointed Town Constable and who refuses to qualify, &c., are not
in conflict with Art. I., § 17, of the Constitution. London v.
Headen, 72.

2. The salaries of the officers and the pay of the employees of the
State are not subject to any judicial process at the instance of
creditors. Swepson v. Turner, 115.

3.

One who professes to be the incumbent of an office and performs
the duties of the same is estopped from denying the legality of
his appointment; Therefore, where in an indictment for failure
to keep a public road in repair it was proven by parol evidence
that the defendant professed to be overseer of the road and had
in all respects acted as such; Held, to be unnecessary to show
his appointment by the Court record. State v. Long, 254.
See INDICTMENT, 4, 5.

PRACTICE, 4.

OFFICIAL BOND.

See CLERK OF SUPERIOR COurt, 1, 2.

OVERSEER OF ROAD.

See OFFICE AND OFFICER, 3.

PARDON.

See CONVICTION.

PARENT AND CHILD.

See ADVANCEMENT, 1, 2, 3, 4.

EVIDENCE, 4.
WITNESS, 1.

PARTIES.

1. When in an action for the recovery of real estate, both the plaintiff and a third party claim to be the landlord of the defendant, the latter has a right upon affidavit to be let in as a party defen-dant to the action. Rollins v. Rollins, 264.

2. In such case if a judgment by default is taken against the tenant, no writ of possession can issue until the determination of the controversy between the plaintiff and the interpleading defendant. lbid.

3. If such application to be made a party is denied, the applicant is a "party aggrieved" for all the purposes of an appeal, under § 299, C. C. P. lbid.

4. In an action for the recovery of real estate, a third person who claims title paramount and adverse both to plaintiff and defendant, should not be permitted under § § 61 and 65, C. C. P. to make himself a party to the action. Colgrove v. Koonce, 363.

5. Where an action is brought by a guardian upon the bond of a former guardian, to which bond the plaintiff guardian is surety, it is necessary that the wards of the plaintiff shall be made parties plaintiff and a prochein ami appointed to protect their interests. Wilson v. Houston, 375.

6. An action upon a note executed to a deceased person during his life-time for land sold by him, should be brought in the name of his personal representative. Blankenship v. Hunt, 377.