STATEMENT ON PUBLIC PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS The Supreme Court on June 25, 1962, handed down an important decision forbidding the use in the public schools of a prayer written by the New York State Board of Regents. The majority opinion written by Justice Hugo L. Black stated: "It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.” We want publicly to endorse and support this decision of the Supreme Court. Although we might not agree precisely at every point in our reasons for opposing the use of public worship as a part of the public school's curriculum or practice, we nevertheless set forth the following 10 reasons for believing the Supreme Court decision is worthy of support by the American people, including those who hold religious convictions and those who do not: (1) Prayer used in the public schools is bound to be offensive to some individuals and groups in our pluralistic society. These include not only persons whose approach to prayer is from a unique religious or denominational background, but also atheists, agnostics, and those who for other reasons are of the belief that prayer in the public schools constitute a violation of the separation of church and state. (2) The responsibility both for religious education and worship rests in the home, the church, and the synagogue. The delegation of this responsibility to the public school, an agency of the State, is but an invitation to promulgate a vague, watered-down, so-called nonsectarian religion, a non-Biblical, artificial faith that must, in the long run, constitute a grave disserve to religion. (3) If prayer is reduced to a lowest common denominator approach in order to be inoffensive to different religious groups, by the same token it becomes theologically inadequate. Prayer thus is secularized through public policy so that public schools may have the appearance of being religious. (4) This lowest common denominator approach to religion not only tends to establish as a new state-sponsored religion the residuum of religious belief acceptable to all faiths, but it relegates the minority of the religiously unaffiliated to a second-class citizenship. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution is intended to preclude such state invasion of the religious sphere as well as to safeguard the rights of minorities. (5) If the state or public servants can constitutionally compose, require, or permit use of a prayer that is allegedly inoffensive to religious groups, what is to prevent government officials from using prayers that are patently offensive to some part of the population? (6) Governments are by nature instruments of restrains and coercion to enforce justice and to promote the general welfare. The worship of God is by nature a voluntary expression and ought not to be associated with the coercive functions of the State. Governments should guarantee freedom of private and public exercise of religious conviction as well as freedom for the expression of objection to any or all religious doctrines. But governments must not be permitted to determine what is orthodox or heretical and hence must leave to the home and the church the ritualistic or doctrinal expressions of religious faith. (7) When persons in a captive audience who do not approve of prayer or a particular prayer or the context in which the prayer is said, are involved in religious worship as a part of government policy, some are alienated from genuine religious expression and commitment. Others may become antagonistic to institutional religion and even intolerant because of its readiness to rely on government coercion of children for external religious expression. In such cases a program designed to foster religious commitment may be responsible for retarding it and may even injure the religious freedom which we in this country so highly prize. (8) It is important to have religious communities that are distinguishable from the political community. Too often the actions of Spain, Israel, or England have been identified with a dominant religious group in those countries. The danger is not only that religious groups will be identified with the mistakes and injustices of political units, but that prayer to a God of all nations may be used to hallow narrow nationalism. This merging of the religious expression with cultural and even governmental activity may mute the prophetic religious criticism that so genuinely serves the best interests of the state. (9) Schoolchildren who object or whose parents object to their participation in religious practices in the public schools may hesitate to declare themselves as nonreligious or as members of a minority religious group. Pressure upon children in such circumstances is an invasion of the privacy of belief that so many consider essential to genuine liberty. (10) Teachers ought not to be expected to perform public religious functions in public schools even if they should be qualified to do so. There is danger of overzealous religious activity as well as of prayer so perfunctory as to be a mockery of religion. Under some circumstances teachers who are identified with a particular religious expression may even become for their