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to have found, and to have used authorities, ample and concurrent. These are cited most conveniently for the reader, who is urged to read them for himself. No one can study this argument as a whole and not be impressed with its consistency in itself, and if this argument is founded on authority, then the epoch made by the books already referred to have already expired, and an epoch-making book of great labor, and erudition has come out on this side of the Atlantic, where it is supposed the highest scholarship has not yet taken root. There is no pedantry or dogmatism in the work. The tone of the book is modest, the style of the writer is clear and simple, and the arrangement of the reading matter admirable. In printing and binding, the book for its purpose is perfect as books of profound learning ought to be, but rarely THOMAS FENTON TAYLOR.

are.

CHAMPERTOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

KANSAS SUPREME COURT, JANUARY TERM, 1883. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY V. JOHNSON.*

J., who had a claim for personal injury against a railroad company, agreed with an attorney employed to bring suit, that the attorney should receive a certain portion of the damages recovered for his services. Suit was brought and judgment recovered, and the agreed portion of the judgment was assigned in writing by J. to her attorney. Of all this the railroad company had notice. Afterward the railroad company and J.settled, and J. discharged the judgment. Held, that the contract between J. and her attorney was champertous, and the company was not liable to the attorney for the amount of his claim under the judgment.

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W. R. Brown, J. H. Smith, and A. R. Clark, for defendant in error.

VALENTINE, J. It appears from the record in this case, that on January 11, 1878, Nancy C. Johnson was injured by a fall, which she experienced while attempting to step from one of the cars of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company to the ground, at Raymond, Kansas. Afterward, and prior to April 11, 1878, Mrs. Johnson entered into a parol contract with J. H. Smith and C. T. Daniels, as follows: Smith and Daniels were to commence and prosecute an action in her name against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, to recover damages for the said injuries. They were to pay all the expenses of the prosecution, and in consideration for their services and expenditures were to receive either one-half of the amount of the judgment to be recovered, or a portion of such judgment amounting to $2,000; and Mrs. Johnson, on her part, was to receive either the other half of such judgment, or the excess of the judgment over and above the amount of $2,000. As to which had the option in determining how the judgment should be finally divided when recovered, the record does not clearly show Afterward, and on April 11, 1878, Smith and Daniels, in pursuance of their contract with Mrs. Johnson, commenced an action in the District Court of Rice

*Appearing in 29 Kansas Reports.

county, in the name of Uriah D. Johnson and Nancy C. Johnson, against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company to recover for said injuries; but they afterward so amended their petition as to make Mrs. Johnson the sole plaintiff in the case. The action was afterward tried by the court and a jury, and on February 4, 1880, judgment was rendered in the case, in favor of Mrs. Johnson and against the railroad company, for the sum of $3,450. The defendant railroad company took proper exceptions to the various rulings of the court during the trial, and also moved for a judgment in its favor upon the verdict and findings of the jury, and also moved for a new trial; which motions were overruled by the court, to which rulings the defendant duly excepted. The de fendant then made a case for the Supreme Court, which case was duly served, settled, sigued and au thenticated, and was duly filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court of Rice county. On March 22, 1880, Mrs. Johnson, in consideration of her previous parol contract with Smith and Daniels, and of the services rendered by them in the case, and of money expended by them in the prosecution of the case, duly executed the following assigument to Smith and Daniels, to-wit:

"For and in consideration of the sum of five hundred dollars, to me in hand paid, and legal services for me performed, by J. H. Smith and C. T. Daniels, I do hereby sell and assign to the said J. H. Smith and C. T. Daniels an interest of two thousand (2,000) dollars in a judgment of $3,450, in my favor and against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, in the District Court of Rice county; and I do authorize the said Smith and Daniels to reserve the said sum out of the said judgment, when they may collect the same; or I do authorize the clerk of the District Court to pay them that sum, and interest at seven per cent on the same from January 6, 1880.

"NANCY C. JOHNSON."

