X. MORTGAGE LIEN.

Follows the property in other States. A chattel mortgage of property duly executed and recorded in one State, so as to confer right of possession of the property in the mortgagee, is equally good and binding in every other State in which the property may come. The lex loci contractus governs the validity, nature and force of such a contract, and the right of possession or lien conferred thereby upon the mortgagee follows the property not only everywhere within, but also everywhere without the particular sovereignty or State wherein the contract is made and the property is at the time; and these rights will be enforced, in the judicial forum, in such other jurisdictions or States, to the same extent and obligation as in the State where the transaction arises, and that a purchase may have intervened from one seemingly the owner does not alter the case. 1

Right of possession enforced. When, by the terms of such mortgage, the right has accrued to the mortgagee of actual possion of the property, that right may be enforced by an action of replevin or other proper action for obtaining possession, in whatever State the mortgaged property may then be; and it is no answer thereto that no evidence or notice existed of record, or was otherwise given, to charge a purchaser therein with notice of the mortgage. But the court say, in the case above cited, in answer to such an objection, and the liability of buyers to be imposed upon, that "this may be so, but the same argument would be just as true and forcible if the instrument were of record in some distant county of this State."3

A mortgage of a vessel regularly made and recorded under the laws of the United States, in the office of the proper collector, although possession be not given to the mortgagee, is not affected as to its validity by any State law in reference to the filing or recording mortgages of personal property made or taken under the

'Smith v. McLean, 24 Iowa, 322; Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 198; Savary v. Savary, 3 Iowa, 272; Bank of U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361; Davis v. Bronson, 6 Iowa, 410, 424; Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42; Offutt v. Flagg, 10 N. H. 50; Ferguson v. Clifford, 37 N. H. 87;

Blystone v. Burgett, 10 Ind. 28; Barker v. Stacy, 25 Miss. 477; Ryan v. Clanton, 3 Strob. 412, 471; Herman on Chattel Mortgages, $$ 79, 80.

Smith v. McLean, 24 Iowa, 322, 330, 331. 3 Ibid.

laws of the State. The congressional acts on the subject of recording and effect thereof are no exclusion of State legislation on the same subject.1

Mortgage in one State; property in another State. But the lien of a mortgage made in one State by a person resident and citizen thereof, on personal property situated at the time in another State, in which latter State the law requires the recording of such instruments, or else that possession be given before levy of attachments or executions thereon as essential to priority, is overcome by the priority of an attachment levy of the same property in a proceeding in rem against it made before the recording of such mortgage, before delivery of possession of the property in pursuance thereof. Though it is true that the validity of a contract is governed, as a general principle, by the law where made, yet it is not so if such conclusion conflict with the rights of others, where the property is situated, or with the laws of the State of its actual situs.3 Therefore, a mortgage made in New York on personal property situated at the time in Illinois, is postponed in favor of an attachment levy of the same property in a proceeding in rem, and by a subsequent condemnation thereof in sale in such proceeding. The title of the purchaser relates back to the date of the attachment levy, and takes precedence of transfers or liens unrecorded at that time, and without change of possession of the property in the debtor. Though, for some purposes, a fiction of law prevails that personal property attends the owner, and that transfers of it by him, valid at his domicile, and there made, are valid in such other State as the property may at the time be situated in. But this is only as against the vendor, or volunteers, and not as against intervening bona fide claims arising under the law of the actual situs. To these, this fiction gives place or yields. It is only by comity that such contracts made in one State, when valid there, are enforcible at all in another State; therefore, when their enforcement conflicts with rights acquired

1 Aldrich v. Etna Company, 8 Wall. 491.

Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139; Milne . Morton, 6 Binn. 361; Taylor . Boardman, 25 Vt. 581; Emerson v. Patridge, 27 Vt. 8; Ward v. Morrison, 25 Vt. 593; Norris v. Mumford, 4 Martin, 20; Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass.

100; Green . Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657.

3 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657. 4 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139; Golden v. Cockrill, 1 Kansas, 259.

under the latter's own law that comity ceases to exist in the particular case.1

Foreign mortgage of land to prefer creditors. Assignments. A mortgage to secure a bona fide debt, duly executed and recorded in Iowa, upon lands in that State, and made by a non-resident debtor, in view of insolvency, is not affected by the fact of the same debtor making, on or about the same day, in another State wherein he resides, a general assignment of all his property in the latter State for benefit of his creditors. By the laws of Iowa, a failing debtor may make a mortgage to secure a particnlar creditor, and the same will not be held invalid by reason of his failing condition;3 and such is none the less the rule if the debtor be a citizen or a resident of another State. The effect of the assignment in the State where that is made, under the laws of that State, as to validity or invalidity thereof, will have no influence or bearing upon the validity of the mortgage in Iowa. It may be stated, as a general rule, that where a foreign assignment conflicts with the local law, the latter will prevail. So that land attached where situated subsequent to a foreign assignment will prevail.

