Alien Female alien, intermarrying with a natural
born subject of this realm, acquires the status of
a natural born subject, by virtue of 7 & 8 Vict.
c. 66. s. 16, and is not entitled to be tried by a
jury de medietate linguæ. R. v. Manning, 1
Appeal Pauper's examination having stated a settle-
ment by apprenticeship in appellant parish under
a covenant of indenture executed in the year 1804,
a ground of appeal that said pauper
66 was not in
the year 1834 legally bound apprentice to," &c.
(following words of examination) "as stated in
said examination of said pauper taken in this
cause," &c. sufficiently traverses the settlement
by apprenticeship stated in the examination,
and decision of Sessions upon the question may
properly be reviewed. R. v. Aston-nigh-Birming-
ham, 17

Under the general ground of appeal "that
statements contained in said examinations are not
true," appellants are entitled to call upon respon-
dents to prove settlement relied upon in examina-
tions.

Inconvenience of such general ground of appeal
for consideration of Sessions in each case, and
ifit amount to a frivolous and vexatious statement,
they may award costs under 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76.
and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31. R. v. St. Pancras, 23

Examinations in support of order of removal
alleged, as evidence of settlement, relief given to
pauper's late husband and pauper in appellant
parish, and a former order, acted upon and unap-
pealed against, for removal of pauper and her
children from respondent to appellant parish as
the place of her late husband's settlement. Ground
of appeal (with other special grounds), that J. S,
late deceased husband of pauper, "had not at the
time of his decease nor ever had any settlement
in our said parish," does not traverse the existence
of the former order, and Sessions properly refused
to call upon respondent to produce and prove it
at the hearing.
Quære whether, if this general ground of
appeal had denied existence of former order, it
would have been rendered unavailable for that

-

purpose by reason of the other special grounds of
appeal. R. v. St. Mary in Bungay, 39

Grounds of appeal against order for mainte-
nance of pauper lunatic alleging that pauper's
mother was legally settled in the parish of R, and
that pauper was legally settled there, her mother's
settlement being legally communicated to her; and
further, that said pauper's mother was legally entitled
to, and in possession of a certain freehold tenement,
situate in parish of R, and that she had been resi-
dent in said parish forty days next before the
making of the order, and that pauper uneman-
cipated, are not sufficiently explicit to enable
appellant parish to set up under them a derivative
settlement by estate from pauper's mother.

Quare Whether distinct grounds of appeal
may be taken together, without some link con-
necting them. R. v. Rhyddlan, 110

If language of ground of appeal is capable of
bearing the construction put on it by the Sessions,
the Court will not review their decision.

Notice of appeal not having been given to par-
ties entitled to it, Sessions are justified in refusing
to hear appeal, and are not bound to allow appel-
lants to abandon the ground of appeal affecting
those persons, and hear the case on remaining
grounds of appeal. R. v. Cambridgeshire, 130

A poor-rate having been made on 7th of
December 1848, the London and North-Western
Railway Company, on 21st of that month, paid
part of the sum for which they were assessed to
such rate, and on 12th of July 1849, gave notice
of appeal to special sessions for hearing appeals
against rates, to be holden on 9th of August 1849.
Three previous special sessions having intervened
between making the rate and 9th of August 1849,
Justices were right in refusing to hear the appeal
on the ground that it had not been brought to the
next practicable special sessions, or within a reason-
able time. R. v. Lancashire, 199

A person convicted at petty sessions and
sentenced to imprisonment under 6 Geo. 4. c. 129,
which gives an appeal, and provides that the
execution of every judgment appealed from shall

be suspended if the person convicted shall "imme-
diately" enter into certain recognizances, need not
enter into recognizances at the time of conviction,
but prisoner is entitled to discharge if he makes
his application to have recognizances taken
promptly and expeditiously. R. v. Aston, 236

Notice of. See Bastardy. Order of Re-
moval.

Assault A surgeon professing to take steps to cure
a girl of a complaint and having carnal connexion
with her, she being ignorant of the nature of his
act, and making no resistance solely from a bonâ
fide belief that he is, as he represents, treating her
medically with a view to her cure, is guilty of an
assault. R. v. Case, 174

Auditor. See Justice of the Peace.