On July 19, 1880, Mrs. Johnson and the railroad company settled and compromised all their disputes, and Mrs. Johnson executed the following release, towit:

"Judgment $3,450.-$575.-For and in consideration of the sum of five hundred and seventy-five dollars, to me in hand paid by the defendants in the above action, I do hereby acknowledge a full release, discharge and satisfaction of the above judgment and costs, and do direct, authorize and request the clerk of said court to enter, upon the judgment docket of said court a full release, discharge and satisfaction of the same.

"NANCY C. JOHNSON."

The judgment, as it appears in the records of the District Court of Rice county, was duly entered satisfied; and this release was attached to the judg

ment.

It is admitted by the parties that the railroad company had notice of the original parol contract between Mrs. Johnson and Smith and Daniels; but whether the railroad company had any notice or knowledge of the assignment made by Mrs. Johnson to Smith and Daniels is a disputed question of fact. We shall say more with reference to this question hereafter.

Afterward, and on July 22, 1880, Mrs. Johnson, at the instance of Smith and Daniels, executed the following revocation of said release, to-wit:

"I, Nancy C. Johnson, do hereby declare that the foregoing instrument, purporting to be a release and satisfaction of the foregoing judgment, was only intended as a release of fourteen hundred and fifty dollars, and interest on the same at seven per cent since the rendition of said judgment; that the remainder of said judgment, two thousand dollars, was assigned to

J. H. Smith and C. T. Daniels for services rendered and money advanced by them on the 22d day of March, 1880; and that I had no authority to settle or compromise their said interest in the said judgment, and did not intend to include their interest in the said release. "NANCY C. JOHNSON."

This revocation was also attached to the judgment, as it appears in the records of the District Court of Rice county.

The great preponderance of the evidence, if not the entire evidence, shows that Mrs. Johnson, when she entered into the contract of settlement with the railroad company, and when she signed said release, intended to include the entire judgment, and to release the entire judgment without any reference whatever to any supposed interests which Smith and Daniels might have had in the judgment. Indeed, we think it may be said that there was no competent or legitimate evidence to the contrary. But whether she could make such a settlement, and execute a valid release of the entire judgment, including Smith's and Daniel's supposed interests therein, is one of the principal questions involved in the case, and is really the only question in this connection. Nothing further was done in the case by either party, or by any person, until May 27, 1881.

On May 10, 1881, section 556 of the Civil Code was so amended, by an act of the Legislature, which then took effect, that no proceeding to reverse, vacate or modify any judgment or final order of the District Court could thereafter be commenced in the Supreme Court, unless the same was begun within one year after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the final order. This statute, by its terms, had the effect to bar and abrogate the then existsng right of the defendant railroad company to take the case to the Supreme Court.

On May 27, 1881, Smith and Daniels made a motion, in the District Court of Rice county, in the name of Mrs. Johnson, to vacate and set aside her said release and satisfaction of said judgment to the extent of $2,000, and that execution be awarded on such judgment for that amount. At the June Term of the District Court, 1881, this motion came on for hearing, and the defendant objected to the hearing of the motion, and to the introduction of any evidence in support thereof, upon the ground that the matters and things set forth therein were not properly determinable by the court upon motion, but should be determined only by a jury upon proper suit brought and upon issues properly joined upon petition and answer, which objection was overruled by the court, and the defendant duly excepted. The motion was then heard by the court, without a jury, upon written and oral evidence; and upon such hearing the court sustained the motion, and ordered that the satisfaction of the judgment previously made and entered should be vacated and set aside to the amount of $2,000, and that execution for that amount, and for costs, be awarded against the railroad company; to which order of the court the defendant duly excepted, and then moved for a new trial and a rehearing, which motion for a new trial and rehearing was overruled, to which ruling the defendant again excepted. The defendant then made a case for the Supreme Court, which case was duly served, settled, signed and authenticated, and the defendant now, as plaintiff in error, brings the case to this court, and asks that the said order of the District Court be vacated and reversed.

There are many questions involved in this case, some of which are difficult to be determined, though many of them we think are easy of solution.

