"Received the contents above, by me," &c. is a sufficient statement of a receipt in an indictment.

Receipt to a navy bill assignment.

Scrip receipt.

Alteration in copy.

Initials, &c. on a receipt must be explained.

Order for pay

ment of money or delivery of goods, must appear to be the

"18th March, 1773. "Received the contents above, by me,

"Stephen Withers." With intent to defraud R. Goadby, &c. It appeared that the prisoner was employed by Goadby, who sold lottery tickets and shares, and paid the money for prizes, to settle an account with S. Withers; that a precise account in writing was given by Goadby to the prisoner, in which there was a balance of 11. 4s. due to Withers, with the money to pay that balance; that the prisoner afterwards, on settling his accounts with Goadby, produced this very account, together with the receipt stated in the indictment, which was not signed by Withers, and took credit for the amount, knowing that Withers had not been paid. It was objected that this receipt did not correspond with the indictment, which should have contained the bill as well as the receipt; and that the receipt, as set forth, of "the contents above" did not appear to be a receipt for the bill in question, or to be a receipt for money. After conviction, judgment was respited; but in Mich. T. 1774, the judges were of opinion that the indictment was sufficient, for it was, "Received the contents above," which shewed it to be a receipt for something, though the particulars were not expressed; it was laid to be a forged receipt for money under the hand of S. W. for 17. 4s. Od., and the bill itself was only evidence of the fact, and shewed it to be a receipt for money as charged.

But in the case of W. Hunter (E. T. 1796), who was indicted for forging a receipt to an assignment for payment of a certain sum in a navy bill, the judgment was arrested, because it did not appear on the face of the instrument, nor was shewn by any averment, that the instrument was a receipt for money. R. v. Hunter, 2 Leach, 624. 2 East's P. C. 928.

In Lyon's case it was ruled by all the judges, that a scrip receipt not filled up with the name of the subscriber, or person from whom the money was received, is not a receipt for money within the statutes. Lyon's case, 2 East's P. C. 933.

A person who makes a copy of a receipt, interpolating the words "in full of all demands," and produces such false copy upon a suggestion of the loss of the original, is guilty of forgery. Upfold v. Leit, Sitt. after H. T. 1804, cor. Ld. Ellenborough C. J., 5 Esp. 100.

The indictment charged the prisoner with publishing the following forged receipt to an account for money, " 1825. Received, H. H., which had been given by Henry Hargreaves as a receipt for other money, but which prisoner had annexed to the account in question, and had published it for a genuine and true receipt for the sum in account, with intent to defraud said H. Hargreaves: after conviction, judgment was arrested, on the ground that the indictment ought to have shewn what "H. H." meant, and what connection Hargreaves had with the receipt. E. T. 1826, R. v. Barton, 1 R. & M. 141.

As to producing unstamped receipts in support of a charge of felony founded thereon, see R. v. Hall, 3 Stark. 67., antè, p. 274. If the warrant or order, mentioned in stat. 7 G. 2. c. 22. (now repealed), do not purport, on the face of it, nor be shewn by a proper averment, to be made by a person having authority to command the payment of the money, or direct the delivery of the

goods, but only amounts to a a request to advance the money or order of a persupply the goods on the credit of the party applying, it is not a war- son entitled to rant or order within the statute. 2 East's P. C. 936. 2 Leach, 597. make it. See also Reeves's case, 2 Leach, 808.

