misled, I think an issue on the particular settlement by apprenticeship was properly raised.

WIGHTMAN, J.-This is not a question of fact, but one of construction, namely, whether or not a sufficient traverse of the particular settlement stated in the examinations has been taken; and, giving effect to the words as stated in the examination of the said pauper," I think it certainly raises an issue upon the point.

ERLE, J.-The question here is in the nature of a question of law, and I think the decision of the Sessions upon it wrong. I am disposed to carry out the rule for giving effect to the intention of the parties, and to apply it to words used in the various steps of legal proceedings. Here it can clearly be gathered that the intention was to deny the settlement stated in the examination, and in the examination there is no deed of 1834 mentioned. Considering, then, the ground of appeal with the examination to which it refers, and striking out the words which have no meaning and giving effect to those which have, I think the issue is sufficiently raised.

Order of Sessions quashed.

THE QUEEN v. THE INHABITANTS
OF WIGAN.

Order of Removal-Sufficiency of ExEvidence of Settlement by Relief by Order of Guardians of Union -Authority of Clerk to Guardians.

The clerk to the board of guardians of an union is an officer having authority to order the giving of relief, so as to establish a settlement by admission in a township within such union.

Where, therefore, a letter was written by the clerk to the guardians of the union within which the appellant township was contained, to the guardians of the poor of the union containing the respondent township, requesting relief to be given on account of his union to a pauper resident in the respondent township, but whose settlement was stated in the letter to be in the appellant township; which relief was afterwards given and repaid :

Held, that it amounted to some evidence of a settlement by admission in the appellant township.

Appeal against an order for the removal of Mary Bamber and her two illegitimate children, aged respectively six and three years, from the township of Leyland to the township of Wigan, in the county of Lan

caster.

Upon the trial of the appeal it was objected on the part of the appellants, that the examinations contained no legal evidence of a settlement of the paupers in the appellant township; and that they contained no direct or legal evidence shewing that the appellants had acknowledged a liability by granting relief to the pauper, as pretended in the examinations. The Sessions overruled the objections and held the examinations sufficient, and confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court. If the Court should be of opinion that the examinations were sufficient, the order of removal and the order of Sessions were to be confirmed, but if otherwise, to be quashed.

The material points of the examinations were as follows:-The pauper Mary Bamber stated that she had never been married; that she was the illegitimate child of Jane Bamber, and was born in Wigan, as she had always been told and believed, where her mother's settlement was; that she was living in Leyland in or about the month of January 1846, and having become chargeable to Leyland, she was sent to the township of Wigan, to which township she belonged, to apply for relief there; that she went there with her child the youngest pauper, and told the relieving officer of Wigan that she belonged to Wigan, and applied to be taken into the workhouse there; that the relieving officer then sent her and her said child into the Wigan workhouse, where she remained twenty-three weeks; and that she was at the time of her examination receiving relief from the township of Leyland, by reason of her poverty, and not by reason of the sickness of or accident to herself or either of her children. It next appeared that the clerk of the board of guardians of the Chorley Union (which included, with several others, the responden township) had received the following letter :

"To the guardians of the poor of the Chorley Union.

"6 'Wigan, 5th March, 1847. "Gentlemen,-I am directed to request that you will, through your relieving officer, relieve on account of this union the undermentioned pauper, residing at Leyland, in your union, with the relief and for the period stated below. I am, &c.

"Thos. Bullock,

"For clerk to the Wigan Union." Then followed a schedule of the pauper's name and family, her age and occupation, and stating Wigan as her place of settle ment, and the amount and period of relief. Thomas Bullock acted as clerk to the clerk of the guardians of the Wigan Union, and the amount of the relief authorized by the said letter was paid to the pauper by the relieving officer of the Chorley Union, who stated that he had paid it on account of the township of Wigan, and the amount was afterwards repaid.

guishable. There nothing appeared but the naked fact of relief by the relieving officer of the union. Then the case of The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Crondall (5) is a direct authority in support of the present order. There the Court held that relief by the guardians of an union on account of a particular parish was evidence of relief by such parish. The case of The King v. the Inhabitants of Edwinstowe (6) deciding that relief by the overseer of a parish is some evidence of settlement, has never been questioned. Then as to the only other question, it is submitted, the clerk to the Wigan Union had sufficient authority to write the letter, so as to make it the act of the guardians. No statute expressly defines his duties; but the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. authorizes his appointment with other paid officers; and by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 57. and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. and other statutes various duties are imposed upon him; and it is submitted, that the writing of the letter was peculiarly a matter within the province of his authority as clerk to the guardians.