That Mrs. Johnson's judgment was valid and binding as against the railroad company up to the time

when she and the railroad company made their settlement, we think there can be no question; for the judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, which at the time had jurisdiction of all the parties and of the subject-matter of the action; and the judgment remained valid and unsatisfied and unreversed up to the time when such settlement was made. No champertous contract on the part of Mrs. Johnson and her attorneys could have the effect to destroy Mrs. Johnson's right to prosecute the action to judgment, and to enforce such judgment against the railroad company. Allison v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 275; Courtright v. Burns, 14 Cent. L. J. 89. Also, except for the interest which Smith and Daniels are supposed to have had in Mrs. Johnson's claim and judgment against the railroad company, she and the railroad company had the incontrovertible right at all times to settle and compromise all their disputes, and finally to have the judgment rendered between them released, satisfied and discharged, and wholly annulled, and to do so in the very manner in which, and for the very consideration for which, all these things were attempted to be done by them. This we think necessarily follows from the decisions heretofore made by this court in the cases of Walrath v. Walrath, 27 Kans. 395, 399, and Clay v. Hoysradt, 8 id. 74. See also Read v. Hibbard, 6 Wis. 175. The question then arises: Could Mrs. Johnson and the railroad company so settle their affairs and so release, satisfy and discharge said judgment, that the settlement and discharge would be valid and binding upon all parties, including Smith and Daniels, notwithstanding the supposed interest which Smith and Daniels claimed to have in the judgment? This question involves many others: Was the original contract between Mrs. Johnson and Smith and Daniels champertous and void? And if so, did it render the subsequent contract between them, assigning an interest of $2,000 in the judgment to Smith and Daniels, void? Or was this subsequent contract itself champertous and void? Can the railroad company raise these questions of champerty as against Smith and Daniels? and can it do so in the manner in which it attempted to do so in the present case? Can a judgment be divided, and a portion thereof be assigned to a third person, and the other portion be retained by the judgment creditor? Can this be done, either with or without the consent of the judgment debtor? Had the railroad company, at the time it settled with Mrs. Johnson and at the time the release of the judgment was made and entered, any notice of the assignment of the $2,000 interest in the judgment to Smith and Daniels? Is a notice, merely in parol, sufficient in such a case, or must the notice be in writing? And did the railroad company ever consent to, or ratify, any such assignment?

The question whether the railroad company had any notice of the assignment by Mrs. Johnson to Smith and Daniels was at the time of the hearing of the motion, and still is, a disputed question of fact. The question however was submitted to the court below principally upon oral testimony; and this testimony was very conflicting and so evenly balanced as to make it very difficult to determine upon which side the preponderance existed; and the court below found in favor of Smith and Daniels, and against the railroad company; and therefore we must now hold, for the purposes of the case, that the railroad company had notice of the assignment. This supposed notice was given some time after the assignment was made, and at most, was given only in parol; and therefore the further question arises: Is a notice in parol sufficient in such a case?

It would perhaps be proper here to state that Smith and Daniels do not claim to have, or to be entitled to

any attorneys' lieu in the case; and therefore the question as to what kind of notice should be given in order to enforce an attorney's lien does not enter into this case. Smith and Daniels rely simply and solely upon the assignment made by Mrs. Johnson to them of the $2,000 interest in the judgment, and upon the knowledge which it is claimed the railroad company had of such assignment, and of the supposed assent which it is claimed the railroad company gave to such assignment. There is no sufficient evidence however upon which to found any just supposition that the railroad company ever assented to such assignment in any such manner as to make it binding upon the company, if such assent were at all necessary to make it binding upon the company. For the purposes of the case, we must suppose that the railroad company had knowledge of the assignment after it was made; and Smith and Daniels testified that one of the defendant's attorneys said to them at one or more times, that he would give them $2,500 to settle the judgment with 'Mrs. Johnson; and that they could thereby make $2,000 clear; that they told him that they had an interest in the judgment; that he said that he understood that, that it was all right, and that he did not care who got the $2,500; that he would just as soon give the money to Smith and Daniels as to Mrs. Johnson; and asked if they would take $1,600 for their interest. But there was no evidence introduced tending to show that the railroad company, or any of its attorneys or agents, ever assented to the judgment itself, or to any portion thereof, or ever agreed to pay any thing thereon, except by way of settlement and compromise. At the time when this conversation occurred, the railroad company was preparing to take the case to the Supreme Court, and did not abandon the intention of doing so until after the settlement was made with Mrs. Johnson. There is still another question involved in this case; back and behind all the foregoing questions, there still exists the question: Did the court below have jurisdiction to hear and determine all the questions involved in the controversy between Smith and Daniels on the one side, and the railroad company on the other, against the consent of the railroad company, upon nothing but a bare, simple motion? Upon the side of the plaintiff in error, see McDonald v. Falvey, 18 Wis. 571; and on the side of the defendant in error, see Wilson v. Stilwell, 14 Ohio St. 464; Laughlin v. Fairbanks, 8 Mo. 367.

