The young NCO waded slowly through the knee-deep, stagnant paddy water. His squad had not taken any fire yet, but the tension seemed to surround him like a fog. There could be booby traps buried under the mud among clumps of rice shoots, grenades with pins pulled halfway out on those vines just an arm's reach away. There could be a punji pit just ahead, its floor a carpet of sharpened bamboo spikes covered with excrement, or an unexploded shell that had been rigged with a pressure detonator in that dry patch off to the right, just waiting for a man who wanted to get out of the stinking muck for a few minutes. If that wasn't enough, somewhere out there a sniper might be drawing a bead on the squad members.

But the sergeant kept his emotions under control and managed to convey a sense of confidence that inspired the patrol's Spec. 4s and PFCs. He wore the stripes and he had the experience. They counted on the sergeant to teach each "newbie" how to spot the telltale signs of the enemy-the trip wires, the cut bark, the color contrasts in the dirt and leaves, and the silhouettes against the sky that were so hard to see in the green maze of Vietnam's delta country. More than that, they relied on him to keep them on their toes in the ferocious

heat-over 100 degrees already, and it wasn't even noon-when a weary man could easily begin to ignore details. Everyone just wanted to get to the objective and clear it. The squad leader had to convince them that the constant care and vigilance were worth it, especially when the alternative could be a life without legs or arms-or no life at all.

Now he could hear the radio telephone operator (RTO) on the horn with the platoon leader. At first the sergeant was angry-the squad was already alert, its weapons locked and loaded; he didn't need reminders. Then he realized that the lieutenant was merely passing on the word from the company commander. Earlier this morning, the men of Alpha Company had been hit by a couple of snipers in the tree line. Every other company in the battalion had heard it-they were just on the other side of that stand of rubber trees over there, no more than a "click" away. Alpha got both snipers, but only after suffering five wounded themselves. The dust-off choppers had come and gone, and now the count was known: one had died in the air on the way back to the field hospital; the other four would make it, though only two would probably ever return to duty in the bush. This was everyday life in the III Corps Tactical Zone, South Vietnam, 1969.

No branch of the Army can claim a longer history than the Infantry. Through the centuries and across national boundaries its experience has an almost timeless quality. Foot soldiers retain their central position in the

profession of arms. For only the infantryman can achieve the ultimate measure of battlefield success-taking and holding ground. Other branches facilitate victory, but only the infantrymen can occupy and hold the objective

once it is taken.

Infantrymen have always faced the most difficult work of war: marching long distances, digging defensive positions, holding the line in the face of enemy fire, and tolerating a wide range of adversity, from thirst and hunger to fear and loneliness. American soldiers and their NCOs have performed those thankless tasks for over two centuries, regardless of how the Army has changed the way it fights the nation's wars. Down in the mud, it hasn't always been easy for the infantryman to appreciate the impact of technology and scientific progress on his immediate role on the battlefield. Other branches have seen the changes more clearly. Signal Corps specialists and their NCOs have watched semaphore flags and torches become microwave relay communications equipment; cavalrymen have made the transition from horses to tracked vehicles and then to helicopters. So far-reaching have been some of these changes that entire new branches of the Army were spawned, including the Army Air Forces, which achieved separate status in the mid-twentieth century as the U.S. Air Force.

Yet the infantry certainly has not been immune to the influence of advancing technology. Both weapons and equipment have changed considerably over time. Infantrymen of the Revolution and War of 1812 struggled to master the primitive smoothbore flintlock musket. Over succeeding decades that basic small arm evolved through rifling, percussion firing mechanisms, metallic cartridges, and breech-loading, magazine-fed, semiautomatic, and finally automatic capability. Other equipment kept pace, as industry and science produced protective helmets, lightweight uniforms, prepackaged individual rations, and comfortable, durable boots. By the height of the Vietnam War the foot soldier possessed the lightest and fastest-firing rifle ever issued to the Army, scientifically designed field gear, and a uniform specifically tailored for the tropical climate in which he had to fight. As valuable as these improvements were, however, they did not alter the fundamentals of how he performed his mission. The Vietnam-era infantryman remained what he had always been. He still had to walk the hills and valleys, rifle at the ready.

In the 1960s the Army's infantrymen adapted their traditional skills to support a new Army doctrine: counterinsurgency. Supported by Communist regimes. elsewhere, North and South Vietnamese insurgents were well into their second decade of struggle to unify the country under Communist leadership. Having defeated French colonialists, they now sought to topple the pro-Western Saigon government. To accomplish that aim, they followed the example set by Mao Ze Dong in China, creating a guerrilla movement that survived by melding with the peasant population. Reinforced at first

by cadres who infiltrated from the North, and later by entire military units, the Viet Cong built an infrastructure by drawing rice, recruits, and information from the hamlets and villages.

After several years of giving advice and support to Saigon, the United States began to commit combat units in 1965 to offset the growing rebel pressure. Striving to buy time for the South Vietnamese to build a military force that could stand on its own, the United States Army, Vietnam (USARV), moved out of the cities and into the countryside to deprive the enemy of support. Counterinsurgency exposed the infantrymen of the combat divisions and their NCOs to battle in terrain that ranged from delta swamps to harsh, jungle-covered mountains. To survive and win, American NCOs had to learn skills that could not be taught at stateside bases like Fort Benning or picked up during routine overseas tours in Korea or Germany.

