crimes indictable. Per Cur. R. v. Edwards and others, 8 Mod. 321. another's name. If a man and woman marry in the name of another, for the pur- Marrying in pose of raising a specious title to the estate of the whose person name is assumed, it is a conspiracy. R. v. Robinson and Taylor, O. B. Oct. 1746, 1 Leach, 37. By false ru mours to raise the price of the funds. It is an indictable offence to conspire on a particular day by false rumours to raise the price of the government funds, with intent to injure the subjects who should purchase on that day; for the purpose itself is mischievous; it strikes at the price of a vendible commodity in the market, and if it gives it a fictitious price, by means of false rumours, it is a fraud levelled against all the public, for it is against all such as may possibly have any thing to do with the funds on that day. The offence is not raising the funds simply, but in conspiring by false rumours to raise them on that particular day; for to raise the funds may be an innocent act, but to conspire to raise them by illegal means, and with a crimi. Per Bayley J. nal view, is an offence. To raise them by false rumours is by S. C. illegal means. An indictment for such an offence need not specify the particular persons who purchased as the persons intended to be injured, for the conspiracy is the thing which constitutes the crime; and it is sufficient if the indictment state the conspiracy as it existed at the time when the crime was complete. It might have been detected before any purchases were made, or the mischief was effected, yet that would not have altered the offence; because the parties had done every thing in their power, and all that was essential to complete the crime when they had formed the conspiracy, and used illegal means for effecting it. Their criminality must depend on their own act, and not on the consequences that ensue from it. R. v. De Berenger and others, 3 M. & S. 67. Where a highway was indicted for being out of repair, and on "not guilty" pleaded, it appeared that two justices conspired to produce before the court a false certificate of the road being in repair, in order to influence the judgment of the court on withdrawing such plea and pleading guilty: this was held to be an indictable offence, as a conspiracy for the perversion of the course of justice, and that it was immaterial whether they knew or not of the road being out of repair at the time. R. v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 619. One person alone cannot be guilty of a conspiracy, 1 Haw. c. 72. §8.: but one person may be prosecuted for having conspired with others, and may be tried and convicted alone, if the others escape or die before the time of trial, or the finding of the bill. 1 Stra. 193. 2 Stra. 1227. And if all but one be acquitted, and it is not stated as a conspiracy with certain persons unknown, the conviction of the single defendant will be invalid, and no judgment can be passed on him, Poph. 202. 3 Burr. 1262. 12 Mod. 262. 1 Haw. c. 72. § 8.; but if an action on the case in the nature of a conspiracy be brought against several persons, and all but one be acquitted, yet judgment may be given against that one only. 1 Haw. c. 72. § 8. And where two conspire and one dies, the survivor may still be indicted for the conspiracy. 2 Stra. 1227. R. v. E. Nicholls, 13 East, 412. (n.) For producing false certi a ficate on a road indictment. One person alone cannot be guilty of a conspiracy. Nor man and wife. Persons acting separately may be guilty of a conspiracy. To ruin prosecutor in his trade. Act of conspir No such prosecution is maintainable against a husband and wife alone, because they are esteemed but as one person in law. 1 Haw. c. 72. § 8. In the case of R. v. Cope and others, 1 Stra. 144., the husband and wife and servants were indicted for a conspiracy to ruin the trade of the prosecutor, who was the king's cardinaker. The evidence against them was, that they had at several times given money to the prosecutor's apprentices, to put grease into the paste, which had spoiled the cards. But there was no account given that ever more than one at a time was present, though it was proved they had all given money in their turns. It was objected that this could not be a conspiracy; for several persons might do the same thing, without having any previous communication with each other. But it was ruled, that the defendants being all of a family, and concerned in making of cards, it would amount to evidence of a conspiracy. In a prosecution for a conspiracy, the actual fact of conspiring ing need not be need not be proved; but it may be inferred from circumstances, proved. and the concurring conduct of the defendants. R. v. Parsons, 1 Black. Rep. 392. To injure a person in his reputation. To prevent a person exercis If the indictment lay the offence to be an unlawful conspiracy, this, whether it be to charge a man with criminal acts, or such only as may affect his reputation, is fully sufficient. The several charges in the indictment are not to be considered as distinct and separate counts, but as one and the same united and continued offence, pursued through its different stages. R. v. Rispal, 1 Black. Rep. 368. An indictment against several persons for conspiring together, "by indirect means,” to prevent one H. B. from exercising the ing a particular trade of a tailor, was held good, without stating the mode. The illegal combination is the gist of the offence, and it is enough to state the conspiracy and the object. R. v. Eccles and others, 1 Leach, 274. 