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goods, but only amounts to a a request to advance the money or order of a persupply the goods on the credit of the party applying, it is not a war. son entitled to rant or order within the statute. 2 East's P. C. 936. 2 Leach, 597. make it. See also Reeves's case, 2 Leach, 808.

Mary Mitchell was indicted for publishing and uttering this forged warrant and order : “ Mr. Jeffereys, I desire you to let this woman have six yards of ordinary stuff, one pair of stockings, one shift, one apron, one handkerchief, and I will see it all paid for. Witness my hand, G. May:" with intent to defraud W. Jeffereys. The prisoner pretending to be entitled to parochial relief, went to Jeffereys's shop with the order, saying she had brought it from May, the overseer of the poor, and desiring him to let her have the articles on the credit of it. After conviction, judgment was respited; and nine of the judges, on a conference in July, 1754, were clearly of opinion that the writing was not a warrant or order for the delivery of goods within the statute; considering that the words “ warrant or order," as they stand in the act, are synonymous, and import that the person giving such warrant or order has or at least claims an interest in the money or goods which are the subject-matter of it, and has or at least assumes to have a disposing power over them, and takes on him to transfer the property, or at least the custody of them, to the person in whose favour such warrant is made. And though this case must fall within the mischief, yet in the construction of an act so penal, the strict letter of it ought not to be departed from. Milchell's case, Fost. 119. 2 East's P. C. 936. 2 Russ. 470.

On the authority of Mitchell's case, it was determined in Wil- S. P. liams's case that a note to a tradesman, requesting him to let the bearer have certain goods, is not within the statute, though most of the judges said they should have doubted the propriety of the former case, had it been res integra; but it having been so long acquiesced in, they thought it could not be departed from. Williams's case, 1775, 1 Leach, 114. 2 East's P. C. 937.

Accordingly, in Ellor's case, a note in the following form, S. P. “ Messrs. Songer, please to send 101. by the bearer, as I am so ill, I cannot wait on you, Eliz. Wery," was holden not to be an order within the statute. The prisoner was therefore acquitted of the felony, but detained, and at a subsequent sessions convicted of a misdemeanor. Ellor's case, 0. B. 1784, 1 Leach, 323. 2 East's P. C. 938.

Prisoner was indicted for forging an order for the payment of It must appear money; viz. “ Mr. T. Sir, you will please to pay R. P. 31. for that the person three weeks due to him, a country member, J. B."

It appeared whose order,&c.

vas forged bad that J. B. was the secretary of a friendly society, and that there

a disposing was usually money in T.'s hands to pay any demands made by power. J. B.'s orders, but there was no member of the name of R. P. No evidence was given that J. B. had any disposing power over the money, which could be shewn only by the production of the rules and regulations. After conviction, the judges thought that this was not an order on the face of it, and that the conviction was therefore wrong. E. T. 1829, R. v. Baker, 1 R. & M. 231.

In Clinch's case it was holden, that an order of this kind ought to be directed to some person in particular, and it ought to appear that the person, whose name is subscribed to the order, had

an authority to make it. Clinch's case, O. B. 1791, 1 Leach, 540.

2 Russ. 473, 4. A forged order

But if it purport to be an order which the party has a right to on a banker for make, although in truth he has no such right, and though no such payment of

person exists as he who is supposed to have made it, it comes money, pur

within the statute. porting to be made by onewho C. Locket was convicted of knowingly uttering a forged order kept cash with for the payment of money in these words: “ Messrs. Neale, Forhim, is within

dyce, and Down, pay to Wm. Hopwood, or bearer, 161. 10s. 6d. the statute, R. Vennest ;" with intent to defraud John Scoles. The prisoner though made in a fictitious

applied to Scoles, a colourman, and agreed to purchase goods to name, or in the the amount of 101. Os. 6d. which he was to send for; and he took name of one away with him a little Prussian blue. He came again, pretending who had no

to be in a hurry, and presented this note, which he said was a good authority to

one; and Scoles gave him 61. 10s., being the difference. No such draw on him.

