not include the standard blue coat. Instead, the troops were issued a newly designed summer fatigue uniform consisting of a grey woolen "round-about" (a short jacket with long sleeves) and grey-white overalls. Companies which had already been issued new uniform coats were told to box them up and turn them back in, each marked with the

owner's name, as soon as the round-abouts were available. All other clothing items not authorized were to be similarly boxed and stored. Sergeants and corporals supervised this process and made one final inspection of their men's muskets, gun slings, and cleaning tools before the division took to the field.

On 3 July 1814, Brown's force crossed the Niagara River and captured Fort Erie opposite Buffalo. Two days later, it collided at Chippewa with a British force which had confidently left Fort George to "restore" the border. The enemy commander took one look at the grey uniforms and concluded that he was facing only local militia. As the outnumbered but well-trained Americans swung into action and executed complex movements under fire with precision, he recognized his error and exclaimed, "Those are Regulars, by God!" That discovery came too late to prevent a British defeat. The weeks of relentless practice imposed on the soldiers by Scott and his NCOs paid off in this hard-fought battle.

The division did not rest on its laurels, but resumed Scott's program of drills and inspections. Each afternoon at four o'clock all men not on an operational mission underwent a full check of equipment. NCOs and officers closely monitored shaves and haircuts. Scott insisted that unit leaders enforce his standards of cleanliness and appearance or face disciplinary charges themselves for failure to exercise proper supervision. (Later, during the Mexican War, that attitude led a younger generation of troops to nickname him "Old Fuss and Feathers.")

The painstaking attention to detail paid off. Following a period of indecisive maneuver, Brown's forces collided again with the reinforced British at Lundy's Lane on 25 July. Fought mostly in the dark, the battle turned into a test of small unit leadership and of the skill, discipline, and devotion of the soldiers on both sides. Once again, the American soldier gave as good as he got, fighting his red-coated foe to a standstill, although heavy casualties forced the U.S. troops to withdraw to Fort Erie after the battle. Both sides considered the battle a victory.

For over a month Brown's outnumbered division clung tenaciously to the fort as the British attempted a conventional siege one in which the enemy attempted to approach and undermine fortifications by advancing a series of trenches. Fortunately, Scott had anticipated this possibility and had created a provisional combat engineer element by pulling one hand-picked private from each infantry company and one corporal from each regiment. These "pioneers' received special training, drew proper tools (saws, spades, and axes carried in special leather shoulder slings), and wore

a linen apron that extended from neck to knee. At regimental drills the corporals positioned themselves with the regimental staff while the privates stood in the center rear of their companies. During the siege the pioneers, led by a handful of officers, supervised infantry work parties in maintaining and extending the fortifications. Finally a brilliant sortie on 17 September forced the British to withdraw and, along with the approach of winter, ended the campaign.

Chippewa, Lundy's Lane, and Fort Erie, like the victories at Fort McHenry and New Orleans on other fronts and some losses elsewhere-reminded the Army of an important point lost during long years in isolated garrisons: training and dedicated, competent NCOs were essential to military success. It was a lesson that the Army would long remember in the aftermath of Winfield Scott's vivid lesson.

The Army underwent a drastic demobilization at the end of the War of 1812, and its surviving units returned to service along the frontier and in coastal defense fortifications. Most of the specialized units and duty positions were eliminated, leaving the bulk of the soldiers in infantry and artillery regiments. Senior leadership positions passed to a new generation of officers who had matured during the conflict. These men retained an important sense of the value of a quality NCO corps to the Army's mission in the field. The new civilian leadership that worked with generals like Scott and Andrew Jackson also recognized the role of sergeants and corporals. Thereafter, when faced with political pressures to trim the regular establishment, they fought hard to preserve as many NCO positions as possible, knowing that a trained cadre could absorb raw recruits quickly. Formal educational programs comparable to the officer corps' United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, still lay far in the future, but by insisting upon literacy as well as technical competence for anyone selected to serve as a sergeant or corporal, they took the first step toward a professional corps as well. Similar changes began to appear within the ranks of the volunteer militia, as some units gradually transformed themselves into a true

reserve component.

Elements of the daily duties of a corporal in Scott's 22d Infantry will sound familiar to any squad leader or team chief today. Like his or her predecessor, the modern NCO is the ultimate first-line supervisor. Every detail of the private's equipment, uniform, and personal hygiene still must be checked on a regular basis. Regardless of branch of service, all NCOs still learn the fundamentals of marksmanship, drill, and tactics and pass them on to new soldiers who

serve under their immediate watch. That legacy is of far greater and more enduring importance to the nation than most people realize. Historians often dwell on Scott's later military career or point out facts such as his responsibility for the grey dress uniforms worn by the cadets at West Point and the country's other military academies. In a real sense, however, his most important legacy, going back to the War of 1812, is preserved within the NCO corps.

The sergeant major and the first sergeant surveyed the dimly lit barracks. It was Saturday afternoon and the soldiers had spent all day cleaning their quarters and equipment. Wooden floors had been mopped or sanded. Heavy wooden bunks had been dismantled, scrubbed, and reassembled. Mattresses were stuffed with clean straw. Polished and oiled muskets were placed in racks on the whitewashed wall. Each soldier had brushed clean his dress uniform, blanket, and pack and neatly placed them on his bunk, topped with the leather dress cap (called a shako) and canvas cover. While the barracks was empty, the senior NCOS began their weekly inspection.

The room was first inspected for cleanliness. Bedding was studied next to ensure the infamous "Army bugs" had been, at least temporarily,

banished. Next, the soldier's clothing and equipment came under review. Because each man's kit was neatly placed according to regulation, it was more quickly and easily checked for accountability and serviceability. Shirts, socks, and underwear received the "bug" test. Buttons and insignia were checked to see that they were clean, polished, and serviceable. Missing and damaged items were noted. The flintlock muskets were examined to ensure that they were in working order. Flints and mainsprings came under close scrutiny. Weapons that failed inspection were noted, to be turned in to the armorer for repair or replacement. When the inspection had been completed, the NCOs returned to their quarters to prepare reports. Housecleaning was over for the company, at least until next Saturday.

The American soldier of the early nineteenth century spent his career largely isolated from civilian influences. Assigned mostly to far-flung outposts on the frontier, the soldier led a harsh, uninspiring life, felt unappreciated, and too often could not recognize the importance of his activities to the country. Attitudes within the civilian community contributed to his sense of estrangement. Many taxpayers and voters still clung to the notion that a soldier's usefulness ended with the close of a war. For much of the early nineteenth century, the nation turned its back on the Army and frequently sought to keep military strength at a minimum. Sustaining morale and combat readiness posed the greatest challenge to the Army's leaders in those years.

The Army had demobilized at the conclusion of the War of 1812 and returned to its traditional missions of policing the frontiers and manning fortifications along the coastline and borders. A new Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, took office in 1816 and immediately began studying the lessons

of the preceding conflict to determine how the Army could better meet its obligations under the Constitution. He and the senior officers quickly concluded that the military's primary peacetime function was deterring future conflict by being able to mobilize rapidly and efficiently. Becoming more professional was the essential precondition to accomplishing that task.

Leaders, however, had to operate within a broader national context. A severe economic depression racked the country, forcing the President and Congress to make major cuts in the armed forces. In late 1820 Secretary Calhoun responded to the challenge, submitting a plan to Congress that would minimize the impact of the budget on the Army's ability to mobilize in the event of another war. To avoid the damage done by the traditional method of disbanding entire regiments, Calhoun proposed an "expansible army” concept. Under that scheme cuts were to be made only in the number of privates in each company, not in the number of