Bail on removal of indictment by certiorari, are
only liable when principal convicted. After granting
rule for new trial it cannot be said there has been
a conviction within meaning of recognizance.
Neither defendant's default in paying costs nor
Judge's order setting aside notice of trial does
away with rule for new trial or restores original
verdict.

Whether liable or not, bail ought not to be
mentioned in side-bar rule for taxation of costs.
R. v. Bowen, 94, Q.B. 63

After removal of indictment by certiorari, if
defendant is convicted and has become liable to
costs, Court will not discharge recognizances of
bail to certiorari until costs paid, although recogni-
zances make no mention of costs; but proceedings
on recognizances with respect to defendant may be
stayed propter paupertatem. R. v. Thornton, 113
Bankrupt Poor-rates are proveable under the fiat.
In re Wetherell, 115

See Indictment.
Bastardy Written order has relation back to prior
verbal adjudication and notice of appeal given
before order signed by Justices is good.

Verbal notice of appeal given to the mother by
clerk of attorney of putative father, in presence
and by direction of the latter, is sufficient. R. v.
Huntingdonshire, 127

Personal service of summons not having been
effected, and putative father not appearing, proof
of summons having been left at his present place
of abode, if he has any, at his last place of abode,
if he has none, is essential; Justices having juris-
diction to make the order, only upon proof of
proper service of summons; and semble, the order
must aver such proof.

Though Justices make the order, having primá
facie jurisdiction, party summoned may shew by
affidavit that summons not in fact served at his
last place of abode, and upon proof thereof Court
will grant certiorari to bring the order up to be
quashed, as made without jurisdiction. R. v.
Evans, 151

Upon appeal against order in bastardy, proof
of notice of recognizance having been sent to
mother of bastard by post, is sufficient proof of
notice under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10. s. 3, though at
time of sending it the mother was dead. R. v.
Leicestershire, 209

Bridge-In the schedule to Boundary Act, 2 & 3

Will. 4. c. 64, part of Glasbury parish was stated

66

to belong to Brecknockshire, to be isolated and to
be locally situated in Brecknockshire or Radnor-
shire, and was annexed, in future, to Brecknock-
shire. By 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61. every part of a county
detached from the main body of such county is to
be considered for all purposes as forming part of
that county of which it is considered a part for
election purposes, under 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 64. In
fact, no part of Glasbury parish was isolated"
or detached," unless 470 acres of land therein,
which were separated from Brecknockshire by the
river Wye, could be so considered:-Held, that
notwithstanding the misapprehension in the sche-
dule as to fact of Glasbury parish being isolated
and locally situate in Brecknockshire or Radnor-
shire, the 470 acres of the parish of Glasbury,
though not strictly speaking either "isolated" or
"detached" from the main body of the county of
Radnor, must upon the facts found be taken to
be the part of the parish described in the schedule,
and that it therefore became, under the Boundary
Act, a part of the county of Brecon, and (under
7 & 8 Vict. c. 61.) for all purposes, including
liability to repair a bridge.

Where boundary line between two counties
necessarily runs along some part of a public river,
the middle of the river is the boundary,there being
nothing in Boundary Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 64, to
prevent the general rule in such cases applying.
R. v. Brecknockshire, 203

The word "riding" in the Statute of Bridges
(22 Hen. 8. c. 5. s. 3.) is not confined to districts
called by that name, but includes any division of
a county which corresponds in its definition to a
riding.

Though by 6 & 7 Will. 4. c. 87. the Isle of
Ely has a separate commission and clerk of the
peace and a separate county rate and custos rotu-
lorum from the county of Cambridge, yet it being,
by 7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 53. s. 7, enacted that,
in statutes theretofore passed or thereafter to be
passed respecting counties, ridings or divisions,
the Isle of Ely should be deemed and taken to be
a division of a county, the Isle of Ely is included
in the Statute of Bridges, and its inhabitants are
prima facie liable at common law to repair bridges
situate within it; and may be indicted in same
form as in ordinary counties.

