CHAP. I.

Containing an Historical View of what Metaphysicians or Divines have formerly taught, so far as concerns the Argument a priori for the Divine Existence.

I SHALL begin with two ancient Theists, both of the same time, or nearly, and both declaring against the possibility of demonstrating a priori the existence of a Deity, or first Cause. One of them was a Christian Divine, and the other an acute Pagan Philosopher.

The Christian Divine was Clemens of Alexandria, who flourished about A. D. 192. He expresses himself thus in Dr. Cudworth's a translation:

"God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed "of: because, since the principle of every thing is hard "to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, "which was the cause to all other things of their being "made, [and of their continuance after they were made,] "must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or mani"fested.—But neither can [God] be apprehended by any "demonstrative science: for such science is from things "before [in order of nature] and more knowable; whereas "nothing can exist before that which is altogether un"made b [or self-existent.]"

The other ancient Theist is Alexander Aphrodisiensis, a celebrated Peripatetic, who flourished between A. D. 199 and 211. After he had proposed an argument for the existence of a first Cause, drawn from the consideration of motion, according to the Aristotelic principles, he proceeds to observe as follows: "This argument [or proof] is

Cudworth Intellect. Syst. p. 716.

• Ναὶ μὲν ὁ δυσμεταχειριστότατος περὶ Θεοῦ λόγος οὗτός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδει κτος, ἥτις τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένοις εἶναι. Αλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συν ίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγενήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει. Clem. Aler. p. 696. edit. Oxon.

• See an account of him in Fabricius, Bibl. Græc. lib. iv. cap. 25. p. 62.

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"in the way of analysis only, it being not possible that "there should be a [strict] demonstration of the first principle of all wherefore we must here fetch our begin"ning from things that are after it, and manifest, and "thence by way of analysis ascend to the proof of that "first nature which was before them d." So Dr. Cudworth renders the passage: and the reflection or comment, which he makes upon what has here been quoted from these two ancient Theists is in these words: "The "true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that "there could be any demonstration of a God, was only "this, that the existence of a God could not be demon"strated a priori, himself being the first Cause of all "things."

Such were the sentiments of metaphysicians and divines at that time, founded upon plain and cogent reason, such as must equally hold at all times, and such as seem to evince, not that the existence of a first Cause may be demonstrated a priori, but rather that it is really demonstrable a priori, if not self-evident, that no such proof can be made, being indeed contradictory and impossible, repugnant to the very nature or notion of a first Cause. But I shall speak to the argumentative part afterwards: I am now upon the historical. It is certain that the Fathers of the Church, Greek or Latin, never admitted any such proof a priori of the divine existence, but either directly or indirectly, either expressly or implicitly, condemned it all along. It would be tedious to enter into a particular detail of their sentiments, in relation to the proof of the existence: I shall content myself with one general observation, that they had not so much as the terms or phrases of necessary existence, or necessity of existence, but utterly rejected the very name of necessity, as not applicable to the Deity at all, understanding it constantly in its ancient,

ὰ Ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν. Aphrodis. Physic. Schol. lib. i. cap. 1.

proper, compulsive sensee. Now it is very well known, that the supposed proof a priori, lately contended for, is built in a manner entirely upon the word necessity, and instantly sinks without it. For, put immutable, or natural, or independent, or emphatical existence, (according to the ancient way,) instead of necessary existence, or necessity of existence, and then it is certain that the very medium of the whole argument drops and vanishes, and there is not so much as any colour or appearance of the proof left. I say then, since it is undoubted fact that the Fathers all along admitted of no such terms as necessary, or necessity, in this case, but rejected them as not applicable either to the Divine existence or attributes; it is very plain, that they therewith rejected any such pretended argument a priori as has been since raised from those terms.

To show how late it was before necessity gained admittance in the Church, and became, as it were, christianized, with respect to our present subject, I may observe that Archbishop Anselmf of the eleventh and twelfth century, yea and Alexander Hales 8 of the thirteenth, were yet

• See my Second Defence, vol. iii. Qu. viii. p. 236, &c. Preface to Sermons, vol. ii.

f Deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur aliquid facere. Et cum dicimus Deum aliquid facere quasi necessitate vitandæ inhonestatis, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quod facit necessitate servandæ honestatis: quæ scilicet necessitas non est aliud quam im-mutabilitas honestatis ejus, quam a seipso et non ab alio habet; et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas. Anselm. Opp. tom. iii. p. 55.

