unpaid taxes were included in such bid, Sowden, by so doing, acquiesced in the payment of the attorney fee and taxes to Hydenburk, as it is not claimed that he did not know they were included; and if he had carried out the arrangement with Brown by redeeming the premises, the complainant would not have been harmed by the payment of these items. When Sowden failed to redeem, the complainant was not authorized to lie by and remain silent as to the validity of this mortgage sale, and then, after the lapse of all these years, and when the rights of a third person, acknowledged to be a purchaser in good faith, have intervened, come into a court of equity and demand a right to redeem from this mortgage sale, because of these two items included in the amount realized by Hydenburk from such sale, and to oust such innocent purchaser from the possession of the premises, or force him to redeem from this mortgage of long standing, the principal of which has nearly doubled. We have enjoined foreclosure sales by advertisement upon tender of the amount due, not including any attorney fee; but we have never held a mortgage foreclosure void because of the insertion of the attorney fee in the sum for which the land was sold. Nor is the mortgage sale necessarily invalid on this account, if the attorney fee was claimed in good faith. See Millard v. Truax, 50 Mich. 343 (15 N. W. Rep. 501). An opportunity was given to redeem in that case, because the fee was considered excessive, it being nearly 25 per centum of the amount of the mortgage, and for other reasons therein stated, and no such laches existed in that case as is shown here. The same may be said of the unpaid taxes of 1869, which it is claimed were included in the sale. The tax was due and unpaid. Brown redeemed the premises from the lien of these taxes, and thinks it was deducted from 78 176 107 659 what he paid Hydenburk for the land, as he was to pay, and did pay, him the amount of money and interest paid by Hydenburk on his bid. There is no showing that the taxes were not a valid lien on the land. They have been paid, and not by the complainant. She cannot complain of such payment, and it is difficult to perceive how she has been harmed by their being included in the amount bid on the sale. There can be upon this record no charge of bad faith made against Hydenburk for including either of the items in the amount claimed to be due on his mortgage. It was an irregularity which certainly did not void the sale, and which could only be a reason for redemption where there was no laches in moving for such redemption. Here there has been gross laches,-an inexcusable delay,—which must be held to defeat complainant's right to redeem. The decree of the court below is reversed and set aside so far as it affects or concerns the Kalamazoo lands, and the complainant's bill must be dismissed as against the defendant Van Zee, with costs of both courts. The other Justices concurred. CHARLES T. FLETCHER ET AL. V. MYRON A. MORREll. Sheriffs and ex-sheriffs-Right to execute process-Fees. 1. It is the duty of an ex-sheriff who has attached property in his custody, after an execution has been issued in the suit, to expose such property to the sheriff, when requested by him, in order that it may be taken in execution and sold to satisfy the same. 2. If an ex-sheriff has any valid charges as custodian, he should make out his bill of items, and present it to the clerk or other taxing officer for taxation, or, if they are not statutory fees, he should apply to the court for such allowance upon motion, and notice to the parties interested. He has no right arbitrarily to fix his own price, and retain the property until paid. 8. The right of an ex-sheriff to execute process until the service upon him of the clerk's certificate required by How. Stat. § 597, showing that his successor has qualified and given the security required by law, exists only as to such process as he has in his hands, and which he is required by How. Stat. $599, to deliver to his successor upon service of such certificate. 4. The following propositions are summarized from the opinion of Mr. Justice CHAMPLIN: a-Whether a sheriff can be allowed for custody of goods levied upon, query? Bank v. Judge, 54 Mich. 305.1 b-How. Stat. §§ 587, 599, 601, deal with process, and not with property, in the hands of the ex-sheriff. c-The requirement that if the sheriff whose term of office is about to expire has commenced the service of process he shall complete the same, is to prevent a divided responsibility in the execution of process. d-A writ of attachment is mesne process, and must be returned by the officer, and when so returned remains in the custody of the clerk as a part of the files in the case. The property attached remains in the custody of the officer who served the writ until the suit is disposed of, unless bonded or the attachment is dissolved. e-If judgment is entered for plaintiff in attachment, execution is to issue thereon to the sheriff or other proper officer of the county, but there is no authority in the law for issuing an execution or other process to a sheriff whose term of office has expired, and whose right to execute process has ceased by the election and qualification of his successor. Mandamus. Submitted November 13, 1889. Granted November 15, 1889. See Fletcher v. Kalkaska Circuit Judge, 45 N. W. Rep. 641, where, on an application by the relators in this case for mandamus directing the circuit judge to set aside an order allowing the ex-sheriff $130 for his services as custodian of the attached goods, the been paid his statutory fees and expenses in full, the order of the Circuit judge allowing additional compensation is illegal and void. 78 MICH.-12. Relators apply for mandamus requiring respondent as ex-sheriff to turn over to his successor goods taken by him during his term of office under an attachment. The facts are stated in the opinion. Charles B. Lothrop, for relators. W. D. Totten and J. L. Boyd, for respondent. CHAMPLIN, J. Three questions are presented on this motion. They arise out of the following facts: Morrell, being sheriff of Kalkaska county, attached and took into his possession certain goods and chattels, in which writ the relators were plaintiffs. The sheriff's term of office expired December 31, 1888. Judgment in the attachment suit was recovered in August, 1889. One John E. Rainbow was elected to succeed Morrell as sheriff, and after judgment was rendered, and execution was issued directed to the sheriff of the county of Kalkaska, Sheriff Rainbow demanded the property of the ex-sheriff, who refused to deliver it, claiming that he was entitled to compensation as custodian, for which he charged $400, being for 400 days at $1 a day; and also that having served the attachment, and levied upon property in pursuance thereof, he is lawfully entitled to make sale thereof under the judgment, and that the execution should have been issued to him for that purpose. If the ex-sheriff has no right to retain possession of the property for the purpose of sale under the final process, he would have no right to retain it because his charges for custody were not first paid. If he has any valid charges as custodian, he should make out his bill of items, and present it to the clerk or other taxing officer for taxation, or, if there are no fees allowed by statute, he should apply to the court for such allowance upon notice and motion to the parties interested. He has no right arbitrarily to fix his own price, and retain the property or money received on sale. He can only retain his fees allowed by law. But we do not decide that a sheriff can be allowed for custody of goods levied. upon, as it is not necessary to determine that question now. Genesee Co. Savings Bank v. Judge, 54 Mich. 305 (20 N. W. Rep. 53). Whether the respondent has the right to complete the service of the attachment by a sale of the property attached depends upon a proper construction of the stat utes. Section 7990, How. Stat., provides that the writ of attachment shall command the sheriff to attach so much of the goods, etc., as will be sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, and safely keep the same to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered in such attachment. Section 7998 enacts that the property attached shall remain in the custody of the officer serving the attachment, unless bonded as prescribed by the statute. Section 8007 provides: * "When a copy of the attachment shall have been personally served on the defendant [which was this case], * * judgment shall be rendered, and execution shall issue thereon, in the same manner, and with the like effect, as in a suit commenced by summons, in which the summons shall have been returned personally served, except that by virtue of such execution the officer to whom the same shall be directed and delivered may sell any property attached in the suit, and remaining in the hands of the officer who served the attachment, wherever the same may be in this State." The statutes also provide that, upon the election of a new sheriff, the former sheriff shall deliver to his suc cessor "All executions, attachments, and final process then in his hands, except such as the said former sheriff shall have executed, or shall have begun to execute, by the col |