It must be remembered however that Smith and Daniels were not parties to this judgment, and that the entire judgment was not assigned to them; hence authorities holding that a party to the judgment, or an assignee of the entire judgment, may have an erroneous satisfaction of the judgment set aside and vacated on motion, have but little application to this case. But passing over all other questions for the present and to the main and principal question-the one that involves the merits of this case was the original contract entered into between Mrs. Johnson, and Smith and Daniels, champertous and void? We think this question must necessarily be answered in the affirmative. It has every element of champerty in it. It was prosecuted for a portion of the expected judgment, and for no other consideration; and Smith and Daniels agreed to pay all the costs and expenses necessary to be paid in such prosecution. This makes the contract unquestionably champertous. Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487; Adye v. Hanna, 47 id. 264; Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389; S. C., 5 Am. Rep. 586; Low v. Hutchinson, 37 Me. 196; Weakly v. Hall, 13 Ohio, 167; Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 117; Coquillard v. Beargs, 21 id. 479; Lafferty v. Jelly, 22 id. 471; Greenman v. Cohee, 61 id. 201; Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 51; Moody v. Harper, 38 Miss. 601; Copley v. Lambeth, 1 La. Ann. 316; 7 Wait's Act, and Def. 73 to 76.

Authorities may be found, holding that a contract between an attorney and his client for a purely contingent fee, or a contract of purchase and sale between an attorney and his client of an interest in tangible property adversely claimed, or adversely held by some third person, which property is then, or is likely to be the subject of litigation, is not a champertous contract; but such authorities have no application to this case. For the purposes of this case we shall assume that such authorities are correct, and that'such contracts are not champertous. The contract in the present case was that the attorneys should commence and prosecute the present action, at their own cost and expense, and for no other consideration than merely a portion of the judgment to be recovered; and the assignment in the present case was simply a reducing to writing the terms of the original champertous contract.

The assignment was for no other or additional consideration than the original champertous contract, and the services rendered and the money expended under and in pursuance of such original champertous contract; and the relations between Mrs. Johnson and Smith and Daniels were therefore no better and no worse after the assignment was made than they were before. The assignment was therefore like the original champertous contract, simply champertous and void; and Mrs. Johnson had at all times an absolute right to treat it as champertous and void. She had the right to collect the entire judgment, unless the railroad company took the case to the Supreme Court to have the judgment reversed, or she had the right to compromise and settle all her disputes with the railroad company, and to release and discharge the entire judg ment, as she did. She in fact had an absolute and unqualified right to do as she pleased with the judgment, and this notwithstanding the champertous claim of Smith and Daniels to a portion of the judgment. The mere fact that both she and the railroad company had knowledge of the assignment could not affect her right to dispose of the judgment as she pleased, and to whom she pleased; and Smith and Daniels had no legal right to interpose any objection, or to raise any question, or to make any complaint with reference to any disposition which she might make of the judgment; and this being so, it necessarily follows that after the railroad company settled and compromised all its disputes with Mrs. Johnson, and after obtaining a full and complete release and discharge of the judgment, it also had the right, the same as Mrs. Johnson had, to treat the assignment to Smith and Daniels as a nullity. Suppose that Mrs. Johnson had enforced the collection of every cent of her judgment-and the champertous contract between herself and her attorneys would not have prevented her from doing so - then could her attorneys collect $2,000 more from the defendant? After she had collected the whole of her judgment, would not the defendant be released? And if so, why could she not compromise the matter and take a portion of the judgment? and certainly so while the judgment had not yet become an absolute finality? We have already stated, that as against the rights of Mrs. Johnson, the railroad company had no right to set up as a defense the champertous contract between herself and her attorneys, for she, at all times and on all occasions, had the right to treat the champertous contract as null and void, and to recover on her own account the whole of her claim; but as against Mrs. Johnson, the railroad company had and now has the right to interpose the compromise and settlement and the release and discharge of the judgment, as a full and complete defense to all claims which she might at any time set up against the railroad company. There is no pretense upon the evidence that any fraud was practiced on Mrs. Johnson in procuring the compromise, or settlement, or discharge, or release of the judgment. She

