C. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SETTLEMENT The United States is not a party to the treaty, signed at London, September 5, 1914, pledging Great Britain, France, and Russia not to conclude peace separately and promising "that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies." (See Current History, December 8, 1914, p. 297.) Japan later acceded to the treaty. Semi-officially it is stated that the United States looks on the Entente Powers as "co-belligerents" rather than "allies"; that there is a "gentleman's agreement" rather than a formal document. Every one of the nations at war with Germany took up arms for some specific reason that can be briefly, if incompletely, stated: Russia to save Serbia; Italy to secure territory from Austria, partly for the latter country's breach of the terms of the Triple Alliance; Great Britain to defend Belgium and protect France; Belgium, France, and Serbia to protect themselves. The use of the submarine against merchant vessels was the one offense that served to associate the United States with the Entente nations. But as Viscount Grey has said: Militarism stands for things that all democracies, if they wish to remain free and to be part of a world that is free, must hate. This conviction and a sense that the old barriers of the world are broken down by modern conditions, that the cause of humanity is one, and that no nation so great and free as the United States could stand aside in this crisis without sacrificing its honor and losing its soul, are so we believe the real motive and cause of the decision of the United States. Democracies are reluctant to take such decisions until they are attacked or until their own material interests are directly and deeply involved, and the United States did not take the decision till German action in the War made it imperative; but then they took it with a clearness, an emphasis, and a declaration of principle that will be one of the landmarks and shining examples of all human history. (The Rt. Hon. Viscount Grey, America and Freedom [ Preface ], p. iv. [Allen & Unwin]; reprinted, International Conciliation, No. 120, November, 1917, p. 24.) (President Wilson's series of addresses to Congress, February 3 and 26 and April 2, 1917, should be read in this connection.) How far did the United States, by entering the war, approve the war aims of the Allies as expressed in the replies to the German note (December, 1916) and President Wilson's note? Compare the views expressed by the Allies and Mr. Wilson. Would the United States be justified as a late comer into the war, owing much to England and France for keeping Germany at bay for more than two years, in using her influence against the realization of certain war aims generally said to be fundamental, e. g., the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France? How far can the United States claim the right to be consulted on war aims covered by the formula "restitution and reparation?" How far are the war aims of the Allies inconsistent with Mr. Wilson's more recent formula (February 11, 1918)? How far is the United States bound to support readjustments which go farther than merely inaugurating a League of Nations as one form of international insurance? Should the United States be a party to all phases of the settlement, even those that do not remotely concern her by menacing her security in the future? D. PRESIDENT WILSON'S DIPLOMACY I. President Wilson's attempt to create a rift between the German military party on the one hand and the German people and Austria-Hungary on the other is his distinctive contribution to the diplomacy of the Allies. An appeal to democratic elements in Germany is particularly made in the reply to the Pope but appears in all of Mr. Wilson's utterances on the war; the same appeal to Austria-Hungary to free herself from Prussian domination is the basis of the address to Congress asking for a declaration of war against Austria (Current History, January, 1918, p. 63) and the address on Count Czernin's speech (February 11, 1918; see below, E). The distinction between the Germans and their government is officially echoed to some small extent in England by Mr. Balfour's phrase that Germany must either become powerless or free and by Mr. Lloyd George's recent speeches which imply that more moderate terms could be made with a democratized Germany. The various declarations of the British Labor Party are more explicit. (See President Wilson's Flag Day speech, June 14, 1917, Current History, July, 1917, p. 1, and the British Labor Platform, Current History, February, 1918, p. 200; also International Conciliation, No. 123.) At Buffalo (November 13, 1917), addressing the American Federation of Labor, Mr. Wilson went out of his way to pay a tribute to the German people: I believe that the spirit of freedom can get into the hearts of Germans and find as fine a welcome there as it can find in any other hearts, but the spirit of freedom does not suit the plans of the Pan-Germans. (Current History, December, 1917, p. 441.) The theoretical distinction between the German Government and the German People is sound enough, but we cannot help thinking that up to the present it has proved quite negligible in practice. Wilson is right in a sense when he says that the German people "did not choose the War." They did not choose it because, under the Bismarckian Constitution, they have no choice at all in such high matters, but they accepted it with enthusiasm. They have given it throughout their active support. Their representatives have voted with unanimity supplies for its continuance. (The London Times, commenting on President Wilson's reply to the Pope; see also, Brig. Gen. F. G. Stone, 'At War with the German People', Nineteenth Century, August, 1917.) Admitting the correctness of the position here taken, does it lessen the chances for success of Mr. Wilson's policy? What are the chances for the success of such a policy? When Mr. Wilson distinguishes between the German Government and the German People is he calling attention to an actual fact or is he simply looking toward the future? Would a Germany "free" be a lesser menace to the future peace of the world than a Germany "powerless"? Would a Germany in which the people had an effective control over foreign policy, the army, and the navy likely be "imperialistic" or "militaristic"? Can the Prussian military domination be utterly and finally destroyed a frequently reiterated Entente war aim-until the German people insist upon its being destroyed? The following books may be found of some help: Ackerman, Germany, the Next Republic (Doran); Fernau, The Coming Democracy (Dutton); Liebknecht, Militarism (Huebsch); Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (Doran); Curtin, The Land of Deepening Shadow (Doran); and Beer, The English Speaking Peoples (Macmillan), p. 129. II. Mr. Wilson is also very largely responsible for the fact that the discussion of war aims is public, not secret. In his own phrase: The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all Governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in the midday hour of the world's life. (Address to Congress, December 4, 1917.) How far did Mr. Wilson's note of December 22, 1916, calling for a statement of war aims from all the belligerents, strengthen the diplomatic position of the Entente Allies and force the hand of Germany? How far have Mr. Wilson's utterances since the United States entered the war-for example his message to Russia (May 26, 1918; Current History, July, p. 49)-influenced Allied diplomacy? Are the so-called German "peace-offensives" with their use of diplomacy as the hand-maiden of military offensives-in consonance with the quotation from Mr. Wilson's December (1917) message? BIBLIOGRAPHY ACKERMAN, Germany, the Next Republic (Doran). Current History. Nineteenth Century and After. |