a modified shape must be retained. The clause called the "all the estate" clause, has been retained, (although in a very abridged shape), to meet those cases in which the conveying party has a term of years, or some other interest in the property distinct from his estate which appears in the deed, and which might be held not to pass except by virtue of this clause. In ordinary cases, however, the clause may be wholly omitted. The clause called "and the reversion," &c., has been dispensed with: it was wholly useless, and has of late been much disused in practice.

In limiting powers no restriction has been imposed on their exercise, except that it shall be by deed. The ordinary restriction, that it shall be by deed, "sealed and delivered in the presence of and attested by two or more credible witnesses," is troublesome and useless, and sometimes renders nugatory the intended execution of a power by an omission to comply with an unmeaning form. The restriction to the exercise by deed is proper to preclude the power from being exercised by a mere letter or note in writing, penned without due consideration, and without that general form which the law considers necessary for the conveyance of estates.

In framing covenants, the word "covenant" only is used; and the covenants for title have,

generally speaking, been reduced to covenants for right to convey free from incumbrances,

and for further assurance, and have been most materially shortened.

The power to appoint new trustees and the other powers have also been very much shortened, without, it is believed, impairing their efficiency; and, generally speaking, redundancies of expression have been cut off.

It is, of course, to be borne in mind, that so small a work as the present can offer but a very small variety of precedents, and those only of the simplest assurances; but the examination of these forms will enable the draftsman readily to shorten and simplify other assurances, or those parts of them which admit of being shortened and simplified.

The work also contains the recent Act, with an Introductory Comment; and some clauses and suggestions submitted to the Lord Chancellor by the author and a learned friend of great eminence as a conveyancer, which were not adopted, but which may perhaps possess some interest for the Profession.

The author has much pleasure in thanking his friend Mr. T. C. WRIGHT, of Lincoln's Inn, for his efficient assistance in preparing the Precedents.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

THE ACT 7 & 8 VICT. CAP. 76 (a).

lands passing

deed and sur

SECTION 1.-It is not correct to speak of cus- Customary tomary freeholds or customary land passing by by deed or deed or by deed and surrender alone, because an render. admittance is always required to perfect the alienation. The inaccuracy, however, is probably not material; for it is laid down, that the land passes by the deed, and that the admittance, or the surrender and admittance, is necessary only to make the change of tenancy. (1 Cru. Dig., by White, 255). The principal cases relating to those customary freeholds which pass by deed and admittance are Willan v. Lancaster, (3 Russ. 108), Doe d. Reay v. Huntington, (4 East, 271); but the latter case seems to confuse those free copyhold lands (improperly called customary freeholds) which are held according to the custom of the manor, but not by the will of the lord, and pass, like common copyholds, by surrender and admittance, with the proper customary freeholds, which pass by deed and

(a) See the Act, infra, p. 35.

admittance, or deed and surrender and admittance. The only reported case, it is believed, relating to customary freeholds passing by deed and surrender and admittance, is Bingham v. Woodgate, (1 Russ. & My. 32, 750). The freehold in those lands which pass by deed and admittance, or by deed and surrender and admittance, is considered to be in the tenant; but in the latter case the point cannot be deemed to be settled, as the ultimate decision does not appear, and the Lord Chancellor was inclined to reverse the decision of the Master of the Rolls. (See the questions with respect to lands of this tenure fully discussed, 1 Cru. Dig., by White, Tit. x, Ch. 1, Sect. 9 et seq., p. 255).

The act declares that the word "freehold" shall apply to customary freehold, or such customary freehold as will pass by deed or deed and surrender, meaning, it is presumed, (see above), by deed and admittance, or deed and surrender and admittance; but the second section goes on to say, that every person may convey by any deed all such freehold land as he might, before the passing of the act, have conveyed by lease and release, and every such conveyance shall take effect as if it had been conveyed by lease and release. Now, on this it seems open to observe, that, so far as the reported cases go, the customary freeholds in question were not, before the passing of the act, conveyed by lease and release, but by an instrument in the nature of, and called a bargain and sale; (Willan v. Lancaster, Doe v. Huntington, and

Bingham v. Woodgate, ubi suprà; Hodgson v. Merest, 9 Price, 556); and therefore it may be doubted, whether the 2nd section applies to customary freeholds. But, as it is clear that the instrument hitherto used may still be used, the only thing to be borne in mind is, that the act cannot be relied on for customary freeholds, except those (if such there be) which, before the passing of the act, were conveyed by lease and release. It may, perhaps, be said, that the customary freeholds which before the passing of the act were conveyed by bargain and sale might have been conveyed by lease and release; but this is by no means clear, for, generally speaking, in customary conveyances, the custom must be strictly adhered to.

The act does not appear to dispense with a surrender where a surrender as well as a deed was necessary, and certainly not with the admittance, and, under all the circumstances, it will be much safer not to depart from the ancient modes of conveyance of customary freeholds.

by deed alone.

SECTION 2.-This provision will render it un- Conveyance necessary to refer either to a lease for a year or to the statute 4 & 5 Vict. c. 21; but it will still be open to the practitioner, if he see occasion, to convey by lease and release, or by a release referring to the above statute, or by feoffment, bargain and sale inrolled, grant, or otherwise, as he might have done before the passing of the new act. For the act is only permissive in its lan