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the person

S. P.

Bank prose

misdemeanor, no person shall be deemed to be an incompetent witness, in support of any such prosecution, by reason of any interest which such person may have or be supposed to have, in respect of

such deed, writing, instrument, or other matter. Other evidence It is not, however, indispensable, that the party whose handadınissible to writing has been forged, should be the witness to prove the prove forgery

forgery. than that of

In a prosecution for the forgery of a bank note, it was ruled, whose signature that the hand-writing of the cashier of the bank might be disproved is forged. by any other person who was acquainted with his hand-writing.

Hughes's case, 2 East. P. C. 1002.

On points reserved from cases on bank prosecutions, it was

resolved by the judges, that it was unnecessary to produce the cutions.

signing clerk, to shew that he never signed the note, if the same is established by the evidence of persons acquainted with his

hand-writing. C.C. R. 380. Comparison of It is an established rule of evidence, that hand-writing cannot hand-writing be proved by comparing the paper in dispute with any other not allowed.

papers acknowledged to be genuine. Phill. Evid. 430. 2 Russ. 379. Evidence of Questions, however, have arisen, whether the evidence of persons persons of ex

of skill and experience, and whose business it was to inspect perience in

franks and detect forgeries at the post-office, was admissible to hand-writings. shew whether certain

writings were in a natural or in an imitated hand. Goodtille v. Braham, 4 T. R. 497. Cary v. Pitt, Peake's

Evid. 85. Phil. Evid. 430. R. v. Cator, 4 Esp. 117. Semb. that they

In the latest of the cases, where an inspector of franks of the

post-office was not allowed to state his opinion whether the handdence.

writing in question was a genuine signature or an imitation, on the trial of a feigned issue to try a question of forgery, the court of B. R. expressed doubts of the admissibility of the evidence, and refused to disturb the verdict, on the ground of its being rejected.

Gurney v. Longlanıls, 5 B. & A. 330. Upon an indict- In R. v. Wylie and another, at the 0. B. Apr. 14. 1804, the ment for utter- prisoners were indicted for disposing of and putting away a forged ing a forged bank-note for 1l., knowing the same to be forged. In order to bank-note,

shew the knowledge of the prisoners that the note was forged, knowing it to

evidence was offered that the prisoners had passed other forged be forged, evidence may be

notes to other persons : And to this evidence the counsel for the given of other prisoners objected, as being inadmissible; because, they said, upon forged notes indictments for burglary or robbery, previous offences were not having been

allowed to be given in evidence to prove the quo animo; nor upon uttered by the prisoner, in

an indictment for uttering bad money; and they said that the order to shew

prisoners ought to have had notice of the several utterings intended bis guilty know- to have been proved against them. Lord Ellenborough C. J. said, ledge.

that in R. v. Tattershall (tried at Lancaster, 1801, by Mr. J. Chambre) it was held by all the judges, that the jury might, from the conduct of the prisoner on one occasion, infer his knowledge on another. And he said, “ I remember a case in which a person came to Manchester with a large parcel of forged notes; his whole demeanour afforded pregnant evidence of the mind and purpose for which he came; and a question was made, whether that evidence should be received; for it was said, that it would be trying the prisoner for other utterings. But if crimes do so intermix, the court must go through the

detail. I remember a case where a man committed three burglaries in one night; he took a shirt at one

are not evi

ment for utter

with an

place, and left it at another; and they were all so connected that the court went through the history of the three burglaries. The more detached in point of time the previous utterings are, the less relation they will bear to that stated in the indictment. But in such case, the only question would be, whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the inference of knowledge from such particular transactions? It would not make the evidence inadmissible. Such evidence may come out from these circumstances, as may leave no doubt that the prisoners must have known what sort of paper they were passing. Under the authority therefore of the decision which has already taken place, I think that it is competent for us to go into and receive evidence of another offence, and of the demeanour of the prisoners on other occasions, from which knowledge may be inferred.” Heath J. agreed, and said he remembered a case where several persons were tried for a conspiracy to raise wages, and evidence was received of circumstances amounting to substantive felonies, such circumstances being material to the point in issue.— Thomson B. agreed, and said, that as to uttering of bad money, the prosecutor could give evidence of another uttering on the same day, in order to prove the knowledge. The evidence was received, and the prisoners were found guilty. Wylie's case, 1 N. R. 92. 2 Leach, 983.

Edward Ball was tried before Heath J. at Lewes Sum. Ass. 1807, Upon an indicton an indictment, charging him in the first count with forging a bank of England promissory note for the payment of 51.,

ing a forged

bank note, intent to defraud the governor and company of the bank of knowing it to be England, and on another count for uttering the same, &c. The forged, evidence prisoner uttered the note in question on the 11th of June, 1807, is admissible of and there was circumstantial evidence of his having actually forged the prisoner it, which might induce an intelligent jury to find him guilty on the having some

utfirst count. The note was forged with a camel-hair pencil.