The general rule as to bridges built prior to
43 Geo. 3. c. 59. is, that if a private person
erects a bridge, and it becomes useful to the
county in general, the county shall repair it.
But where an act rendering a bridge necessary,
though authorized to be done, is done primarily
for private purposes, and interferes with public
right and public user, from which public benefit is
inferred, is referable only to that act, because made
necessary by it, the authority to do the act in
question is conditional only on the party main-
taining public right in same state as before it was
interfered with.

Plea to indictment for non-repair of bridge,
alleging a drain and the bridge to be vested in
corporation, &c., not double. R. v. Isle of Ely, 223
See Railway.

Certiorari The provision in 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45.
8. 7. (which came into operation on the 1st of

November 1849), that no objection on account of
any omission or mistake in an order brought up
on return to a certiorari shall be allowed, unless
such omission or mistake shall have been specified
in the rule for the certiorari, is not applicable to
rules obtained before 1st of November 1849.

Quare-Whether its effect is to prevent sub-
stantial as well as formal objections to the order
being taken, unless specified in the rule. R. v.
Crowan, 20

--

A whole term having elapsed after bringing up
a case granted by Quarter Sessions, it is too late
to quash certiorari on ground that, although affi-
davits on which it was obtained alleged notice to
two Justices present at time of making the order,
one of those Justices was, in fact, not then present.
R. v. Basingstoke, 28

-

It is no ground for certiorari to remove con-
victions before Justices under Factory Act (certio-
rari being expressly taken away), that summons
to appear and answer charges, served only day
before the hearing, and that Justices made convic-
tions upon no other appearance than that of an
attorney who professed to represent parties charged,
without requiring proof of service of summons,
and upon evidence offered in support of one only
of several charges. Ex parte Hopwood, 197

See Bail. Disorderly House.
Chargeability. See Order of Removal.
Churchwardens and Overseers-for time being may
sue upon bonds under 59 Geo. 3. c. 12. s. 7. for
due performance of duties of assistant overseer in
parish within an union, notwithstanding 7 & 8
Vict. c. 101. s. 61. Skelton v. Rushby, 29
Clergy Indictment against a clergyman for refusing
to marry upon registrar's certificate must aver
that the parties had demanded and tendered
themselves to be married by him at a time and
place when he could legally have been called upon
to perform the ceremony. And, semble, it must
aver that the parties were persons who could law-
fully intermarry. R. v. James, 179
Coin. See Larceny.

Commitment-Warrant of imprisonment directing
defendant to be imprisoned thirty-five days, but
not naming any day for commencement of im-
prisonment, is good; in such case imprisonment
begins to run from time of defendant being taken
into custody. Braham v. Joyce, 24, Ex. 1

Warrant of commitment by Judge of county
court being partly a civil and partly a penal pro-
ceeding, is not bad, because it does not appear
on the face of it that defendant was examined on
oath touching his estate and effects; nor because
it states two offences, viz. that defendant had
obtained credit by false pretences, and had made
a transfer of his property to defraud his creditors;
nor for uncertainty in stating defendant had made
delivery, gift, or transfer of property to defraud
his creditors; nor because it ordered defendant
to be imprisoned for forty days, or until he be
sooner discharged by the course of law. Ex parte
Purday, 95

Warrant of, granted by Judge of county court,
recited that party committed had wilfully insulted
Judge, who thereupon ordered him into custody,
and it proceeded, "these are therefore to require
you," &c. to deliver him to keeper of house of cor-

rection, to be kept for seven days in custody.
This a good warrant, it being unnecessary to shew
what species of insult had been committed; and
the word "therefore" not rendering it uncertain
whether commitment was for the insult, or because
Judge had ordered party into custody.

Semble, that county courts constituted by 9 & 10
Vict. c. 95. s. 113. are inferior courts. Levy v.
Moylan, 236, C.P. 308

Constable The 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 41. is not repealed,
with respect to appointment and remuneration of
special constables within boroughs, by 5 & 6
Will. 4. c. 76. s. 83.

