part of his thumb were amputated. There was no question but that the injury was permanent in character. Counsel for defendants, however, contend that the court was in error in using the illustration of money placed at interest producing a given sum. It is contended, however, that the illustration was used as mere caution to the jury to be reasonable and considerate in fixing the amount, and that the court did not use the illustration as one controlling their judgment; and especially instructed them that perhaps this would be too large an amount, because they should take into consideration the contingencies of ill health, the inability to secure work, and other contingencies incident to human life, and that they were to give him such fair and reasonable amount as would fairly compensate him for the injury. Counsel for defendants cite the case of Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 215, as sustaining their position. In that case the illustration was used by Chief Justice COOLEY in delivering the opinion of the Court. The only question then under consideration was the instruction given by the trial judge, that the jury, in estimating damages, should take into consideration whether the family of the deceased were in poor and needy circumstances, and looked to the boy, when alive, for at least partial support; and upon this Chief Justice COOLEY remarked, in speaking of the amount of damages awarded ($3,400), that— "It is difficult to understand any estimate which would place the loss of the family at such a sum. The annual interest on it, at the customary legal rate for money borrowed, would have been more than three-fourths the whole annual earnings, even supposing Williams to have had steady employment, and to have lost nothing from sickness or other contingencies, and, at the lowest statute rate, it would have been more than half. It seems incred ible that the family could have had reasonable expectation of receiving an annual sum to either amount from such a source; but, if they had, they could, at most, have realized it only for his life-time, while this award of the sum in gross would enable the family to realize the income, not for his life merely, but in perpetuity." Here the plaintiff was suing for injuries which were permanent, and to continue for a life-time. He was a man in apparent good health, and sound in limb, before the accident. He was a boiler-maker by trade, and capable, as shown by the evidence in the case, of earning large wages. If, as claimed by defendants' counsel, the jury were influenced by this illustration, and fixed an amount which, placed at interest at 6 per cent., would amount to $300, the deficiency of plaintiff's earning capacity as used by the court in the illustration, yet the other elements of damages, which were proper to be considered, and which the jury must have taken into consideration, are not necessarily included therein. The amount paid for physicians, medical attendance, nurses, and medicine, the physical pain and suffering and mental anguish endured, were all elements to be considered in fixing the amount of the recovery, as well as mere loss of service and his inability to earn wages. We think, however, that the court was in error in the use of this illustration. If the jury might give an amount which, placed at interest at 6 per cent., would produce the amount representing the loss of his earning capacity, it would be in perpetuity; and this he is not entitled to have. We see no error in the other portions of the charge, as to the measure of damages. Error is also assigned upon the ruling of the court in permitting plaintiff to testify that soon after the accident he stated his case to Shields & McNamara, attorneys at Alpena, substantially as testified to by him on the wit ness stand. Defendants' counsel, at the time, made no objection to the inquiry, except when the further question was put, as to whether they took down his statement. Defendants' counsel objected to the answer to this question, unless the witness stated which one. Thereupon the court permitted the witness to testify that he made a statement to counsel. This was error. Counsel for the plaintiff contend that this was proper, for the reason that one Luther had been permitted to testify that plaintiff, about that time, told him he did not know how he did it, or how he came to be injured. This testimony would in no sense tend to contradict Luther, and was incompetent. The sixth assignment of error relates to the ruling of the court in allowing the plaintiff to show that, two or three days after the injury, Mr. McNally, one of the defendants, told John Kinney to tell Dave (plaintiff) that the company would see him through all right, and not to worry, and that that would do him more good than all the medicines, or all the doctors, could do for him. The court was in error in permitting this testimony. It was in no sense a confession or admission of liability on the part of Mr. McNally or the company, and yet the admission of such testimony may have been very prejudicial to the defendants. We Some claim is also made that the court was in error in refusing to give defendants' requests to charge. think some of the requests state the law correctly, but that they were fully covered by the charge as given. Those referring to the starting of the blower by some of the employés, instead of the defendants, we think, have no force here, and need not be noticed. The judgment of the court below must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered. The other Justices concurred. INDEX. Head-note references are to pages. Where there are several notes on a page, the number of the note is added in parenthesis, Cross-references are to subjects, and the same rule is followed as ABATEMENT. An assignment of plaintiff's claim for damages in a pending See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS (2); BILLS AND ABBREVIATION. The abbreviation, "M. C. R. R.," is the recognized name of ACCEPTANCE. An arrangement by the receiver of a corporation to pay its out- See CONTRACT (2); DELIVERY (4). ACTION-See EXCHANGE OF LAND; PARTIES. ACTION FOR VALUE OF VOID NOTE-See BILLS AND NOTES (2). ADVERSE POSSESSION-See EVIDENCE (15). AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY-See CHATTEL MORTGAGE (1). ANIMALS-See NOTICE. 703 APPEAL. The action of the circuit court in denying an application for 7005, on the ground that the appellant was prevented from ARREST. 1. An arrest, without a warrant, of an alleged prostitute or 2. The following propositions are summarized from the opinion a-Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen b-One may travel along the public highways or in public c-The Constitution and the laws are framed for the public d-Any law which would place the keeping and safe con- e-Suspicion that a party has on a former occasion com- |