meticulously trained to stand in lines and load and fire in unison. Then they had to learn how to maneuver on the battlefield in those lines without losing their cohesion.

The system of instruction crafted by Steuben at Valley Forge was published in early 1779 under the title Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, Part I (better known to the troops as the Blue Book because of the color of its cover). It broke down the elements needed for combat success into individual tasks, each of which built upon mastery of preceding tasks. One of the simplest systems devised anywhere in the world, it was quickly absorbed by the soldiers. To speed that process along, Steuben displayed a genius at practical psychology. He assembled a "company of instruction" built around Washington's bodyguard and personally drilled it, encouraging all off-duty personnel to watch. Punctuated by a colorful array of epithets and jokes in several languages, his method of teaching made training enjoyable and challenged each soldier to excel. Members of the company then returned to their original units where, under the watchful eye of a select group of officers, they extended the system to the rest of the Army.

Beginning at the battle of Monmouth in June 1778, Steuben-trained continentals demonstrated a new battlefield competence. His system relied on skilled marksmanship (in fact, the Blue Book became the first drill manual in the world to use the command to take aim rather than simply instructing the private to point his weapon in the general

direction of the enemy). It also called for new skills. Thanks to his instruction, Americans quickly mastered the techniques of bayonet fighting and learned to use cadenced marching and column formations to maneuver quickly under fire. Whenever possible, these skills were practiced on the same kind of broken terrain that would be encountered on the battlefield, not on the kind of manicured parade grounds preferred by European armies.

In the late summer of 1781 the process set in motion at Valley Forge had achieved a measure of success on the battlefield. Moreover, Britain no longer faced rebellious Americans fighting alone, for France had declared war on England in 1778, followed in due course by Spain and the Netherlands. As the conflict spread around the globe, resources available to the British to carry on military operations in North America shrank. Commanders based in New York City, admitting that they could no longer risk challenging Washington on ground of his own choosing, shifted to a new strategy. All troops that could be spared from the British garrison in New York sailed south in an attempt to conquer the lower colonies one at a time. Despite a series of battlefield victories, the British could not crush the resistance there either. When the unanticipated arrival of a large French fleet from the West Indies created a decisive opening, Washington rapidly shifted his focus to Virginia, pinned General Charles Cornwallis against the water at Yorktown, and, in a textbook example of formal European siege warfare, forced Cornwallis to surrender.

Initial Continental Army tables of organization drew upon European ideas that had been modified by American. experience, especially during the French and Indian War. They created an infantry regiment composed of eight companies and a small headquarters. At full strength, an ideal seldom reached, the basic 90-man company of musketmen had 4 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 76 privates. The privates and corporals formed the "rank and file," the men who shouldered muskets in linear combat and fired in volleys. The fifer and a drummer drew the same pay as corporals and counted as NCOS. Despite their musician title, they actually functioned as the company's signal section, relaying commands through their instruments in the same manner as buglers in a later era.

If the basic company arrangement required by formal European-style combat formations appeared to minimize the importance of the NCO, administrative organization was quite a different matter. Camp routines revolved around four squads, each consisting of 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and up to

19 privates. They ate and slept with their squad, sharing the burden of transporting unit equipment, such as cooking pots or axes, and occasionally splitting into two sections, each headed by an NCO. Appointment of sergeants and corporals remained the exclusive prerogative of the regimental commander, normally acting on the advice of the company commander, but great attention was paid to selecting men of demonstrated maturity and leadership. Subsequent changes in company organization preserved these same basic arrangements. In 1778 the company shrank to 3 officers, 2 musicians, and 3 squads with a total of 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, and 53 privates. In 1781 the fourth squad returned when the number of privates grew to 64. That final change did not alter the number of officers or musicians, but increased the sergeants to 5 and the corporals to 4. One of each continued to provide leadership for each squad; the extra sergeant, created by freeing the first sergeant from direct supervision, helped to augment the officers' command and control abilities.

As a product of the Old World, Steuben emphasized the

importance of officer involvement in training and in tactical leadership. As an American, he integrated the noncommissioned officer into that system. A fundamental Continental Army concept after Valley Forge called for each NCO to be trained so that when emergencies arose in the heat of battle he could step forward and assume the duties of his immediate superior. That message was brought home through the final chapter in the Blue Book that set out the duties and responsibilities of each individual in a regiment, from colonel to private.