students objects of ridicule or hostility. James E. Amick, CLU. SIGNERS Carl Bangs, associate professor of historical theology, St. Paul School of Theology, Methodist, Kansas City, Mo. Ernest E. Bayles, professor of education, Lawrence, Kans. Eleanore C. Blue, professor, University of Kansas City Law School. Stanley Bohn, pastor, Kansas City Mennonite Church. Arthur Brand, Brand & Puritz Co. Girard T. Bryant, school administrator. Clifford P. Buck, director, Department of Religious Education, Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Shrum Burton, pastor, Country Club Methodist Church. Ramon C. Butts, pastor, Methodist Churches in Camden and Orrick, Mo. Mr. and Mrs. W. W. Chick. Carolyn Benton Cockefair. Clayton M. Crosier, professional engineer. Mrs. A. Henry Cuneo, CPA. E. Dale Dunlap, associate professor of theology, St. Paul School of Theology, Methodist. C. L. Duxbury, pastor, Antioch Community Church. John D. Fischer, pastor, First Congregational Church. William A. Greenbaum II, rabbi, Temple Beth El. Morton Goldman. Ruth Anne Hatcher, teaching dietitian, St. Luke's Hospital. T. Ben Hatcher, physicist, University of Kansas Medical Center. Francis H. Hayward, pastor, Southminster Presbyterian Church, Prairie Village. J. R. Hodges, professor of economics. Harold L. Holliday, attorney. Berndt L. Kolker. Charles A. McRowen, executive secretary, Missouri West Conference, the Methodist Church. Morris B. Margolies, rabbi, Beth Shalom Congregation. J. L. Mitchell, pastor, St. Matthew and St. Mark's Methodist Churches, Independence, Mo. Filbert Munoz, attorney. G. E. Olmsted, pastor, Countryside Christian Church, Mission, Kans. Robert B. Olsen, attorney, Prairie Village. Alvin C. Porteous, professor, Central Baptist Theological Seminary. Mark A. Rouch, pastor, First Methodist Church, Baldwin, Kans. Ben Morris Ridpath, pastor, Trinity Methodist Church. Norman N. Royall, Jr. Mrs. A. Harold Schmidt, past president and member at large, United Church Women of Greater Kansas City, Mo. William B. Silverman, rabbi, Congregation B'nai Jehudah. John M. Swomley, Jr., associate professor of social ethics and philosophy, St. Paul School of Theology, Methodist. Kenneth S. Waterman, pastor, First Presbyterian Church. John W. Williams, pastor, St. Stephen Baptist Church. Howard L. Thompson, pastor, Randolph Memorial Methodist Church. Braxton J. Boyd, pastor, Bowers Memorial CME Church. M. A. Burgess, president, Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance. Sidney Lawrence, director, Jewish Community Relations Bureau. Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., attorney. (Organizations are listed for purposes of identification only.) Senator JAMES O. EASTLAND, WASHINGTON, D.C. Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: It is my understanding that your Judiciary Committee will shortly give consideration to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Engel v. Vitale, No. 468, decided June 25, 1962, otherwise known as the New York School Prayer case. I would like to point out to your committee exactly how the Supreme Court has again amended the Constitution of the United States by judicial fiat in violation of article V which requires amendments to be proposed by a two-thirds vote of Congress to be followed by ratification by threefourths of the States. The first amendment of the Constitution of the United States reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Note that the entire context of the provision is a prohibition on Congress from enacting any law establishing a religion. Anyone who can read that English language can plainly see that this amendment does not purport to vest any rights in anyone-religious, civil, or otherwise. For a long time following the adoption of the U.S. Constitution there were established religions in some of the States pursuant to State law. A discussion of this situation will be found on pages 2:42 and 243 of the American history book called "Growth of the American Republic," by Samuel Eliot Morrison, professor of American history, of Harvard University, and Henry Steele Commager, professor of history, of Columbia University. I invite your attention to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the January term of 1845 in the case of Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans (42 U.S. 589 (3 Howard 589, 11 L. ed. 739)), and, in a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution and the first amendment made no provision for the protection of the citizens of the respective States of the Union in their religious liberties, and that the Constitution left this to the State constitutions and State laws. In the unanimous opinion, the Court said, "The ordinances complained of must violate the Constitution or laws of the United States, or some authority exercised under them; if they do not, we have no power under the Judiciary Act to interfere. The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective States in their religious liberties; this is left to the State constitution and laws; nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States, in this respect, on the States." In this case it was contended that the religious liberty