it is no part of the duty of the appellate court to speculate
whether the jury acted judiciously in determining which wit-
nesses presented matters truly and which otherwise. In such
a case they act within their legitimate powers, and, in legal
presumption, decide correctly. Id. (3).
5. A verdict considerably lower than the outside range of the
testimony would have warranted is not excessive. Id. (4).
See DAMAGES (3); QUESTIONS TO JURY.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-See HIGHWAYS (3).
KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW-See FRAUDULENT REPRESENTA-
TIONS (2).
The concealment by a landlord from a tenant of the polluted
condition of the water in a well belonging to the leased prem-
ises, after his discovery of the cause, which he failed to
remove, and which existed at the time of the leasing, will
subject him to damages for all of the injuries naturally fol-
lowing from the use of the water, and the tenant, on discov-
ering the facts, is justified in vacating the premises and
terminating the tenancy, if the cause of such pollution can-
not be removed; its presence amounting to an eviction, reliev-
ing the tenant from the payment of rent after such removal.
So held, where on complaint by the tenant of the condition
of the water an examination was made by the landlord, who
discovered the carcass of a dead dog in the well, which he did
not remove, but advised the tenant's wife not to use the
water for cooking or drinking purposes, but that it was all
right for scrubbing, etc., and such use was made of the
water as resulted in sickness in the tenant's family, who
removed from the premises on discovering the real facts, and,
in a suit to recover rent, the tenant sought to recoup the
expenses of such sickness, including physician's bills, etc., as
damages; and his right to do so is affirmed, and $50 damages
awarded against the landlord for a vexatious appeal, the ten-
ant having recovered in the justice's court, and on appeal to
the circuit. 135.
LABOR CLAIMS-See PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
In this case a deed from a father to his son, and a life-lease
back to the father, are construed together, and the lease is
held not to give exclusive possession to the father, after the
son's death, with right to eject the son's widow, etc. 415 (2).
See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
1. A partnership is liable for slanderous statements made by
one partner, the purpose of which is to aid the partnership
business by preventing another party from making sales of
an article which the partnership is at the time selling. 1 (1).
2. Words spoken or written injurious to a person in his busi-
ness, and false and malicious, are actionable per se, and
special damages need not be proved. Id. (2).
3. In this case it is held that the facts shown, and offered to
be shown, by the plaintiff, raised issues which should have
gone to the jury, and that under the evidence given and
offered, which upon this record must be taken as true,
the plaintiff was entitled to have the alleged libelous article
placed before the jury; and that, under proper instructions,
it was a question of fact for their consideration whether its
publication was within defendants' knowledge, or whether
they were responsible for it. Id. (4).
4. While it is true that two or more persons cannot as a gen-
eral rule be held jointly liable for a verbal slander, yet, under
circumstances where all are jointly concerned and interested,
and participate in the general purpose, such concert and
co-operation may be shown, although the false and malicious
statements may have been made by one alone. 472 (1).
5. In this case Mr. Justice MORSE filed an opinion, favoring a
reversal for the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury,
as requested by the defendant, that if the plaintiff, at and
before the publication of the alleged libel, was generally
known as "John D. Finnegan," and not as merely "John
Finnegan," and that the initial letter had been adopted by
him to distinguish him from persons known by the latter
name, the article complained of will not be presumed to have
had reference to the plaintiff, and, as there is no evidence in
the case that plaintiff is the person referred to in said article,
their verdict must be for the defendant. 659 (1).
LIBEL AND SLANDER-Continued.
6. CHAMPLIN and LONG, JJ., concurred in the reversal of the
judgment. 660 (2).
7. SHERWOOD, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., favored the affirm-
ance of the judgment.
Id. (3).
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (2).
A log-owner contracted with a mill-owner for sawing a quantity
of logs, and sold 700,000 feet of the lumber, which was paid
for, and piled by itself on the dock, and marked by the mill-
owner with the initial letters of the vendee's name, who
shipped 600,000 feet, and, at the close of the season's sawing,
the vendor settled for the balance of the saw-bill by his note,
which was accepted by the mill-owner, who is held by these
acts to have waived any lien he had upon said lumber; and
it is further held that he had no lien upon the lumber so
sold for the entire season's sawing. 81.
LIFE EXPECTANCY-See MORTALITY TABLES.