Mary Mitchell was indicted for publishing and uttering this forged warrant and order: "Mr. Jeffereys, I desire you to let this woman have six yards of ordinary stuff, one pair of stockings, one shift, one apron, one handkerchief, and I will see it all paid for. Witness my hand, G. May:" with intent to defraud W. Jeffereys. The prisoner pretending to be entitled to parochial relief, went to Jeffereys's shop with the order, saying she had brought it from May, the overseer of the poor, and desiring him to let her have the articles on the credit of it. After conviction, judgment was respited; and nine of the judges, on a conference in July, 1754, were clearly of opinion that the writing was not a warrant or order for the delivery of goods within the statute; considering that the words "warrant or order," as they stand in the act, are synonymous, and import that the person giving such warrant or order has or at least claims an interest in the money or goods which are the subject-matter of it, and has or at least assumes to have a disposing power over them, and takes on him to transfer the property, or at least the custody of them, to the person in whose favour such warrant is made. And though this case must fall within the mischief, yet in the construction of an act so penal, the strict letter of it ought not to be departed from. Mitchell's case, Fost. 119. 2 East's P. C. 936. 2 Russ. 470.

On the authority of Mitchell's case, it was determined in Wil- S. P. liams's case that a note to a tradesman, requesting him to let the bearer have certain goods, is not within the statute, though most of the judges said they should have doubted the propriety of the former case, had it been res integra; but it having been so long acquiesced in, they thought it could not be departed from. Williams's case, 1775, 1 Leach, 114. 2 East's P. C. 937.

Accordingly, in Ellor's case, a note in the following form, "Messrs. Songer, please to send 107. by the bearer, as I am so ill, I cannot wait on you, Eliz. Wery," was holden not to be an order within the statute. The prisoner was therefore acquitted of the felony, but detained, and at a subsequent sessions convicted of a misdemeanor. Ellor's case, O. B. 1784, 1 Leach, 323. 2 East's P. C. 938.

S. P.

Prisoner was indicted for forging an order for the payment of It must appear money; viz. "Mr. T. Sir, you will please to pay R. P. 31. for that the person three weeks due to him, a country member, J. B." It appeared whose order,&c. that J. B. was the secretary of a friendly society, and that there was forged had a disposing was usually money in T.'s hands to pay any demands made by power. J. B.'s orders, but there was no member of the name of R. P. No evidence was given that J. B. had any disposing power over the money, which could be shewn only by the production of the rules and regulations. After conviction, the judges thought that this was not an order on the face of it, and that the conviction was therefore wrong. E. T. 1829, R. v. Baker, 1 R. & M. 231.

In Clinch's case it was holden, that an order of this kind ought to be directed to some person in particular, and it ought to appear that the person, whose name is subscribed to the order, had

A forged order

on a banker for payment of money, purporting to be made by onewho kept cash with him, is within the statute, though made in a fictitious

name, or in the

name of one who had no authority to draw on him.

Request, if ambiguous, must be explained. Need not be particularly addressed to any one.

an authority to make it. Clinch's case, O. B. 1791, 1 Leach, 540. 2 Russ. 473, 4.

But if it purport to be an order which the party has a right to make, although in truth he has no such right, and though no such person exists as he who is supposed to have made it, it comes within the statute.

C. Locket was convicted of knowingly uttering a forged order for the payment of money in these words: "Messrs. Neale, Fordyce, and Down, pay to Wm. Hopwood, or bearer, 16/. 10s. 6d. R. Vennest; with intent to defraud John Scoles. The prisoner applied to Scoles, a colourman, and agreed to purchase goods to the amount of 10l. Os. 6d. which he was to send for; and he took away with him a little Prussian blue. He came again, pretending to be in a hurry, and presented this note, which he said was a good one; and Scoles gave him 67. 10s., being the difference. No such person as R. Vennest kept cash at Messrs. Neale and Co.'s, nor did it appear that there was any such man existing. The question submitted to the judges was, whether this were an order within the statute, being the name of a fictitious person? the doubt arising on what is said in Mitchell's case. (See supra.) The judges, after very long consideration, at last agreed in Trin. T. 1774, that this was forgery. They thought it quite immaterial whether such a man as Vennest existed or not; or if he did, whether he had kept cash at the banking house of Messrs. Neale and Co.'s; it was sufficient that the order assumed those facts, and imported a right on the part of the drawer to direct such a transfer of his property. Lockett's case, O. B. June, 1772, 2 East's P. C. 940. 1 Leach, 94. S. C. 2 Russ. 474.

