The question presented by the record is one that has arisen of late years, and as to which the authorities are not in accord. It is whether the seat of a member of a merchants' exchange, such as is established in the large centers of commerce, and having a constitution and rules such as usually govern these exchanges and stock exchanges in America, is a species of property which if not subject to execution by the ordinary process without the intervention of equity, may by proper proceedings on the part of a judgment-creditor be subjected to sale, and the proceeds applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment, the debtor being compelled to make the transfer and the exchange to ratify it in accordance with its rules in other cases.

The question seems to have been first considered in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on argument of a motion for a rule on a bankrupt, a member of the Chicago Board of Trade, that he assign and transfer to the assignee his certificate of membership in the board. In re Sutherland, 6 Biss. 526. The Board of Trade in that case was incorporated. Its objects were similar to those of the Merchants' Exchange of which the defendant in the case at bar is a member. As in the present case, membership conferred no pecuniary profit upon the members, except what was derived from the incidental use made of his privilege of membership by the member. Persons were admitted to membership by ballot-a vote of two-thirds being required to elect-and were liable to expulsion for a violation of the rules or dishonorable conduct. The admission was $1,000. A member in good standing might transfer his certificate to any person eligible, after ten days' notice, approved by a vote of twothirds of the directors. The selling value of the membership was $500, where buyer and seller could comply with the conditions. It was held that this membership confers no property right, represents no interest in property, and conferred privileges similar only to those given by membership of a club or lodge. As the certificate conferred nothing that the assignee could use, except by consent of others, in the absence of authority and from these supposed analogies, the learned judge determined that the bankrupt's membership cannot be treated as a portion of his assets, or pass to his assignee, and the motion was denied.

In the same year the case of Hyde v. Woods was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, 94 U. S. 523. The case was this: The San Francisco Stock and Exchange Board was a voluntary association, whose objects are expressed by its name. The members were elected by ballot and limited in number. The Constitution provided that a member on failing to perform his contracts, or becoming insolvent, may assign his seat to be sold and the proceeds to the exclusion of his outside creditors, shall be first applied for the benefit of members to whom he was indebted; the purchaser does not become a member until elected by ballot. It was held that this provision is not contrary to public policy, or to the Bankrupt Act. Judge Miller, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "There can be no doubt that the incorporal right which Fenn had to this seat when he became bank→ rupt was property, and the sum realized by the assignee ($10,000) "from its sale proves that it was valuable property. Nor do we think there can be any reason to doubt that if he had made no such assignment it would have passed, subject to the rules of the stock board to his assignee in bankruptcy; and that if there had been left in the hands of the defendants any balance after paying the debts due to the members of the board, that balance might have been recovered by the assignee."

Following this case it was held in 1877, by the New York Superior Court, Special Term, Rittenhouse v. Baggett, 4 Abb. N. C. 67, that membership in a board

or exchange, which has a money value, and is transferable, subject to the purchaser's procuring himself to be elected a member, is property, the beneficial in terest in which passes to a receiver, and that the receiver may maintain an action to compel the debtor to convey to a member elect with whom the receiver may contract for its sale. The board in question was the New York Cotton Exchange, an incorporated body. The initiation fee was $5,000. By a by-law the property could not be assigned to any one but a member or member elect. Other provisions were similar to those noted above in the San Francisco Stock Exchange.

