are not disposed to disturb this allowance, although it is certainly very liberal, under the circumstances. But the whole amounts paid to Abigail Lord must be disallowed. With that exception the account will stand as fixed by the circuit court. Interest at 6 per cent. must be allowed on the $360 paid Abigail.

The decree below must be reversed as to this dower payment, with costs of this Court, and affirmed as to the balance. The issues being clear, we have not deemed it necessary to discuss the technical questions presented by the argument.

CHAMPLIN, MORSE, and LONG, JJ., concurred. SHERWOOD, C. J., did not sit.

STEPHEN F. DOWLING AND DAVID DOWLING V. SOLOMON HANNANT AND GEORGE HANNANT.

Statutory construction-Forcible entry and detainer act-Chancery foreclosures.

How. Stat. § 8295 (subd. 3), giving a summary remedy for securing the possession of premises sold by virtue of any mortgage or execution, applies, by its terms, only to redeemable foreclosures, and cannot cover chancery sales without enlarging it beyond its terms, and interfering with the legitimate powers of courts of equity.

Appeal from Calhoun. (Hooker, J.) Argued October 30, 1889. Decided November 15, 1889.

Proceedings under forcible entry and detainer act. Defendants bring error. Reversed and proceedings quashed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Hulbert & Mechem, for complainants.

Volney H. Lockwood, for defendants.

CAMPBELL, J. In this case complainants were allowed in the court below to recover possession under a chancery foreclosure sale, by proceedings under the forcible entry and detainer act, commenced before an officer having the jurisdiction of a judge at chambers.

These proceedings, which are summary, and provide for getting possession of land without the forms of law to which parties are entitled in courts of justice, are purely statutory, and cannot be allowed in any case not clearly within the statute.

Where a chancery sale is conducted under a decree in equity, the court granting the decree has full power to give possession against parties bound by the decree, and can in each case secure all the rights of persons whose interests are involved. There is no need of other relief, and, if sought elsewhere, it may interfere with the proper control of the court of equity over its own process.

The only clause relied upon by complainants is that which gives the remedy

"When any person shall continue in possession of any premises, sold by virtue of any mortgage or execution, after the expiration of the time limited by law for the redemption of such premises." Subdivision 3, § 8294,

How. Stat.

The same subdivision applies to probate sales.

In execution and probate sales the court under which title is made has no power whatever to put purchasers into possession. Their only remedies are by distinct possessory suit of some kind. In execution and statutory foreclosure sales the purchaser gets only an inchoate title, contingent on failure to redeem. In chancery sales there is no redemption. The statute giving summary remedics

applies, by its terms, only to redeemable foreclosures, and it cannot cover chancery sales without enlarging it beyond its terms, and interfering with the legitimate powers of courts of equity.

Judgment must be reversed, and the proceedings quashed, with costs of all the courts.

SHERWOOD, C. J., CHAMPLIN and MORSE, JJ., concurred. LONG, J., did not sit.

HENRY HEWITT, JR., V. PETER WHITE,

AND

HENRY HEWITT, JR., V. HARRIET A. OSBORN.

[Two Cases.]

Tax sales-Illegal tax-Authority of supervisors to pay a salary to sheriff in lieu of fees.

1. The board of supervisors have no power to allow the sheriff an annual salary for services rendered the county, in lieu of all fees, and a sale of land to satisfy a tax made up in part of such illegal salary is void.

2. The following propositions are summarized from the opinion of Mr. Justice CAMPBELL:

a-It has been pointed out more than once by the Court that the sheriff must be confined to his statutory fees in all cases where they are fixed by statute. Burk v. Webb, 32 Mich. 173; Clark v. Supervisors, 38 Id. 658; Peck v. Bank, 51 Id. 353. And demanding and receiving more is a misdemeanor. How. Stat. § 9256.

