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The 1950-53 "police action" in Korea sent NCOs into combat as part of a United Nations force when the Cold War heated up. Despite the onrush of technology, some fundamental NCO functions had to be performed in time-honored fashion. The intelligence value of this observation post overlooking enemy-held Hill 518 outside Waegwan (above) depended directly upon the alertness and vision of the sergeant in charge. The United States and the Soviet Union, each armed with nuclear weapons, spent the decades after World War II engaged in a new kind of rivalry. The Cold War placed different demands on the NCO corps than conventional combat. Constant vigilance became a watchword for NCOs assigned to patrol the Iron Curtain in Germany (below). (DA photographs.)

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directly than all else to an uplift of the fighting power of the army."

After the war ended in stalemate in 1953, there was once again some slippage in the readiness of the Army. Budgets were cut, and the NCO corps was used as a holding area for officers who could no longer keep their

commissions and who were awarded six stripes instead. But things never returned to the climate of the late 1940s. The nation had been warned, and it maintained the draft and at least the minimum forces that it needed to meet a continuing Communist threat throughout the world.

Vietnam and Beyond

When war broke out again it was in another poor and divided nation of the Third World. Although the nature of the Vietnam conflict differed considerably from the fighting in Korea during the previous decade, the NCO again was called upon to fill the traditional roles of skilled trainer and small unit leader.

The first American soldiers arrived in the Republic of Vietnam not as fighting forces, but as military. advisers to a non-Communist government under siege by both domestic insurgents and infiltrators from North Vietnam across the so-called Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ. Working directly with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in a variety of hands-on situations, Army NCOs proved their worth as trainers, teachers, and advisers, just as they had in earlier, similar assignments in the Philippines, Korea, and elsewhere. American sergeants and corporals helped the ARVN develop abilities ranging from how to operate bulldozers and other heavy equipment to how to use helicopters and sophisticated weapons supplied by the United States.

NCOS tackled this traditional role in a new land with skill and determination, and the effort quickly proved to be effective, both among the ARVN soldiers and the Hmong tribesmen of the Central Highlands. The people of Vietnam were willing to learn and to take a role in their own defense, and the American advisory effort-at least at the practical level where the noncommissioned officer operated-was a success.

Beginning in 1965, the American commitment in Southeast Asia began to change. The advisory effort, always supported by a small number of combat units for security, dwindled in proportion as the deployment of U.S. ground forces expanded dramatically. Thousands of additional American soldiers, along with allied forces from Korea, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand, joined the ARVN in fighting the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

As American soldiers took on a major combat role, the character of the war became apparent: more so than in any other military involvement in American history, battlefield success in Vietnam was dependent on effective small unit leadership. In this sense, Vietnam was the war of the platoon sergeant-of the squad, patrol, and fire-team NCO. The Korean War had provided many

examples of such leadership, but the NCO role in Vietnam was much more pervasive, reflecting the enemy's own increasing emphasis on small unit tactics and the diversity of the terrain. Now NCOs were called upon to demonstrate their competence, judgment, and fighting skills in isolated actions in areas ranging from rice paddies and deep jungles to the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Their success in a succession of often forgotten day-to-day engagements was critical to the total American military effort. At the same time, their advisory role continued as they taught ARVN units to conduct their own search and destroy missions and large sweeps to clear areas of enemy forces.

U.S. Army commanders in Vietnam knew that a favorite Communist tactic was to infiltrate troops into a particular area until they outnumbered the ARVN defenders. The insurgents would then strike, overwhelming the government forces before reinforcements could arrive, and then fade back into the peasant population. Using this tactic, the Communists were able to muster a numerical superiority at almost any given point in Vietnam, even if they were outnumbered in the country as a whole. The Americans hoped to counter this tactic by making the maximum use of airmobility-moving troops quickly by helicopter. If there was one item of military equipment that symbolized American warfighting in Vietnam, it was the helicopter. Choppers enabled small combat units to move quickly throughout the Vietnamese countryside. The U.S. Army's extensive use of airmobility made the role of the NCO small unit leader not only more effective, but also of greater tactical importance.

But if NCOs played a critical role in the Southeast Asia conflict, they did not find it an easy assignment. Operations in unfamiliar terrain, increasing and determined challenges from the enemy, and deteriorating morale on the home front-all these factors combined to place tremendous strain upon the Army's leaders, from generals to sergeants. But the sergeants had special problems.

For thousands of noncommissioned officers, the Vietnam War brought an identity crisis. Because of a chronic shortage of experienced NCOs, caused in part by rotation policies and the one-year tour of duty, many

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The most recent challenge to the corps came during eight years of fighting in Southeast Asia. Beginning with small-scale deployments of advisers to help the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (above), the American presence grew to over a half-million men. At peak intensity (below), large forces took advantage of the helicopter to conduct multibattalion operations. (DA photographs.)

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The Vietnam era's heavy requirement for small unit tactical leaders, technical specialists, and trainers strained the available pool of NCOs. At the same time the 365-day tour of duty (ending with the flight home on a "Freedom Bird") disrupted the traditional ability of the corps to provide the Army with continuity and experience in the field. (DA photograph.)

company grade officers got used to dealing directly with the men. The result was that those NCOS who were available were often bypassed, and their proper role as small unit leaders eroded. The morale of the noncommissioned officer corps thus declined at the very time when, because of the nature of the tactics employed in Vietnam, the small unit leader was more important than

ever.