of the defendant under the Constitution of the United States had been infringed, but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as being a matter not covered by the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in the case of Engel v. Vitale, has in a vague way on several occasions referred to "the establishment clause" which, of course, is found only in the first amendment relating to its prohibition against action by the Congress of the United States. After 100 years in a series of cases, beginning with Cantwell v. Connecticut (310 U.S. 296, 84 L. ed. 1213), and running through Murdock v. Pennsylvania (319 U..S. 105, 87 L. ed. 1292), Douglas v, City of Jeanette (319 U.S. 157), and Zorach v. Clauson (343 U.S. 306, 96 L. ed. 954), the Supreme Court, without referring to Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, above, announced a new doctrine that the 14th amendment makes the 1st amendment applicable to States to prevent anything being done under the authority of a State relating to the establishment of a religion. But, an examination of the 14th amendment fails to disclose how the first amendment becomes applicable to States other than by the judicial fiat of the Supreme Court. Section 1 of the 14th amendment provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In these relatively recent cases various things have been held to violate the Federal Constitution because State law deprived a person of his religious liberty without due process of law, and that this religious liberty was guaranteed by the first amendment. None of these cases explain or point out any language of the first amendment which guarantees to a citizen anything at all much less religious liberty. Bearing in mind that in Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, it was specifically held that the first amendment made no provision for the protection of citizens of the respective States in their religious liberty, and that the Constitution left this to State constitutions and State laws (and you do not have to be a lawyer to comprehend its meaning from its simple terse language), it will be seen that the recent Supreme Court decision in the New York School Prayer case has again amended the Constitution by fiat when it states that religious liberty was guaranteed by the first amendment. As heretofore stated, the Supreme Court, in a series of recent cases culminating in the recent New York School Prayer case, has held that the 14th amendment brings the 1st amendment into effect in respect to States (whereas the 1st amendment actually related only to Federal legislation). There is nothing in the 14th amendment which says this. The opinion in the New York School Prayer case is vague and ambiguous about the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and how they apply to the case. The opinion frequently refers to the "establishment clause" which reference is to the first amendment, the entire force and effect of which is to forbid the Federal Congress to enact any law for the establishment of a national religion. It indulges in general language and cliches as "the constitutional wall of separation of church and state" when no such words or anything like them are to be found in the Constitution itself. Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Permoli case, not only were no rights in respect to religion granted to any citizens, but it specifically held that the Constitution left to the State constitutions and the State laws the control of this matter within the States with no inhibitions imposed on the States by the Federal Constitution. Under the ruling, any State had the power to establish an official religion for itself, and any statements made by early political leaders such as Jefferson and Madison about a constitutional wall of separation of church and state related solely to enactments of the Legislature of the Federal Government. There were no inherent or inalienable rights in the citizens preventing the States by the constitutions or by acts of the State legislature from establishing a State religion. That the foregoing is true is shown by the history of the United States in which for many years some of the States did maintain established religions at the time and for many years immediately following the adoption of the Constitution. As we move from a consideration and understanding of the language and meaning of the 1st amendment to the language and meaning of the 14th amendment, we are left in ignorance and lack of comprehension from the opinion of Justice Black as to how the "establishment clause" of the 1st amendment referred to so frequently became engrafted onto the 14th. The portion of the 14th amendment, as explained in some of the prior cases such as Cantwell v. Connecticut, which is supposed to accomplish this transposition is the clause in the 1st section of the 14th amendment reading, "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, wtihout due process of law." When we consider that no citizen has any religious rights under the 1st amendment by the Permoli case, the only right under the Federal Constitution left to the citizen is any inhibition against the State contained in the 