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Adams's case. the 9th of June 1807, William Barret, the prosecutor, being the

constable of Poplar and Blackwall, and John Lee, being the headborough, having heard that there was a riot in a street called Noblestreet, went into that street about twelve o'clock at night, with a view of keeping the peace; that when they got there the rioters had dispersed; but observing a woman, who turned out to be the prisoner's wife, standing at an alley in that street, Barret told her to go home, or he should find her one; and immediately upon his saying this, the prisoner (who probably mistook him and Lee for some men, who, as he alleged in his defence, had been in his house that night, and treated his wife with great indecency)

, rushed by the woman, and with some weapon struck Lee two blows, the last of which knocked him down, and directly afterwards struck the prosecutor with the same weapon several blows on the head and body, pursuing him near two hundred yards, when he fell, and was there left by the prisoner senseless, with a cut, as the prosecutor expressed himself, on one side of his head, of two inches long. The weapon, as described by Lee, was about two feet and a half long, heavy, and sharp withal, and, as he supposed, iron, but he did not observe its shape. Barret described it as being about three feet long, of the same thickness through. out, and square, and from the blows he received, and its appear. ance, he judged it to be a square iron bar. One of the blows divided the prosecutor's hat in a straight line for about the length of an inch or more ; another blow, which occasioned the wound in his head, made a dent in the hat of some length, and in some degree broke the texture of the hat, but it did not divide it; and the wound, as described by the surgeon who attended the prosecutor, was about two inches long, penetrating the integuments to the skull, and appeared to him to have been given by a blunt, and not by a sharp instrument; there being a great deal of contusion down the sides of the wound, being what the surgeons call a con. tused and lacerated wound, and not what is called an incised wound. There was no direct proof of any intention in the prisoner to cut the prosecutor. Under these circumstances, the learned judge directed the jury, if they believed the evidence, to find the prisoner guilty, reserving it for the opinion of the judges, whether the facts, as given in evidence, were sufficient to establish a wilful cutting within the meaning of the 43 G. 3. c. 58.; and the jury found the prisoner guilty. The judges held the conviction wrong, the wound having been inficted, not with a sharp, but with a blunt instrument. Rex v. Adams, 0. B. Jan. Sess. 1808, MS. C. C. R.

So also, in a case before Dallas C. J. and Burton J. at Chester Assizcs, it was ruled, that a blow with the handle of a windlass was not a cutting within the act, though it made an incision.

Anon. 5 Ev. Col. Stat., part v. c. 4. p. 334. note (2.) 9 G. 4. c. 31. It is to be remarked, with reference to the foregoing decisions, “ stab, cut, or that the importance of them is now in a great measure superseded, wound,"

as the stat. 9 G. 4. c. 31. uses the terms “stab, cut, or wound;" whereas the two first of these only are to be found in 43 G.3. c. 58.

See, however, R. v. Wood and another, p. 542., and the following Cutting with What shall be considered a cutting with intent to do some intent to do grievous bodily fried before Graham B. at Chelmsford Lent Ass. 1818. The

grievous bodily harm.] _An extraordinary and shocking case was harm.

cases.

some other

prisoner was indicted on Lord Ellenborough's act. The only count Cox's case. to which the evidence applied was, that with a sharp instrument he feloniously and maliciously did cut Mary Evans upon her private parts, with intentin so doing to do her a grievous bodily harm. The fact of cutting, as charged, was proved by the evidence of Mary Evans, an intelligent girl of ten years of age ; in which she was corroborated by the testimony of her mother and the surgeon who had examined her. — The learned judge told the jury, that they were to consider whether this was not a grievous bodily injury to the child, though eventually not dangerous ; that such it seemed to him; and as to the intent (though meant a rape), he did that which the law made a distinct crime, viz. intentionally to do the child a grievous bodily harm. He was not the less guilty of that crime, because his principal object was another. That the intention might be interred from the act itself. The jury found the prisoner guilty, but sentence was respited, to take the opinion of the judges, all of whom held the conviction right. R. v. Cox, C. C. R. 362.