66

The expressions in § 10. of 1 W. 4. c. 66. are any warrant, order, or request for the delivery or transfer of goods." See

antè.

A request (under 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66. § 10.) must import on the face of it to be a request. E. T. 1831.

And if the words have not necessarily that effect, but are so understood in trade, &c., there must be an innuendo to explain them. E. T. 1831.

A request need not be addressed to any particular person. Semb. E. T. 1831.

On indictment for uttering a forged request, the request was stated to be " per bearer two 11s. 4d, counterpanes, J. Davies, E. Twell, 88. Aldgate:" this was explained to mean in the trade in which J. Davies dealt at 88. Aldgate, to be a request from Twell, D.'s foreman, to any person in the trade, to supply the counterpanes. Objection was made, that the request was not addressed to any person in particular, and ca. saved. On consideration, the judges (twelve) seemed to think the address not necessary; but they thought the words "per bearer" did not necessarily import "send per bearer," they might have meant " I have sent per bearer; and that there ought to have been an innuendo to explain them. E. T. 1831, R. v. Cullen, MS. Bayley B. S. C.` 1 M. 300.

In these cases it is not necessary to specify the particular goods in the order, provided it be conceived in terms intelligible to the parties themselves to whom it is addressed. 2 East's P. C. 941. Jones's case, 1 Leach, 204. 2 Russ. 475.

trade.

In R. v. M'Intosh, 2 East's P. C. 942., an order for payment of Not confined prize-money, and in R. v. Graham, 2 East's P. C. 945., a forged to dealings in order of a magistrate upon the high constable of a division, or the treasurer of the county, to pay a reward of 10s. to the prisoner for apprehending a vagrant under stat. 17 G. 2. c. 5. § 5. (a), were holden to be orders within the meaning of the 7 G. 2. ; though in the latter case, the 18th section of the act subjects the party forging such order to a penalty of 50l. See 2 Russ. 471. n.

Benjamin Rushworth was indicted at York Sum. Ass. 1816, for forging an order for the purpose of obtaining the sum of 47. 10s. for apprehending and conveying certain vagrants: but the order not being under hand and seal, as required by 17 G. 2. c. 5. § 5. and being addressed to the county treasurer instead of to the high constable, as that statute also requires, Bayley J. thought it was not such an order for payment of money as was within the statute, and directed an acquittal. Rushworth's case, C. C. R. 317. 2 Russ. 471.

A bill of exchange may be stated as an order for payment of money. In Shepherd's case, O. B. Sept. 1781, 2 East's P. C. 944., the forged instrument, which was set out, was precisely in the form of a bill of exchange, and in the indictment it was stated to be an order for payment of money. It was objected, that it ought to have been laid to be a bill of exchange. But in Mich. T. 1781, the judges were unanimously of opinion that it was properly laid. It was observed that the indictment and the draft were the same as in Lockett's case, (suprà,) where all the judges held the conviction. proper; and that every bill of exchange seemed to be an order for payment of money, though not vice versa.

Uttering a forged note was within the forgery acts prior to 1 W. 4., though it was on the face of it payable in Ireland only. Tr. T. 1831.

Indictment for uttering here in April, payable to bearer on demand in Dublin. whether the uttering an Irish note was

11 G. 4., a note for 30s. Case upon the question within the then existing

statutes, and the judges (fourteen) were unanimous it was. Tr. T.

1831, S. C. 1 M. 311. R. v. Kirkwood, MS. Bayley B.

A forged order for obtaining the reward, &c. for apprehending a vagrant,

not under hand

and seal, &c. not within the statute.

A bill of exchange may be

laid as an order

for

payment of

money.

Promissory note payable

in Ireland.

If several make distinct parts of a forged instrument, each is a Principals in principal, though he does not know by whom the other parts are forgery. executed, and though it is finished by one alone in the absence of the others. Tr. T. 1831.