Combat operations were often intense and resulted in large numbers of killed and wounded. These casualties, taken together with noncombat losses, and the one-year rotation system soon stretched the Army in Vietnam thin among the younger commissioned and mid-level noncommissioned officer grades. Promotions to captain and major, or to staff sergeant and platoon sergeant, came more rapidly than normal. To meet a critical shortage, the Army turned out thousands of so-called "shake and bake" NCOs. Often their personal qualities of bravery and talent overcame their lack of experience and

training, but individual achievement could not conceal the fact that the Army had come to depend in great part on a hasty wartime expedient.

As the buildup in Vietnam continued, ill will within the American enlisted ranks also became a growing problem. During World War II, enlisted animosity usually was directed toward officers' privileges. Even before Vietnam, however, the focus of enlisted hostility shifted toward the career NCOs, or "lifers." The problem was a growing polarization between the younger, junior enlisted men (E-1s through E-5s) and the older, professional noncommissioned officers (E-6s through E-9s). Junior company grade officers, reflecting the national generation gap, also often found it difficult to identify with the older NCOs. The latter found themselves either completely isolated or siding with the attitudes of senior officers in their own age group. Unit discipline was the ultimate casualty.

Incidents of insubordination and violence toward

senior noncommissioned officers and, in some cases, company commanders became more common as the Vietnam War continued. This is not to say that the Army was overwhelmed by insubordination or that noncommissioned officers overall lost control of their men. But incidents were frequent enough to contribute to an atmosphere of frustration and self-doubt among many experienced NCOs. The crisis of the corps was a part of the more general crisis of the Army itself and of the nation at large, a product of deep divisions that had developed over the war.

As the United States combat forces withdrew from Vietnam, the Army Chief of Staff recognized that raising the esteem of the noncommissioned officer corps was the first, crucial step toward rebuilding the Army. In 1973

the President and Congress decided to end the draft (Selective Service). Instead of a mainly conscript Army, the nation would now have a truly professional Modern Volunteer Army. As the term "modern" suggested, the intent was not to return to the lean, struggling "old Army" of the 1920s and 1930s-much less to the frontier and the Indian-fighting days-but rather to build an Army upon the most modern principles of personnel management, leadership, motivation, and training. After two hundred years of NCO evolution and development as trainers, technical specialists, and small unit leaders, the Army was at last fully prepared to recognize, encourage, and reward NCO professionalism. No less. was needed if the Army was to continue to serve the nation that depended upon it.

The Triumph of Professionalism

The Army's increased emphasis on NCO professionalism meant that the noncommissioned officer corps' potential would at last be fully developed. From the days of George Washington's Army, noncommissioned officers had usually thought of themselves as professionals, for they did skilled work that was not easy to learn and they shared a sense of identity as leaders and teachers of the enlisted ranks. But the Army leadership had been slow to recognize and encourage NCO professionalism. Vietnam and the Volunteer Army compelled a recognition of the changes that advances in science, technology, and tactics had brought. The dark hours of Vietnam thus led in the end to a greater appreciation of the noncommissioned officer's proper role. The change that resulted affected four critical areas: NCO pay, treatment in peacetime, training and education, and personnel management. Through fundamental changes in these areas, the Army gradually recognized NCOs as a distinct and essential group, separate from those they led, and provided them a career ladder to climb and the knowledge and training they needed to climb it.

NCO pay had been a problem for generations, not only because it was low, but also because it differed very little from the pay of privates. In 1775 privates in General Washington's Army received 40 shillings a month, while corporals, drummers, and fifers could expect only 44 shillings, and sergeants only 48. A corporal, in spite of extra responsibilities, received only. ten percent more pay than the newest private.

This gap between levels of duty and pay lasted for over one hundred years. Periodically throughout the nineteenth century-and especially after the Civil Warmany officers warned that poor NCO pay was a continuing danger to morale. However, their voices were not heard in Washington. When Congress finally enacted

a relatively comprehensive military pay bill in 1870, it did not address this particular problem. As a result, soldiers sometimes avoided the chance to obtain NCO stripes. Others, already promoted to noncommissioned officer status, requested reduction in grade. Both were responding to the simple fact that a private could make more money than his sergeant by earning extra duty pay for special details. NCOs were not eligible for such "'overtime."

After the patriotic frenzy of the Spanish-American War had passed, the question of enlisted pay surfaced again as enlistments declined and desertions increased. By 1900 practically every unit of the Regular Army was understrength. For the rank and file, this meant more fatigue details and less time for training. Noncommissioned officers, instead of being experienced veterans, frequently had to be appointed from among men in their first term of enlistment. By 1907 the situation was so disturbing that Secretary of War William Howard Taft addressed it in his annual report to the President.

Taft argued that to recruit and hold skilled workmen such as foremen, mechanics, and clerks-men who could become NCOs-the Army had to compete successfully with industry. If a businessman expected to hire and keep foremen who could train unskilled laborers and make them work effectively together, he had to pay them far more than unskilled workers. This fact held true for the Army as well.

Taft's strong plea for higher Army enlisted pay, especially for noncommissioned officers, finally moved Congress in May 1908 to pass the first Army-wide pay bill since 1870. The long-overdue legislation was a major step toward solving the problem that had for so long demoralized senior NCOs. It increased NCO pay, both in absolute terms and relative to privates' pay.

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