Within an infantry regiment in the Steuben era, each staff function had two individuals assigned, one officer and one NCO. The quartermaster watching over transportation and logistics had his quartermaster sergeant backing him up, for example, just as the sergeant major assisted the adjutant, while two senior musicians (called the fife and drum majors) provided technical supervision over their company-level counterparts. Similar relationships emerged within the line companies. When deployed for combat, a regiment's men stood two deep to take maximum advantage of the firepower of their muskets. Company grade officers assumed positions in the front row to exercise command and control. A "covering sergeant" stood immediately behind each officer with the dual mission of protecting him or stepping forward in the event that he fell. The covering sergeant kept his musket at shoulder arms with bayonet fixed and did not shoot when the other troops did, but reserved fire until the last resort. Other NCOs provided a guard for the junior officers carrying the regimental colors or occupied positions behind the line as file closers.

Although no one realized it at the time, Yorktown was the decisive battle of the War of American Independence. News of the defeat broke Britain's political will to wage war, forcing the King to appoint a new government which was

committed to negotiating peace. While war dragged on for almost two more years as diplomats worked out complex arrangements acceptable to all of the parties involved, the Continental Army used the time to continue improving its training in the Steuben system. It even conducted maneuvers on the Hudson River in the summer of 1782 as a dress rehearsal for a planned invasion of Manhattan Island. An armistice went into effect on 19 April 1783, eight years to the day after the first shots at Lexington. The final peace treaty was signed in Paris the following September.

Demobilization began almost at once, introducing a pattern that would become typical of America's response to the end of any war. By the end of the year, Washington had returned his commission to Congress and had joined most of his former troops in civilian life. The last contingent of the Continental Army, a regiment in size, disbanded on 20 June 1784 at West Point, New York, proving that Washington had created not a standing army but, rather, a wartime emergency force. A lone company of artillerists provided a measure of continuity by transferring directly into the new, single-regiment Regular Army created by Congress that same month.

Over time that nucleus would expand and contract, as would the militia, whose citizen-soldiers provided an emergency reserve force under the Constitution. Each contingent preserved the Steuben system of doctrine and training relatively intact through the War of 1812. The practice of dispersing the regulars in coastal forts and small garrisons along the frontier and the militiamen in companysize units in individual towns, together with changes in weapons and equipment, eventually watered down the immediate battlefield practicality of the Blue Book. Ironically, these very same trends increased the Army's reliance on both the technical knowledge and small unit leadership of the NCO corps.

The 22d Infantry noncommissioned officers were tired when they reached the bivouac areas north of Buffalo on a warm Tuesday. Unlike other units of the division, which had begun arriving in mid-April, Capt. Sampson King's three companies of the 22d left western Pennsylvania late. The NCOS could not pause to appreciate the beauty of the season. As soon as the companies linked up with Maj. Henry Leavenworth's 9th Infantry, they learned that they had to prepare their men for combat in a matter of hours, not months.

While the officers went off to receive their briefings, the regimental sergeant major of the 9th quickly outlined what had been done so far and told the 22d Infantry's sergeants and corporals what he expected them to do. The NCOS returned to their companies and began to settle the men into the camp's routine. The edge in each corporal's voice during the endless round of squad inspections and drills communicated a sense of urgency and seriousness to the recruits.

The Army entered the War of 1812 with less than 12,000 men. Few of the soldiers had any previous combat experience, and only the most senior officers, veterans of the War of Independence, had fought a trained enemy. In small, isolated garrisons on the frontier, where the Army had conducted some major campaigns against sizable Indian forces, the ability to make do with field expedients had been essential, not any sophisticated understanding of military science. When Congress declared war on Great Britain, the Army had to shift gears and attempt to relearn the hard lessons of the Revolution.

Mobilizing in that era called for existing regiments to pull their scattered companies together, absorb new recruits, and deploy to meet the threat. Other regiments, added by congressional legislation, were raised from scratch. The Army had not yet discovered the value of promoting experienced junior NCOs to provide trained cadres for new organizations. Hence, regiments created in wartime trained sergeants and corporals in their duties and responsibilities at the same time that raw privates were learning rudimentary skills from the company officers.

The weapons and tactics of 1812 were unchanged from those of the Revolution. This was the age of linear warfare. To succeed, infantry units had to be highly disciplined and superbly drilled. Up to a thousand men had to move as one

to get into proper position and then fire their smoothbore muskets in controlled volleys to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. Each man, in essence, was a part of a lead-throwing machine whose strength and success depended on a rigorous form of teamwork. In this system, NCOS took positions as file closers on the flanks and in the rear of their units where they could watch the men's performance and plug gaps appearing in the line.

The work of the NCOS in preparing the men for campaigning in the field had an equally important impact on battlefield success. This role had been defined clearly since Steuben first set the standards at Valley Forge in 1778. The regimental sergeant major was responsible for the performance of the NCOs below him. He monitored their conduct, made sure they were technically proficient, and instructed them when they were not. He was the enlisted expert on matters of drill. The sergeant major also inspected the books and records maintained by the company first sergeants, showed them how to solve problems, and gave a consolidated report to the regimental adjutant each month. The first sergeant knew every man in his company, watched their progress in camp, arranged duty details such as guard, and served himself as a file closer in the field.