had full knowledge of all the facts, and with such knowledge voluntarily made such compromise and settlement and release and discharge; and this, at a time when the judgment had not yet, from lapse of time or from any other cause, become absolutely final, but was still subject to be taken to the Supreme Court for further adjudication. Hence, although the railroad company cannot, as against Mrs. Johnson, interpose the defense of champerty, yet it can, as against her, interpose the defense that all matters of difference between them have been legally compromised and settled, and the judgment absolutely and wholly discharged. But as against Smith and Daniels, we think the railroad company can interpose the defense of champerty. They are attempting to enforce the champertous contract, and not merely to ignore it, as Mrs. Johnson has done, and as she would do, in a contest between her and the railroad company, provided the railroad company had attempted to set up such a defense as against her. Probably they could not enforce their champertous contract anywhere or against any person or corporation; but they certainly cannot enforce it against the defendant, under the present circumstances. Mrs. Johnson we think had the unquestionable right to treat the contract between herself and her attorneys as champertous and void; and the railroad company, by compromising and settling all their disputes with her and obtaining a release and discharge

Daniel's motion in the name of Mrs. Johnson is an equitable proceeding, it is not necessary for us now to decide.

There are some other questions involved in this case, not yet decided; but we do not think that it is necessary to decide them now.

The order of the court below sustaining the said motion will be reversed.

Horton, C. J., concurring.
Brewer, J., dissenting.

NUISANCE NOT INJURIOUS TO HEALTH.

ENGLISH HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN'S BENCH
DIVISION, DECEMBER 8, 1882.

LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH OF BISHOP AUCKLAND
V. BISHOP AUCKLAND IRON Co., 48 L. T.
Rep. (N. S.) 223.

An English statute provides that "any accumulation or de-
posit which is a nuisance or injurious to health shall be
deemed to be a nuisance, liable to be dealt with summa-
rily."

Held, that an accumulation destructive of the personal comfort of the neighborhood came within the section although not injurious to health.

of the judgment from her, has succeeded to all her PROCEEDINGS against the Bishop Auckland Iron

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and Steel Company for maintaining a nuisance, namely "an accumulation or deposit of cinders, ashes and refuse." It was shown on the hearing that other cinders and ashes in question were continually smoldering, and from them were thrown off in large quantities fumes or effluvia. It appeared that this effluvium was not injurious to health. The court below asked as a question of law this: "Was it necessary to prove not only that a nuisance was caused by the effluvia in question, but also that such nuisance was injurious to the health of the inhabitants of the district?"

The following statutes and sections became material in the course of the argument:

The eighth section of the Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act, 1855, is:

rights. If she had the right to set up the defense of champerty, as against Smith and Daniels, then the railroad company, which has succeeded to her rights, undoubtedly has the same right. But probably Smith and Daniels could not enforce their champertous contract against any person or in any proceeding. Smith and Daniels, in their brief, have suggested that champerty must be pleaded. This is probably generally true, though several courts have held otherwise: Greenman v. Cohee, 61 Ind. 201; Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Humph.(Tenn.) 379; Morrison v. Deaderick, 10 Humph. 342; Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 131, 143. In the present case however there was no fair opportunity for setting up the defense in any formal pleading. Smith and Daniels are attempting to enforce their claim by a mere motion; and it is very rare that an answer in the nature of a pleading is allowed to be filed to a mere motion; but every defense that may be allowed in the particular case is usually allowed as against the motion, without the adverse party's filing any pleading. Probably Smith and Daniels should have prosecuted "Any person who in any urban district (1) keeps any their claim by a regular action; and then formal plead-swine or pigsty in any dwelling-house, or so as to be a ings would necessarily have been required from every nuisance to any person * * *shall for every such party who wished to set up any cause of action or any offense be liable to a penalty, etc." defense. But they did not choose to prosecute their claim by the commencement of a formal action, but chose rather to prosecute the same by a mere motion, and in the name of Mrs. Johnson; and hence they had no right to require the defendant to file a formal answer to their motion. We think the defendant had the right to interpose the defense of champerty in the manner in which it did in the present case.

