JAN. 13, 1844.

The following are the Names of the Gentlemen who favour THE JURIST with Reports of Cases argued and decided in the several Courts of Law and Equity:

any

OBSERVATIONS ON SOME MODES OF SHORT-
ENING THE FORMS OF CONVEYANCES.

best can the information necessary to protect him; but to flow; and we have no doubt, that, if patentees had it does not follow, that concession to their wishes is been consulted in making the law, they also would have most consistent with sound policy. Perhaps no better liked concealment of their titles; but they have not been answer can be given to the objection than the argu- consulted upon the matter, and the result of the registry ment used by Sir Edward Sugden, (Vol. 3, p. 381), in this case appears to be, not to injure the holder of a in support of it: "No man," says that learned writer, good title, but simply the intended and proper effect of "desires to make his private affairs public, and the pub-a registry, to enable any person desiring to acquire prolic have no right to pry into his affairs, except for perty, to ascertain whether the title to the property some legitimate object, and this case presents none; which he desires to acquire, is free from interference by but, if all the dealings of men of property, and all their other title. title-deeds were to be disclosed to the world, the mischiefs would be obvious; immediate ruin would not unfrequently be occasioned, flaws in titles would be readily discovered, (for the plan will not add to the learning or sagacity of real property lawyers), and Jews would have an opportunity of ascertaining to what ex- Some years ago, a learned writer made a premature tent they could safely satisfy the demands of an improvi- attempt to introduce short forms of conveyances, and dent heir. Many a young man has been saved from ruin sent forth his notions to the world in the shape of a because he had not the means of proving to money-little collection of precedents, with notes, called "The lenders what his interest was in the family property." If a man knows that there are flaws in his title which he cannot conceal, he will, of course, not attempt any dealings with his property, and, of course, would not fall under the operation of a general registration; and, surely, it is not meant to be contended that such a person should be protected by the law in concealing the flaws, for the purpose of dealing! Then, with regard to improvident heirs, supposing it to be the whole object of the law, instead of a miserable fraction of it, to protect them, still it is plain, that, if the actual extent of their rights could be ascertained, they would be able to borrow of fair lenders, instead of falling into the hands of the Jews.

Concise Conveyancer." At that period, however, the profession had not opened its mind to the idea that any safety could exist in short forms, and the book to which we refer, and on the execution of which we offer no opinion whatever, was silently passed by-useless to the public, and, we believe, at the time, prejudicial to its author. Since then the modern school of conveyancing has sprung up, and some of the most learned conveyancers have applied their abilities in reducing the unwieldy bulk of conveyancing forms. The effect has been to bring within the sphere of the regular and scientific conveyancer, abundance of transactions which formerly were subjected to all kinds of irregular transfer, exemplifications of what might be termed rather the act of incumbrancing, than of conveyancing; and as the shortening of conveyances has facilitated the transfer of small properties, so the appetite for such transactions has increased among the class of small owners, and the desire for shorter and still shorter and more economical modes of transfer has yearly been gaining ground. This is not, indeed, wonderful, if we recollect that the value of brevity in deeds, is felt not only in the diminution of expense in reference to the

In the discussions upon general registry, more particularly in the Legislature, the arguments are necessarily to a great extent one-sided. The interest, or supposed interest, of vendors or owners of land is strongly represented, because they form a compact class; purchasers, on the contrary, have, as a class, scarcely any existence. A capitalist, not intending to purchase, has no interest, and, therefore, no sympathies with purchasers; no man is, in fact, a purchaser, except for what may be termed almost a momentary period, viz. while the pur-particular deed, but in reference to all subsequent transchase is being negotiated and completed. From the moment that it is completed, he becomes a holder, and then his interest and sympathies are with vendors. This may account for the naïveté with which, on the part of objectors to a general registry, the wishes of the owners of property are treated as of such paramount importance. It must be observed, however, that, in practice, purchasers endeavour, as far they can, to create and enforce a registry; the whole doctrine, for instance, of giving notice to trustees, and others filling a fiduciary character, is evidence of this desire.