Three years afterward the same question came up for consideration in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. It was held that a seat in the New York Stock Exchange is property which passes to an assignee in bankruptcy, and the court required the bankrupt to make the transfer. The same court had recently decided In re Gallagher, 19 N. B. R. 224, that a license to occupy certain stalls in a New York market, though revocable at the will of the city and though the city refused to recognize the rights of the assignee in bankruptcy under the general assignment, passed to the assignee under the bankrupt law; and he made an order compelling the bankrupt to make a special assignment of his license. Judge Choate in his opinion, says that the case of the seat in the stock exchange cannot be distinguished in principle from the market license case, 66 as in that case," he proceeds, "the consent of the city was necessary to a transfer, so here the consent of a committee of the stock exchange is necessary to a transfer of this right. The seat however has an actual pecuniary value, which the rules of the society, as interpreted and applied in practice, permit the holder to realize by a sale and transfer. There is no practical difficulty in effecting a transfer of this right or interest for a pecuniary consideration subject to the condition that the debts of the present holder to members are first paid; and the right or privilege is to all intents and purposes a business right or privilege, useful for business purposes only. I see nothing in the rules of the exchange which renders it impossible for the seat to be disposed of by the assignee in bankruptcy, with the co-operation of the bankrupt, subject to the conditions above mentioned." The learned judge then cites Hyde v. Woods, supra, as directly in point, and says that if In re Sutherland, supra, cannot be distinguished from Hyde v. Woods (which seems to be difficult), it is not to be followed; and that he is not satisfied with the reasoning in the Gallagher

case.

The next cases to be considered in chronological order are Thompson v. Adams, and Pancoast v. Gowan, reported in 93 Penn. St. 55 and 66. These cases decide that a seat in the Philadelphia Stock Exchange is not subject to levy or sale under an ordinary fieri facias. As to this we suppose there can be no question. The proceeds of the seat when sold, by the rules of that exchange, go, as was the case in Hyde v. Woods, supra, not to the general creditors of the bankrupt, but first to his creditors of the stock exchange. Without the intervention of equity, it is difficult to see how such property could be reached. The Pennsylvania decisions do not go so far as to hold that the seat is not property, but hold that it is not property subject to ordinary process at law.

The question is carefully considered in an opinion of the Superior Court of Cook county, Illinois, per Gardner, J., reported in 21 Am. L. Reg. 408. It is there held that certificates of membership in the Board of Trade of Chicago are property, and as such liable for the debts of the owner on a creditor's bill to subject them to the payment of his debts, and that the debtor

will be restrained from disposing of his certificate of membership, and ordered to execute a blank assignment thereof to the receiver appointed in the cause. On appeal this judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court, Barclay v. Smith, 28 Alb. L. J 175, which refers carelessly to the Pennsylvania cases cited above, and says generally that it has been referred to other cases holding a different view, but declines to review the cases, and says that it does not think they establish a correct rule, and that the Supreme Court of Illinois is not inclined to follow them.

These seem to be all the cases directly in point. To these might be added cases in which patent rights and similar interests have been subjected in equity to the payment of judgments. There can be no doubt that the weight of authority is, that the seat of a member in a stock board or merchants' exchange is a species of property not subject to ordinary execution, but which may be reached by equity processes in such a way as to respect the rules of the exchange and the rights of all parties interested, and at the same time by proceedings in aid of the execution, to compel an insolvent member to transfer his seat under the rules of the board, and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the debt of his judgment creditor. And this seems to be the view which has the strongest arguments in support of it. The law upon the subject, as deduced from an attempt to reconcile the cases with a view to the facts and circumstances of each case, seems to be well set out by a recent text-writer whose treatise on stock brokers and stock exchanges is a valuable contribution to the learning of the profession upon a subject as to which nothing of importance had hitherto been done toward collecting and reviewing the decisions upon the subject, scattered through the volumes of reports in England and at home. Dos Passos on Stock Brokers, 96.

We are of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed, and that no objection can be reasonably made to the sale by the sheriff under the decree, acting under the order of the court in a proceeding such as the one before us, to which the exchange as well as the insolvent member whose certificate is to be sold, are both parties.

With the concurrence of all the judges, the judgment is affirmed.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

DECEMBER 3, 1883.