The plaintiff in error, defendant below, raises the further question that a judgment cannot be so divided that a portion thereof may be assigned to a third person, and the other portion retained by the judgment creditor; and cites, as authority therefor: Love v. Fairfield, 13 Mo. 300; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 286; and Freeman on Judgments, § 424. We suppose that a portion of a judgment cannot be assigned at law, but that it may be assigned in equity: or, in other words, we suppose that a portion of a judgment cannot be assigned so as to be enforced in a mere legal proceeding, but that it can be assigned so as to be enforced in equity wherever it is equitable that the same shall be enforced. Whether Smith and

8. The word "nuisances" under this act shall include * ** any accumulation or deposit which is a nuisance or injurious to health.

The Public Health Act, 1875, contains these provisions:

"For the purposes of this act * * * (4) any accumulation or deposit which is a nuisance or injurious to health* * * shall be deemed to be nuisances, liable to be dealt with summarily in manner provided by this act."

"Where any candle-house, melting-house, melting place, or soap-house, or any slaughter-house, or any building or place for boiling offal or blood, or for boiling, burning or crushing bones, or any manufactory, building, or place used for any trade, business, process or manufacture causing effluvia, is certified to any urban sanitary authority by their medical officer of health, or by any two legally qualified medical practitioners, or by any ten inhabitants of the district of such urban sanitary authority, to be a nuisance or injurious to the health of any of the inhabitants of the district, such urban authority shall direct complaint to be made before a justice * * * and * person so offending * shall be liable to a penalty, etc."

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STEPHEN, J. I am of opinion that the justices were wrong in dismissing this information. I stand by the

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judgment which I gave in the case of Malton Board of Health v. Malton Manure Co., 40 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 755; 4 Ex. Div. 302, and I do not feel that the earlier case of Great Western R. Co. v. Bishop, 26 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 905; L. Rep., 7 Q. B. 550, is in point in this case. In both these acts of Parliament which it has been necessary to examine in this case a definition of "nuisance is given. Uuder the Nuisances Removal Act, 1855(18 & 19 Vict. chap. 121), it is provided that the word "nuisances" (§8) "shall include any premises in such a state as to be a nuisance or injurious to health." Now the particular nuisance under consideration in the case of Great Western R. Co. v. Bishop, supra, was not only not injurious to health, but in no kind of way related to the health or comfort of any person in the nighborhood, but was simply a common-law nuisance, similar, for instance, to a neglect to repair a highway. It was, in fact, the nuisance of having a railway bridge out of repair, so that water dripped on to those who happened to be passing underneath, and the decision there was to the effect that such a nuisance as that did not come within the words of the Nuisances Removal Act, which was a sanitary act dealing with nuisances which were injurious to health. That is what that case says, but it does not say what the court would have done had the nuisance been, not precisely injurious to health, but one which interfered with the comfort of the neighborhood. There is a great difference between a railway bridge out of repair, so that the water dripped from it, and heaps of cinders throwing off fumes and effluvia in large quantities. On looking closely into the circumstances of the two cases, that seems to me to be the difference between Great Western R. Co. v. Bishop and this case. The nuisance, in fact, in that case was of an entirely different kind from that to which the act referred. In the case of Malton Board of Health v. Malton Manure Co., 40 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 755; 4 Ex. Div. 302, the nuisance was distinctly injurious to health, inasmuch as it made sick people worse; but apart from that, as I put it in my judgment in that case, even if it were not shown to be injurious to health, yet if it were destructive of the present comfort of the neighborhood and very near to being injurious to health, it seemed to me exactly the thing to which both the present and the old act referred. I do not find in the case of Great Western R. Co. v. Bishop an authority which governs this case. On the contrary, the proper mode of interpreting the act is, in my opinion, to take the natural sense of the words. I understand them as meaning not a common-law nuisance, but something destructive of present comfort or something injurious to health without interfering with present comfort. A man, for instance, may catch diphtheria without being exposed to any present loss of comfort, and it is also possible to destroy a man's comfort in his home without injury to his health, on the same principle that consumptive patients used to imagine that their health was benefited by exposing themselves to the disagreeable smells of a tanner's yard. This seems to me to be the only method of interpretation which gives a proper sense to the words of the act, and it is at the same time not inconsistent with the case of Great Western R. Co. v. Bishop. The case of Banbury v. Page, 45 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 759; 8 Q. B. Div. 97, which was handed up after the close of the argument, is also in agreement with this view. It was there held that keeping swine so as to be a nuisance to any person, in the ordinary sense of the word, came within the meaning of the forty-seventh section of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. chap. 55), although it was not proved that the keeping of the pigs was injurious to health. When, that is to say, you complain of a man's pigs as a nuisance, he is not at liberty to say, "You have had no typhoid, therefore do not interfere with my pigs." "It appears to me," says Grove, J.,