14th amendment. But, so long as the religious liberty of a citizen is not restricted (i.e., the freedom to be a member of any religious body he may choose and to engage in the practice of such religion), he would not be deprived of his "liberty" without due process of law and there would be no infraction of the 14th amendment no matter what the State might do toward the establishment of a religion. The Supreme Court recognizes that its holding cannot be supported by the 14th amendment alone, and it therefore seeks to transpose and engraft upon the 14th amendment an enlargement of the language of the 1st amendment that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of a religion:" which clearly is restricted to the enactment of legislation by Congress) into the Court's construction of the 14th amendment to the effect that nothing can be done by the legislature or the courts of a State or anyone else under the authority of the State government in respect to religion by a transposition of a part of the "establishment clause" from the 1st to the 14th amendment so as to permit enlargement thereof under the 14th amendment without the virtue of a proposal of such transposition and enlargement by a two-thirds vote of the House and Senate of the United States and a ratification thereof by threefourths of the States. This is an amendment by judicial fiat. When remedial action for this and the many other decisions of the Supreme Court of recent years (which have effectually amended the Constitution) is considered in the form of constitutional amendments with the slow and ponderous proposal by a two-thirds vote and ratification by three-fourths of the States, it is realized at once that such form of action is not practical and that something simple and speedy is needed. I suggest one simple and speedy method is to amend the Constitution to provide that the Senate by a majority vote might resolve that the decision makes an erroneous construction of the Constitution and that it shall not be considered to be a precedent for future cases. This would allow the decision of the Court to stand as a final determination of the specific case decided. But, the precedent would be established that it was erroneous for future cases. It might be argued that such an amendment has no teeth in it-which would be true. But, the moral force of such a resolution and the power of the Congress to impeach would, in my opinion, be a sufficient force to control future cases. Such a procedure is analogous to the confirmation of the Senate of Executive appointments. Sincerely, Senator JAMES O. EASTLAND, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, PINCKNEY G. MCELWEE. VILLAGE OF TUCKAHOE, July 29, 1962. Senate Building, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: I would like to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the school prayer ban hearings. Enclosed is a statement, that I would like to read to your committee. Please let me know when I may appear. Sincerely, MILTON A. GIBBONS, Mayor. The enclosed petitions signed, for the most part, by residents of New York State, expresses the concern of our people over the recent ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, declaring that it is unconstitutional for pupils in New York State public schools to voluntarily recite a prayer for the guidance of God in their daily school endeavors. In my mind, and in the minds of all those who have signed these petitions, this decision is an unspeakable condemnation of those who made it and calls for their impeachment and removal from the highest court in the Nation as rapidly as possible. This decision uses the first amendment of our Constitution to outlaw the very guarantees of religious freedom it was designed to supply. The first amendment forbids the passage of any law "respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." If the decision of the Supreme Court is not prohibiting the free exercise of religion, there never was any such prohibition anywhere and millions of believers in God were never persecuted, tortured, or killed. In view of this Supreme Court decision, it is imperative that the Constitution be amended to positively guarantee that every American has the right to the belief in and the practice of the worship of God at any and all such places and times as he may desire. This guarantee must be so worded that no one could misconstrue it. This should be accomplished as speedily as the law will allow. The statistics on juvenile delinquency show positively the need for greater emphasis on the teaching of the word of God in every walk of life and at every age level. Those of us who have spent a lifetime fighting juvenile delinquency believe we have a right to expect that there will be on the U.S. Supreme Court men who will help rather than hinder such efforts. Meanwhile, it is imperative that those responsible for this decision be forthwith removed from positions in which they have the power to make such decisions, by impeachment or any other legal means. The signers of this petition wholeheartedly endorse these actions and will support any legal moves to carry them out. So believing, we earnestly entreat your support. |