person as R. Vennest kept cash at Messrs. Neale and Co.'s, nor did it appear that there was any such man existing. The question submitted to the judges was, whether this were an order within the statute, being the name of a fictitious person ? the doubt arising on what is said in Mitchell's case. (See supra.) The judges, after very long consideration, at last agreed in Trin. T. 1774, that this was forgery, They thought it quite immaterial whether such a man as Vennest existed or not; or if he did, whether he had kept cash at the banking house of Messrs. Neale and Co.'s; it was sufficient that the order assumed those facts, and imported a right on the part of the drawer to direct such a transfer of his property. Lockett's case, 0. B. June, 1772, 2 East's P. C. 940. 1 Leach, 94. S.C. 2 Russ. 474.

The expressions in § 10. of 1 W. 4. c. 66. are any warrant, order, or request for the delivery or transfer of goods.” See antè.

A request (under 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66. s 10.) must import on the face of it to be a request.

E. T. 1831.
And if the words have not necessarily that effect, but are so
understood in trade, &c., there must be an innuendo to explain them.
E. T. 1831.

A request need not be addressed to any particular person.

Semb. E. T. 1831. Request, if am

On indictment for uttering a forged request, the request was biguous, must stated to be " per bearer two lls. 4d, counterpanes, J. Davies, be explained. E. Twell, 88. Aldgate :this was explained to niean in the trade Need not be

in which J. Davies dealt at 88. Aldgate, to be a request from particularly addressed to

Twell, D.'s foreman, to any person in the trade, to supply the any one. counterpanes. Objection was made, that the request was not

addressed to any person in particular, and ca. saved. On consideration, the judges (twelve) seemed to think the address not necessary; but they thought the words“ per bearer" did not necessarily import « send per bearer,” they might have meant “I have sent per bearer ;” and that there ought to have been an innuendo to explain them. E. T. 1831, R. v. Cullen, MS. Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 300.

In these cases it is not necessary to specify the particular goods in the order, provided it be conceived in terms intelligible to the parties themselves to whom it is addressed. 2 East's P. C. 941. Jones's case, 1 Leach, 204. 2 Russ. 475.


In R. v. MʻIntosh, 2 East's P. C. 942., an order for payment of Not confined prize-money, and in R. v. Graham, 2 East's P. C. 915., a forged to dealings in order of a magistrate upon the high constable of a division, or the trade. treasurer of the county, to pay a reward of 10s. to the prisoner for apprehending a vagrant under stat. 17 G. 2. c. 5. $5. (a), were bolden to be orders within the meaning of the 7 G. 2. ; though in the latter case, the 18th section of the act subjects the party forging such order to a penalty of 501. See 2 Russ. 471. n.

Benjamin Rushworth was indicted at York Sum. Ass. 1816, for A forged order forging an order for the purpose of obtaining the sum of 41. 10s. for obtaining for apprehending and conveying certain vagrants : but the order the reward, &c. not being under hand and seal, as required by 17 G. 2. c.5. 5.,

for apprehend

ing a vagrant, and being addressed to the county treasurer instead of to the

not under hand high constable, as that statute also requires, Bayley J. thought and scal, &c. it was not such an order for payment of money as was within the not within the statute, and directed an acquittal. Rushworth's case, C. C. R. 317. 2 Russ. 471.

A bill of exchange may be stated as an order for payment of A bill of ex. money. In Shepherd's case, 0.B. Sept. 1781, 2 East's P. C. 914., change may be

laid as an order the forged instrument, which was set out, was precisely in the

for payment of form of a bill of exchange, and in the indictment it was stated to be

money. an order for payment of money. It was objected, that it ought to have been laid to be a bill of exchange. But in Mich. T. 1781, the judges were unanimously of opinion that it was properly laid. It was observed that the indictment and the draft were the same as in Lockett's case, (suprà,) where all the judges held the conviction proper; and that every bill of exchange seemed to be an order for payment of money, though not vice versa.

