mum of direct supervision.

NCOS in the intelligence field in Korea met the challenges posed by new Communist tactics in several ways. CIC detachments assigned to each division, usually operating as teams composed of one officer and three enlisted men, produced combat intelligence. Other NCOS found themselves working in rear areas to counter enemy propaganda, sabotage, espionage, and subversion efforts. CIC NCOS working with the South Korean Army became especially adept at uncovering low-level North Korean agents attempting to infiltrate the lines by posing as civilian refugees. Others in the signal field maintained the security of friendly radio traffic through the use of codes and ciphers. The members of communication reconnaissance companies operated powerful radio equipment designed to intercept or jam enemy communications. The value of intercepts often went beyond message content. If at least two units intercepted the same transmission, they could pinpoint the location of an enemy command post, then inform an artillery or air unit for an attack mission.

The NCOS working in the field of combat intelligence drew less attention, but in many ways exceeded even the high standards set during World War II. Thanks to American air superiority over the entire Korean peninsula, observers could photograph enemy activity from above. Film came back to intelligence units, where NCOS studied the prints through magnifying lenses. All features of military significance-firing bunkers, trenches, weapons emplacements-were identified and labeled, and prints were distributed to units operating in the area. Other NCOS specialized in producing technical intelligence from weapons, equipment, and documents captured by line units or developed tactics to counter more effectively enemy strengths. Linguists at the enlisted level interrogated refugees, suspected agents, and prisoners and translated documents to learn enemy operational plans.

Solving the language problem became one of the more enduring intelligence triumphs of the war. Although in the two world wars large numbers of Americans had spoken the languages of the enemy, Americans fluent in Korean were very rare in 1950. At the outbreak of hostilities only two members of General MacArthur's G-2 staff spoke Korean. As a temporary measure he turned to the Japanese-Americans who had proved

invaluable in World War II. Since most Koreans had to learn Japanese during the decades before 1945, when their country was occupied by Japan, Japanese became the linguistic bridge between Korean and English. However, this three-language system caused delays that lowered the value of information collected. A crash program of language training instituted during the first year of the war eventually filled the gap.

Captured enemy soldiers turned out to be one of the most valuable intelligence assets in Korea, just as they had been in every other war in history. Primary responsibility for exploiting this source fell to the intelligence specialists within the NCO corps. It quickly became apparent that a sudden increase in enemy stragglers and deserters foreshadowed an offensive, and NCO interrogators soon uncovered the reason. Communist doctrine stressed building unit cohesion by furnishing troops with very detailed information on upcoming tactical plans, although not a date for the attack. Once this practice was discovered, a team of interrogators and analysts could easily connect items of information extracted from a number of individuals and fill in the missing pieces.

The close relationships established between American and South Korean soldiers in the intelligence field were matched elsewhere. Very early in the war the Army adopted a policy of pairing officers, NCOs, and other enlisted men of the two national armies at all echelons as a way swiftly to improve the Korean ground force. At the company level and below, the policy took the form of the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program. A number of ROK soldiers were assigned to each American line company. Training and fighting within a "buddy" system, American troops taught South Korean soldiers the use of infantry weapons, small unit tactics, and basic English terms and phrases. In return the "Katusas" became invaluable assets for squad and platoon NCOs. They were adept at reading terrain accurately, detecting signs of enemy activity, and serving as translators.

The use of Katusas recalls the experience of earlier generations of NCOS working with Indian scouts to conduct cavalry operations on the western plains. The result in both eras was the same: NCOS became more effective small unit leaders.

Throughout World War II and Korea the number and functions of intelligence specialists within the Army.

grew, eventually giving rise to the formation of a permanent, distinct military intelligence branch. During

this process a basic distinction emerged, based on rank: enlisted personnel collected and recorded relevant information, while officers analyzed it. In accordance with this tradition, NCOs occupied critical middle positions in the chain. They transmitted finished intelligence from division-, corps-, or army-level G-2 staffs downward to the regiment-, battalion-, and company-level units engaged in field operations. And during operations the NCOS gathered information and equipment from small unit actions for transmission to higher-echelon intelligence sections to be analyzed. The historical practice in the intelligence field of reserving to officers the function. of analysis did not bar NCOs from interpreting evidence they handled. On the contrary, NCOs were required to look for changes or trends and to bring them to the attention of superiors.