PAYMENT OF CLAIM AGAINST GOVERNMENT TO ATTORNEY IN FACT VALID.-Payment to an attorney in fact, constituted such by power of attorney executed by the claimants before the allowance of their claim by Congress or by the proper department, is good as between the government and such claimants, where the power of attorney has not been revoked at the time payment is made, notwithstanding the provisions of the act of July 29, 1846, entitled "An act in relation to the payment of claims," and the act of February 26, 1853, entitled "An act to prevent frauds upon the treasury of the United States." 9 Stat. 41, and 10 id. 170. In United States v. Gilliss, 95 U. S. 414, it was ruled that a claim against the United States could not be assigned so as to enable the assignee to bring suit against the government in his own name in the Court of claims. In Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484, the question was as to the validity of certain orders drawn by a claimant, before the allowance of his claim, upon the attorneys having it in charge, directing the latter to pay certain sums out of the proceeds when collected, and which orders being accepted by the attorneys, were purchased by Spofford in good faith and for

value. Upon the treasury warrant being issued, the claimant refused to admit the validity either of the orders he had given or the acceptance made by his attorneys. Thereupon Spofford sought by suit against the claimant and his attorneys, to enforce a compli ance with the orders and acceptances of which he had become assignee and holder. The court adjudged that the transfer or assigument to Spofford was under the act of 1853-carried into the Revised Statutes, § 3477a nullity as between him and the claimant. No question arose in that case as to what would have been the effect upon the rights of the claimant had the officers of the government recognized the assignment to Spofford. In Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392, it was ruled that the act of 1853 applied to cases of voluntary assignments of demands against the government, and did not embrace cases where the title is transferred by operation of law. "The passing of claims to heirs, devisees, or assignees in bankruptcy," said the court, "are not within the evil at which the statute aimed." But what was said in Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 559, seems to be more directly in point. That was the case of a voluntary assignment by a debtor of his property for the benefit of creditors, including his rights, credits, effects, and estate of every description. The assignment embraced a claim of the assignor arising under a contract with the United States. It was adjudged in the court of original jurisdiction, that as to that claim the assigument was rendered invalid by the act of 1853. But the language of this court was: "It is understood that the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer under the pressure of the strong language of the opinion in Spofford v. Kirk. We do not think however that the circumstances of the present case bring it within the one then under consideration, or the principles there laid down. That was a case of the transfer or assignment of a part of a disputed claim, then in controversy, and it was clearly within all the mischiefs designed to be remedied by the statute. Those mischiefs, as laid down in that opinion, and in the others referred to, are mainly two: 1. The danger that the rights the government might be embarrassed by having to deal with several persons instead of one, and by the introduction of a party who was a stranger to the original transaction; 2. That by a transfer of such a claim against the government to one or more persons not originally interested in it, the way might be conveniently opened to such improper influences in prosecuting the claim before the departments, the courts or the Congress, as desperate cases, where the reward is contingent ou success, so often suggest." 'But these considerations," the court proceeded to say, "as well as a careful examination of the statute, leave no doubt that its sole purpose was to protect the government and not the parties to the assignment." Baily v. United States. Opinion by Harlan, J.

PROBATE LAW-ADMINISTRATOR DE BONIS NON MAY NOT SUE HIS PREDECESSOR.-Under the act of Congress of February 20, 1846, the same rule is applied in District of Columbia to the case of an administrator de bonis non succeeding a removed administrator, and to that of one succeeding a deceased administrator, in respect to actions upon the administration bond. No suit lies in favor of the administrator de bonis non on the bond of the preceding administrator to recover moneys collected by such preceding administrator upon a claim held by the estate of the decedent. On the contrary, the surety on the bond of the removed administrator is liable only at the suit of creditors, distributees, and legatees entitled to the funds. It is well settled at common law that "the title of an administrator de bonis non extends only to the goods and personal estate, such as leases for years, household goods, etc., which remain in specie and were not administered by the first executor or administrator, as