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ATTORNEY-PURPOSE OF FEE BILL.- The fee bill is intended to regulate only those fees and costs which are strictly chargeable as between party and party, and not to regulate the fees of counsel, and other charges and expenses, as between solicitor and client, nor the power of a court of equity, in cases of administration of funds under its control, to make such allowances to the parties out of the fund as justice and equity may require. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 535. U.S. Circ. Ct., E. D. Louisiana, Feb. 1883. Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Clarke. Opinion by Pardee, J.

CARRIER-NON-DELIVERY OF GOODS SEIZED UNDER LEGAL PROCESS.-However the law may be elsewhere, the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States is that a seizure under legal process is a defense to the carrier in an action for non-delivery. But the mere seizure under valid process is not enough to excuse the carrier, for he must give immediate notice to the consignee; failing this, he becomes liable as in any other case of delivery to another person than his own bailee and assumes the burden of showing that the party seizing the goods under the process has the paramount title, unless he can show that the consignee had actual knowledge from other sources in due time to be equivalent to that notice he would have received if the carrier had not been negligent in this regard. If the carrier, on demand of an adverse claimant to surrender possession, refuses, but promises to and does delay shipment so as to give the claimant an opportunity to sue out a writ of replevin or take legal proceedings, he is liable absolutely to the consignee unless he can show that the adverse claimant was the rightful owner; and this, whether he gives his bailee for carriage notice of the seizure or not. A carrier cannot thus desert his duty of immediate shipment and delivery according to his contract. U.S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Tennessee, April 24, 1883. Robinson v. Memphis, etc., Railroad Co. Opinion by Hammoud, J.

CONFEDERATE SECURITIES-CONTRACT OF SALE OF, UNLAWFUL.- As the bonds of the Confederate States have been declared illegal by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a contract for the sale and delivery of such bonds at a specified rate per 1,000, entered into since the war, is void, and a suit for damages for a failure to deliver as promised cannot be maintained. When a contract is connected by its consideration with an illegal trans. action, a court of justice will not aid its enforcement. U. S. Circ. Ct., M. D. Alabama, Feb., 1883. Branch v. Haas. Opinion by Bruce, J.

NUISANCE-JOINDER OF SEVERAL PARTIES CREATING- TENANT IN COMMON PLAINTIFF. -- Several parties owning extensive mines at various points on the affluents of the Yuba river work them independ ently of each other by the hydraulic process, discharging their waste earth and other debris into the stream, whence it flows down into the main river, where the debris becomes mingled into one indistinguishable mass, passes on, and is deposited along the course of the river in the valley below, burying valuable lands and *Appearing in 16 Federal Reporter.

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