13 East, 230. (n.) trade. So also in a recent case, an indictment charging that the defendants conspired, by divers false pretences, and subtle means and devices, to obtain from P. D. and G. D. divers large sums of money, and to cheat and defraud them thereof, was held sufficient; for the gist of the offence being the conspiracy, if that fact and its object be stated, the particular means and devices need not be set out. R. v. Gill and Henry, 2 B. & A. 204. But an indictment will not lie for conspiring to commit a civil trespass: as, to go by night into a person's grounds to take game. R. v. Turner and others, 13 East, 228. In which case, Lord Ellenborough C. J. said, that the case of R. v. Eccles was considered as a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and so far a conspiracy to do an unlawful act affecting the public. See Russ. 564. Where two were indicted for conspiring to cheat prosecutor by selling him an unsound horse, and it appeared that one had advertised the horse for sale as sound, and when prosecutor inquired at the stables another of the defendants was there and stated particulars to confirm the fact of soundness, Lord Ellenborough held, that the case did not assume the shape of a conspiracy, but that the proceeding ought to have been an action on the warranty. R. v. Pywell and others, 1 Stark. 402. Russ. So, a conspiracy to deprive a man of the office of secretary to an illegal unincorporated trading company is not indictable, for, per Lord Ellenborough, instead of having an interest which the law would protect, he was guilty of a crime. R. v. Stratton and others, 1 Campb. 549. (n.) Russ. 565. In an indictment against the defendants for a conspiracy to cause themselves to be reputed persons of considerable property and in opulent circumstances, for the purpose of defrauding tradesmen, the prosecutor may prove various instances of their giving a false representation of their circumstances, as overt acts of the conspiracy. R. v. Roberts and others, 1 Campb. 399. And wherever a sufficient foundation is laid by evidence to go to a jury, of several persons having met for the purpose of a conspiracy, the declarations of any of the parties made at any time or place, relating to the object of the conspiracy, is evidence as against all. R. v. Salter and others, Kingston Lent Ass. 1804, cor. Hotham B. 5 Esp. 125. But see 1 Phill. Ev. 89. Where the conspiracy is to deprive a person of an illegal situation. To defraud tradesmen. Declaration or act of each conspirator is evidence against all. An indictment against workmen for conspiracy against their Conspiracy by employers, to prevent them from taking any apprentice, was held journeymen against their to be sufficiently proved, by evidence of their having turned out employers. from their employment with intent to compel their masters to dismiss any one apprentice. R. v. Ferguson and Edge, Lancaster Spring Ass. 1819, cor. Wood B. 2 Stärk. N. P. 489.-N. B. In Easter term following, the defendants received sentence of fine and imprisonment. II. Trial and Punishment. A conspiracy being a trespass, and tending to a breach of the Trial. peace, is cognisable by the general quarter sessions. R. v. Rispal, 3 Burr. 1321. 1 Blac. Rep. 368. Where the object of conspiracy is illegal, it is not necessary to state the nature of the means by which it is to be effected. Eccles's case, 13 E. R. 230. (n.) Russ. 568. So, where the indictment charged defendants with conspiring by divers false pretences to cheat A. of divers sums of money, it was held not necessary to set out the specific pretences. R. v. Gill, 2 B. & A. 204. But where the act only becomes illegal in consequence of the means used or the object to be attained, as in the case of conspiracies to marry paupers, the illegality ought to be explained by proper statements. See 2 Russ. 569. 1 East, P. C. 461. Semb., that there are no technical terms for charging the conspiracy in an indictment. 2 Russ. 569., and see R. v. Macarty, 2 Lord R. 1179. 2 East, P. C. 824. It was formerly holden that an indictment for conspiracy must be tried where the conspiracy was, and not where the result of it was put in execution. Reg. v. Best, 1 Salk. 174. But it has since been determined that the crime may be tried wherever a distinct overt act of conspiracy was in fact committed. R. v. Brisac and Scott, 4 E. R. 171. R. v. Bowes, cit. ib. 2 Russ. 569. See 7 G. 4. c. 64. § 12., whereby any felony or misdemeanor began in one county and completed in another may be tried in either county. Not necessary to state the means by which the conspiracy is to be effected Nor the false pretences. But aliter where the illegality results from particular cirumstances. No technical words of conspiracy. Venue. Where any overt act took place. 7 G. 4., offence taking place in two counties. How far the one conspirator are evidence against the others. Where several persons are proved to have combined together acts or words of for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of the party, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, is in the contemplation of law the act of the whole party; and, therefore, the proof of such act would be evidence against any of the others who were engaged in the same conspiracy; and further, any declarations, made by one of the party at the time of doing such illegal act, seem not only to be evidence against himself, as tending to determine the quality of the act, but to be evidence also against the rest of the party, who are as much responsible as if they had themselves done the act. But what one of the party may have been heard to say at some other time, as to the share which some of the others had in the execution of the common design, or as to the object of the conspiracy, cannot, it is conceived, be admitted as evidence to affect them on their trial for the same offence. 