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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANGELL, The World's Highway (Doran).

BARCLAY, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy (Boston
Book Co.).

BOURNE, Toward an Enduring Peace (American Association for Inter-
national Conciliation).

BRAILSFORD, A League of Nations (Macmillan).

CLAPP, Economic Aspects of the War (Yale).

CORBETT, The League of Peace and a Free Sea (Doran).

'COSMOS', The Basis of Durable Peace (Scribner).

EGERTON, British Foreign Policy in Europe (Macmillan).

HOLLS, The Peace Conference at the Hague (Macmillan).

MAHAN, Armaments and Arbitration (Harper).

MAHAN, The Interest of America in Sea Power (Little, Brown).

MOORE, Digest of International Law, Vol. VII (Government Printing
Office).

`PHILLIPSON, International Law and the Great War (Dutton).

PIGGOTT, The Neutral Merchant (University of London Press).
ROGERS, America's Case against Germany (Dutton).

SCOTT, The Two Hague Conferences (Johns Hopkins Press).
American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference (Ginn).

American Journal of International Law.
Atlantic Monthly.

Contemporary Review.

International Conciliation.

The New Europe.

World Peace Foundation.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

Cf. previous utterances of Mr. Wilson:

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. (Reply to the Pope, August 27, 1917.)

It might be impossible also in such untoward circumstances [ if the German people were compelled to continue to live "under ambitious

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and intriguing masters" ] to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself by processes which would assuredly set in. (Address to Congress, December 4, 1917.)

How far are these expressions of opinion incompatible with the Resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference?

For the texts of the Resolution see Hobson, The New Protectionism (Putnam), Appendix; European Economic Alliances (National Foreign Trade Council); Congressional Record, July 10, 1916, p. 12284; and Current History, August, 1916, p. 928. See also Clark, 'Shall There Be War after the War? The Economic Conference at Paris', American Journal of International Law, October, 1917.

Does Mr. Wilson propose conditional economic war and say, in effect, to the German people that they will have nothing to fear if they cease to rely on the prowess of their military masters?

Did the entrance of the United States into the war cause the German people to attach more importance to the economic war after the war?

Cf. the Reichstag Resolution: "No less does the Reichstag reject all schemes which aim at creating economic isolation and enmity among nations after the war," and the German Chancellor's statement, July 19, 1917:

We must by an understanding and give and take guarantee the conditions of existence of the German Empire upon the Continent and overseas. Peace must build the foundation of a lasting reconciliation, prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through economic blockades, and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive against us. See Brailsford, "The Reichstag and Economic Peace', The Fortnightly Review, October, 1917.

Without the existence of that vigorous industry which, after the shutting in of Germany, we converted mainly into a war industry we should long ago have lost this war. This kind of war industry, however, must, after peace, become relatively small, while millions of our fellowcountrymen will stream back into Germany from the trenches without

finding sufficient work there and, in any case, wages corresponding to the enormously increased prices of the necessaries of life. Imagine, if we simultaneously had to bear the burden of taxation which must fall on every German, even the poor-for the greatest exaction from property would not be sufficient even remotely to meet it—and further, if, in spite of the fallen value of German money, we must still buy the most necessary raw materials and food supplies from abroad, notwithstanding all the political and other hindrances which the situation would produce for all! Can anyone in his heart of hearts really believe that under these circumstances, without an increase of power, without indemnity, without security, we could avoid Germany's ruin? (Admiral Tirpitz in December, 1917, London Weekly Times, December 7, 1917.) The economic weapon must in the case of Germany work in part through a grinding process of attrition, in part through a quickening among Germans of the desire for peace and in part through an increase of their fear of the inevitable economic penalties of prolonging hostilities. It will gradually persuade them to pay a higher price for the opportunity of negotiating; and in the end this price can be raised to any reasonable figure any figure, that is, which does not deprive them subsequently of the essentials of national security and growth. (The New Republic, November 17, 1917.)

How far has this position been taken by English opinion which advocated the Paris Resolutions as a measure of reprisal? (See recent speeches of Lloyd George and the British Labor Party's memorandum on War Aims. International Conciliation, No. 123.)

What would have been the prospect of carrying out successfully the programme of the Paris Resolutions?

Is it possible for the Allies to accept or consider "the German invitation, so bluntly held out to them by the Chancellor, to enter into negotiations on the basis of bargaining for territory in exchange for economic concessions?"

Or are the Allied peace terms “absolute, which admit of no bargaining?"

Is it possible for the Allies to "invite the Central Powers to make peace by a certain date and threaten them with post-war economic reprisals varying in duration or intensity according to the length of their subsequent resistance?" (Quotations from 'The Economic Weapon', The New Europe, October 4, 1917, which answers the last question in the negative.)

Arguing for another economic conference to consider the post-war situation, The New Europe says, however, that "it should be made clear to the Central Powers that when they have accepted the Allied terms, including, of course, full reparation by the guilty parties for the ravages of war and acts done in violation of international law, there is no desire to penalize them further or to hinder their recuperation. Their peoples should be offered, under these conditions, a proportionate share in the controlled supplies and ensured against any legal restriction upon their legitimate trading activities at the expiration of the period of trade control. No pledge or action by Governments, of course, can give back to the German trading community the confidence of individual dealers or purchasers in the countries they have antagonized." (October 4, 1917.)

Should the protectionist movement after the war have purely an economic and not a political motive?

What attitude should be taken by Governments toward the export of capital to "backward countries?"

See Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold (Bell) and A League of Nations, Chap. IX ('The Economics of Peace'); Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (Holt); and Hobson, The New Protectionism (Putnam), Towards International Government (Allen and Unwin), and 'The Open Door' in Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan).

Is Mr. Wilson's proposal consistent with the programme of the League to Enforce Peace providing for the joint use of economic and military force?

What are some of the difficulties of using a boycott as a substitute for war?

What would be your own feeling if an international boycott were applied to the United States, in a case in which you believed the United States to be in the right?

What measure could be taken to prevent a boycotted country from taking up arms and precipitating the appeal to arms which the boycott is proposed to prevent?

Do you share the view of the importance of selfish economic motives in politics that underlies such suggestions as the boycott as a means of preventing war?

Are your own political actions motived exclusively, or chiefly, by considerations of private economic interest?

What are the possibilities of an international commission charged with the supervision of international economic questions arising out of the war?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BRAILSFORD, The War of Steel and Gold (Bell).
BRAILSFORD, A League of Nations (Macmillan).
HOBSON, The New Protectionism (Putnam).

HOBSON, Towards International Government (Allen and Unwin).

Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan).

European Economic Alliances (National Foreign Trade Council).

American Journal of International Law.

Congressional Record.

Current History.

International Conciliation.

The Fortnightly Review.

The New Europe.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

Count Hertling in his speech of January 24, 1918, declared that

"The idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable. The financial position of all European States after the war might most effectively promote a satisfactory solution." Count von Bernstorff in December, 1916, said that “it is Germany's desire, if the belligerents should enter upon a discussion of peace, to confer upon the question of the limitation of armaments. The Ambassador adds that in view of the German Government, a lasting peace can be accomplished only by reducing the armaments of Europe to a scale lower than that which obtained before the war. A rider is added to this statement that Germany views the international coalitions which existed before the war as objectionable, and as opposed to the maintenance of Peace." (London Daily News, December 16, 1916.)

Are the difficulties in the way of limiting armaments insuperable?

What methods might be employed (e. g., reduction of the term of service in national armies, naval holidays, etc.)?

Would the agreement, if arrived at, have to be under the direction of an international commission?

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