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also to all debts due and owing to the testator or intestate." Bacon's Abr., Title Executors and Administrators, B. 2, 2, citing Packman's case, 6 Coke, 19. In illustration of this rule the same authority says: "It is holden that if an executor receives money in right of the testator, and lays it up by itself, and dies intestate, that this money shall go to the administrator de bonis non, being as easily distinguished as part of the testator's effects, as goods in specie. "But if A. dies intestate, and his son takes out administration to him and receives part of a debt, being rent arrear to the intestate, and accepts promissory note for the residue, and then dies intestate, this acceptance of the note is such an alteration of the property as vests it in the son; and therefore on his death it shall go to his administrator, and not to the administrator de bonis non." An administrator de bonis non derives his title from the deceased, and not from the former executor or administrator. To him is committed only the administration of the goods, chattels, and credits of the deceased which have not been administered. He is entitled to all the goods and personal estate which remain in specie. Money received by the former executor or administrator, in his character as such, and kept by itself will be so regarded, but if mixed with the administator's own money it is considered as connected, or as technically speaking, "administered." Beal v. New Mexico, 16 Wall. 535; Wernick's Adm'r v. McMurdo, 5 Randolph, 51; Bank of Penn. v. Haldeman, 1 Pen. & W. 161; Kendall v. Lee, Potts v. Smith, 3 Rawle, 361; Bell v. Spaight, 11 Humph. 451; Swink v. Suodgrass, 17 Ala. 653; Slaughter v. Froman, 5 B. Mour. 19; Gamble v. Hamilton, 7 Mo. 469; Adams v. Johnson, 7 Blatchf. 529. In Beal v. New Mexico, 16 Wall. 535 it was said by this court, that "by the English law, as administered by the ecclesiastical courts, the administrator who is displaced, or the representative of a deceased administrator or executor intestate, is required to account directly to the persons beneficially interested in the estate-distributees, next of kin, or creditors-and the accounting may be made or enforced in the Probate Court, which is the proper court to supervise the conduct of administrators and executors. To the administrator de bonis non is committed only the administration of the goods, chattels, and credits of the deceased which have not been administered." United States v. Walker. Opinion by Woods, J.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-SUIT ON BOND OF UNITED STATES MARSHAL- CONFLICT OF LAW.- (1) A suit against United States marshal and his sureties held a suit upon his official bond and removable to the Federal court as a suit arising under a law of the United States. Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 How. 29; Gwin v. Barton, 6 id. 7. In McKee v. Rains, 10 Wall. 22, the removal of which was held to be unlawful, was made under the supposed authority of the act of March 3, 1863, and that of April 9, 1866. (2) A seizure

by a marshal under the Federal Bankruptcy Act is not governed by the law of the State in reference to seizures under execution. Feibelman v. Packard. Opinion by Matthews, J.

negligence of himself or his servants. The fundamental principle which is applicable is stated in Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, as follows: "First, a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility, when such exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law; second, it is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself or his servants." (2) When a thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. Scott v. Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596; Transp. Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Rose v. Stephens Trausp. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 438. (3) A clause in a bill of lading which provides that the carrier who is legally liable for any damage shall have the benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon the damaged goods, is not an unreasonable and unjust exemption from liability for negligence, and may be enforced. Hall v. Railroad Co., 13 Wall. 367; Hart v. Railroad Co., 13 Metc. 99; Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calebs, 20 N. Y. 173; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co., 25 Conn. 265. U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, August 24, 1883. Rintoul v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. Opinion by Shipman, J.

DOWER

EQUITABLE DOWER-LAND PURCHASED FOR FIRM-CONVEYANCE TO A PORTION OF PARTNERS. -Under the Revised Statutes of New York a widow is not entitled to equitable dower except in lands of which the husband was equitably seised at the time of his death, and has no interest in contracts of purchase which the husband aliened in his life-time; nor has she any inchoate dower unless the husband have a valid and recognizable equitable estate. Where four out of six members of the firm of W. A. R. & Co. contributed the consideration for the purchase of valuable real estate which was afterward used in the firm business, and the title, by the arrangement and concurrence of the four associates, was taken for convenience in the name of W. A. R. only, and the rents for many years were divided ratably among the four, according to their contributions of the purchase-money, until the bankruptcy of all of them, when the property was transferred, first to a voluntary assignee and afterward to the assignee in bankruptcy, held, that under the New York Revised Statutes, the other three associates had no recognizable equitable estate in the property, and that their wives had no inchoate right of dower therein. also, that if the associates were regarded as partners in a particular purchase, still the property would be treated as personalty not subject to dower. In Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 318, 452, 453, it was held by the chancellor that by these provisions of the Revised Statutes the legislature "distinctly adopted the principle permitting the widow to receive equitable dower in the descendible equitable interests of the husband in the real estate which belonged to him at the time of his death;" but not as "against a grantee to whom the husband aliened it in his life-time." Hawley v.