Borough of Manchester, incorporated subse-
quently to 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 76. and having separate
Quarter Sessions, is contributory to county rate
within meaning of 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 41. s. 13;
therefore, order by Justices of borough of Man-
chester upon treasurer of county of Lancaster for
payment of expenses, &c., of special constables
appointed under 1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 41. for borough
of Manchester, is good. R. v. Hulton, 32
Conviction Imprisonment not being for the purpose
of ascertaining whether plaintiff had any goods
whereon distress could be levied, and warrant
naming no day for its return, is not authorized by
5 Geo. 4. c. 18.

Quare-whether verbal order to detain under
5 Geo. 4. c. 18, is valid.

The 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68. s. 19. does not authorize
a distress for costs not adjudged by the convic-
tion.

There being excess of jurisdiction by Magis-
trates, trespass maintainable against them under
11 & 12 Vict. c. 44. s. 2. Leary v. Pattrick, 211
See Appeal. Certiorari.
Costs. See Appeal. Mandamus. Order of Re-
moval.

County

Bridge.

Construction of Boundary Acts. See

County Court an inferior court. Levy v. Moylan,
236, C.P. 308

Court for Crown Cases Reserved-has no power, on
case stated, to review a judgment for the Crown
on demurrer to the indictment. R. v. Faderman,
147

Depositions Right to copy of. See Prisoner. And
see Evidence.

Disorderly House-After removal by certiorari of an
indictment for keeping a disorderly house from
Middlesex Sessions to Central Criminal Court, a
second writ of certiorari for removal of same in-
dictment into the Queen's Bench may be obtained
at instance of party indicted. R. v. Brier, 121
Distress Warrant of, to levy church-rate from per-
son not a Quaker, directing sale of goods "forth-
with," is bad; it should fix a certain time, not less
than four nor more than eight days, before sale.
R. v. Williams, 126

See Conviction. Rate.

Embezzlement Receipt of poor-rate by collector, a
receipt by virtue of his employment, although from
person not liable to pay it.

Money so received is well described as property
of overseers by whom collector employed, and need

not be alleged to be property of overseers and
churchwardens jointly. R. v. Adey, 149

See Larceny.
Evidence Admission of evidence by conduct (see
Order of Removal). R. v. Basingstoke, 97

Prisoner being charged with felony before a
Magistrate, minutes of examination and cross-exa-
mination of witnesses were taken in writing under
inspection of Magistrate, and taken to Magistrate's
office to clerk named T, who proceeded to draw
up depositions. Witnesses attended at office, and
T, in order to make depositions complete, put
questions to witnesses and inserted their answers
in depositions, neither Magistrate nor prisoners
being present. Depositions having been so written
out, the witnesses again appeared before the Magis-
trate, and were in presence of prisoner re-sworn,
and depositions read over to him, and full oppor-
tunity given for cross-examination before deposi-
tions signed by witnesses. Counsel for prisoner
entitled, without putting in depositions, to ask wit-
ness whether he had not made a certain statement
to T. in answer to question put by the latter in
course of writing depositions, although, according
to the evidence, the answer would have appeared
in the depositions. R. v. Christopher, 103

After taking examination of witnesses on
charge of felony, Magistrate cautioned prisoner in
language prescribed by sect. 18. of 11 & 12 Vict.
c. 42, but did not, as proviso to that section re-
quires, tell him that he had nothing to hope from
any promise of favour, or fear from any threat, &c.
Prisoner then made a statement, which was taken
down, but not signed by him or the Magistrate.
Prisoner, after remand, being brought again before
the Magistrate, some questions were put to wit-
nesses by prisoner's attorney, who then objected
to the statement being treated as prisoner's state-
ment, as an addition had been made to the evi-
dence; and prisoner being then asked if he wished
to make any statement declined doing so. State-
ment admissible in evidence at trial. R. v. Bond, 138
If prisoner make a statement before a Magis-
trate which is taken down, and deposition contain-
ing it is duly returned, and it appears upon its face
that the caution required by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42.
8. 11. has been given, and it purports to be signed
by the Magistrate, and there is no evidence that
any threat or promise has been held out to induce
a confession from prisoner, deposition may, without
further proof, be read in evidence against him on
his trial, although Magistrate did not comply with
direction in first proviso to sect. 18, and give pri-
soner to understand before he made his statement
that he had nothing to hope from any promise of
favour, &c.