Armies employing linear tactics, whether in the Old World or the New, found that a company's sergeants and

corporals formed the backbone of any unit. Although officers were in charge of conducting training, the NCOs, in their constant supervision of the privates, had to see to it that the instruction became internalized, so that the men responded instinctively in any crisis. Picked because of their superior performance in the ranks, company NCOS served as examples to the men they were expected to lead. For day-to-day life, a company formed messes, or squads, each under a single NCO, who became responsible for the squad's well-being on and off the battlefield. His knowledge of camp life, equipment care, and drill determined the quality and performance of his unit. Each recruit learned his manual of arms, wearing of the uniform, and basic drill from his squad leader. If the squad leader did not measure up, neither could the company or the regiment.

The critical role of NCOS in preparing for combat during this era was highlighted in the third year of conflict. When the war began, few British troops could be spared from the crucial struggle against Napoleon in continental Europe to fight the Americans. Public opinion in the United States understood this fact and expected a swift victory to be won by an invasion of Canada. The task turned out to be far more difficult than anticipated. In 1814, after several inconclusive American victories and defeats, Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown's division drew the assignment to strike at southern Ontario as soon as the weather improved enough to allow operations. Learning from the failures of other commanders who had been repulsed, he refused to launch his invasion prematurely. That spring, as the bulk of the troops marched westward from Sacketts Harbor, New York, Brown concentrated on logistics and turned training over to Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott. The result was an intense program that produced the best force fielded by the United States during the War of 1812—an outnumbered contingent that crossed the Niagara, fought two battles, and later withstood a siege in Fort Erie.

In 1814 Scott's problems were compounded by the absence of standards for unit or recruit training. Part of the problem lay in a lack of initiative in many commanders, part in an absence of agreement on which drill manual should be used. Some commanders favored Steuben's original 1779 Regulations, still nominally the official doctrine; others leaned towards a variety of privately published books. Scott preferred the current French system, available in translation as Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercises of the French Infantry (1803). Like Steuben at Valley Forge, he trained his officers and NCOs first and then had them train the men.

Knowing that his men might face some British elite regiments, he initiated a vigorous program as soon as the troops settled into camp in the Flint Hill area north of Buffalo. Reveille came at sunrise, at which time the troops were expected to turn out under arms. Except for a brief breakfast break, squad and company drill lasted until noon,

followed by four hours of battalion drill in the afternoon. The only free time was between supper at seven and lights out at nine o'clock. Each Sunday he conducted a full field inspection of the entire force. Daily battalion and company drills, some personally conducted by the general, gradually expanded to fill the entire duty day. Officers and NCOs alike emphasized mass movements and instinctively developed the pace and cadence so important to maneuvering linear formations. Scott applied his routine equally to regulars and to volunteer militia units, rarely approving exemption from drill for reasons of bad weather or special duties or commitments.

The tempo and sophistication of training picked up in June as the men mastered the basics. Scott then began to emphasize proficiency in the tricky technique of firing muskets while formed in three ranks instead of the Revolutionary War's two. He also instituted, like Steuben a generation earlier, the practice of forming a composite unit at full strength; the various officers and NCOs whose men were included then took turns running the unit through the different maneuvers. This exercise not only allowed the leaders to gain additional experience, it helped build confidence at all ranks. Throughout the training, General Scott and his fellow brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Eleazer W. Ripley, tried hard to impress upon the officers and NCOs the importance of enforcing division policies. The former were told to lead through example, by being prompt and attentive at each formation. The latter, in directly supervising the privates, became the key enforcers of regulations, which touched on almost all aspects of the soldier's life. For example, believing that good health and sanitation went together, Scott required the men to bathe three times a week, in the lake, not in the creek."

Scott also stressed that each soldier was to learn to keep his weapons, equipment, and uniforms in the best condition possible. When he initially faced major shortages, especially in clothing, he encouraged units to make up in drill and discipline what they lacked in appearance. When supplies eventually caught up, Scott made the NCOS responsible for ensuring that the entire division marked and numbered clothing and unit equipment according to a single scheme and began prohibiting deviations from standards that had been justified as "field expedients." Division inspectors checked each individual knapsack to ensure that it contained one shirt, one pair of summer pantaloons, one pair of shoes, one pair of socks or stockings, one fatigue frock, one pair of trousers, and one blanket. A hairbrush and handkerchief were the only optional additional items authorized. Every man also carried a haversack with three days' bread and meat. Any deficiencies were reported to the quartermaster and requisitioned by the units.

The last missing element in the division's preparation for the campaign arrived on 23 June the long-expected shipment of uniforms. Because of shortages, however, it did