The tered another company's notes are struck off a copper plate, and so are most of forged note of the forged notes that have been circulated. Evidence was then the same maoffered and admitted, that the prisoner had uttered another note nufacture, and

also of a numforged in the same manner, by the same hand, and with the same

ber of others materials, on the 20th of March, 1807, and that two ten-pound having been in notes, and thirteen one-pound notes of the same fabrication had circulation with been found on the files of the company, on the back of which the prisoner's there was the prisoner's hand-writing, which was evidence of their band writing having been in his possession, but it did not appear when the

on the back. company received them. The prisoner was found guilty, but sentence was respited for the purpose of taking the opinion of the judges as to the admissibility of this evidence. On the 14th Norember, 1807, all the judges (except Rooke J.) met, and the majority were of opinion that the evidence was admissible, subject to observation as to its weight, which would be more or less consi. derable according to the number of the other notes, the distance of time at which they were put off, and the situation in life of the prisoner, as to make it more or less probable that so many notes should pass through his hands in the course of business. Ball's case, C. C. R. 132. 1 Campb. 324. S. C.

In another case, where the prisoner was indicted for forging a Other forged promissory note (not a note of the bank of England), and also for note found in uttering it, evidence was given that, in the same pocket-book possession of

prisoner. belonging to the prisoner in which the forged note was found, on





S. 3, 4.

which the indictment proceeded, there was also found another promissory note for 1001., payable to the prisoner's order, appearing to be signed by one Wm. Gapper, which Wm. Gapper proved not to be his hand-writing, and that he never owed the prisoner 1001. This evidence of Gapper's note was objected to by the prisoner's counsel, but admitted; and on reference to the judges, a majority were of opinion that Gapper (a) was not a competent wit

The prisoner was pardoned. Crocker's case, Salisbury Sum. Ass. 1805, cor. Le Blanc, J., 2 N. R. 87. 2 Russ. 373. 375.385.

& n. ibid. Evidence of Where it appeared that the prisoner, who was charged with guilty know

knowingly uttering a forged promissory note of which he was ledge.

payee, stated at time of uttering it, that the drawer (W. H.) was a respectable man, keeping a public-house at T.; it was held, on ca. res., that W. H. having been called to shew that it was not his note, it lay on the prisoner to disprove the forgery, or his guilty

knowledge of it. .. T. 1830, R. v. Hampton, i R. & M. 255. Judgment for It was formerly a consequence of the judgment for forgery, that forgery dis

the defendant was rendered incapable of being a witness, as having qualifies as a

been convicted of a crimen falsi, until restored to competency by

the king's pardon. 2 Russ. 385. 9 G. 4. c. 32. But now, by 9 G. 4. c. 32. $$ 3, 4., after any conviction for felony or misdemeanor (except perjury and the subornation of perjury)

, Restoration of

the offender having endured the punishment to which he has been competency after suffering

adjudged, shall no longer be an incompetent witness in any court the punishment. or proceeding, civil or criminal. Intent to de

The intent to defraud and the party to be defrauded must be fraud.

stated in the indictment; and the proof must agree with such allegation. But it need not state the manner in which the party is to be defrauded; for that is matter of evidence. R. v. Powell, 2 Blac. Rep. 787. 2 East's P. C.976. 1 Leach, 77.

Stat. 7 Ĝ. 2. c. 22. was confined to those cases where the forgery was committed with intent to defraud individuals, and not corpo, rate bodies. R. v. Harrison, 0. B. 1777, 2 East's P. C. 988.;

therefore stat. 18 G. 3. c. 18. was passed to remedy this defect.(6) Forged instru- It was formerly necessary to set forth in the indictment the inment, descrip- strument forged, in words and figures. R. v. Mason, 2 East's

P. C. 975. Not necessary

By 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 123. $ 3., in order to prevent justice from being

defeated by clerical or verbal inaccuracies, it is enacted, that in or fac simile of all informations or indictments for forging or in any manner ut forged instru

tering any instrument or writing, it shall not be necessary to set forth any copy or fac simile thereof; but it shall be sufficient to describe the same in such manner as would sustain an indictment for stealing the same.

The following decisions have taken place as to variances between the instrument or writing as described by averment in the indict

ment, and the evidence produced in support of it. Purport, its The word purport imports what appears on the face of the meaning instrument; and, therefore, if it be stated in the indictment that

the instrument purports to be so and so, and the instrument when set forth does not accord with what it is said to purport, it is bad.

(a) It does not appear that the judges gave any opinion that G. was incompetent as a witness; it is said that it was understood that they thought so : there were, however, several other objections taken to the conviction. 2 Russ. 385. D.

(6) Now repealed, but see 28. of 1 W. 4. c. 66.


tion of.

to set out copy



In Jones's case, in 1779, the instrument was described to be a paper writing purporting to be a bank note; but the court were of opinion, that as it did not purporton the face of it to be a bank note, the indictment could not be supported; and that this defect could not be supplied by the representations made by the party when he passed off the note. Jones's case, Dougl. 300. 2 Èast's P.C.883.