N. B. At the following assizes the prisoner received sentence In an indictof death, and was left for execution. 'On 30th July following, he ment on stat. was respited till the 14th of August; and ultimately he was

43 G. 3. c. 58.

semble, that ordered to be imprisoned two years in the house of correction. the words,

R. v. Akenhead, Northumberland Summer Ass. 1816, cor. Bayley J., Holt's Rep. 469. The prisoner was indicted on stat. 43 G. 3. grievous bodily c. 58. The circumstances were these : — The prosecutor and harm,” must be some other men had got hold of a woman, who, as they conceived, construed to had been using another person ill. They said that she deserved to wounds only as be ducked in a trough which was near; but it did not appear that are inflicted such was their intention. The prisoner, who was at some distance upon a vital at the time, on being informed that they were using the woman ill, part of the exclaimed,' “ I have got a good knife," and immediately rushed body. to the place where she was. He entered among the crowd, and instantly struck the prosecutor on the shoulder with a knife. The prosecutor turned round upon him ; a struggle ensued between them, and in that struggle the prosecutor received other wounds. After they had fought for some time, the prisoner dropped the knife and ran away. The wound upon the prosecutor's shoulder was about seven inches long, and two deep; and the lap of one of his ears was cut. There was likewise a slight wound on the gland of his neck, and a cut on his left arm. The indictment contained counts — first, for an intent to murder, &c.; and, second, to maim, disfigure, and disable ; third, and do some other grievous bodily harm. Williams, for the prisoner, objected ; - First, that the first and second counts in the indictment were not supported by the evidence. The only question was upon the third count; did the prisoner mean to do some “ other grievous bodily harm” to the prosecutor ? He submitted that the wounds were not of that nature from which grievous bodily harm could ensue. It was a scuffle, in which a knife was used accidentally, without any settled design to “ maim, disfigure, or disable,” or to do “ other grievous bodily harm” to the prosecutor. Secondly, the wounds were not inflicted in a part of the body which could produce such a consequence. Bayley J. entertained some doubts on the circumstances; the wounds were not in a vital part; and quære, whether the injury done was a grievous bodily harm contemplated by the act? Had

death ensued, would it have been more than manslaughter? And was not this limit clearly understood throughout the act? His lordship directed an acquittal, under all the circumstances of the

case.

stat.

The wound In a case where the prosecutor suffered grievous bodily injury must be such from the prisoners, by being beaten with an iron bar and haminer

, as to break the it was held not to be a wound within the meaning of 9 G. 4., on skin.

account of the continuity of the skin not being broken. R. v.

Wood and another, 1 M. 278. Such wound But where the prosecutor was severely wounded by a hammer, inflicted by a which was thrown at him, and divided the skin, and caused an hammer will be effusion of blood, it was held to be within the statute, and that the within the stat.

prisoner was properly convicted. R. v. Withers, 1 M. 294. Wound from a A wound from a kick with a shoe will be within the act, Tr. T. kick with a shoe 1831, MS. Bayley B. A wound from a shoe in the hand would is within the be within the act, and a blow from a shoe on the foot would be

likely to inflict a more deadly wound than a blow from a shoe in

the hand. Per Ld. Tenterden, ib. Means or in- On an indictment for wounding with intent to kill, &c., the instrument of the strument or means by which the wound was inflicted need not wound need

be stated, and though stated, do not confine the prosecutor to not be stated.

prove a wound by such means. Averment of a On an indictment which charges the wound to have been wound by inflicted by striking with a stick and kicking with the feet, proof striking and

that the wound was caused either by a blow from a stick or from a kicking; proof of cither sufti

kick will be sufficient, though it be uncertain by which of the two cient.

it was. Ibid. Person wound

Indictment on 9 G. 4. charged that the prisoners, with a certain ed had been stick and with their feet, did strike, kick, and wound W.L., with inboth struck tent, &c. It appeared in evidence that the prisoners struck him with and kicked.

a hedge-stake, or half a rail, and kicked him, and that the wound was occasioned either by a blow from a stick or by a kick from a heavy shoe, but the witnesses could not say which. On case, the

judges (Patteson J. alone absent) held, that the means by which Averment the wound was inflicted need not have been stated; that it was of means of surplusage to state them; that the evidence did not confine the wounding sur- crown to the means stated, but might be rejected as surplusage ; plusage.

and that, whether the wound was from a blow with a stick or a kick from a shoe, the indictment was equally supported. Conviction right. Tr. T. 1831, R. v. Briggs, MS. Bayley B. S.C. 1 M. 318.