1 Phill. Ev. 88. 2 Russ. 570. Proof of the conspiracy generally. Wife of one of several defendness for any of ants not a wit defendants. Conspiracy of fraud; similar instances are evidence. Cross-examin for defence. On a prosecution for a crime to be proved by conspiracy, general evidence of an existing conspiracy may in the first instance be received, as a preliminary step to the more particular evidence, by which it is to be shown that the individual defendants were guilty participators in such conspiracy. In such cases, the general nature of the whole evidence should be opened to the court, and if upon such opening, it should appear that there was no particular proof sufficient to affect the individual defendants, it would be the duty of the judge to stop the case in limine, and not to allow the general evidence to be received. The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 310. So, assuming that an alleged conspiracy to suborn witnesses against the accused party is a legitimate ground of defence, general evidence of an existing conspiracy is admissible, with this qualification, viz. that the proposed evidence should be previously opened to the court, as in the former case, in order to enable the judge to form an opinion of the probability of bringing the evidence home, so as to affect some person whose acts are material, and relevant to the issue of the indictment then under trial. The Queen's case, 2 Brod. & Bing. 311. On the trial of several persons for a conspiracy, the wife of one of the defendants is not a competent witness for the rest, for their acquittal would be a ground of discharge for the husband. R. v. Lockyer, 5 Esp. 107. R. v. Frederick, 2 Str. 1094. 2 Russ. 570. Where defendants were indicted for conspiring to hold themselves out as persons of fortune, for the purpose of defrauding tradesmen, it is competent to give evidence of their making similar representations to other different tradesmen besides the prosecutor, on the ground that in prosecutions of this nature it is necessary to produce cumulative instances to prove the offence. Per Ld. Ellenborough, R. v. Roberts, 1 Campb. 399. 2 Russ. 572. On an indictment against A., B., and C., C. only called a witness ation of witness to prove a conversation between himself and A. Held, that the witness might be cross-examined as to other conversations between C. and A., though tending chiefly to criminate A. R. v. Krochl, 2 Stark. 343. 2 Russ. 573. Allegation, for whose use the Where A., B., C., and D. were charged with conspiring to obtain money illegally for the use of A., B., and C.; and it appeared that D., in whose hands the money was lodged for the use of A. and money to be got B., did not know that C. was to have any part of it: held, that by the conspirthe averment as to the application of the money, though laid ing was to be under a “viz.” was material, and that as to D. the conspiracy material. was not proved as laid. R. v. Pollman, 2 Campb. 231. 2 Russ. 573. applied, is conspiring to indict falsely, to extort money; Indictment for conspiring falsely to indict A. with intent to extort Indictment for money, and the jury found them guilty of conspiring to indict with that intent, but not falsely held to be sufficient to enable the court to give judgment, for that such a conspiracy was a misdemeanor, whether the charge was true or false. R. v. Hollingberry, 4 B. & C. 329. All the defendants convicted upon an indictment for a conspiracy must be present in court when a motion for a new trial is made on behalf of any of them. R. v. Teal and others, 11 East, 307. R. v. Askew, 3 M. & S. 9. R. v. Lord Cochrane, 3 M. & S. 10. (n). So also on a motion in arrest of judgment, the defendants must be personally present in court. R. v. Spragg et al., 2 Burr. 936. It is clear that those who are convicted of conspiracy at the suit of the party shall have judgment of fine and imprisonment, and to render the plaintiff his damages. 1 Haw. c. 72. § 9. defendant may be convicted, though the indictment was not false. On motion for new trial, or in arrest of judgment, all the defendants must be pre sent. Punishment. Also it is certain that he who is convicted at the suit of the king On indictment of a conspiracy to accuse another of a matter which may touch or information. his life, shall have judgment that he shall lose the freedom and franchise of the law (whereby he is disabled as a juror and discredited as a witness). 1 Haw. c. 72. § 9. And this is commonly called villanous judgment, which is given by the common law, and not by any statute. But it now is the better opinion, that the villanous judgment is by long disuse become obsolete, there being no instance of its having been pronounced since the reign of Edward the Third; but instead thereof, the delinquents are usually sentenced to fine, imprisonment, and surety for good behaviour. 4 Blac. Com. 136, 137. 2 Burr. 996. 1027. 1 Haw. c. 72. § 9. 7th edit. Previously to the stat. 56 G. 3. c. 138., in very aggravated cases, the offenders were generally also sentenced to stand in the pillory. - See the trial of Lord Cochrane and others, by Gurney, 1814. See also stat. 3 G. 4. c. 114. tit. Judgment. Dogs. [7 & 8 G. 4. c. 29. § 31.J IN this part of the work dogs will be considered only so far as the Criminal Law applies to them. It is said that if a fierce mastiff is allowed to go in the street Fierce mastiff. unmuzzled, it is considered a common nuisance, as being danger ous and the cause of terror, and that the owner is indictable on that account. 1 Russ. 303. By 7&8 G. 4. c. 29. § 31., if any person shall steal any dog or 7&8 G. 4. c. 29. any beast or bird ordinarily kept in a state of confinement, not Stealing dog, N 3 &c. |