So in J. Reading's case, 1793, where the indictment charged that S. P. the prisoner being possessed of a bill of exchange, purporting to be directed to J. King, by the name, &c. of J. Ring, forged the ac. ceptance of the said J. King, judgment was arrested, because the bill did not purport to be drawn on J. King, as stated in the indict. ment. And Buller J., in delivering the opinion of the judges at the 0. B., observed, that the indictment, as drawn, was absurd and repugnant in itself; for the name and description of one person or thing could not purport to be another. Reading's case, O. B., Sept. 1793, 2 Leach, 590. 2 East's P. C. 981.

Again, in Gillchrist's case, the indictment was for forging paper writing, purporting to be an order for payment of money, dated, &c. with the name of Thos. Exon thereunto subscribed, purporting to have been signed by Thos. Eron, clerk, and to be directed to George Lord Kinnaird, Wm. Moreland, and Thomas Hammersley, of, &c. bankers and partners, by the name and description of Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley, for the payment of the sum of 101., &c.;” the tenor of which said false writing, &c. is as follows; viz. “ Messrs. Ransom, Moreland, and Hammersley, please to pay to Mr. Brooks, or bearer, the sum of ten pounds for Thos. Exon; Sept. 11th, 1794;" with intent to defraud the said George Lord Kinnaird, &c. A motion was made in arrest of Purport is the judgment; and upon a conference with the judges in Easter term, apparent and 1795, it was resolved by ten judges present, that the judgment

not the legal

import. should be arrested, because the word purport imports what appears on the instrument itself. It means the appareni and not the legal import; and that this bill of exchange could not purport to be directed to Lord Kinnaird, because his name did not appear on the face of the bill. Gillchrist's case, 0. B. 1795, 2 East's P.C. 982. 2 Leach, 657.

And these determinations have been acted upon in various subsequent cases.

A merely literal variance is not fatal; as in Hart's case, where Variance of a the word was written in the indictment “received,” and it was word or letter. “ reicevd" in the bill of exchange itself. 2 East's P. C. 977.

So where the prisoner was indicted for uttering a bill of exchange directed to Messrs. Masterman, Peters, and Co., with a forged indorsement thereon; and it was objected that there was a variance in the indictment, which imported to set out the bill according to its tenor, inasmuch as the letter r in Messrs. was omitted, and the abbreviation Messs. might stand for words which Messrs. could not; the objection was overruled, and the judges, upon the point being referred to them, held the indictment sufficient. Oldfield's case, Durham Sum. Ass. 1811, cor. Bayley J., MS. 2 Russ. 360.

But, if by addition, omission, or alteration, the word is so changed as to become another word, the variance will be fatal. 2 Russ. 360. R. v. Beach, 1 Cowp. 229. Reg. v. Drake, Salk. 661.

Form of Commitment for Felony in uttering a forged Bank

Note, under stat. 1 W. 4. c. 66. g 3.
County of Sir G. C. baronet, one of the justices of our lord the
Warwick, king, assigned to keep the peace within the said county.
to wit.

To the constable of in the said county, and to the keeper of the common gaol at Warwick, in the said county. THESE are to command you the said constable, in his said majesty's

name, forthwith to convey and deliver into the custody of the said keeper of the said common gaol the body of A. O., charged this day before me the said justice, upon the oaths of A. I., A. W., and others, with feloniously uttering, publishing, disposing of, and putting away at Birmingham, in the said county, on the -day of

now last past, a certain false, forged, and counterfeited bank note, purporting to be a note of the governor and company of the bank of England, for the payment of one pound, he the said A. O. at the time of uttering, &c. [or, as the case may be], well knowing the same to be false, forged, and counterfeited, with intent to defraud the said governor and company, contrary to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided.

And you the said keeper are hereby required to receive the said A. O. into your custody in the said common gaol, and him there safely keep, until he shall be from thence discharged by due course of law. Hereof fail you not. Given under my hand and seal, the day of in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and

Fornication. See Lewdness.

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Game. *[7 & 8 G. 4. c. 29. -9 G. 4. c. 69.–1 & 2 W. 4. c. 32.] UNDER this head, such illegal acts relating to game will be

treated of as are made by law the subject of indictment, or

are rendered liable to other penal enactments. 9 G. 4, c. 69. By 9 G. 4. c. 69. § 1., reciting the 57 G.3. c. 90., and repealing the Persons taking same except so far as the same repeals any other acts; “if any or destroying

person shall, after the passing of this act, by night unlawfully take or gaine by night to be commit

destroy any game, or any rabbits in any lands, whether open or ented, for the first closed, or shall by night unlawfully enter or be upon the land, whether offence for three open or enclosed, with any gun, net, engine, or other instrument months, and

for the purpose of taking or destroying game, such offender shall, kept to hard

upon conviction thereof before two justices of the peace, be comlabour, and to find sureties,

mitted for the first offence to the common gaol or house of correction for any period not exceeding three calendar months, there to be kept to hard labour, and at the expiration of such period shall find sureties by recognizance, or in Scotland by bond of caution, of himself in 10l. and two sureties in 51. each, or one surety in 101. for his not so offending again for the space of one year next following; and in case of not finding such sureties, shall be further imprisoned and kept to hard labour for the space of six calendar months, unless such sureties are sooner found; and in case such

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