N.B. The wounds were such that prosecutor was covered with

blood, his mouth was cut, and the membrane of his skull laid bare. Biting off a The prisoner having been convicted at the Old Bailey in April, finger not a 1834, on an indictment for feloniously and maliciously assausting wounding within the stat.

G. A., and feloniously and maliciously wounding him, by biting off the end of the second finger of the left hand, with intent (1st count) to main ; (2d) to disfigure; (3d) to do some grievous bodily harm. A doubt having arisen whether this was a wounding within the meaning of the statute, on case reserved it was the opinion of seven judges against six that the conviction was wrong.

1834, R. v. John Stevens, MS. Intent must be It is necessary that the indictment should allege the intent with laid.

which the defendant inflicted the personal injury with which he is charged. 1 Russ. 598.

E. 7.

lawful author

But though the intent laid is that of doing grievous bodily Main intent to harm, and it appears that the prisoner's main intent was to prevent prevent being his lawful apprehension, yet he may be convicted, if, in order to apprehended, effect such latter intent, he also intended to do grievous bodily of doing bodily harm. 1 Russ. 599.

harm, such Where a poacher fired at one of three keepers, who were ad- latter intent vancing to seize him, and the jury thought his motive was to pre- may be laid. vent his being apprehended, but that, in order to effect that purpose, he had also the intention of doing some grievous bodily harm, it was held, that he was properly convicted on an indictment, laying the intent to be that of doing grievous bodily harm. R. v. Gillow, 1 R. & M. 85.

Where the intent charged is that of obstructing a lawful appre. There must be hension, it must appear that resistance was made to a person having lawful authority to apprehend the prisoner. R. v. Dyson, bend.

ity to apprecit. 1 Russ. 600.

Where the prisoner was detected in the night attempting to Person atcommit a felony, it was held, he might lawfully be detained with- tempting a out a warrant, till he could be carried before a magistrate. felony by night R. v. Hunt, 1 R. & M. 93. 1 Russ. 601.

maybe detained. So, if the injury is inflicted with the intent to do grievous bodily Sufficient if harm, it is immaterial whether grievous bodily harm be or be not there be intent done. S. C. ibid.

to do bodily It was also held, that to constitute this offence, general malice is barm. sufficient, and that it is not necessary to shew particular malice General malice against the individual. S. C. ibid.

sufficient. Killing an officer who attempts to arrest a man will be murder, though the officer has no warrant, and though the man has done nothing for which he is liable to be arrested, if the officer has a charge against him for felony, and he knows the individual to be an officer, though the officer do not notify to him that he has such a charge. E. T. 1832, Bayley B. MS.

Prisoners attempted to push I. S. into a ditch: shortly after. Charge of wards, J. S. saw A., a watchman, and told him they had attempted felony made, to rob him. J. S. and A. followed them, and J. S. said to A.

though none

had been com“ That's them:' prisoners were near enough to have heard. They mitted. had not, in fact, attempted to rob J. S. A. addressed the pri; Oficer woundsoners, “ You must come back and go along with me :” he did ed in arresting not say why, or say he had any charge : he was at the time be- out of his limits, yond the limits in which he was watchman. One prisoner, W., without declardrew a sharp instrument, and said, “ Keep off." A. repeated, “ It's ing the charge, of no use; you must go back.”. The prisoner W. made a spring at knew him to be A., and caught one of the skirts of his coat : A. pulled out his

an officer. staff, and turned at the prisoners, and they came at bim. He struck at W. with his staff, and hit him: W. immediately stabbed A., and the other prisoner struck at him with another knife. On indictment inde for stabbing, with intent to do grievous bodily harm, it appeared that the prisoners knew A. was a watchman ; and upon conviction and case, the question was, whether, as pri- Case within the soners had done nothing to warrant their arrest, A. could legally statute. attempt to arrest them without saying they had a charge of robbery against them; and nine judges, against Bayley, Park, Littledale, and Bosanquet, held he might, and that had death ensued it would have been murder. E. T. 1832, R. v. Woolmer, MS. Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 334.