Pashley, in support of the order of Sessions.-All that it is necessary to establish here is, that the examinations contain some legal evidence of the settlement. The relief stated in the pauper's examination, taken with the fact that she told the relieving officer of Wigan that she belonged to Wigan, and the further statement that the amount of the relief had been paid and received on account of the parish of Wigan, as also the letter to the guardians of the Chorley Union (assuming it to have been written with sufficient authority) amounted to evidence of a sufficient admission to warrant the order of removal-The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Sowe (1). The cases of The Queen V. the Inhabitants of Hartpury (2), The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Bradford (3), and subsequent cases to the same effect, may at first be thought contrary decisions, but, in truth, they will be found to be different from the present case. case of The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Little Marlow (4) is clearly distin

The late

Q.B. Rep. 493; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)

Ibid. 569; s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C.

(3) Ibid. 571, note; s. c. 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.)

M.C. 117.

(4) 10Q.B. Rep. 223; s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)

M.C. 70.

Whigham, contrà.-The evidence as to relief other than the letter really amounts to nothing. The question is, how far the letter can be considered as evidence, and it is submitted it is not binding upon the appellant parish. It does not state that the relief was to be given on any other account than that of the union, and the subjoined schedule is descriptive only of the person to receive it. It was not sufficiently shewn, either by the production of the books of the board of guardians, or in any other way, that the clerk had authority to give the directions contained in such letter, and The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Crondall shews that proof of certain preliminaries was necessary. Looking at the terms of the judgment in that case, it might even be contended, if necessary, that proof of the direction of the guardians to write the letter, without more, would not be sufficient. The case of The Queen v. Little Marlow is an authority in favour of the appellants, and so, too, is the case of The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Bradford.

(5) 10 Q.B. Rep. 812; s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 157.

(6) 8 B. & C. 671; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. M.C. 30.

COLERIDGE, J.-In this case the order of Sessions ought to be confirmed. The question is one simply of agency, whether or not the particular acts and statements were done and made with sufficient authority from the board of guardians, for it is not and cannot be disputed that if done and made with such authority, they would be evidence to charge the township. It is said, however, that there is no evidence of the board of guardians having acted in the matter at all; but if there be, it has not been in so regular a way as to bind the parish. The letter, which is now to be considered as having been written by the properly appointed clerk to the guardians of the Wigan Union, speaking of a pauper in another union, requests the guardians of that other union to relieve on account of the Wigan Union; and then appended to that letter is a schedule, in which the pauper's name appears, and under the column "place where settled" is written " Wigan," so that the letter not only states on account of what union the relief is to be given, but also by the schedule shews in respect of what township. In addition to which we find that the relief was paid and received, and afterwards repaid. Then it is said, supposing the agency to be established, it was not proved by the production of their books or any other way that the guardians had acted. I do not think that point is open to argument, because, supposing in the ordinary course the clerk had been told by the guardians to write the letter and send the money, and further, to put their seal or make an entry in their books, I do not think the omission of the seal or the entry would make the authority the less binding. Whether, therefore, regular or irregular, the letter is equally the act of the guardians, if the clerk possessed sufficient authority, which is the main point. Now the acts of parliament, I think, justify the Court in treating the clerk as the recognized officer of the union, and there are certain duties ex vi termini (if I may so speak) attached to the office; and here one duty would certainly be to make communications on behalf of the guardians to other boards of guardians, and if wished, to remit small sums of money. Upon the whole, therefore, there is enough here to shew that the letter was written with the authority of the guardians, and if so, there

was some evidence of a settlement in the appellant township.

