For special stress on the natural resources of Alsace-Lorraine see Gregory, 'Geology and Strategy', Contemporary Review, December, 1915; Gardner, 'Lorraine, the Test of Victory', World's Work, January, 1918; and Brooks, 'The Real Problem of Alsace-Lorraine', North American Review, November, 1917.

From 1871 till 1911, Alsace-Lorraine was governed as a direct appanage of the Imperial Crown; in the latter year it received a constitution, but nothing even remotely resembling self-government. Contrary to the expectation of most Germans, the two provinces have not become German in sentiment; indeed the unconciliatory methods of Prussia have steadily increased their estrangement, despite their share in the commercial prosperity of the Empire. Those who know intimately the undercurrent of feeling in Alsace-Lorraine are unanimous in asserting that if before last July an impartial plebiscite, without fear of the consequences, could have been taken among the inhabitants, an overwhelming majority would have voted for reunion with France. But having once been the battle-ground of the two nations and living in permanent dread of a repetition of the tragedy, the leaders of political thought in Alsace-Lorraine favored a less drastic solution. They knew that Germany would not relinquish her hold nor France renounce her aspirations without another armed struggle; but they believed that the grant of real autonomy within the Empire, such as would place them on an equal footing with Württemberg or Baden, would render their position tolerable, and by removing the chief source of friction between France and Germany, create the groundwork for more cordial and lasting relations between Germany and the two Western Powers. (Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson in The War and Democracy, pp. 244-246.)

For the status of Alsace-Lorraine in the German Empire see Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe (Harvard University Press), or Ogg, The Governments of Europe (Macmillan).

"What we have gained by arms in six months we shall have to defend by arms for fifty years," said General von Moltke after the FrancoPrussian War. Prince von Bülow's opinion (Imperial Germany, p. 69) was as follows: "The irreconcilability of France is a factor that we must reckon with in our political calculations. It seems to be weakness to entertain the hope of a real and sincere reconciliation with France, so long as we have no intention of giving up Alsace-Lorraine. And there is no such intention in Germany."

How far would these considerations apply in the case of a forcible re-annexation by France?

Would the unconditional return of Alsace-Lorraine to France be inconsistent with Mr. Wilson's principle regarding the selfdetermination of free peoples?

Would this principle require that Alsace-Lorraine be allowed, “under the protection of the super-national authority or League of Nations freely to decide what shall be their future political position?" ('Memorandum on War Aims of the British Labor Party', International Conciliation, No. 123.)

What would be the difficulties of a referendum in AlsaceLorraine?

Assuming that it could not be conducted under French or German auspices, would an international commission be able to secure a free decision?

Would people sent in by Germany be permitted to vote and would the plebiscite be delayed until the return of the exiles to France and elsewhere?

Would either France or Germany peaceably accept an adverse decision?

See Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. 40.

Alsace-Lorraine falls into three well-marked areas:

(1) Western Lorraine (the Metz region) is Catholic and French by choice and language, but it contains only fifteen per cent. of the total population of the Reichsland. (2) Northeastern Lorraine, on the other hand, is mainly German and Protestant, and, together with the northwest district of Alsace, would certainly prefer to be German. (3) About the real opinion of the greater part of Alsace, German by race, Catholic by religion, but with a persistent French tradition, no one can dogmatize. (Brailsford, A League of Nations, pp. 115-125.)

Would the proposed plebiscite have to give these districts an opportunity to decide for themselves?

Should the fact that economic resources do not follow the lines of popular feeling be taken into consideration?

Would it be possible to neutralize Alsace-Lorraine under a guarantee of the powers or under an international commission? Or simply to give it independence? Or to form it into a federation with Belgium that would make a stretch of neutralized territory from the North Sea to Italy?

Cf. the status of Savoy, a neutralized province of France, and the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864. See Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XI, p. 642; Lawrence, Principles of International Law (Heath), Secs. 246-248, and Fayle, The Great Settlement (Duffield), pp. 148-153.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BLUMENTHAL, Alsace-Lorraine (Putnam).
BRAILSFORD, A League of Nations (Macmillan).
'COSMOS', The Basis of Durable Peace (Scribners).
ECCLES, Alsace-Lorraine (Oxford Pamphlets).
FAYLE, The Great Settlement (Duffield).