Most of the sheriff's statutory fees relate to services in connection with the administration of civil and criminal justice, and the keeping and control of prisoners. There are

the strongest reasons why such matters should not be left to the supervisors, but it is enough for the present purpose that they have not been so left.

c-The sheriff has it in his power to forward or hinder the course of criminal justice in many respects. It is essential to public safety that its administration be kept as far as possible free from any extraneous meddling or interference, and, if the supervisors or any other body can have a voice in the payment of the sheriff's charges, it is evident that his subservience to them is invited, if not compelled, and that they can have a good deal to do with the pursuit or exemption of criminals.

d-We have been compelled several times to compel the payment of justices' fees for criminal examinations that did not terminate as the supervisors desired, or which were prosecuted against their wishes.1

e-If the principle is once admitted that any deviation can be had from the statutory allowances, the temptation is directly offered to the sheriff to make himself agreeable to the board on the one hand, and to shirk unprofitable duties on the other.

Error to Marquette. (Grant, J.) Argued October 29 and 30, 1889. Decided November 15, 1889.

Ejectment. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion.

F. O. Clark, for appellant, contended:

1. In support of the proposion that the board of supervisors had no power to allow the sheriff a salary in lieu of statutory fees, counsel cited: People v. Supervisors, 3 Mich. 475; People v. Auditors, 13 Id. 233; Kennedy v. Gies, 25 Id. 89, 90; Mixer v. Supervisors, 26 Id. 422; Burk v. Webb, 32 Id. 182; Peck v. Bank, 51 Id. 355; Follensbee v. Supervisors, 67 Id. 614; Clark v. Supervisors, 38 Id. 658; Vincent v. Supervisors, 52 Id. 340. Ball & Hanscom, for defendants, contended:

1. The action of the board in voting such salary was a mere estimate of the amount of money that would be required to pay the sheriff for services to be rendered for the year. In the case of Sawyer-Goodman Co. v. Crystal Falls, 56 Mich. 600, it was held that such action by the township board should be so construed.

1See Jaminet v. Supervisors of Monroe Co., 77 Mich. 245.

2. It is not shown that the plaintiff or any tax-payer was injured by the action of the board in appropriating $1,500 as a salary to the sheriff; citing How. Stat. § 1165; and confessedly, it was within their power, and was their duty, to provide money by tax to pay the sheriff for his services rendered the county. It is fair to presume that in determining the amount to be raised by county tax, a sum was estimated for that purpose, and as they voted to appropriate $1,500 for sheriff's salary for the next ensuing year, it may be considered probable that they included that amount in their estimate, unless they had moneys on hand applicable thereto. But it is not fair to presume, and cannot properly be presumed, that the supervisors would pay that amount through the year, unless they were satisfied that the sheriff was lawfully entitled to it. They were at liberty to change or abolish the "salary" whenever they saw fit; in fact, if unlawful, as claimed, the "salary" could be disregarded, even after the services were rendered, and the sheriff remitted to his lawful fees. But payment to the sheriff of excessive compensation would not invalidate a tax levy made for lawful purposes.

CAMPBELL, J. These are ejectment cases involving the sufficiency of tax-titles. The chief question raised touching the tax of 1878 relates to its including the salary of a sheriff, at a sum of $1,500, in lieu of all fees for services rendered the county. Payment was made in pursuance of this resolution.

It has been pointed out more than once by this Court that the sheriff must be confined to his statutory fees in all cases where they are fixed by statute. Burk v. Webb, 32 Mich. 173; Peck v. Bank, 51 Id. 353

681); Clark v. Supervisors, 38 Id. 658.

(16 N. W. Rep. Demanding and

receiving more is a misdemeanor. How. Stat. § 9256. Most of the sheriff's fees fixed by statute relate to services in connection with the administration of civil and criminal justice, and the keeping and control of prisoners. There are the strongest reasons why such matters should not be left to the supervisors, but it is enough for the present purpose that they have not been so left. sheriff has it in. his power to forward or hinder the

The