Railroad mortgage. A mortgage of a railroad is valid, though executed by the president in a different State than that where the railroad corporation exists, if its execution be otherwise sufficient and is authorized by the directory, although the vote of authority be silent as to the place where it shall be executed. And such mortgage, if shown on its face to be so intended, may legally call for the rate of interest allowable where the road is situated, although it is a higher rate than that allowed where the mortgage is executed.

XI. LABORERS' LIEN ON INTER-STATE RAFTS.

Rafts of lumber floated out of one State into another, in which latter State a lien on rafts of lumber is given by law to laborers assisting to run such rafts, become liable to the laborers'

1 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 150, 151.

2 Lyon v. McIlvaine, 24 Iowa, 9. Lampson v. Arnold, 19 Iowa, 479;

Lyon v. McIlvaine, 24 Iowa, 9.

4 Lyon v. McIlvaine, 24 Iowa, 9.

* Lyon v. McIlvaine, 24 Iowa, 9. Burrill on Assignments, § 304; Story's Conf. of Laws. §§ 327, 423 a. Cheever v. Rutland & Bur. R. R. Co., 39 Vt. 653.

1

lien on arriving in such latter State for whatever sum of money may be due them, and the same will there be enforced, if applied for, on arrival of such rafts at the destined port in such State for which they started. Nor will it alter the case as to the right of the lien, that the owner of the raft contracts with another person to make the run at his own expense to the destined point; the laborers are none the less entitled thereto, if there is no agreement with them to the contrary.

XII. CONTRACTS OF AFFREIGHTMENT.

Contracts for inter-State affreightment, valid in the State where made, are valid elsewhere if not in contravention of the law of such other place or places,3 and when made by a consignor of goods delivered for carriage, are binding on the consignee of another State the same as if made by himself.4

Existing rights of shippers, attached to freight consigned for inter-State carriage, are not prejudiced by the property being carried into another State. 5

A bill of lading and contract of shipment made in one State for the shipment and transportation of property to a point in another State, and on the faith of which advances are made in the State where the transaction occurs, is a contract governed by the laws of the State where made, if between citizens of such State. The person thus making the advances on the bill of lading becomes the legal owner of the property-not absolutelybut as security for the reimbursement of his advances. The obligation to reimburse the advances is in legal effect, and in the

"First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283; First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati . Kelly, 57 N. Y. 34; Bank of Rochester Jones, 4 N. Y. 497; Bailey v. Hudson R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70; Dows v. Greene, 24 N. Y. 638; Lickbarron v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, and Hare & Wallace's Notes to Smith's Leading Cases, vol. 1, 7th ed. pp. 1147, 1227; Marine Bank of Chicago v. Wright, 48 N. Y. 1; Cayuga County Nat. Bank v. Daniels, 47 N. Y. 631.

absence of any other understanding, an obligation to make such reimbursement at the same place where the advancement is made.

Bills Drawn on Consignee. This, too, although bills are drawn. on the consignee in favor of the person making the advances, and for the purpose of reimbursing the same. The effect intended is repayment there by means of such bills, and the law of the place governs the transaction.1 When the reimbursement is completed, the ownership then is in the person thus secured, no longer for his own security, but in trust for the consignee or real owner of the property.2

Affreightment Contracts by Foreign Corporations. Contracts of affreightment or carriage made in one State by a railroad corporation of another State, and to be performed in the latter State, are governed, as to performance, by the laws of the latter State,3 and the fact that a part of the carriage is across an intermediate State boundary river, over which both States possess the right of navigation and used by their respective inhabitants, does not alter the case in law.4

XIII. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS.

The transfer, by delivery and endorsement of warehouse receipts, in one State, for goods stored in a warehouse of a different State in the ordinary course of commerce, is a transfer of the goods, as actual delivery is impracticable, and will, where the transaction is a bona fide one, hold over process of attachment against the person making the transfer, although such change of ownership and transfer be unknown to both the warehouseman and the plaintiff in attachment. The force thereof is like the transfer of a ship at sea-delivery is impracticable. Such transactions are a necessity of internal trade and result from the usages thereof.5

1 First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283, 292; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 635, 644; Lanussee v. Barker, 3 Wheat. 101; Grant . Healey, 3 Sumn. 523.

2 First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283, 202, 294; Allen v. Will.

iams, 12 Pick. 297; City Bank v. Rome, W. & O. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 136.

3 Brown v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 83 Penn. St. 316. 4 Ibid.

Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384.