MOREL, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy (Labor Press). Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan). American Political Science Review. Atlantic Monthly. Contemporary Review. Council for Study of International Relations. North American Review. The Nation (New York). The New Europe. II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants. The "freedom of the seas" has apparently given Germany great concern. It is stressed by von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech of November 9, 1916; it is included in the proposals for peace communicated to American newspapers, April 18, 1915, by Dr. Bernhard Dernberg: "The world is one interlocking family of nations. World dominion is possible only with dominion on high seas. All the seas and narrows must be neutralized permanently by common and effective agreement guaranteed by the Powers." (Toward an Enduring Peace, p. 134.) Exactly what does Germany mean by her insistence on the "freedom of the seas?" Would Germany herself consider at the settlement that anything could be done to make the seas freer in time of peace than they were at the beginning of the war? Is it true that the discussion about freedom of the seas narrows to the question of restriction on trade between belligerents and neutrals in time of war? "Freedom of the seas" figured prominently in the exchanges between the United States and Germany over the submarine; President Wilson referred to it several times in addresses while the United States was a neutral: If the United States were permitted to initiate or assist in a movement for peace it would urge “a universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world. . At a banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, May 22, 1916.) And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and coöperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it. It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the coöperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. (Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.) What is the connection between the freedom of the seas as advocated by Mr. Wilson and the position of the United States that private property should be immune from naval capture? (Cf. Mr. Wilson's proposal and the suggestion of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace that "to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments the right of capture will be abolished and the freedom of the sea assured." For the 'Minimum Programme' of the Central Organization, see Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace [ Allen & Unwin ], p. 63, and Andrews, 'The Central Organization for a Durable Peace', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1916, p. 16.) As the United States has for many years advocated the exemption of all private property not contraband of war from hostile treatment, you are authorized to propose to the Conference the principle of ex tending to strictly private property at sea the immunity from destruction or capture by belligerent powers which such property already enjoys on land as worthy of being incorporated in the permanent law of civilized nations. (Instructions to the American delegates to the First Hague Peace Conference.) For the efforts of the United States in support of this proposal, before 1899 and at the Hague Conferences, and for the policy of such a departure as affecting the interests of the United States and Great Britain, see 'Cosmos', The Basis of Durable Peace (Scribner), p. 29 ff.; Scott, The Two Hague Peace Conferences (Johns Hopkins Press), vol. I, Chapter XV; Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (Macmillan), pp. 306-321; Moore, Digest of International Law (Government Printing Office), vol. VII, Sec. 1198; Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy (Boston Book Co.), pp. 63-70, 172-179; Choate, 'Immunity from Capture of Unoffending Property of the Enemy upon the High Seas', American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference (Ginn), pp. 1-25 (also published as a pamphlet of the World Peace Foundation, February-March, 1914); Hirst, 'The Capture and Destruction of Commerce at Sea', International Conciliation, November, 1910; Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (Harper) and The Interest of America in Sea Power (Little, Brown). For a statement of the readiness of the British Government to consider proposals looking toward the immunity of private property from capture, see Sir Edward Grey's remarks in the House of Commons, April 1, 1913, and May 6, 1914. How far was the Declaration of London a partial expression of the policy? For authorities see Bentwick, The Declaration of London, and Scott, 'The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909', American Journal of International Law, April and July, 1914. To what extent is it fair to accuse England of having used her naval supremacy in a way corresponding to Germany's "mailed fist?" (e.g., in the Napoleonic Wars and at the time of the blockade of the Confederate ports during the American Civil War.) See Egerton, British Foreign Policy in Europe (Macmillan); Piggott, The Neutral Merchant (University of London Press). For the restrictions by England on neutral trade in the present war, see Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War (Yale); Phillipson, International Law and the Great War (Dutton); numerous editorials and articles in the American Journal of International Law; Corbett, The League of Peace and a Free Sea (Doran). Mr. Wilson's reference to "freedom of the seas" is to be welcomed on the ground of its lucidity and breadth of definition . . . No other formula that we have seen meets so fully the stipulations that an island Power like Great Britain is bound to make to insure its own safety and that of the Empire in time of war. It seems to be a natural corollary of a League of Nations that freedom of navigation must be denied any nation that violates international covenants for the maintenance of peace. (British Labor Manifesto endorsing Mr. Wilson's address, January 9, 1918.) Would Mr. Wilson want Great Britain and the United States to relinquish their control of the sea without its being handed over to a League of Nations? On the handling of naval power by a League of Nations see Angell, The World's Highway (Doran); Sidebotham, "The Freedom of the Seas' in Towards a Lasting Settlement and Atlantic Monthly, August, 1916; Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). A blockade of the North Sea ought not to be regarded as legitimate. Those who desire the freedom of the seas must insist that there is some sea-power in existence which can effectively limit England's sole supremacy. Therefore, it is of the first importance for us that there should be no hindrance to the strengthening of our fleet. We used to say before the war that our fleet could protect our oversea trade and possessions. This task it has not fulfilled in the present war but we see the need to protect our coasts and provide a secure base for our submarines. The submarine weapon must not be struck out of our hand. It is the most effective help in war against a superior sea power, and the increased risks and uncertainties that it involves are well calculated to prevent the outbreak of war. The submarine is the warship of the small Power. So long as England maintains her supremacy it is indispensable to us. (Europäische Staats- und Wirtschaftszeitung, June 2, 1917, quoted in The New Europe, August 9, 1917.) Must measures be taken as part of the settlement to confine the use of the submarine to war vessels alone? Can there ever be freedom of the seas while the submarine is used against commerce? Would it be proper for a League of Nations to use the submarine against merchant vessels? See Minor, 'The Rule of Law Which Should Govern the Conduct of Submarines with Reference to Enemy and Neutral Merchant Vessels and the Conduct of Such Vessels Toward Submarines', Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1916; Rogers, America's Case against Germany (Dutton) and authorities there cited; and Bellot, 'The Submarine Menace', Contemporary Review, August, 1917. It would, however, be highly important for the freedom of shipping in the future if strongly fortified naval bases or important international trade routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hongkong, the Falkland Islands, and many other places, were removed. (Count Hertling, January 24, 1918.) Discuss this suggestion: The necessity for naval vessels will continue, but among the policies that will be approved in the peace conference that will follow the war there should be incorporated a provision guaranteeing an international navy to enforce international decrees. To this international navy, composed of separate naval establishments of all nations, each nation should contribute in proportion to its wealth and population, or upon some plan to insure that no nation can safely challenge the decree of the high international court . . . It would be a lasting calamity if, when this war ends, there should linger as a burden upon a people already heavily taxed by wars a competitive programme of costly naval construction. This country will, no doubt, take its proper place in bringing about such provisions in the peace treaties as will never again constrain any nation to adapt its naval programme to the programme of some other nation from which there is the compelling menace of possible and unprovoked attack. Such compulsion is the very negative of natural and orderly development. It means the tyranny of a programme dictated by apprehension rather than the free choice of a standard suggested by national needs and supported by national ideals. An international navy, on the contrary, will make possible such naval development as each nation deems fitting for its own people. It will also serve the "parliament of man" by providing a naval force ample enough to give validity to international decrees, and strong enough to keep inviolate the peace of the world. (From the report of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress, December, 1917.) |