Held

it was held that a widow was not entitled to dower in lands held under a contract of purchase, where the husband had aliened his interest in the contract prior to his death. In Church v. Church, 3 Sandf. Ch. 434, where equitable dower was allowed, the husband had died in possession of certain real estate, seven-eighths of which he had purchased at the master's sale, for which he paid the consideration, but never ob

tained a deed. See also Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 478. The recent case of Hurst v. Harper, 14 Hun, 280, involved essentially the same question, and it was there held that the person who paid the consideration acquired no equitable estate in the premises; and upon this view of the case no right of dower can be sustained. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York, June 28, 1883. Matter of Ransom. Opinion by Brown, J.

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MARITIME LAW-ACTION FOR DEATH SURVIVES IN ADMIRALTY.-An action for damages for the loss of a human life, caused by a maritime tort, survives in admiralty. That the cause of action does survive in admiralty has been hinted and doubted for fifty years. See Plummer v. Webb, 1 Ware, 75. But the first perpendicular decision was rendered by Chief Justice Chase on the Circuit in the case of The Sea Gull, Chase Dec. 145. The collision in that case may have been within the body of a country, but the report does not show it, nor does that fact cut any figure in the case. The court held that "the rule that personal actions die with the person is peculiar to the common law, traceable to the feudal system and its forfeitures, and does not obtain in admiralty;" and that husband can recover by a proceeding in rem against the vessel which caused the death of his wife for the injury suffered by him thereby." This decision has been cited and followed in the following cases, which I have examined: The Highland Light, Chase, Dec. 150; The Towanda, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 384; The Garland, 5 Fed. Rep. 924; The Harrisburg, 15 id. 610; The Charles Morgan, 18 Law Reg. 624. See also Holmes v. O. & C. Ry. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 75; In re Long Island Transp. Co., id. 599. That the action does not survive has been held expressly in The Sylvan Glen, 9 Fed. Rep. 335, and this present case, 16 id. 255, which are the only late cases to this effect found. U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Louisiana, June, 1883. The E. B. Ward. Opinion by Pardee, J.

MARITIME LAW-SALVAGE-CORPORATION.-An in. corporated company, organized for the purpose of en. gaging in the meritorious work of saving ships in distress, and devoting themselves diligently to that pursuit, may be granted salvage award as liberally as natural persons so engaged. U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Virginia, July 2, 1883. The Egypt. Opinion by Hughes, J.

TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-CONVEYANCE TO HUSBAND AND WIFE.-At the common law a conveyance to husband and wife, as such, made them tenants by entirety, and neither could dispose of the estate thus conveyed without the consent of the other; but upon the death of either, the survivor was the sole owner of it. 2 Blackst. Com. 182; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 424; 2 Kent Com. 132; 1 Bish. Mar. Wom., § 613; Den. v. Hardenberg, 18 Am. Dec. 371 (5 Hall, 42); Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa, 305. U. S. Cir. Ct., Oregon, August 8, 1883. Myers v. Reed. Opinion by Deady, J

CHATTEL MORTGAGE- TITLE UNDER- EFFECT OF TENDER TO DISCHARGE LIEN-DEBT NOT DISCHARGED -SURETYSHIP.-A mortgage of personal property is a sale of the property by way of securing a debt, with a condition that if the mortgagor pays the debt the sale shall be void; a pledge contains no words of sale, but an authority, if the debt is not paid, to sell the pledge for that purpose. In the former case the title passes to the mortgagee; in the latter, the title remains in the pledgor, although possession is given to the pledgee. At common law a tender of the debt on the law-day satisfies the condition of the mortgage, and discharges the property from the incumbrance as effectually as payment, but the debt remains, and may be recovered by action at law. "If A. borroweth a hundred pound of B., and after inortgageth land to B. upon condition for payment thereof, if A. tender the