Semble, that the last proviso overrides the whole
of that section, and renders admissible in evidence
against a prisoner any statement made by him
either before a Magistrate or on any other occa-
sion, which independently of the statute would by
law be admissible as evidence against him. R. v.
Sansome, 143

See Highway.

Examinations. See Order of Removal.

Factory Acts-It is no offence against the Factory

Acts to employ a young person, a female, ten hours

in any one day, such ten hours ending at period
which is more than ten hours (in addition to hour
and half allowed for meal-times) from period
another child or young person or female began to
work.

Subject to limits as to period, and restriction as
to meal-times, working by relays is legal.

All children, young persons, and females must
be taken to have commenced work when any one
child, young person, or female commenced. Ryder
v. Mills, 82

See Certiorari.

False Pretences Omission of word "knowingly" in
indictment for obtaining money by false pretences,
no ground for arresting judgment. R. v. Bowen, 65

A person obtaining by false pretence a railway
ticket, entitling him to travel without payment
from one place to another in company's carriages,
but which is to be delivered up to company at the
end of journey, is guilty of obtaining by false
pretence a chattel of the company with intent,
&c. R. v. Boulton, 67

A person obtaining by means of a false pre-
tence a voluntary charitable gift of money, may
be indicted under 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 29. s. 53

Prisoner, in a begging letter, requested prose-
cutor, who resided in Middlesex, to forward by post
to an address in Kent, a sum of money, and prose-
cutor obtained a post-office money order, and in-
closed and addressed it as requested by prisoner,
putting the letter into a post-office in Middlesex.
Prisoner properly indicted in Middlesex for having
obtained post-office order by false pretences in that
county, for by directing prosecutor to send the
money by post he constituted the postmaster in
Middlesex his agent to receive the post-office order
there for him. R. v. Jones, 162

Prisoner, who was secretary of a lodge of Odd
Fellows, came to prosecutor and told him he owed
a sum of money to the society, at the same time
producing a paper purporting to be a summons
signed by himself, giving notice to prosecutor that
he owed the money to the lodge. Prosecutor be-
lieving the statement, paid prisoner the amount.
Prisoner properly convicted, under the statute, for
obtaining money by false pretences, although
paper not set out in indictment, and although, by
rules of society, secretary had no authority to re-
ceive money out of the lodge, and although amount
due was as much within prosecutor's knowledge as
prisoner's. R. v. Woolley, 165

A pretence that a certain printed paper is a
good promissory note is a sufficient pretence, with-
in the statute; and purport of the paper need not
be set out. R. v. Coulson, 182

Fees to Justices' clerks (See Police).
Chapman, 155

Wray v.

Forgery. See Jurisdiction.
Friendly Society Alterations in original rules of
society, affecting rates of contribution and relief
amongst members, made without formalities re-
quired by act and not inrolled, do not take away
jurisdiction of Justices to hear complaint against
stewards. R. v. Cotton. 233

See Justice of the Peace.

Guardians of the Poor-Authority of Clerk. See
Settlement.

Habeas Corpus After judgment against defendant in county court he became insolvent, and obtained discharge from Insolvent Debtors Court, having inserted debt in his schedule. Being afterwards arrested under warrant of commitment from county court, subsequent to his discharge, Court refused to grant habeas corpus to discharge him out of custody, as warrant of commitment a subsisting valid commitment. Ex parte Purday, 95 Highway Navigation company being required by local act to make and keep in repair a road seven yards wide, made and kept in repair a road twelve yards wide. Canal company who purchased navigation, &c. under subsequent act, liable to indictment for non-repair of road to full width of twelve yards; but not liable to repair ratione tenure of land, purchased by them, connected with the navigation. R. v. Sheffield Canal, 44

By local act proprietors of a navigation were directed to repair ancient highway situate in township of B, and subjected to indictment in case of default; but nothing therein contained to excuse inhabitants of several townships, &c. in which said way lieth, from contributing to repairs thereof with their carts, &c., or otherwise, as now obliged to do by law. Township not exempted from common law liability to repair highway.