actions; that, on every mortgage, on every re-conveyance, on every sale, complete or partial, on every family settlement, and last, but not least, in every case of litigation touching the premises comprised in the original deed, the length of that deed governs the subsequent expenses; so that a long deed is, in effect, a permanent land-tax upon the estate that it conveys. From this conviction, no doubt, have arisen the legislative attempts at introducing Parliamentary formulæ for conveyancing, by the aid of which conveyances might be made to contain substantively little more than the designation of the parties and of the pre

There is one species of property, in which a compulsory registry and deposit of title-deeds have always ex-mises, and the words of grant, disposing of all the isted; and, so far as we are aware, not only no mischief, but great benefit, both to the public and to the owners of that species of property, has been the consequence. We allude to the property of patent rights. The inrolment of the specification, which the law requires of every owner of a patent right, is that complete publication of his title, from which it is said, that, in reference to landed property, so much mischief and danger ought

provisoes and covenants by reference to certain Parliamentary standards. On these attempts, of which Lord Campbell's ill-fated bill was the last, we shall at present offer no comments, reserving our remarks on that mode of shortening conveyances until some further indication shall appear of the subject being resumed by the Legislature. But it occurs to us, that, awaiting those alterations which the wisdom of Parliament may

suggest, there are some very simple contrivances which place within the reach of conveyancers the means of safely effecting considerable abbreviations in deeds, beyond those which the utmost prudent curtailment of existing forms, by mere elimination of words, will permit. One very effective curtailment of a deed containing complicated arrangements might, for instance, be obtained by the use of a preliminary interpretation clause-a plan already adopted in many modern acts of Parliament, and in some deeds of a peculiar nature, such as the deeds of settlement of joint stock companies. Thus, for instance, in any deed, the incessant repetition of the words designating the representatives of the several parties might be got rid of, by a clause declaring, that, wherever a party is named, his name shall extend to his heirs, executors, administrators, appointees, and assigns, according to the nature of the estate, unless otherwise expressed; or, in a conveyance to trustees upon various trusts, many useless repetitions would be avoided, by a declaration, that, wherever the trustees are named, their names shall extend to, and include, them and the survivor of them, and the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of such survivor*. So, in a deed conveying several distinct sets of parcels by distinct witnessing parts, as is, under some circumstances, requisite, a declaration that the word "appurtenances" should extend to all the words contained in what are called the general words, and that the word "estate" should mean estate, right, title, &c., would avoid the frequent repetition of precisely the same formulæ, and very materially abridge a deed. And so in regard to any particular set of words which the frame and objects of the deed would render of frequent occurrence, the declaratory clause might provide for their being included in some one or more of the words in connexion with which they would be introduced.

Court Papers.

CAUSE LISTS.-HILARY TERM, 7 VICT.
Court of Chancery.

abridge the space the Cause Papers would otherwise have occu
*** The following abbreviations have been adopted to
pied:-4. Abated-Adj. Adjourned-A. T. After Term-Ap.
Appeal-C. D. Cause Day-C. Costs-D. Demurrer-E. Ex-
ceptions-F. D. Further Directions-M. Motion-P. C. Pro
Stand Over-Sh. Short.
Confesso-Pl. Plea-Ptn. Petition-R. Re-hearing-S. O.

Before the LORD CHANCELLOR.
APPEALS.

Marquis of Westminster v.
Morrison (Ap) S O
The Sheffield Canal Co. v. The

Strickland v. Strickland
Ditto v. Boynton
Ditto v. Strickland

West v.

Sheffield & Botheram Rail-Waard. Ditice (Ap)
Morrall v. Sutton (Ap) SO
way Co.
Baillie v. Innes (Ap, part

(Ap)

Ditto v. Palmer heard)
Tullock v. Hartley (Ap) SOG
Benson v. Heathorn (Ap) A
Cottingham v. Earl of
Shrewsbury
Praed v. Richards
Ditto v. Jerningham
Booth v. Lightfoot (Ap)
Cutts v. Thodey (Ap)
Selby (pauper) v. Jackson (Ap)
Heighington v. Grant (5 causes,
Sherwood v. Walker (Ap)
Ap)
Bonser v. Cox (Ap, F D)
Att.-Gen. v. Rickards (Ap)
Foley v. Hill (Ap)

