as undisputed the authority as stated in the following syllabus of the case: "When a court of equity sustains a bill filed to compel the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of lands, and decrees such conveyance, it is within the proper exercise of its jurisdiction, and according to its modern practice, to give full and complete relief, by awarding to the plaintiff, not only the conveyance to which he is entitled, but also the damages which the defendant has caused by his refusal and delay in the performance of his contract; and these may be ascertained by the court in any mode which its discretion approves." § 169. Continued-The Ruling in other States. 46 44 . In Wisconsin, with no statute to authorize it, a mortgagee, in an action for foreclosure by sale, may take a personal judgment against the mortgager for any balance that remains un atisfied a ́te: the sale of the mortgaged premises; and in an action to enforce a vendor's lien, the plaintiff is allowed to take a personal judgment."5 In most of these cases the double relief is improperly spoken of as a union of two causes of action, although it does not appear that they were separately stated as is required in case of such union. In Minnesota, in an action to reform an insurance policy, the plaintiff also sought to obtain judgment for the amount due upon it as reformed. It was called by the court a union of two causes of action, although there could have been no action for the money until the policy had been reformed." So, in Nebraska, a plaintiff sought to reform an official bond, and damages for its breach; it was also treated as a proper union of two causes of action.48 In Indiana, the action to set aside a fraudulent deed, and for possession of the premises covered by the deed, there was but one cause of action. And Getty v. Hudson River R. Co., 6 How. Pr. 269, giving damages for obstructing a private waterway, and enjoining its continued obstruction; [Johnson v. Golder, 132 N. Y. 116, 30 N. E. 376; Louvall v. Gridley, 70 Cal. 507, 11 Pac. 777.] 44 Sauer v. Steinbauer, 14 Wis. 70; Cary v. Wheeler, Id. 281; Jesup v. City Bank, Id. 331; Stillwell v. Kellogg, Id. 461; Faesi v. Goetz, 15 Wis. 231. 45 Stephens v. Magor, 25 Wis. 533. 46 Ante, §§ 114-116. 47 Guernsey v. American Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 104 (Gil. 83). 48 Stewart v. Carter, 4 Neb. 564. In neither of these cases was the equitable seventy-first section of its Code authorizes the correction of mistakes in title papers, or other instruments of writing, in any action when the correction is essential to a complete remedy. In applying this statute to a promissory note, the following language is used in regard to the judgment: "It is insisted that the court should first have entered up a judgment reforming the note, and then have allowed it, as reformed, to be given in evidence at the trial. We perceive no valid reason for that precise mode of practice. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute requires it. It is enough if the court, as in this instance, find the mistake and correct it, and then render a final judgment in the case in accordance with such finding." 49 In North Carolina, the right to pass upon a mistake in a note, and, at the same time, find the amount due upon it, seems to have been conceded.50 This right to complete relief in one action may be said to be now universally acknowledged, and the right is generally treated as springing from a single cause of action. § 170. Continued-The Doctrine in Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri at one time seemed to have adopted the view, although not stated in these terms, that the Code had changed the equity rule; that, inasmuch as a plaintiff could unite in one petition, by separate statements, causes of action of a legal and equitable nature, he should not, if he has failed to do so, be granted legal relief in an equitable action; that the reason formerly given for giving such relief, to wit, that a multiplicity of suits is thereby avoided, cannot exist when the plaintiff is allowed, by a separate statement, to attach the legal to the equitable action; and the objection to so doing is that, in a money demand, or in a demand for the restoration of specific property, the defendant has a right to a trial by jury, which would be denied him if the court should take the whole matter into its own hands and give a money judgment in an action whose issues are triable by the court.51 cause of action sustained, but they show the difficulty of distinguishing be tween two causes of action and a single cause with two kinds of relief. 49 Rigsbee v. Trees, 21 Ind. 227. See, also, Monroe v. Skelton, 36 Ind. 302. 50 McCown v. Sims, 69 N. C. 159. 51 In PEYTON v. ROSE, 41 Mo. 257, being an action to recover possession of land, to vacate a conveyance upon the ground of fraud, and vest the title in § 171. The Objections to this View are twofold. This reasoning is specious when the plaintiff has in fact a legal cause of action, so called. It may be reasonable not to permit one who has a money demand, which is ripe at the commencement of the suit, to evade a jury trial by hiding it under an equitable cause of action, and to require the plaintiff, if he would unite them in the plaintiff, the court treated the petition as containing two causes of action in one count-one of ejectment, and one for equitable relief-and held the joinder to be erroneous. Judgment below had been rendered for the plaintiff both for possession and for title. But this judgment was reversed, the prayer for possession was treated as surplusage, and judgment was given in the Supreme Court for title only, leaving the plaintiff to a new action for possession. So far as treating the supposed misjoinder as ground for reversal, no objection having been made to it by demurrer or by motion, the doctrine of the case was overruled in House v. Lowell, 45 Mo. 381; but the general view of the court was acquiesced in in several cases, without discussion, until HENDERSON v. DICKEY, 50 Mo. 161, where it was materially