The Evolution and Development of the NCO Corps Since 1775 Colonial America characteristically adapted continental European and English traditions and practices to fit local circumstances. This process of selective modeling was apparent when the colonists created military forces to protect themselves, and it applied to their use of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) as well. In continental Europe, noncommissioned officers had appeared with the emergence of standing armies. The European noncommissioned officers were the enforcers of camp discipline and the only authority figures who were in constant contact with the troops. There was a huge social distance between the aristocratic officer corps and the men-both NCOs and private soldiers. This social gap, combined with Old World military tactics, placed very strict limitations on the lives of noncommissioned officers. If there was no place for corporals and sergeants in the ballroom, neither was there any real independence of action on the battlefield; NCOS merely browbeat the soldiers to stand fast in the line of battle despite horrific casualties. The British settlers in colonial America, however, brought with them a militia tradition dating back to the Anglo-Saxons. Every free, able-bodied adult male was expected to own arms and to be a part of the militia in his local community. The colonists created militia units to face two major potential threats: Indians along the frontier and the warring European powers. The militia structure, in which an entire town formed a single company, emphasized the need for noncommissioned officers. The local militia quickly divided into squads, each with its own NCO, to share the burden of rotating guard duty. Jamestown, Virginia, organized by squads as early as 1609. Such small units were well suited to counter Indian hit-and-run tactics and to operate in the heavily wooded country around the settlements, where larger units had no chance of chasing and catching raiders. Unlike continental European NCOS, colonial noncommissioned officers had far more opportunity in these circumstances to exercise initiative. Militia units, led by qualified NCOs, would be joined together for a specific campaign, but there was no permanent standing army. Larger units joined with British forces to defeat the French in Canada and to meet threats from the Spanish along the borders of South Carolina and Georgia. Birth of an Army, 1775-1860 Militia units were involved in the first fighting between the colonists and British troops in the American Revolution. In the immediate aftermath of the skirmishing at Lexington and Concord in April 1775, the New England colonies raised separate armies. In June 1775 the Continental Congress assumed responsibility for these troops, as well as others raised in New York, and formed a national force of ten (later thirteen) companies of "expert riflemen." Over the next two years the Continental Army expanded into a force of 110 regiments, including units from all thirteen colonies and Canada. Colonial units had tables of organization that reflected the settlers' knowledge of British and European armies. But the organizational details varied, showing local innovation. By 1776 a typical infantry regiment had a regimental staff and eight companies. The staff consisted of three field officers and six staff officers, plus four staff NCOS: a sergeant major, a quartermaster sergeant, and two lead musicians (a drum major and a fife major). The sergeant major served as the regiment's ranking noncommissioned officer and provided administrative assistance to the regimental adjutant. The quartermaster sergeant provided logistical support to quartermasters in the field. The two senior musicians trained the company fifers and drummers and were responsible for signal functions on the battlefield. Colonial companies varied somewhat in size during the War of Independence. When at full strength a typical infantry company consisted of ninety members. Each company had four officers, four sergeants, two musicians (a fifer and a drummer), and eighty "rank and file" soldiers (four corporals and seventy-six privates). Rank and file refers to those men who stood in the line of battle (ranks parallel to the line, files perpendicular) carrying muskets. The fifer and drummer, who were classified as NCOs, were in charge of battlefield communications. Each infantry company was divided into four squads for administrative purposes. A squad consisted of a sergeant, a corporal, and nineteen privates. These men formed into two ranks of ten files each, with the corporal serving as the file closer in the rear of the formation and the sergeant performing the same function on the flank. Artillery and light dragoon (cavalry) regiments had arrangements similar to the infantry regiment, but made provision for specialized ratings such as gunners, bombardiers, saddlers, and blacksmiths. These skilled individuals drew higher pay than privates, but did not have the command responsibility of noncommissioned offi cers. In 1778 a Prussian volunteer, Baron Frederick William von Steuben, arrived at General George Washington's camp at Valley Forge. Steuben's claim to the title Baron and to the aristocratic "von" in his name are doubted by many historians, but he did possess considerable military skills. Published at Washington's direction, Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States (1779) established the principle that the noncommissioned officer