Foster v. Smith (Ap)
Bute v. Stuart (E)

Jones v. Howells
Ditto v. Godsell

(Ap)

CAUSES, FURTHER

'} (Ap):

Brown v. Bees (Ap)
Bruin v. Knott (Ap)
Blackford v. Kirkpatrick'
Oglander v. Williams
Ditto v. Eames
Matthew v. Brise (Ap)
Duke of Leeds v. Earl Am-
hurst (Ap)

Thompson v. Geary (Ap)
Spalding v. Ruding (Ap)
Hills v. Nash (Ap)
Millar v. Graig (Ap)
Rickards v. Rickards (Ap)
Sands v. Fincham (Ap)
Cochrane v. Cochrane
Lord v. Colvin
Davenport v. Bishop (Ap)
Clifford v. Turrell (Ap)
Parsons v. Bignold (Ap)

}(Ap)

Forbes v. Peacock (Ap)

Forman v. Nevill (Ap, M)

Marquis of Hertford v. Lord
Lowther (Ap)

DIRECTIONS, AND EXCEPTIONS.
Before the VICE-CHANCELLOR of England,
Parker v. Bult (D)
Ward v. Weight (D)
Spreadury v. Nicholson (D)
Shoobridge v. Woods (D)
St. Victor v. Devereux (D)
Attorney-Gen. v. Baines
Croft v. Waterton
Waterton v. Croft
Farmer v. Farmer
Ditto v. Ditto
Beresford v. Armagh (E, F D)
Bentley v. Smart March 1
Graham v. Williams (F D,

Patrick v. Richards (F D, C)
Fisher v. Great Western Rail-
way Co. (F D, C)
Whitby v. Hughes
Caffary v. Caffary
Leslie v. Verbeke (F D, C)
Taylor v. Haygarth (F D, C)
Murray v. Stone

Of the perfect safety of these expedients, there can be no doubt, as they would, in fact, alter nothing of Smith v. Henley (Ap) the forms whose efficacy is tested by practice. All that they would do would be, by one general declaration in a deed, where the same form would have to be frequently repeated, to import it into its proper places. Some care, and the smallest imaginable quantity of boldness in a few conveyancers of sufficient distinction to be able to bear that their drafts should be stared at for a little while, would soon introduce these, or some equally harmless contrivances for abridging drafts; and, perhaps, not one of the least beneficial results of this, as of every successive step in the system of shortening forms of conveyancing, will be, that, as it not only shortens a draft, but increases the mental labour of the draftsman, for the sole purpose, and with the effect of lessening for ever after the expenses of the owners of the estate, it must tend to accelerate the dissolution of the system of remunerating the draftsman according to the length of his drafts,-a system, which, we shall not cease to repeat in these pages, is, and has long been, we believe, as odious to the great majority of solicitors, as well as counsel, as it is manifestly absurd and impolitic.

MASTER IN CHANCERY.-The Lord Chancellor has appointed John Nicholas Richards Millett, of Penzance, Cornwall, Gent., to be a Master Extraordinary in the High Court of Chancery.

* We have now before us a precedent, in which, in a portion of a conveyance to trustees, extending over about six folios, the above words occur six times. A declaratory clause, such as that suggested, would, probably, in a long trust-deed, abridge it under that one head alone by many folios.

part heard)
Cordy v. Williams (Cause)
Wyatt v. Dalrymple

Att.-Gen. v. Allen (F D, C)
Simpson v. Holt

Bailey v. Runcy (F D, C)
Cooper v. Carrington

Hancock v. Harborne

Leev. Leeming
Smith v. Compton
Hill v. Sanders

Smith v. Falconer

Cooke v. Smith

New Zealand Co. v. Barnewall
Wright v. Barnewall
Bowers v. Sherman (FD)
Ditto v. Nunn (Cause)
Shackell v. Duke of Marlbo-
rough (re-hearing) SO
Foley v. Hill (F D, C) S O
Davis v. Beavan
Wright v. Norris
Curzon v. Belworthy
Williams v. Jones
Sutherland v. Abington (F D,
C)

(F D, C)