In the same case, JOHNSON, J., said in reference to the bill of complaint: "Much of the matters herein contained by way of complaint, would seem to depend for relief upon the exercise of political powers; and, as such, appropriately devolving upon the executive, and not the judicial department of the government."1

American Inter-State Law - Defined. - The term American Inter-State Law, as here used, embraces the law which governs the American States in their dealings and relations with each other, as well as with the national government, and the extent of recognition and binding force which is accorded the citizens and laws of each State, and of the national government, in the American courts.2

'Any case which asks the court to entertain jurisdiction of a political question, and to decide it, will not be considered by the same. To do so would encroach upon the supreme powers of the co-ordinate branches of government. U. S. v. Baker, 5 Blatchf. 6; The Hornet, 2 Abb. 35; The Protector, 12 Wall. 700; Van Antwerp. Hulburd, 7 Blatchf. 426; Grossmeyer v. U. S., 4 Nott & H. 1; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 166.

The term American Inter-State Law is somewhat akin to American private international law, but it is much broader and more comprehen. sive. On the general subject the reader is referred to Story's Conf. of Laws; Wharton's Conf. of Laws; Burge's Commentaries on Colonial Law; Gardner's Institutes of Ameri can Law; Westlake's Private International Law, and Foote's Private International Law, a work just published in England.

CHAPTER II.

COMITY NATURAL RIGHT LAW OF NATIONS AND UNIVERSAL LAW.

1. Comity. Although the relations of the several American States to each other do not rest upon the ordinary principles of comity alone, yet these relations are not such as to exclude the doctrine of comity from their inter-state code, or from their conduct toward each other as separate states, for municipal purposes; but such rather as should increase their good neighborhood and regard for each other.1

The observance of comity is not a matter of obligation, ordinarily, between states, but is mere matter of voluntary courtesy and favor, which may be extended or withheld at pleasure.

It

is in virtue of this voluntary consent, expressed or implied, and this only, that the laws of one entirely independent state are enforced or administered in the courts of another, to any extent, or in any respect whatever in the absence of compact or treaty stipulations providing therefor. 3

But where no inhibition to the exercise thereof exists, then such comity is impliedly permitted, as to such matters, and to such an extent, as does not conflict with the local policy, or differ from the local laws of the forum, when the rights of persons are involved, which are of a transitory nature. Not, however, for the enforcement of penalties, or in penal actions, or matters of police, or for the punishment of offenses against the state; nor

1 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214.

2 Story's Conf. of Laws, $$ 36, 38; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Martin, (N. S.) 569.

8 Story's Conf. of Laws, § 38.

5

Story's Conf. of Laws, § 38; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Woods, 643; S. C. 6 Otto, 1. Story's Conflict of Laws, § 621; The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66; Scoville v. Canfield, 14 John. 338; State v. Knight, Taylor's Law and Eq. (N. C.) 65.

as to statutory rights of action, or statutory remedies.1 This comity is not the comity of the courts, though sometimes so called, but is the comity of the state, and is merely administered by the courts, where permitted by the state, as other laws are adininistered. In a case cited in the note the ruling is unambiguous and express, that "comity extends only to enforce obligations, contracts, and rights under provisions of law of other countries, which are analagous or similar to those of the state where the litigation arises."s

So, too, it was said in Arkansas, that the rule of comity will not be enforced as against domestic law or the legal rights and interests of citizens, or to their injury. When a government undertakes to enforce or administer laws of other communities, care must be taken that no injury results therefrom to its own citizens. The municipal laws of a State are of no force in other States, and cannot in other States confer a right. They have no extra-territorial force as laws. But where they enter into a contract they are regarded, and enforced, as a part of the contract, and not as mere laws.