But before intelligence NCOs could examine any prisoners, equipment, or documents and begin extracting information from them, they had to receive evidence from the field. That process depended on an even older military skill: reconnaissance. Ever since Maj. Robert Rogers' men ranged the woods in the mid-eighteenth century, the observations of such specialists within the combat arms had formed the primary source of the raw information on which intelligence was based. If modern intelligence specialists owed much to the revolution in technology that produced sophisticated photographic and communications intercept equipment, the reconnaissance field remained solidly grounded in time-honed fundamentals. Patrols conducted in Korea, like Rogers' sweeps along the shores of Lake Champlain, could succeed only if carried out by hand-picked, highly motivated, and well-led soldiers with the training to collect relevant information over all types of terrain and

through all types of weather.

The combination of traditional reconnaissance expertise with a highly technical information-processing function made for a very effective intelligenceproducing operation by the time of the Korean War. Information derived from patrols and intercepts became very valuable in frustrating new tactics introduced by the Communists. As the Army tried to adjust to America's new role as the leader of the Free World, it returned again and again to techniques pioneered in the Korean War. In succeeding decades, the ground component of the military focused increasing attention on the need to operate in underdeveloped areas, creating in time a host of special operations forces to carry out that mission. Each step along the way reaffirmed the importance to ultimate success of competent, professional NCOs.

Together, the intelligence specialist and the reconnaissance NCO were also a fine example of the twentieth century cooperation between the specialist and the troop leader. The Army created its technical specialists largely by giving them special training; the troop leader, in the absence of schools for enlisted men, was a product of on-the-job training. In combat, however, the two worked. together to accomplish a single mission, the patrol maintaining close contact with the enemy while the intelligence expert used technical tools to collate and analyze the reports on enemy units to produce a single picture. On both sides of the equation, the NCO was an essential member of the team, contributing not only to a more versatile and professional corps, but also to a more flexible, modern, and effective Army.

The NCO instructor wore a black hat, spit-shined jump boots, and a scowl on his face. Aided by a demonstrator in the standard T-10 "chute," reserve parachute, weapon, and full field gear, he had just given a careful explanation of how to hit the ground safely even while carrying a great weight. But when the students attempted to practice what they had been taught, one of them committed a bad mistake-all the worse because, although he wore no rank insignia on his white T-shirt, the offender was a brand new lieutenant.

Fortunately, the sergeant was an old hand at this game. He had the job of ensuring that trainees' mistakes were corrected on the practice field, before they cost a life. The Army had equipped him with a sure-fire method to make his points-physical exertion.

"You!" he bellowed. The offender came to rigid attention. "Drop!"

The class was only part way through the first phase of a three-week course, yet that simple four-letter word already carried a special meaning. The lieutenant understood exactly what was expected. He assumed what was commonly known as the "front leaning

rest" position and began knocking out strenuous four-count pushups.

For him, it was a tough moment in a tough day-in fact, the lieutenant found airborne training the most physically demanding experience of his life. Up at dawn, he had gone through an hour of intense exercise. With his fellow students, he double-timed everywhere he went. At every moment he was subject to close supervision, iron discipline, and immediate on-the-spot corrections by tough NCOs. Yet the young officer endured and in time came to respect and even admire his taskmaster; he knew that he must learn fast in a game where errors could be fatal.

The payoff came later, when he made a series of five jumps from transport aircraft over the Fort Benning drop zones. He learned the whole experience, from the butterflies in his stomach before each jump to the exhilaration that followed a successful landing. He made the transition from "leg" to paratrooper and earned the right to wear jump wings and the distinctive glider badge. And he, with his fellow students who did not "wash out," went on to become teachers of others.

The Army got into airborne warfare through a series of limited experiments. When World War II erupted in Europe at the end of 1939, the United States faced the task of suddenly modernizing and expanding its armed forces after years of low peacetime budgets. Army planners had to address a host of new or emerging technologies and to uncover ways to exploit them on the battlefield. The task ranged from employing primitive

automatic data processing equipment to studying recent improvements in tanks and airplanes. Fortunately, the Army had time to assess experiments carried out by the European powers, especially by Germany and the Soviet Union. Experts also studied the operations of the recently concluded Spanish Civil War and the opening campaigns of World War II.

Exploring the airborne forces' potential fell to the