GIBBONS, The New Map of Europe (Century).
HAZEN, Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule (Holt).
LAWRENCE, Principles of International Law (Heath).

LOWELL, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe.

OGG, Governments of Europe (Macmillan).

PUTNAM, Alsace and Lorraine, from Caesar to Kaiser (Putnam).

SETON-WATSON, The War and Democracy.

STODDARD, Present-Day Europe, Its National States of Mind (Century). TOYNBEE, Nationality and the War (Dutton).

VON BÜLOW, Imperial Germany (Dodd).

VON MACH, Germany's Point of View (McClurg).

Cambridge Modern History.

Contemporary Review.

North American Review.

Political Quarterly.

The New Europe.
The World Court.
World's Work.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

What influence has the quarrel with the Papacy had upon Italy's political development?

What are the problems that the South of Italy presents? Why did Italy join the Triple Alliance?

Why did she leave it?

Consider the justification (suggesting any modifications that seem good) of the Italian claim to control both shores of the Adriatic, from the point of view (a) of nationality, (b) of strategic security, and (c) of the future peace of the world.

On Italian history, see King and Okey, Italy of Today (Nisbet); Seton-Watson, The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic (Nisbet); Coolidge, The Origins of the Triple Alliance (Scribner); Wallace, Greater Italy (Scribner).

The terms of the Triple Alliance have not been published but Articles I, III, IV, and VII are given in the second AustroHungarian Red Book as follows:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against any one of their respective States.

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political and economic questions of a general nature as may arise; and, moreover, promise their mutual support within the scope of their own interests. Article III. If one or two of the High Contracting Parties should be attacked without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war with two or several Great Powers not signatory to this Treaty, the casus foederis shall apply simultaneously to all the High Contracting Parties.

Article IV. In the event that a Great Power not signatory to this Treaty should menace the safety of the States of one of the High Contracting Parties, and that the menaced Party should be forced to make war on that Power, the two others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her Ally.

Article VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the territorial status quo in the near East be maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all territorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers signatory to this Treaty. To that end they shall communicate to one another all such information as may be suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as well as those of other Powers.

Should, however, the status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish Coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, in the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or otherwise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or per

manent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of both Parties. (Austro-Hungarian Red Book [ No. 2], Appendix, Nos. 1, 14, 15, 16; Scott [ed.], Diplomatic Documents Relative to the European War, pp. 335, 346 [Oxford].)

For Italy's refusal to stay in the Triple Alliance and her declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, see the Austro-Hungarian Red Books, and Italy's Green Book (International Cor.ciliation, No. 93, August, 1915) which will be found in Scott's edition of the diplomatic correspondence. See also Feiling, Italian Policy since 1870 (Oxford Pamphlets); Hope, Why Italy is with the Allies (Clay); 'Civis Italicus', Italy and the Jugo-Slav Peoples (Council for the Study of International Relations); Rigano, The War and the Settlement: An Italian View (Council for the Study of International Relations).

A secret treaty between Italy, Russia, Great Britain, and France, signed on May 9, 1915, two weeks before Italy's entrance into the war, promises Italy territorial compensation for her military assistance. The Treaty was among the secret engagements made public by the Bolsheviki and a translation was published by The New Europe (See Current History, March, 1918, p. 494; the treaties also appeared in the New York Evening Post, January 25, 26, and 28, 1918). Would the changes contemplated by this treaty be more than "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy. . along clearly recognizable lines of nationality"?

See Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton), Chap. V; Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century), Chap. VII, XIII; Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East, Chap. IV; Taylor, The Future of the Southern Slavs, Chap. IV, esp. pp. 150-160; Dominian, "The Nationality Map of Europe', A League of Nations, December, 1917 (World Peace Foundation); Murri, 'Italy and England', Contemporary Review, November, 1915; 'O. de L.', 'Albania, Austria, Italy, Essad', Contemporary Review, August, 1917; and the provisions of the secret treaty.