On an indictment against Dade, Kirkwood, and Stansfield, for forging a note, and against Collins and Campbell as accessaries before the fact, it appeared that Stansfield made the paper, Kirkwood engraved the plate, and struck off the impression, and Dade, in the absence of Stansfield and Kirkwood, filled up and finished the note. Stansfield, when he made the paper, did not know that Kirkwood or Dade were to have any thing to do with the forgery; nor did Kirkwood know, when he engraved the plate and made the impression, that Dade or Stansfield were, or were to be, concerned. Collins and Campbell were the movers, and through them all the parties were set to work. The object was, to pass off notes of the Wirksworth bank. Dade was not upon his trial, and Collins and Campbell could not properly be tried unless Stansfield and Kirk

(a) Repealed by stat. 5 G. 4. c. 83. See tit. Uagrant.

Actors in the transaction of the forgery, but

unknown as such to each

S. P.

Using a second time a stamp detached from parchment.

wood were to be deemed principals. The four were convicted, but case for the judges upon the question whether Stansfield and Kirkwood were principals and rightly convicted; and, on consultation, the judges (fourteen) were unanimous that they were, that R. v. Bingley was rightly decided, and that the ignorance of Stansfield and Kirkwood, who were to effect the other parts of the forgery, was immaterial: it was sufficient if they knew it was to be executed by somebody. Tr. T. 1831, R. v. Kirkwood, MS. Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 307. by the name of R. v. Dade and others. There was another indictment against Dade and Kirkwood, for forging a note of Heywood's bank at Manchester, and against Collyer and Calvert, as accessaries before the fact. Kirkwood engraved the plate, and worked off the impression from it; and Dade, in his absence, filled up the note. Dade not being in custody, Kirkwood, Collyer, and Calvert, were alone tried, and upon their conviction the point was also saved, whether Kirkwood was a principal, and the judges were unanimous that he was. Tr. T. 1831, R. v. Kirkwood, MS. Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 304.

On indictment against prisoner for getting off from a certain piece of parchment the impression of a die, made and used in pur. suance of the statute in that case made and provided, for denoting a 55 G. 3. c. 184. stamp duty of 257., with intent to use the same upon another piece of parchment, it appeared that the prisoner was ordered by the commissioners of stamps to cut off from an instrument brought to have a spoiled stamp allowed, that part upon which the stamp was; that he did so, and afterwards detached from the parchment so cut off the blue paper upon which the stamp was impressed, and affixed it to another piece of parchment, and offered it for sale. The impression was made by a die used by direction of the commissioners before and after 55 G. 3. The jury found, 1st, that they could not say whether the impression was made before or after 55 G. 3.; 2dly, that when the prisoner cut the piece from the instrument, he had no fraudulent intention; 3dly, that he had, when he detached the stamp from the parchment he had cut off with it; and, 4thly, that he intended to use it upon other parchment destined for indentures; and, upon this finding, the judges thought the prisoner rightly convicted. Tr. T. 1831, R. v. Smith, MS. Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 314.

Forged stamps Prisoner was indicted on 55 G. 3. c. 185. § 7., for selling plate on plate. with the king's mark forged upon it, knowing, &c. Previous acts, 55 G. 3. c. 185. viz. 24 G. 3. sess. 2. c. 53. § 16., and 52 G. 3. c. 143. § 7., had contained similar provisions. By 55 G. 3. it is made a capital offence. After conviction, judgment was respited, on a doubt whether the punishment of death was taken away by subsequent statutes; and, if it was, whether the punishment was transportation for life absolutely, or discretionary in the court. 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66. § 1., repeals the punishment in very many forgeries, and gives the court discretion: § 31. repeals many former acts, but does not specify the above acts: 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 123., takes away the punishment of death from many other forgeries which were made capital by 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66., and enacts transportation for life.

Punishment discretionary.

The judges held that the punishment of death is taken away by 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66. § 1., and that the punishment is discretionary under that section. M. T. 1833, R. v. William Hope, Sum. Devon Ass. 1833, cor. Patteson J. MS.