Cttering a forged note was within the forgery acts prior to Promissory 1 W. 4., though it was on the face of it payable in Ireland only. note payable T. T. 1831.

in Ireland. Indictment for uttering here in April, 11 G.4., a note for 30s. payable to bearer on demand in Dublin. Case upon the question whether the uttering an Irish note was within the then existing statutes, and the judges (fourteen) were unanimous it was. Tr. T. 1831, S. C. 1 M. 311. R. v. Kirkwood, MS. Bayley B.

If several make distinct parts of a forged instrument, each is a Principals in principal, though he does not know by whom the other parts are forgery. executed, and though it is finished by one alone in the absence of the others. Tr. T. 1831.

On an indictment against Dade, Kirkwood, and Stansfield, for Actors in the forging a note, and against Collins and Campbell as accessaries transaction of before the fact, it appeared that Stansfield made the paper, Kirk- the forgery, but

unknown as rood engraved the plate, and struck off the impression, and Dade,

such to each in the absence of Stansfield and Kirkwood, filled up and finished

other. the note. Stansfield, when he made the paper, did not know that Kirkwood or Dade were to have any thing to do with the forgery; nor did Kirkwood know, when he engraved the plate and made the impression, that Dade or Stansfield were, or were to be, concerned. Collins and Campbell were the movers, and through them all the parties were set to work. The object was, to pass off notes of the Wirksworth bank. Dade was not upon his trial, and Collins and Campbell could not properly be tried unless Stansfield and Kirk.

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wood were to be deemed principals. The four were convicted, but case for the judges upon the question whether Stansfield and Kirkwood were principals and rightly convicted; and, on consultation, the judges (fourteen) were unanimous that they were, that R. v. Bingley was rightly decided, and that the ignorance of Stansfield and Kirkwood, who were to effect the other parts of the forgery, was immaterial : it was sufficient if they knew it was to be executed by somebody. Tr. T. 1831, R. v. Kirkwood, MS.

Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 307. by the name of R. v. Dade and others. S. P.

There was another indictment against Dade and Kirkwood, for forging a note of Heywood's bank at Manchester, and against Collyer and Calvert, as accessaries before the fact. Kirkwood engraved the plate, and worked off the impression from it; and Dade, in his absence, filled up the note. Dade not being in custody, Kirkwood, Collyer, and Calvert, were alone tried, and upon their conviction the point was also saved, whether Kirkwood was a principal, and the judges were unanimous that he was. Tr. T. 1831, R. v.

Kirkwood, MS. Bayley B. S.C. I M. 304. Using a second On indictment against prisoner for getting off from a certain time a stamp

piece of parchment the impression of a die, made and used in pur. detached from

suance of the statute in that case made and provided, for denoting a parchment. 55 G. 3. c. 184. stamp duty of 251., with intent to use the same upon another piece

of parchment, it appeared that the prisoner was ordered by the commissioners of stamps to cut off from an instrument brought to have a spoiled stamp allowed, that part upon which the stamp was; that he did so, and afterwards detached from the parchment so cut off the blue paper upon which the stamp was impressed, and affixed it to another piece of parchment, and offered it for sale. The impression was made by a die used by direction of the commissioners before and after 55 G. 3. The jury found, Ist, that they could not say whether the impression was made before or after 55 G. 3.; 2dly, that when the prisoner cut the piece from the instrument, he had no fraudulent intention ; 3dly, that he had, when he detached the stamp from the parchment he had cut off with it; and, 4thly, that he intended to use it upon other parchment destined for indentures; and, upon this finding, the judges thought the prisoner rightly convicted. Tr. T. 1831, R. v. Smith, MS.