was selected by and responsible to the company commander, subject to the battalion or regimental commander's approval. Unfortunately, this close connection with the parent unit became one of the factors hindering NCO professional development. Unlike commissioned officers, until World War II the noncommissioned officer was locked for his entire career into the one regiment that had accepted his enlistment. No NCO could be transferred in grade from one regiment to another without the permission of the General-in-Chief of the Army, a permission that was seldom sought or granted. In other words, with few exceptions, the stripes remained with the regiment. But Steuben's Regulations also aided the NCO's growth as an instructor of soldiers. Popularly known as the Blue Book because of the color of the first edition, his manual covered all aspects of infantry service and stressed NCO responsibilities for the care, discipline, and training of the men, both in garrison and in the field, areas which Steuben had found weak in the Continental Army. It also directed the company's senior, or first, sergeant to keep a Company Descriptive Book. This document listed the name, age, height, place of birth, and prior occupation of every enlisted man in the unit. The Army maintained similar books into the first years of this century, when they were finally replaced by other documents describing the individual soldiers. Steuben's Regulations also introduced a new emphasis on the noncommissioned officer's battlefield role that enhanced his status and further distinguished him from his British counterpart. The NCO's traditional importance as a file closer was already well established in America. Because both the American and European armies generally fought standing in lines facing the enemy (linear tactics), the noncommissioned officers had to keep the long ranks steady to maintain volley fire discipline. But the Americans' French-made muskets were more accurate than the British weapons. American NCOS consequently became responsible for aimed volley fire, while the British volleys remained untargeted. The men who faced the opening shots of the War of Independence at Lexington, Massachusetts, on 19 April 1775 (above) exemplified the ideal of the citizen as soldier. But patriotism alone was not sufficient to ensure victory in an age when linear tactics dominated the battlefield. The Continental Army that emerged from Valley Forge relied upon competent NCOs to match the British in actions like Guilford Court House (below). ("Stand Your Ground," oil on hardboard by Don Troiani, 1985, National Guard Heritage Painting, Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau; and "Guilford Court House," watercolor on board by H. Charles McBarron, c. 1975, Soldiers of the Revolution, Army Art Collection.) The lessons of the Revolutionary battlefield, especially the value of sergeants and corporals, had to be relearned the hard way during the War of 1812. This painting of the American charge at Chippewa depicts one of the Army's highlights, a triumph which solidified the NCO's role as small unit leader. (Those Are Regulars, By God," watercolor on board by H. Charles McBarron, 1957, U.S. Army in Action, Army Art Collection.) Other nations had special forces (partisans, rangers, jaegers, etc.) who were trained for aimed fire, but this emphasis on aiming by the whole force, rather than merely pointing the musket in the general direction of the enemy, made Americans unique among the infantrymen of the day. Steuben's training at Valley Forge, therefore, included an emphasis on marksmanship for all soldiers. To enable Americans to engage the British Redcoats with cold steel, he also emphasized training in the use of the bayonet. The continentals learned precision high-speed maneuvering and flexibility on the battlefield. As in eighteenth century continental Europe, training was the responsibility of officers, not NCOs. Yet Steuben's system did provide for training noncommissioned officers in leadership skills. Staff NCOS supported staff officers, and line NCOs backed up-and could take over for-line officers in combat. On the battlefield the sergeant became the "covering sergeant," who stood in the second rank immediately behind the company officer and was responsible for protecting him. The covering sergeant kept his bayonet fixed and carried his musket at shoulder arm. He did not fire in volleys, but reserved his fire until needed to defend his captain or lieutenant. One of the corporals assumed a similar guard function in protecting the junior officer (the ensign) who carried the colors, until the color sergeant later assumed that position with an expanded guard of corporals. NCOS became essential figures in the linear tactics that survived until after the Civil War-though at no time did their status and pay reflect their real importance, which grew steadily as tactics were refined. In 1815 Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott published his Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Maneuvers of Infantry (later revised at the direction of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun), which replaced Steuben's earlier Regulations. Scott's book put particular stress on the importance of swift movement from the column of march to linear formation on the battlefield. In executing this maneuver the color guard, led by the color sergeant, played the key role, maintaining the proper alignment and cadence that enabled the men to |