money to B. and he refuseth it, A. may enter into the land, and the land is freed forever of the condition. but yet the debt remaineth, and may be recovered by action of debt." Harg. Co. Lit., 209 b., § 338. And upon this point the current of authorities is unbroken from Lord Coke's time to the present. Jones Mort., §§ 886, 891. Schearff v. Dodge, 33 Ark. 346. But the general rule is that at common law a tender of the mortgage debt after breach of the condition does not operate as a discharge of the mortgage. The ground of this rule is that upon failure to pay at the specified day, according to condition of the mortgage, the mortgagee's title at law becomes absolute, and he can. not be required to accept the tender and restore the property. It is true that after breach of the condition the mortgagor has in equity a right to redeem, but the only effect of a tender after that time is to stop interest and protect from cost so long as it is kept good. Jones Mort., $$ 9, 892; Jones Chat. Mort., § 632; Whart. Cont., § 972; Rowell v. Mitchell, 68 Me. 21; Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493; Currier v. Gale, 9 Allen, 522; Holman v. Bailey, 3 Metc. 55; Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J. Law, 496; Story v. Krewson, 55 Ind. 397; Perre v. Castro, 14 Cal. 519; Himmelmann v. Fitzpatrick, 50 id. 650. But upon this point the authorities are not quite uniform. In New York, Michigan and New Hampshire a tender of payment, after maturity of a debt, has the same effect as a tender on the law-day, and releases the lien of a mortgage given to secure it. Whart. Cont., § 972: Jones Mortg., § 893; Kortwright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343; Edwards v. Ins. Co., 21 Wend. 467; Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; Potts v. Plaisted, 30 id. 149; Swett v. Horn, 1 N. H. 332; Robinson v. Leavitt, 7 id. 73. A debt payable in money is never discharged by a tender. It is only where a debt is payable in specific articles of personal property that a tender operates as a satisfaction of the demand. In such cases, a tender properly made discharges the debt and the articles tendered become the property of the creditor and afterward are kept at his risk and expense. Barney v. Bliss, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 399; S. C., 12 Am. Dec. 696; Sheldon v. Skinner, 4 Wend. 525; S. C., 21 Am. Dec. 161; Lamb v. Lathrop, 13 Wend. 95; S. C., 27 Am. Dec. 174, and note. The pledgee may therefore, notwithstanding the tender, have his action at law against the debtor for his debt; for while the tender extinguishes the lien and renders the further possession of the pledgee tortious, it does not relieve the debtor from personal Bailliability to pay the debt. Bacon's Abr.. tit. " ment, B.;" Edw. Bailm., § 230; Story Bailm., § 341; Jones Mortg., § 893; Jones' Chat. Mort., § 7; Kortwright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 348; Moynahan v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9; Potts v. Plaisted, 30 Mich. 149. Where the owner of property pledges it for the debt of another, he is to be treated as standing in the relation of a surety. Edwards Bailm., § 302; King v. Baldwin, 2 Johns. Ch. 554; S. C., 17 Johns. 384; Strong v. Wooster, 6 Vt. 536; Ingalls v. Morgan, 10 N. Y. 178; Eddy v. Traver, 6 Paige, 521. And it is well settled that if the principal debtor, after the maturity of his debt, tenders the amount due to the creditor and he refuses to receive it, the surety is discharged. Brandt, Suretyship, § 295: Sears v. Van Dusen, 25 Mich. 351: Joslyn v. Eastman, 46 Vt. 258; Curiac v. Packard, 29 Cal. 194. And when property of any kind is mortgaged or pledged by the owner to secure the debt of another, such property occupies the position of surety, and whatever will discharge a surety will discharge such property. Brandt, Suretyship, §§ 21, 22; Christuer v. Brown, 16 Iowa, 130; Rowan v. Sharps' Rifle, etc., Co., 33 Conn. 1; Union Bank v. Goven, 10 Smedes & M. 333; White v. Ault, 19 Ga. 551. U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Arkansas. April, 1883. Mitchell v. Roberts. Opinion by Caldwell, J.