LIFE-LEASE-See EQUITY.
LIFE SUPPORT OF PARENT-See CONTRACT (1).
Relator applied for mandamus to compel respondent to place
on the assessment roll so much of private claim 306 as lies
south of the town line between China and St. Clair town-
ships and west of Pine river and of the corporate limits of
the city of St. Clair. The reason given for relator's inter-
ference is that there was formerly a bridge across Pine river
on the township road between China and St. Clair, on the
west side of Pine river, which communicated with the city
of St. Clair, lying on the east side, which is now destroyed,
and cannot be rebuilt, because of the dispute as to the town-
ship in which the west end of it would lie; that respondent
claims the land belongs to East China, whereas the relator
claims it is in China; that relator uses the road, and he and
his neighbors need the bridge to get conveniently to the city.
It does not appear whether the bridge had a draw or not.
The Court hold that relator's purpose cannot be reached by
mandamus proceedings, and suggest that the controversy can
be amicably determined. 606 (2).
1. Where a servant, whose duty it is at any time during work-
ing hours when upon the master's premises to perform the
duties incident to his employment, starts to leave the prem-
ises on his private business, and is injured by the alleged
negligence of the master, while upon the premises, and dur-
ing working hours, he is at the time in the employment of
the master. 272 (5).
2. The duty of inspection, when required by the circumstances
of the case, cannot be delegated by the master in such man-
ner as to avoid responsibility. 492 (1).
3. The following propositions are summarized from the opinion
of Mr. Justice CHAMPLIN:
a-This Court long ago announced and has steadily adhered
to the doctrine that a master is not liable to a servant for
injuries received through the negligence of a fellow-servant
while engaged in a common employment.
b-Perhaps no satisfactory rule has yet been formulated by
which it may in all cases be determined who are fellow-
servants, in such sense as to shield the master for the negli-
gence of his servant. We may start, however, where the
rule is clear that a master is liable to his servant for an
injury caused by his own negligence.
c-The master may not choose to give his personal atten-
tion to his business, and may desire to put another in his
place, to manage and control it for him as fully as he might
do if personally present. Such person is his alter ego (another
self), and the master is as responsible for his acts of omission
and commission, while engaged in the business intrusted to
him, as if he did such acts himself.
d-It is the duty of the master to supervise, direct, and
control the operations and management of his business, so
that no injury shall ensue to his own employés through his
own carelessness or negligence in carrying it on, or else to furn-
ish some person who will do so, and for whom he must stand
sponsor. This is true of natural persons, and it is especially
true of corporations, who can only act through natural per-
e-Whenever the business conducted by a person selected
by the master is such that he is invested with full control
(subject to no one's supervision except the master's) over the
action of the employés engaged in carrying on a particular
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
branch of the master's business, and, acting upon his own
discretion, according to general instructions laid down for
his guidance, it is his province to direct, and the duty of the
employés to obey, then he stands in the place of the master,
and is not a fellow-servant with those whom he controls.
514, 515 (8).
MATERIAL CLAIMS-See PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
In this case, the judgment, so far as it establishes a personal
liability against the defendant, is affirmed, but is held void
so far as it gives plaintiff a lien under the mechanics' lien
law of 1887, which was held unconstitutional in John Spry
Lumber Company v. Loan & Trust Co., 77 Mich. 199. 334.
MICHIGAN CASES CONSTRUED.
This case was not reversed on the former hearing (65 Mich. 10)
on the ground that evidence was received concerning the
condition of the yard in which the accident happened, and
the use of it as a place of pastime by children, nor was it
held that the error of the court in receiving such testimony
was not cured by its being afterwards withdrawn from the
consideration of the jury. 399 (1).
The mortality tables contained in How. Stat. § 4245, show the
probable life expectancy of a healthy person, whose age is
given, but are not conclusive evidence; and when offered
in connection with proof of the physical condition of the
deceased at the time of his death, and all testimony which
may reasonably affect his duration of life, the jury must
determine from all of the testimony before them such prob-
able duration of life had the deceased not died as a result of
the injury complained of. 514 (4).
1. Where judgment creditors file a bill in aid of execution,
and join as defendants prior attaching creditors, who have
levied upon the land to satisfy the judgment rendered in the
attachment suit, and who also hold a mortgage upon the
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