WIGHTMAN, J.-The real question here is, whether there was sufficient evidence that the person writing the letter had the authority of the guardians. It appears

from the examinations that the clerk was in the habit of writing letters for the guardians, and he is, moreover, an officer recognized by the legislature, with, amongst others, certain duties imposed by acts of parliament. I think there is sufficient to shew that one of his duties is to carry on a correspondence on behalf of the guardians; and that being so, there is in this case primá facie evidence of a settlement.

ERLE, J.-The question here is, not whether a distinct settlement has been shewn, but whether there is any legal evidence of a settlement in Wigan. The authority of The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Crondall establishes that the guardians are the persons to make admissions of settlement by deciding that relief shall be given; and in this case, as it sufficiently appears the clerk was the agent of the guardians, I think prima facie it must be taken that the letter was written by their authority, and therefore some evidence of a settlement in the appellant township.

66

An order of removal commenced "County of C," and purported to be made by “A. and B, Justices acting in and for the said county of C." Indorsed on it and bearing date the same day, was an order suspending its execution and commencing County of C," and purporting to be made by " A. and B. the Justices within mentioned." There were also indorsed on the order of removal two orders, both bearing date two years later than it. The one purported to be made by "A. and D, two of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the said county of C," and

directed the suspension to be taken off; and the other purported to be made by "A. and D. the Justices whose names are hereunto subscribed," and was an order for payment of the expenses incurred by the suspension, and was expressed to be made "in pursuance of the statute in such case made and provided." These last two orders bore date the same day, but neither of them had any marginal venue :-Held, that they were void as not shewing jurisdiction.

The 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45. s. 7. (which came into operation on the 1st of November 1849) provides that no objection on account of any omission or mistake in an order brought up on return to a certiorari shall be allowed, unless such omission or mistake shall have been specified in the rule for the certiorari:-Held, that this provision does not apply to rules obtained before the 1st of November 1849.

Quære-Whether the effect of this provision is to prevent substantial as well as formal objections to the order being taken, unless specified in the rule for the certio

rari.

In this case a rule had been obtained, calling upon the churchwardens and overseers of Tywardreath, in the county of Cornwall, to shew cause why two several orders, dated the 5th of October 1847, and indorsed on a certain order, dated the 8th of July 1845, should not be quashed for insufficiency. The rule for issuing the certiorari to remove these two

orders

was made absolute on the 11th of

May 1848, and did not specify any objection to the orders. The following were the orders of removal and of suspension :— "County of Cornwall. To the churchwardens, &c. of Tywardreath, &c. Upon the complaint of the churchwardens, &c. of Tywardreath, &c. unto us, whose names are hereunto set and seals affixed, being two of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace in and for the said county of Cornwall; that J. S, &c. [it then directed the removal of J. S, his wife, and Ann their daughter

our hands and seals the 8th of July 1845. "C. B. Graves Sawle (L.S.) "Charles Lyne (L.S.)" County of Cornwall. Whereas it appears unto us, C. B. Graves and C. Lyne,

the Justices within mentioned, that the within-named J. S. and Ann his daughter are at present unable to travel, by reason of sickness, &c. We, the said Justices, &c. [it then suspended the execution of the order of removal, on which it was indorsed]. Given under our hands and seals this 8th of July 1845.

"C. B. Graves Sawle (L.s.)
"Charles Lyne (L.S.)"

The two orders in question, which were also indorsed on the order of removal, were as follows:

"Whereas it duly appears unto us, J. H. Tremayne and C. B. Graves Sawle, two of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the said county of Cornwall, that the above-named Ann, the daughter of the said J. S, is dead; and that the said J. S. is wholly recovered, &c. [it then proceeded to direct the removal of J. S. and his wife to Crowan]. Given under our hands and seals this 5th of October 1847.

"J. H. Tremayne (L.S.)

"C. B. Graves Sawle (L.s.)" "Whereas it has been proved on oath before us, J. H. Tremayne and C. B. Graves Sawle, the Justices whose names are hereunto subscribed, &c., that the charges incurred by the suspension of the said order of removal amount to, &c., which charges appear to us to be fair and reasonable. And whereas it is duly proved on oath that the said Ann the daughter of the said J. S, the pauper above mentioned, is dead, &c. We, the said Justices, do in pursuance of the statute in such case made hereby order, &c. [it then directed payment of the costs by Crowan to Tywardreath]. Witness our hands and seals this 5th of October 1847.