warrant con

lawful appre

Charge for Prisoner was indicted for maliciously cutting and wounding, maliciously with intent to resist his being lawfully apprehended for a certain cutting to pre- offence, for which“he was then and there liable to be apprehended, vent lawful apprehension.

by,

,&c.,viz.for that on, &c. he violently assaulted and beat one A.B.

It appeared that prisoner, being apprehended on a warrant for an Question of assault, and carried before two magistrates, refused to find bail, and

while his commitment was making out, made his escape : upon tinuing in force.

which the prosecutor (being the person who had taken the prisoner into custody) was ordered verbally by the magistrates, through their clerk, to go after the prisoner, which he did ; and on attempting to retake him, the prisoner cut him with a knife in the hand and arm.

It was objected, that the warrant for the assault was functus officio, and that the second apprehension was for the escape. It was also objected that the count was bad, as it did not follow that the prisoner was liable to be apprehended for assaulting and beating A. B. The judges held unanimously that

the prosecutor had power to arrest upon the original warrant; and, Indictment secondly, that the count was good, the words of the stat. being sufpursuing the

ficiently pursued (a), and that all after the viz. might be considered words of the

surplusage. Conviction right. M. T. 1833, R. V. Robt. Williams, statute suffi. cient.

cor. Gaselee J., Denb. Sum. Ass. 1833. MS. Malicious cut

Charge for maliciously cutting, with intent to resist lawful apting to prevent prehension. Prisoner, with several others in his company, was

playing at thimble-rig in a fair, between two and four p.m., and a hension.

constable, who had orders to take up persons so employed, endeaPrisoner using voured to apprehend him, and took one of them, but the prisoner unlawful games and the others rescued him. The constable saw nothing more of at a fair, appre- the prisoner till nine at night, when he found him at a public-house

, hours after and trying to apprehend him, the prisoner cut him, &c. By wards without Vagrant Act, 5 G. 4. c. 83. § 4., prisoner was a rogue and vagawarrant: Held bond, and $ 6. authorises any person whatever to apprehend not fresh pursuit.

any person who shall be found offending, &c. The question reserved was, whether the constable had power to apprehend without warrant, and whether it was fresh pursuit : the judges held unanimously that it was not fresh pursuit, and a pardon was recommended. M. T. 1833, R. v. W. Gardener, cor. Bosanquet J., Glamorgan Sum. Ass. 1833. MS. R. v. Howarth, 1 R. & M. 207.

Hanway v. Bolton, 2 Mann. 15. It is not an R. v. Ricketts, Worcester Sum. Ass. 1811, cor. Lawrence Jog offence within

3 Campb. 68. Indictment on stat. 43 G. 3. c. 58., for maliciously 43 G. 3. c. 58. against malici- cutting one Webb, with intent to obstruct, resist, and prevent the ously cutting,

lawful apprehension and detainer of the prisoner. The prisoner with intent to stole some wheat, which was soon after found concealed resist lauful

in a field. Webb watched near the place, and on the prisoner's the cutting took coming and taking up the bag containing the wheat, pursued and place in an at

seized him, without desiring him to surrender, or stating for what tempt to appre- reason he was apprehended. A scuffle ensued, during which, hend the pri- before Webb had spoken, the prisoner drew a knife, and cut bim soner previous

across the throat. Lawrence J. As Webb did not coinmunicate to notification to him of the

to the prisoner the purpose for which he seized him, this case does

If death had ensued, it would only which he was have been manslaughter. Had a proper notification been made laid hold of. before the cutting, the case would have assumed a different com

not come within the statute. purpose for

(a) See s. 21. of 7 G. 4. c. 64.

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