Bayley B. S. C. 1 M. 314. Forged stamps Prisoner was indicted on 55 G. 3. c. 185. 87., for selling plate on plate. with the king's mark forged upon it, knowing, &c. Previous acts, 55 G. 3. c. 185. viz. 24 G. 3. sess. 2. c. 53. § 16., and 52 G. 3. c. 143. Ø 7., had con

tained similar provisions. By 55 G. 3. it is made a capital offence. After conviction, judgment was respited, on a doubt whether the punishment of death was taken away by subsequent statutes; and, if it was, whether the punishment was transportation for life absolutely, or discretionary in the court. 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66. § 1., repeals the punishment in very many forgeries, and gives the court discretion : § 31. repeals many former acts, but does not specify the above acts: 2 & 3 W. 4. c. 123., takes away the punishment of death from many other forgeries which were made capital

by 11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4.c. 66., and enacts transportation for life. Punishment

The judges held that the punishment of death is taken away by discretionary.

11 G. 4. & 1 W. 4. c. 66. $ 1., and that the punishment is discretionary under that section. M. T. 1833, R. v. William Hope, Sum. Devon Ass. 1833, cor. Patteson J. MS.


It appeared that the prisoner was in the habit of putting off bad Delivery of notes through the agency of S. H., a female; and it being proved forged note to that she had given a 21. note at a shop, which note prisoner claimed an agent to to be his, he was found guilty; and on ca. res. a majority of the dispose of. judges were of opinion that the conviction was right on the count for disposing and putting away. R. v. Palmer, C. C. R. 72.

N. B. This was under 13 G. 2. c. 13. § 11., now repealed; but see 1 W. 4. c. 66. $ 3.

But where the prisoners, having agreed with A. to sell him some Agreement for forged notes, met him by appointment, and pointed out to him a

sale of forged woman who would deliver him the notes, and from whom A. re

notes, and

pointing out ceived them, but it did not appear that the prisoners were present the person who at the delivery, it was held that the prisoners were only accessaries is to deliver before the fact. R. v. Stewart and another, C. C. R. 365.

Where it was proved that the prisoner delivered a forged note Delivery to to an agent for the purpose of passing it, which the agent en- agent, being an deavoured to do, the judges held that, assuming the agent knew accomplice. the note to be forged, the delivery of it to him by the prisoner was a disposing of it within the statute, and that the conviction was right. E. T. 1827, R. v. Giles, 1 R. & M. 166.

Semb. also, that if the agent was an innocent instrument, and Delivery to an employed as such, his act would be the act of the principal, for innocent agent which the principal might be convicted. Per Vaughan B., ib. 169.

Where the prisoner left a forged bill, payable to himself or Delivering a order, and not indorsed by him, in the hands of bis landlady as a forged note by pledge for the payment of his bill, the judges held that, having way of pledge been delivered for the purpose of obtaining credit, it was a guilty uttering. R. v. Birkett, C. C. R. 86.

But where, on a charge for uttering and publishing, it appeared Aliter, if it be that prisoner had delivered the notes to the innkeeper where he

delivered for

safe custody. lodging, to take care of them for him, and to shew that he was a man of substance, the judges held the conviction wrong, and that it did not amount to an uttering, unless the note was used in some way to obtain money or credit upon it. R. v. Shuckard, C. C. R. 200.


names are

III. Indictment and Evidence. The rule was formerly well established with respect to the com- Old rule as to petency of witnesses in cases of forgery, that no one was allowed competence of to give evidence for the prosecution who was interested, at the witnesses whose time of his examination, in setting aside the instrument alleged to

forged. be forged, if, in case of its being genuine, he would either be liable to be sued upon it, or be deprived by it of a legal claim against another; and he was also held to be equally incompetent to prove any other fact which contributed to establish the forgery. 2 East. P. C. 993. 1 Phill. Evid. 113. 2 Russ. 374.

But, now, by 9 G. 4. c. 32. § 2., on any prosecution by indict- 9G.4. c. 32. s.2. ment or information, either at common law or by statute, against Rendering them any person for forging a deed, writing, instrument, or other matter competent in whatsoever, or for uttering or disposing of any deed, writing, in- support of the strument, or other matter whatsoever, knowing the same to have

prosecution. been forged, or for being accessary before or after the fact to any such offence, if the same be a felony, or for aiding, abetting, or counselling the commission of any such offence, if the same be a

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