"J. H. Tremayne (L.S.)

"C. B. Graves Sawle (L.s.)" Pashley now shewed cause.-The objection, that the orders are defective for not stating that they were made by Justices in and for the county of Cornwall, cannot now be taken. The rule for the certiorari, by which the orders were removed, does not set

forth any objection to them as a ground for issuing the writ; and by the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45. s. 7 (1), it is expressly provided that

(1) Sect. 7. "That if upon the trial of any appeal to any Court of Quarter Sessions of the

an objection like the present shall not be allowed, unless specified in the rule for the certiorari. The act, it is true, was not in force when the rule was obtained, but being a statute regulating procedure, it governs pending proceedings, and has, therefore, a retrospective operation. Besides, the words of the section are" shall have been specified."

[COLERIDGE, J.-According to that, the effect of it would be to quash every pending rule, whether the objection were a substantial or a formal one.]

It may be, that according to the reasonable purview of the act, the provision in question is limited to omissions or mistakes, which might have been supplied or avoided.

[COLERIDGE, J.-Do you mean to say that even substantial objections may not hereafter be taken advantage of without being specified in the rule?]

It is not necessary to contend that here. The legislature, perhaps, intended to limit the section to formal objections arising upon the face of the order.

[WIGHTMAN, J.-What effect do you give to the 20th section, which makes the operation of the act to commence on the 1st of November 1849?]

That does not qualify the operation of the act when it does commence, but only postpones its commencement. The ques

tion is, what is now its effect, and it is

Peace against any order or judgment made or given by any Justice or Justices of the Peace, or if upon the return to any writ of certiorari any objection shall be made on account of any omission or mistake in the drawing up of such order or judgment, and it shall be shewn to the satisfaction of the Court that sufficient grounds were in proof, before the Justice or Justices making such order or giving such judgment, to have authorized the drawing up thereof free from the said omission or mistake, it shall be lawful for the Court, upon such terms as to payment of costs as it shall think fit, to amend such order or judgment, and to adjudicate thereupon as if no such omission or mistake had existed: Provided always, that no objection on account of any omission or mistake in any such order or judgment brought up upon a return to a writ of certiorari shall be allowed, unless such omission or mistake shall have been specified in the rule for issuing such certiorari."

Section 6. of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31. contains a similar provision, but was not adverted to in the argument. As that act, however, came into operation on the 1st of August 1848, it would be equally inoperative on the rule for a certiorari previously obtained.

submitted, that it has a retrospective effect, and applies to the present case- -Cumming v. Welsford (2), Towler v. Chatterton (3), In re Eyre (4), The Queen v. Christchurch (5).

[The COURT intimated that the objection need not be specified.]

Then it is objected to these orders, that they do not shew jurisdiction, as it does not appear that they were made by the Justices in the county, or as to the order for costs that they were acting for it. But these orders are indorsed on one which states that it is made by Justices acting in and for the county, and that may be referred to The Queen v. Casterton (6), Baker v. Bacon (7), The Queen v. Silkstone (8). It is impossible to support The Queen v. Shipston-on-Stour (9) to its full extent. But the same strict rule which is applied to orders of removal does not extend to orders of a different kind The Queen v. Stainforth (10), The Queen v. Ashburton (11). In The King v. St. Mary, Leicester (12), Holroyd, J. supports the order, on the ground that no other Justices except those of the county could by law make it. If it is capable of being read two ways, that mode which will support the order should be adopted-The King v. Countesthorpe (13).

[COLERIDGE, J.-It all turns on whether the marginal venue will aid, for as to the order for costs, the only presumption to be drawn as to Mr. Tremaine's jurisdiction is from the previous order by Mr. Sawle.]

The order for costs is expressed to be made in pursuance of the statute, and it appears that that order and the order taking off the suspension were made simul et (2) 6 Bing. 502; s. c.8 Law J. Rep. C.P. 168. (3) Ibid. 258; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. C.P. 30. (4) 2 Ph. 367 ; s.c. 17 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 277.

(5) 18 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 28.

(6) 6 Q.B. Rep. 507; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 5.