modified. This was an equitable action for title, for damages, and for possession of the land. The court below had given a judgment for title only; the plaintiff appealed, and the case was sent back with directions to award a writ of possession, the Supreme Court treating the prayer for damages as surplusage, but intimating that damages could not be awarded except upon a separate cause of action, and upon verdict of a jury. The opinion of the court, after clearly stating the rule of pleading that different causes of action must be embodied in separate statements, refers to Peyton v. Rose, and the other cases, claiming that the errors consisted in the non-observance of that rule, and continues as follows: "Had the petitions been drawn in accordance with the rules of pleading laid down in the Code, and contained separate counts, with appropriate prayers for relief or judgment, as warranted by the law applicable to the different causes of action, a different question would have been presented. The Code of Procedure, authorizing the joinder of equitable and legal causes upon their separate statement in distinct counts, was passed for the purpose of preventing circuity of action and multiplicity of suits; but it applies simply to the form and manner of action, and was not designed to change any principle of law. Why the distinction must be kept up between legal and equitable proceedings is obvious to all. In an action at law there is a constitutional right to a trial by jury, which has no existence in equity. It seems to be conceded, in all the states where the new system of pleading prevails, that when legal and equitable causes of action are united, as to the former, on the trial, the issues must be submitted to the jury, and cannot be passed upon by the chancellor." [See, also, Duvall v. Tinsley, 54 Mo. 93.] one proceeding, to embody each in separate statements as separate causes of action. But the objections to this view are twofold: First, a party usually asks the aid of a court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction when, without it, he has no claim for the money or for the specific property which he seeks. The legal demand, so called, does not arise until after the decree of the chancellor. When the mistake in his contract is corrected, when the deed that interferes with his title is set aside, when the constructive trust is declared-then his power to enforce his money or property demand begins. In such case there is but one cause of action, and there can be no separate statement. Second, if the money demand be perfect at first, this objection does not lie; but even then, as in collecting a debt secured by a lien, there is but one cause of action, but one wrong, although two actions may be based upon it. The money demand may be separately prosecuted, and the wrong the cause of action-is the refusal to pay it; if he seeks to enforce the lien, the plaintiff has the same cause of action, only another remedy, and he will obtain other relief. Formerly this twofold relief was sought in different courts, and by a different mode of procedure-one was called an action at law, and the other a suit in equity, and only by the rule given in section 166 could one have full relief by one action. Under the Code there is but one court and one form of action and, by a single complaint, the aggrieved party may have all the relief to which he is entitled. In seeking what is still called legal and equitable relief, he does not unite different causes of action, for there is but one, he only seeks the twofold relief for the one wrong; there fore there can be no union of causes of action by separate statements. The pleader, in thus seeking full relief, should embody in his one statement all the facts showing the obligation and its breach, to which should be added the facts which show the lien, and he will ask for the double relief; or, if he seeks a money judgment only, he will stop with the obligation and breach. (284) The Oath. § 172. Its Object. The requirements as to the oath differ in the different states. Its object, as before shown,52 is to secure honest issues, to confine the litigation to matters really in dispute between the parties [and prevent false or sham pleadings from being interposed]. 173. The Oath as required in certain States-By whom made.53 In New York, a pleading may, or may not, be sworn to. The plaintiff is at liberty to swear to his complaint, or may omit the oath; but where any pleading is verified, every subsequent pleading, except a demurrer, must Le verified also. Thus, if one brings an action upon a demand which he is unwilling to verify, any defense may be made without the restraint of an oath. The verification, when made, is similar to that required in equity practice, and must be to the effect that the statement is true, to the knowledge of the person making it, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, he believes it to be true. It must be made by the party, or, if there are more than one, by one who is acquainted with the facts, by an officer of a corporation, or by any one on behalf of the state."* It may be made 52 Ante, § 138. 58 [See Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. § 525; Rev. St. Ohio, § 5109.] 54 [But when the verification is made by a party other than a party to the pleadings, the reason therefor should be stated. Fitch v. Bigelow, 5 How. Pr. 237.] [Remedy for Failure to Verify. [If the pleadings are not verified when required, the remedy is simply to treat it as a nullity. Ralph v. Husson, 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. 515. But the defendant should give prompt notice of his intention so to do. Hull v. Ball, 14 How. Pr. 305. It has been held, however, that the objection to such omission is by motion to strike pleadings from the files. Warner v. Warner, 11 Kan. 121; Fritz v. Barnes, 6 Neb. 435; 2 W. L. M. 528. The verification is no part of the pleadings, and is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction. George V. McAvoy, 6 How. Pr. 200; Johnson v. Jones, 2 Neb. 136. The verification |