In indictment against township for non-repair of road, conviction of adjoining township for nonrepair of portion of highway in continuation of road in question, admissible, to prove road in question to be a highway. R. v. Brightside Bierlow, 50

Divided liability to repair.

The proviso in section 58. of 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 50. applies only to cases where boundary line runs along highway, and where liability to repair not at common law, but ratione tenure or clausuræ. R. v. Perkins, 105

An award of Inclosure Commissioners under 54 Geo. 3. c. clx., setting out an ancient public bridle-road over common uninclosed lands (altered in some parts, and defined throughout within narrower limits), as 66 one public bridle-road and private carriage-road for the use" of certain private individuals named, to be kept in repair by them, does not operate under General Inclosure Act, 41 Geo. 3. c. 109, as a diversion or stopping up of old public bridle-road and setting out of new one, but public have the same right of passage as before, and parish in which road lay remains liable to repair it, so as to maintain it as a public bridleroad. R. v. Cricklade, 169

-Turnpike-road a common Queen's highway, which parish liable to repair, the user and preamble of statute for forming it shewing it to be beneficial to the public.

Indictment sufficiently describes it as a common Queen's highway, without reference to its temporary nature under Turnpike Act or payment of toll.

Want of compliance with provisions of 41 Geo. 3. c. 149. s. 9, though it renders road under Inclosure Act a highway, but not repairable by the parish, does not prevent it from having all the incidents of a common highway when adopted and used by turnpike trustees.

Breach of duty by trustees, in not making road
NEW SERIES, XIX.-MAG. CAS.

of proper width or erecting sufficient fences, no answer to indictment for non-repair.

Evidence to shew that although road had been opened to public and used by them, it had never been fully completed according to requirements of Turnpike Act, properly rejected as irrelevant. R. v. Lordsmere, 215

The limitation in 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 50. s. 82. as to not pulling down any house, &c. does not apply to the case of diverting a highway, which must be done with consent of the owner of land through which the new road passes; but (assuming it to apply to such a case) where, at the instance of A, with his consent, the Sessions duly made an order that an existing highway be diverted, and new highway substituted through lands of A, which surveyors were thereby authorized to purchase for that purpose, with proviso that in so doing surveyors were not to pull down any house, &c., and surveyors made the new road, not according to plan deposited with clerk of the peace, but as near to the site there delineated as practicable, without pulling down a house, the statutory power for diverting the old highway had not been properly carried out.

The proviso rendered the order of Sessions bad on its face, for throwing that upon the discretion of surveyors, who are ministerially to execute, what is in truth a restraint upon the power of the Magistrates who are to order; and if it were rejected, the new highway had not been made in pursuance of the order. R. v. Newmarket Railway, 241 Inclosure Act. See Highway.

Indictment against bankrupt which alleged, that at time of examination under fiat, he was possessed of certain real estate, and then charged that at time of his said examination, he feloniously did not discover when he disposed of said estate, with intent to defraud his creditors, is bad in arrest of judgment for not containing an averment that prisoner had in fact disposed of estate. R. v. Harris, 11

Indictment alleging that prisoner "did unlawfully attempt and endeavour fraudulently, falsely and unlawfully to obtain from A. B. a large sum of money, to wit, the sum of 221. 10s., with intent thereby then and there to cheat and defraud the said A. B." is bad in arrest of judgment, for not sufficiently alleging an indictable offence. R. v. Marsh, 12

Removal by certiorari. See Disorderly House. Venue. See False Pretences. And see Bridge. Clergy. False Pretences. Highway. Larceny. Threatening Letter. Information. See Justice of the Peace.

Judgment-on demurrer. See Court for Crown Cases Reserved.

Jurisdiction. On trial of indictment for forgery prisoner was not shewn to have been in custody till trial began. Indictment and conviction good under 11 Geo. 4. & 1 Will. 4. c. 66. s. 24, inasmuch as prisoner in custody before the Court at time of trial. R. v. Smythies, 31

See Conviction. Court for Crown Cases Reserved. Friendly Society. Justice of the Peace. Order of Removal. 2 L