• Ad aliud vero quod objicitur de necessitate bonitatis, dicendum est quod nomen necessitatis non congrue hic dicitur de Deo. Unde Anselm. In Deo nulla cadit necessitas. Necessitas enim videtur dicere coactionem. Sed nec est necessitas utilitatis a parte sua, sicut habitum est in præcedente autoritate. Si vero dicatur necessitas congruitatis, sive idoneitatis, sicut tangitur in quadam authoritate, tunc potest dici quod ex necessitate bonitatis condidit res. Non tamen videtur congruere quod dicatur ex necessitate naturæ: licet enim sit idem bonitas quod natura ejus, tamen si diceretur ex necessitate naturæ, videretur poni talis necessitas qualis est in rebus naturalibus. In rebus enim naturalibus ignis ex necessitate naturæ generat ignem, et homo hominem : non sic autem est cum creaturæ fiunt a Deo. Alex. Alens. part. ii. p. 15. N. B. This author flourished about 1230, died 1245. Albertus Magnus, who flourished about 1260, and died in 1280, made no scruple of applying the

scrupulous of making use of the term, and were very tender of applying it to the Divine acts or attributes, except it were with great caution, awe, and reserve; at the same time owning the word to be both harsh and improper. And as to applying it to the Divine existence, I do not find that they ventured upon it at all; though others frequently did it afterwards in the decline of the thirteenth century, and downwards, when Aristotle's Metaphysics, translated into barbarous Latin, and the Arabian philosophy, (of Avicen, Averroes, and Algazel,) had paved the way for it h

Let us see however how this matter stood after those improper terms were brought in, and softened into a qualified sense; whether any Schoolmen or others (now they might seem to have some handle for it) ever attempted to draw out any such argument a priori for the existence of a first Cause, and to commend the same as true and solid reasoning. I would here observe by the way, that the Schoolmen, though they deservedly lie under a disrepute for their excesses in many things, may yet be justly looked upon as carrying great authority with them in a point of this nature, where they had no bias to mislead them, (being inclined to the side of Theism,) and where a question turned upon a right understanding of technical terms or phrases, and a thorough acquaintance with logic and metaphysics; being a matter of pure abstract reasoning. They were undoubtedly great masters in that way: for "where they argued barely upon the principles of rea

word necessary or necessity (in a sober but new sense) to the Divine essence or existence: and it is very plain that he learned that language from Aristotle's philosophy, to which he refers for his sense of those terms. See Albert. Mag. Comment. in lib. i. Sentent. Dist. 6. Opp. vol. xiv. p. 121. edit. Lugd.

h Quievit autem et siluit philosophia Aristotelis, pro majori parte,usque post tempora Mahometi, quando Avicenna et Averroes et cæteri revocaverunt philosophiam Aristotelis in lucem plenam expositionis. Et licet alia logicalia et quædam alia translata fuerunt per Boetium de Græco, tamen tempore Michaelis Scoti, qui annis Dom. 1230. transactis apparuit, deferens librorum Aristotelis partes aliquas, &c. remagnificata est philosophia Aristotelis apud Latinos. Rog. Bacon, p. 37. Conf. p. 45, 262, 420.

"son," as a very judicious writer observes, "they have often ❝ done exceeding well, and have improved natural reason "to an uncommon height." And I will venture to add, that if the sharpest wits of these later days shall undertake, upon their own stock, to furnish out a new scheme of school divinity, or metaphysical theology, it will be a long while, perhaps some centuries, before they arrive to such perfection in some part as many of the Schoolmen arrived to; unless they shall be content within a while to take those despised Schoolmen into consultation with them, and to extract the best things from them. This I hint by the way, in order to remove prejudices, with respect to my citing (as I am now going to do) Schoolmen in this cause; though I intend not to cite them only, but other the most judicious and learned divines and metaphysicians, who have come after them, and have entirely agreed in this article with them. However, as I have already intimated, the Schoolmen are most certainly proper judges within their own province, and in a point of school divinity and this which we are now upon is very plainly such, as the pretended argument a priori proceeds altogether upon scholastic terms, and is managed in a scholastic way, and therefore must at length stand or fall by scholastic principles and scholastic reasonings. These things premised, I may now proceed in the historical view, according to order of time, beginning from those days when necessary existence, with other the like terms or phrases, had gotten some footing in the Christian theology.

A. D. 1260. ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

Albertus, surnamed the Great, on account of his great learning and abilities, was one of the most considerable among the divines or metaphysicians of the age he lived in. He was one of the first (I mean among Christian writers) that took upon him to give God the metaphysical title of a necessary Being. Yet he presumed not to found any argument a priori for the existence upon it, but denied

j Reflections upon Learning, p. 217, 227.