2. Natural Right. It is a well settled maxim of the law that "natural right is that which has the same force among all men." It is written on the hearts of all mankind. Hence it is that there are certain rights and liabilities which, being personal, and founded in natural right, do follow the person of the parties into every country into which they may come. These

1 Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102. Justice CHRISTIANCY, in treating this subject in Thompson v. Waters, 25 Mich. 214, uses the following language: "But upon the principle of comity, which is a part of the law of nations, recognized, to a greater or less extent, by all civilized governments, effect is frequently given in one State or country to the laws of another, in a great variety of ways, especially upon questions of contract rights to property, and rights of action connected with, or depending upon, such foreign laws, without which commercial and business intercourse between the people of dif

natural rights and liabilities are of the law of nature, and are parcel of the law of nations; they are a species of universal law, and are binding upon, and are recognized and enforced in, the courts of all civilized countries, in times of peace. The enforcement thereof does not depend upon the citizenship or allegiance of the parties, nor upon the place or country in which the right of action accrues, but the same are enforceable in the courts of all other States and countries by implied permission in law, to sue against those thus liable who are there found.

Law of Nations and Universal Law. These principles of natural right and national law are common to the jurisprudence of all countries, as a part of the law of nations, or great communities of states and sovereignties, and are thereby a part of the domestic code of each, and by these the people of each are bound to those of the others, in their personal transactions.

They have grown up as a necessary result of commerce and intercourse between organized governments and courts which are foreign to and independent of each other. They are not mere creatures of comity, enforceable at the will of neighboring states, as matter of favor or good neighborhood, but are of as truly binding authority as are the local laws of each binding on its own citizens, subjects, officers and courts. They are of that part of the law of nations which are not only obligatory upon the sovereign or aggregate community, but are of an inter-state character in the transactions of individuals, and are a necessity as well of the social fabric as of inter-state intercourse, commerce and trade. They are not the creatures of special enactments, but are tacitly acknowledged and enforced in all civilized countries. Nor is the local law anywhere made to give way to their enforcement, for they are themselves a part of the local law by virtue of their universality. In the language of Sir William Black

'Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394, 396. Justice DENIO, speaking in this case of the universal recognition of the title to personal property, says: "Every country enacts such laws as it sees fit as to the disposition of personal property, by its own citizens, either inter vicos or testamentary; but these laws are of no inherent obliga tion in any other country. Still, all

civilized nations agree, as a general rule, to recognize titles to movable property created in other States or countries in pursuance of the laws existing there, and by parties domiciled in such States or countries. This law of comity is parcel of the municipal law of the respective countries in which it is recognized."

and

stone, these rules of law "result from the principles of natural justice in which all the learned of every nation agree," and are in England adopted to their full extent by the common law, are held to be the law of the land."1 Such, too, they were, and still are, in the American States, irrespective of the national Constitution and Union. Though sometimes re-enacted, yet their re-enactment is not regarded as the introduction of new rules of law, but simply as declaratory of these rules of universal and national law, without which, as is well said by the same learned jurist, a state or kingdom would "cease to be a part of the civilized world."***"In mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like; in all marine causes relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurance, bottomry, and others of a similar nature; and in the law merchant, which is a branch of the law of nations, they are regularly and constantly adhered to. So, too, in disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there is no rule of decision but this great universal law, collected from history and usage, and from such writers of all nations and languages as are generally approved and allowed of."2

"The law of nations," says the same learned author, "is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world, in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to insure the observance of justice and good faith in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the individuals belonging to each."

Among the laws of inter-state general recognition may also be classed the laws of marriages and divorce, by which such as are valid where consummated or obtained are regarded as valid in law in all other states, unless the marriage be polygamous, incestuous, immoral, or otherwise obnoxious to the moral senses of civilization.

Also, the law which requires the movable property of a person

Black.'s Com. Book 4, 67.

Black.'s Com. Book 4, 67. Wheaton's International Law, SS 1-17; Woolsey's International Law, §§ 3-5.

32 Kent, *92; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Stephenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. 193.

4 Cheever. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108,