The 9th Infantry Division, deployed in the south along the watershed of the Mekong River, invented special riverine tactics to cope with the maze of rice paddies and streams. In the country's Central Highlands, the 4th Infantry Division dealt with a population of different ethnic background and language, in terrain where temperatures could fall far below the tropical range characteristic of the delta. And in the north, in I Corps, troops of the 23d (Americal) Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions, operating alongside U.S. marines, contended with landscapes that ranged from wet lowlands to sharp hill masses. The 1st Cavalry Division, which ranged throughout the country, adapted its airmobile capability to all situations. The remaining divisions, particularly the 1st and 25th Infantry, occupied positions in what was known as the III Corps Tactical Zone. Together with a host of smaller formations and key elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), they formed a barrier of men and guns between Communist base areas in neighboring Cambodia and Saigon, the capital of the fragile, developing Republic of Vietnam. NCOs of the "Big Red One" and "Tropic Lightning" divisions and their men learned to fight in rice paddies, rubber plantations, and patches of bamboo and jungle crisscrossed by irrigation canals and small

streams.

At first, counterinsurgency strategy adapted conventional techniques to the tropical environment. When they embarked at American ports, units left behind bulky equipment and some of their heaviest weapons, but they added many more helicopters and much technical support. After arrival in country and initial orientation, the forces fanned out to confront the Viet Cong. In strengths ranging from a brigade to several divisions, the Americans attacked enemy elements which threatened to cut off inland rice-producing areas from the urban centers

along the coast. By late 1967 the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army had been stopped in their tracks in most areas. Then their high command made a desperate gamble to regain the initiative during the lunar new year holiday in early 1968. This Tet offensive cost them grave losses, but back home in America antiwar sentiment accelerated after the bloody fighting of Tet. The fact that the Communist forces could still mount such a major attack loomed larger in the public mind than the enemy's defeat.

Convinced that superior American firepower could not be met head on, the enemy high command changed tactics. Most large formations withdrew westward to sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos to reconstitute their manpower and prepare for an eventual return. In the meantime, thousands of small detachments moved back and forth across the border, planting caches of weapons and equipment for subsequent operations or carrying out hit-and-run attacks on American and ARVN bases. By early 1968 the big multidivision operations of the war were over, at least as far as the Americans were concerned. While brigade-size operations continued, small unit actions on both sides became the norm, giving even more importance to the role of the NCO.

Ambushing enemy elements and seeking out the thousands of supply points required skilled and courageous small unit leadership. The smallest hamlets and stream beds had to be searched, and virtually every fold in the landscape had to be examined again and again in an effort to uncover every stockpile, cave, and tunnel complex. In the process the war became an endless series of search and destroy missions.

For thousands of NCOs and their infantry squads, sections, and platoons, search and destroy came to mean not only patrolling and sweeping through areas of suspected enemy strength, but dealing face to face with villagers. In supervising the search of individual huts for weapons, documents, and hidden supplies, NCOs had to act with great tact to accomplish their mission without alienating the rural Vietnamese people whose support

was fundamental to winning the war.

At the village level, counterinsurgency demanded unit reorganization. Throughout Vietnam, units as small as battalions activated an additional staff section, Civil Affairs (S-5). It continued the Army's earlier programs of civic action and helped to integrate them into the flow of combat operations. While a sweep was under way, for example, one or two squads would escort medics or engineers into a village to provide otherwise unobtainable treatment and assistance. NCOs and their men often stood guard as Army materials and expertise were employed to construct hospitals, schools, wells, and roads, all in an effort to bind the villagers to the central government.

Civic action, of course, was a very old technique for the Army. So too were the skills of small unit combat and patrolling. In fact, each soldier arriving in Vietnam received a pocket-size card containing "Rogers' Rules of Ranging." Written during the French and Indian War, these rules were still applicable two centuries later.

In Vietnam, American soldiers and their NCO leaders enjoyed one key advantage over Major Rogers' men the helicopter. The "chopper" gave Americans. and their allies unprecedented mobility, largely neutralizing the Communist tactic of ambush that had helped to defeat the French in the early 1950s. Announcing their arrival by the sound of rotor blades slicing through the humid air, these machines served as transports, gunships, and aerial ambulances, and successfully demonstrated the tactical value of airmobility. Major terrain obstacles were no longer a deterrent. Infantrymen could now land at an objective with little warning and be fresh for combat. Once he pinned down an elusive enemy, a ground commander could use helicopters to "pile on" additional friendly forces, bring direct and precise fire to bear, and conduct resupply and dust-off" operations rapidly. On the ground the infantryman and his NCO squad leader were cut from traditional cloth, but supporting them was the most advanced technology yet seen in any war.

The Vietnam War and the needs of counterinsurgency doctrine gave NCOs a prominent role in Army operations. Terrain, enemy methods, and political reality combined to place a premium on small unit leadership. The Vietnamese land surface includes dense jungle, with a double or even triple canopy of trees in some areas; towering hill masses; and many rivers and streams. These features often forced larger units to break up into

smaller elements, in close but not direct contactmoving along parallel ridges or valleys, for example. This pattern was reinforced later in the war when the enemy shifted to small-scale forces conducting localized ambushes and population-control operations.

The Army carried the battle to the enemy by trying to maintain the maximum number of maneuver battalions in the field and by breaking them down into